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The Essence Of Right

THE NATURE OF RIGHT:
ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH DUTY

223. The principle of Right is the first object of research in jural philosophy. This principle is simply the most general idea of right. Any principle, in fact, is only an idea considered in its aptitude for being applied.(146)The idea, or concept, contains the essence of some thing:(147) the idea or concept of right contains and makes known the nature and essence of right. This essence, when known and capable of being seen, can be recognised in those actions which share in it. In other words, rights can be derived from their principle. The concept of any thing is also expressed in the things definition. Our first aim, therefore, is to define right; we shall then subject the definition to analysis; and finally we shall compare right with duty and establish the relationship between them.

CHAPTER 1

The definition of right

224. Common sense maintains and always has maintained that right is different from force. Often it goes so far as to see opposition between force and right Force is sometimes employed to defend right and sometimes to violate it.

When brute force is used to oppress human beings who possess right per se, other people show an extraordinary interest in the matter. From that moment on, right appears to shine with unusual splendour. It triumphs, in fact, because it renders itself immune to violent action. It acts as an immortal entity, out of reach of all material power which tries in vain to touch it. All the efforts made by material force are excluded from the high, spiritual sphere where right has its home. In a word, right, no less than duty, is an ideal, moral entity whose source has to be found where we find the source of duty, that is, where in fact we find will and law. Will is the power through which, by acknowledging the objects which present themselves to our understanding, we either adhere to them and thus fulfil our duty, or disavow them. Two terms have to be distinguished in the volitive power: the principle of action, which is the will or subject (human being) it self, and the term of action, that is, the objects set before the subject.

225. As we have seen in discussing the Moral System, law begins to shine in us from objects when their exigency manifests itself to our intelligence. Law is itself the exigency; law is duty intimated to us; and the science of duty is called morals. Pleasure comes from the subject, of which it is a modification; and the science of pleasure is what we have called eudaimonology. Pleasure taken in its broadest sense as eudaimonological good constitutes right when it is protected by law emanating from the object.

226. To find the distinct, accurate definition of right, and all the elements which compose it, we have to meditate and analyse the act of will that contains in itself the source of right and the source of duty. Let us do this as carefully as we can.

227. When we recollect ourselves in order to contemplate an object, we say willingly, without any hesitation or withdrawal on the part of the will: `This object is beautiful, good, worthy and precious. And our act is just if the object is the same when we affirm it as when we apprehend it. In this case, our soul, undisturbed by bitterness arising from a desire for something which would hinder its full assent to the object, sees the object and fixes its attention entirely upon its beauty, goodness, worth and excellence (which every object possesses in some way). As a result, the soul experiences delight and enjoyment in the object. This delight rises within the soul from an intimate, hidden law which links the intellective soul to being, to the whole of being and to every entity. We call this love `appreciative because it is an affection carried over from the act of esteem with which we judge some thing favourably and willingly.(148)

228. Nevertheless, the act of simple, willed acknowledgment has a nature distinct from such enjoyment, which follows and springs from this act as heat does from light. Knowing is the proper act of the intellect. Its effect in the soul, the subject of the intellective potency, is joy or delight on account of the known object. The subject, in so far as it is susceptible of such feelings, is called spirit, heart, and so on.

229. We have to note, however, that the subject or the soul does not experience a pleasurable feeling only from its union with acknowledged objects; it draws pleasure also from the use of any of its powers which achieves the end for which it exists. The presence of an object is sufficient, therefore, for the soul to experience enjoyment, but an intellective subject is necessary if intellectual enjoyment is to be present, that is, enjoyment springing from the light and good present in things which have been understood. All enjoyment begins and ends, therefore, within the subject; enjoyment is so simple that it has no terms, but perfect unicity. All knowledge, on the other hand, bears the subject into an object outside the subject itself. Consequently, it has two terms, the knower and that which is known.

230. This proves that the simple act of acknowledgement does not depend on the delight that succeeds it, but on the energy proper to a will freely obeying the exigency manifested by objects which, in this way, impose law upon the will. But while the intelligent subject is thus morally necessitated to humble itself and as it were depend upon objects which make themselves known and which it cannot change, it benefits from its subjection and spontaneous passivity. It achieves its own perfection by adhering to beings themselves through the act of knowledge, through reception of the truth, and through carrying out the law. But there is no physical coercion in all this; hence the presence of moral freedom.

231. Moral freedom arises from the opposition between object and subject. The latter, as subject, without reference to the law that it receives from the object, is guided by instinct; the former on the contrary imposes a law on the subject by prescribing a way of action which conforms to what is true, but without any reference to instinct as instinct. Both instinct and law, each in its own way, determine human actions, but the determination brought about by instinct often finds itself in opposition to the determination imposed by the law. One determination collides with the other and remains suspended, as it were. At this point, the human being is not necessitated by either determination. He can choose, making use of one or other of the two determining principles. And this is freedom.

