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Rights in Civil Society - Section Two
Part Three

Conclusion

Social Right

2674. I shall add nothing more to the conclusion of this work on the special Right governing civil association. Instead, I shall bring together the threads of the various volumes in which I have divided and examined briefly, as far as I could, the whole of the philosophy of social Right. These threads of thought will be united under a single heading and, as it were, bound together: the heading is the majesty of the Creator.

In fact, every right receives its authority and its unshakeable consistency from God himself. This authority is made known to us by reason and divine revelation. Reason shows us the divine authority of the moral law and of Right both directly and indirectly. Directly, in the self-evident principle of the moral law, that is, BEING AS MANIFESTATIVE OF ESSENCES, to which we can assent (moral good) or from which we can dissent (moral evil); indirectly, when we first know through reason that the essence itself of Being is alive in the fullest sense of the word, and wills itself eternally, and then, second, know that assenting to manifestative Being means assenting to the supreme will, just as assenting to the supreme will means assenting to manifestative Being. The moral law which we know directly is, therefore, divine; its indirect consequences share in divine authority itself (with the result that every right is divine); on right is founded not only the prosperous state of human societies, but also their existence and all the powers that rule them. How praiseworthy, therefore, the wisdom of ancient Rome which asserted with such good sense: `A city is bounded more securely by religion than by its own walls.'(465)

2675. The social atheism of our own times is very different; it reveals itself as unfounded, totally ignorant nonsense. It also shows its petty narrowness of mind when it maintains, as some authors do, that rulers have their authority from divine Right, and that the divinity of right is restricted to protecting the civil power or, even more narrowly, the thrones of civil rulers. They mean that this power alone comes from God, and clutter up with ambiguities and interminable questions the entire science of human rights, from the clarity of which ensues peace, from the obscurity and confusion of which comes war upon the world. The abuse of the phrase `divine right', subjugated to the service of rulers, both deprives many other powers of their legitimate value, and throws together confusedly in a single concept that which comes from God through the divine light of reason, and that which comes from God positively, that is, the authorities of the Church of the Redeemer. Divine Right, in the proper and common sense of the word, pertains only to these authorities.

2676. The abuse of this divine right, exclusively used by some writers to maintain human sovereignty, is very strange. Authors use it to cut, but not untie, the knot of the most difficult and important socio-jural questions. To know that the power of rulers, like every other lawful power, comes from God, seems to mean, according to these writers, that we also know the jural title of this power.

It would seem odd to send these Europeans, and 19th century masters at that, to China for clarification of their ideas, to some very ancient disciples of Confucius, whose knowledge was extant centuries before Christ. But there they would learn that knowledge of power which comes from God does not dispense them from investigating its origin amongst human beings.

In fact, ancient Chinese philosophers taught in agreement with the whole of antiquity that civil rule comes from God, whom they called heaven; they also called the emperor the son of heaven. At the same time, they harmonised this teaching in the best possible way with that on jural, natural titles. The following dialogue between Wen Chang and Confucius' disciple, Mencius, is sufficient to illustrate the point:

This passage of a very ancient book clearly expresses the divine right of rulers. At the same time, it reconciles with this right the jural and natural rights in which God, the author of nature and reason, speaks and manifests his will.

2677. The titles of social rights lie in human nature. Indeed, this nature is, as it were, a complex of such titles. Human nature is essentially jural, essentially social.

2678. I do remember, of course, that I once wrote that the quality, `social', should not be put in the definition of human nature.(468) But I was speaking there of the individual. Here, I am speaking about society and human society. Human society leads us back to the species. Now it cannot be denied that the reason for every human society has to be found finally in the fact that many human beings are a single species subsisting in many individuals (RF, 1554). Let us grant also that some society of different species could be conceived through the identity of the intellectual good which they enjoy (RGC, 635-670). Nevertheless, human society possesses this as its own in a particular way; the quite special characteristic of human society is to place in communion human nature itself, the identical species.

2679. This explains why pagan sages, confined to nature, were unable to extend their vision beyond humanity, or scarcely beyond it. The foundation of their arguments about social life was the innate, human quality of sociableness, a quality based on the fact that each human being sees his own species in others; he see another self.(469) This unity of species which brings together individuals is truly the principle not of every society, but of every human society. In the most cultured nations of the ancient world, however, the City prevailed, and every human society was reduced to the City. The City became the source of justice precisely because all justice was reduced to the human justice included in human society. This explains why Plato, Aristotle and other sages made civil life the height of virtue, and considered political science as the continuation and apex of moral science. For us, enlightened by Christ, these are extremely limited, narrow concepts. Our mind goes out beyond the finite and human to associate with pure intelligences and enjoy the bliss of true society with God.

2680. Only by removing every limit to the association of intelligent natures is it possible to attain that concept of society which, stripped of every injustice, is totally full of justice. We have seen that every social element is an element of justice, that every limitation of society is accompanied by something unjust and that, as society extends, justice too is fulfilled.(470)

2681. Three societies are necessary for complete organisation of the human race (USR, 20). Of these, family society, which is the most natural, is also the most restricted, although this was not intended according to the first design of the Creator who provided a single father for the whole human race (RF, 994). That father became mortal, however, along with his children, and the great, single domestic society, which should have embraced the whole of mankind, was split into many divided families whose limitations and restrictions went on increasing.

