Moral System
Section 2 - VII.
The principle of charity in a wise person
158. Considerations like these led Leibniz to place the principle of morality in the wisdom of a totally good nature and to define justice as `charity in a wise person.
I do not know whether, after so many outstanding authors, we have the notions of right and justice sufficiently clear. Right is a moral power; obligation a moral necessity. By `moral I understand the same as `natural in a good human being. The Roman lawyer says so well that we must believe we are quite unable to do anything contrary to good behaviour. Furthermore, the good human being is the one who loves all human beings to the extent indicated by reason. Justice, therefore, which is the controlling virtue of the affection the Greeks call filanqrwpian, can fittingly be defined (if I am not deceived) as charity in the wise person, that is, charity which follows the dictates of wisdom.(102)
The search for the principle by which justice springs up in human beings has passed from the force of nature to the force of instinct; from instinct to common utility; from utility to common will; from common will to force and the will of a superior, and from the arbitrary will of a superior to the wise will of a benevolent human being.
159. This last idea of Leibniz is certainly nearest the truth. This admirable man would surely have perfected his noble thought if he had gone on from wisdom to the very objects of wisdom, that is, to the nature of things, which demands acknowledgement and respect from our minds. He did not take this step, and consequently his teaching remains doubtful. By saying that justice `is the virtue which orders benevolence according to the dictates of wisdom, he leaves himself open to the criticism that his definition is a vicious circle because it is justice itself that indicates what wisdom must suggest to benevolence. Thus, the definition becomes: `Justice is the virtue which directs benevolence according to the dictates of justice.
It is true that he defines wisdom as the `knowledge of happiness. But we can ask whether this happiness must be understood in accordance with the dictates of justice and as an effect of justice. If not, we fall back into the system of utility. Nor can it be said that the greatest happiness is justice itself. If we imagined that in the just human being there had to be enough wisdom to calculate the greatest happiness obtainable in the universe, nobody could ever be just without infinite wisdom. On the contrary we could be certain of deceiving ourselves when calculating the happiness we obtain both for ourselves and for others. Following such a system we could in fact convince ourselves of acting according to the norm of the science of happiness in performing an unjust act to save a multitude of unfortunate people from disaster.
160. Leibniz cannot deny this supposition if he wishes to be coherent with his principles. According to the system that he laid down with great ingenuity in his Theodicy, nothing happens except for the greatest good, the greatest happiness of intelligent beings. It is therefore impossible for human beings ever to act contrary to the science of universal happiness. If they had to follow this science alone and possessed infinite wisdom, they would act according to the principles of Leibnizs theodicy, as they do at the moment, whether they act justly or unjustly. In the great calculation their acts would be part of the totally good order of the universe. In the vision of wisdom, which shows how maximum happiness is to be established in the universe, even their mistakes and perversities would be necessary.
161. For us to be just therefore it is not sufficient that our benevolence be guided by knowledge of happiness; it must properly be guided by the science of justice, which is essentially different from happiness. If I wish to attain the science of happiness, I have to know an infinite number of things. On the other hand the science of justice is simple, and I acquire it when things are presented to me for the first time. It does not come to birth with science but with truth, and begins by commanding me to acknowledge truth as soon as the latter shines on me.
Notes
(102) Dissertatio de Actorum publicorum usu, atque de principiis Juris naturae et Gentium, §11. The passage is found at the beginning of Part 1 of the Cod. Diplom. delle Genti etc.