232. Because the law is inflexible, we always feel morally obliged by it, but without physical constraint. Nevertheless, the obligation itself, felt continually through the unceasing stimulation provided by its relentless voice, provokes and strengthens us to act rightly. The germ of moral force within us is first our feeling of duty and then our consciousness of it.

233. This force or moral energy belongs to each one of us. It is we ourselves who, as intelligent subjects, act contrary to ourselves as feeling subjects. The subject has become `person; `person stands opposed to the merely instinctive subject. And we ourselves are that person.(149) We are the authors, therefore, of what we do, and of the praise or blame, the merit or demerit, of our actions. We have real governance over what we do, and must take account of this governance as an element of right.

234. Indeed, the concept of right supposes in the first place a person, the author of his own actions. If a body moves, the action adheres to the body, but the body cannot be called its author. Body is passive; it neither wants to act, nor knows how to act. It does not act; action is done in it. The laws of motion of body are fixed; they depend upon its nature, but this nature does not depend upon ITSELF. Its motion does not proceed from ITSELF because ITSELF does not exist. And in the last analysis, even the actions of brute animals are not proper to their subject. The instinct determining these actions does not depend upon the subject, but upon the nature of the subject which has been constituted by the author of the universe. In order that beings may be called authors of their own actions, it is necessary for THEMSELVES to do these actions. THEY THEMSELVES exist only if they know and they will in a word, if they are persons.(150)</ P>

235. Freedom this governance with which we posit and rule our actions is however a de facto, but not yet a de jure seigniory. Although we possess freedom, by means of which we can determine our actions in favour of, or against the law, we act badly every time we make use of freedom to determine actions in opposition to the law, and we act well every time we make use of it to determine them according to the law. This is what we call moral good and evil. We have physical freedom, therefore, but not yet truly moral freedom, which is present only when freedoms actions are in accordance with the limits defined by the moral law.

236. Moral freedom, therefore, is that part of physical freedom which is not restricted by the moral law. This is not only de facto freedom but also freedom de jure. And it is here, in moral freedom, that right, whose notion we were seeking, begins to appear. Absolutely and properly speaking, we cannot have a true right to do an action forbidden by the moral law (and by moral law we mean any law which morally obliges). The reason is clear: what is wrong cannot be right. But this is not sufficient. We have to add that the word right indicates something over and above what is simply licit. It indicates not simple freedom, but a certain authority or governance to act, which of its nature involves a relationship with other people. This relationship is formed by the moral law itself which simultaneously grants freedom of action to a person and prohibits others from interfering with that action.

237. Our definition of right may, therefore, be expressed in the way we noted in the Introduction. Right is a moral governance or authority to act, or: right is a faculty to do what we please, protected by the moral law which obliges others to respect that faculty.

Notes

(146) OT, 570-573.

(147) OT, 646.

(148) I have no intention of abandoning the ancient distinction between love and joy. For me, love is the tendency to good, and joy is contentment in the possession of what is good. My sole comment is that human beings must first acknowledge what is good as good before they can tend towards possession of it. Simply by acknowledging it as such, they rejoice in it from afar. Delight in love is one thing, therefore; delight in joy properly so-called is another. The first kind of delight comes from simple contemplation of what is good; the second from its complete, real possession. The intellective soul unites itself to its objects either through the species which informs the soul's knowledge if the real object is not per se intelligible, or through real, immediate union if it is per se intelligible. -

The ancients attributed love even to inanimate things. This would be only a metaphorical way of expressing things in our manner of speaking. For the ancients, however, it had real meaning because of their definition of love. They called love `unitive force', a definition inherent to the etymology of the word. At the very beginning of philosophy, `love' was properly used of physical love, and metaphorically of moral love. This is a constant, regulatory law in the use of words which were first invented to express physical things such as the attraction of bodies. Their use was then extended metaphorically to embrace spiritual things, for example, the attraction and union of spirits. Finally, the first meaning was forgotten; words were reserved to signify spiritual things alone, for which they became proper. Unless I am mistaken, this is the history of the meanings of the words to love, love, etc., and of the word sin. Cf. vol. 4, Opere morali, pp. 19 3-196.

(149) The teaching on personship has been set out by me in AMS, bk 4, to which I refer the reader.

(150) This teaching is admitted by all. Nevertheless, no one, as far as I know, has realised how pregnant it is with ontological consequences. The proposition, `There are no true causes other than intelligent causes', when considered carefully, is sufficient to rectify the common manner of thinking about external nature and of conceiving its powers.

Chapter 2