Moral System
Section 2 - II.
The principles of pleasure, utility and happiness
148. Similar to Spinozas principle is that of Epicurus, who made pleasure the supreme principle of human actions. But nothing cleverly thought or said to justify this principle frees it from the force of the objections against Spinozas principle.
I have said that we feel pleasure when we follow the truth. But the question consists in knowing whether pleasure is the object to which we must direct our attention when acting. Pleasure, whether corporal or spiritual, is always something relative to us; truth, as we have already pointed out, demands our assent with a force totally independent of ourselves. This force is eternal, proper to truth itself, and we in our insignificance are nothing compared with it. We cannot change anything in it, no matter how much pain or pleasure urges us to do so. We can know what is painful, but things do not cease to be true simply because they are painful, nor do they diminish our obligation to acknowledge them for what they are. Troublesome things can indeed cause us pain in so far as they are troublesome; at the same time they give us a certain peace in so far as they are fully acknowledged by us as true. To put it briefly, we feel an obligation to acknowledge them not because individually or collectively they bring us peace, but because each carries the message: `I am true. Behold me, and acknowledge me.
149. It is self-evident that we must follow good, but we cannot therefore conclude that we must follow subjective good. The proposition is true only when it refers to good in itself, that is, it is the nature of the apprehended object which obliges human beings, not their own pleasure or utility. Explained in this way, the teaching that `human beings must follow good is no different from my own teaching, because all natures are good in so far as they are conceivable.
150. The principle which Burlamachi and others re-elaborated and re-presented is ultimately that of happiness. It was defended in two ways: either 1. by saying that happiness and the supreme good are the same, or 2. by appealing to the instinct of human nature, which amounts to the same thing.(94) In answer to the first of these explanations, I say that what is good in itself is indeed our good. But must we follow it because it is good in itself, or because it is our good? the whole problem lies here.
The obligation originates from the object in such a way that even relative to those for whom the truth is the greatest torment, that is, for the devils in hell, there is an equal obligation to respect and love it; these condemned spirits are tormented precisely by the ceaseless force of this obligation.
151. Instinct certainly moves us, but it does not oblige us to move. Sometimes it will direct us to carrying out what we are in any case obliged to do. But even if it opposed the carrying out of our obligation, we would still remain obliged. The obligation therefore does not depend on our inclination or aversion to carrying out the obligation. Finally, an upright instinct can certainly make the Creators will known to us when we consider the instinct as coming from him and as a sign of the end he has put before all his creatures. Here instinct is simply an indication for discovering the source of the obligation and cannot constitute the obligation itself.
152. When Carneades tried to demonstrate that justice did not exist, he took as the basis of his seductive reasoning the argument that if justice existed, its principle would have to be utility. Granted this, he was certain his argument could not be refuted. It ran as follows: the principle of justice is constituted either by our own or by anothers utility. If it is our own, we are simply aware of acting for our own advantage. If it is anothers, we are simply acting stupidly, because we would often harm ourselves by helping others, and would foolishly put anothers utility before our own!(95)
Notes
(94) Aware of the weakness of the principle of utility, many authors have turned to instinct but failed to notice that they have not changed the principle, only the way of demonstrating it. In the first case, utility is sought as a result of counsel from reason; in the second, as a result of the inclination of nature. If utility were to be a good foundation for justice, following it by reason would certainly be more worthy than following it by blind instinct. Buchanan is one of these authors, cf. his Dialogue, De iure regni apud Scotos. In the dialogue he objects that his opponent had proposed utility as the first and supreme conciliator among human beings: `If somebody wants an explanation for his own utility, don't you see that utility would divide rather than unite society?'
His opponent replies; `That is perhaps true. But I would like to know what other source there is of human fellowship.' Buchanan answers: `The other source is a certain power of nature present not only in human beings but in the more gentle of other animals. Even if the blandishments of utility were absent, they would freely associate with animals of the same kind, etc.' But the origin of this inclination of animals to associate with others of the same kind can only be the pleasure they experience. The inclination arises therefore from some good or utility of their own which they draw from the association although, because instinct is blind, they do not know this.
(95) Carneadis summa disputationis haec fuit: Jura sibi homines pro utilitate sanxisse, scilicet varia pro moribus, et apud eosdem pro temporibus saepe mutata; jus autem naturale esse nullum. Omnes et homines et alias animantes ad utilitates suas natura ducente ferri; proinde aut nullum esse justitiam, aut si sit aliqua, summam esse stultitiam, quoniam sibi noceret alienis commodis consulens (Lactantius, bk. 5, c. 16). — It is noticeable how the word `nature', granted its many meanings, is always open to sophistry. One of the false arguments used by Carneades, as we can see in Cicero (De Rep., 3: 11), to annihilate natural law rested upon the opinion that nature is constant and does not manifest variety. It is indeed true that nature is constant, if by nature we mean the essences of things, but not true if we mean subsistent things themselves. These are forever changing and altering, disintegrating and renewing themselves.