2682. This separation and restriction of family societies gave rise to all that was unjust in the nature and tendencies of families — family selfishness, as we have called it. How could this intrinsic evil, this profound defect in the family, be removed? The family could not be extended beyond certain limits because nature would not allow this. All that remained was some kind of mediation between families. Hence the institution of civil society, a broader society, which would undertake such mediation and be responsible for healing the radical defect of the family.

Family pride, however, is untamed and ferocious. Every time civil society attempts to dress the wound, this pride, aggravated by deep pain, rises up in fury. Its only desire is to destroy its healer. The consequence is the obstinate, angry strife between domestic and civil society that we have described (cf. 1963-2016).

This war to the death would have ended with the destruction of both societies unless a third society, even more extensive than civil society, had appeared in the world in good time. This society, universal and extremely powerful, assumed in its turn the responsibility of mediation between civil and family societies which had come to blows, just as civil society had assumed responsibility for mediation amongst different family societies. This new, most widely extended society was Christianity.

The Church reconciled family and civil principles, rendered possible their co-existence and by saving them both brought them to such accord that they were of help to one another. Civil society completed its mission of mediatrix between families, and domestic society communicated its force and consistency to civil society.

This, however, was not sufficient. The universal society of Christ, (`theocracy', as we have called it), still had to fulfil the role of mediation between civil societies. These societies, although more extensive than family societies, were still confined within certain limits which added to their multiplicity and exclusiveness. This limitation became a source of injustice and war between them. Combat and strife would have torn them to pieces unless a more magnificent society had intervened to pacify them. This society was of its nature universal and totally just. It excluded no one, admitted all to its embrace, rendered justice to all alike, and gathered all to itself in its immense benevolence and beneficence.

Thus family society, no longer enclosed within domestic walls, was gradually perfected by civil society which in turn was perfected by the Church of JESUS Christ, a society not confined to a single place by mountains, rivers, seas or even human treaties and conventions. It spread all over the globe to humanity itself but, better still, is as universal as the truth, justice and charity of God himself. Thus, the perfect organisation of mankind is brought to completion.

2683. But has this great work of Providence truly been completed? Not yet, but it is being brought to fulfilment every day. Some idea of the progress made in this great work can be gained by noting how family selfishness has been put down and conquered forever. Yes, it still slithers around like a beheaded snake or like a hydra trying to grow heads again. But I regard it as overcome because it can never reassert itself to any great degree; civil society prevails and is always ready to humiliate it again. The first step, therefore, has been completed.

Now, however, civil society is itself puffed up by its victory. Selfishness has passed from families to nations. Our own time is a period of national selfishness which flourishes and increases, and invades everything. It thinks itself all-powerful, and becomes irritable and bitterly suspicious about anything that may temper it or rein it in. Nevertheless, it must be and will be refrained by the law of universal justice proper to theocratic society, and by the progress of universal charity incessantly preached by the Church of Christ. This second operation is still to be completed. Theocratic society does not want to destroy civil society, but root out the vice of selfishness that defiles it with injustice. In the same way, civil society did not want to destroy family society, but heal in it the same disease of even narrower selfishness.

Universal justice and universal love are the powerful remedies brought from heaven by the teacher of mankind who bears, written on his thigh, the words: `King of kings, and Lord of lords'. His medicine alone is capable of healing the nations.

There can be no doubt, therefore, of the importance of the philosophy of Right which we have outlined as best we could. Nor is its end uncertain. I repeat, civil society still has to grow towards perfection by befriending universal society (perfect, theocratic society) from which alone it can draw complete justice and attain purification from every spirit of injustice. To indicate the path to such a glorious rejuvenation of the nations, I have tried to determine the end within which civil society and its government must limit themselves, that is, `the regulation of the modality of rights.' It is only a little seed, but one that I entrust to the logic of time and to the charity of Christians. Charity will water it, and time will allow it to unfold. I have no doubt of this. And perhaps future generations will enjoy its fruits.

Notes

(465) Cicero, De Nat. Deor, 3: 40.

(466) Note here the characteristic which we used to discern lawful occupancy, that is, lack of jural resentment and tacit consent.

(467) Mencius, bk. 2, c. 3.

(468) Anthropology.

(469) This is how Cicero expresses the teaching in Latin: Nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit, ut habeat quiddam innatum quasi CIVILE ET POPULARE, quod Graeci politikon vocant: quidquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea, quam exposui, caritate atque SOCIETATE HUMANA non abhorrebit: vicissimque justitia, ut ipsa se fundet usu in ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet [Human nature is generated in such a way that something almost CIVIL AND POPULAR is innate to it. The Greeks call this politikon. Whatever any human capacity does, it has no dread of community and of that love and HUMAN SOCIETY which I have explained. The same is true about justice. Just as it comes forth in use through the other virtues, so it searches for them](De finib., 5: 23). Here the Greek word politikon, which corresponds to civil and popular, is obviously taken to mean `human society' which, in turn, is taken erroneously for every society, for that society which includes every other society.

(470) SP, 37-49.

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