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Rights in Civil Society - Part Four

Chapter 4

The final form to which modern civil societies tend

2064. Modern civil societies have a tendency to draw ever closer to their ideal, which we can summarise as follows:

Civil society will have attained its most perfect form when
1. Laws and governmental acts make no ordinances affecting the value of any rational right but regulate only the modality of all rational rights pertaining either to individuals or societies. In this way, maximum rational freedom is preserved.
2. All members of civil societies have perfect equality before these laws.(250)
3. The norms of rational Right are fully observed in respect of persons outside civil society.

2065. Granted this perfect form, the following goods are the immediate consequence:

1. The guarantee of all rights together with prompt, effective justice, equal for all.
2. Concurrence for all social and other goods, open equally to all, whether collective or individual persons. Hence:
3. The facility to improve one's fortune by rising through social levels and offices in proportion to one's greater suitability.(251)
4. The progressive development of every industry, of every kind of study, of intelligence, etc., and consequently: 5. The best possible moral-economic condition of the largest number of citizens who will certainly not lack the means to satisfy their primary needs.
6. A population balanced by production.
7. The maximum national force against external enemies.
8. The flourishing state of religion and of beneficent institutes which cater for any poor who might be deprived of the above-mentioned means.

2066. Careful consideration and unbiased discernment will show, I think, how these eight general goods follow, like necessary effects from their causes, the three laws of social justice in which we contemplate the ideal of civil society. This whole book explains this. Nevertheless I would like to add an observation about the connection between those goods and the three laws of the ideal civil system.

2067. First, we note that the three laws bring about civil society free from every seigniorial and family element. We respect these elements as a complex of rights, but not as a foundation of civil government.

2068. In fact, the first law, which allows civil government to dispose solely of the modality, not the value, of citizens' rights, is the opposite of the notion of seigniory, which disposes of the rights (of their value) over which seigniory extends.

2069. The second law, by indicating the equality before the law of all members of civil society, shows that an equal right has equal protection. This is the opposite of the notion of seigniory, which introduces the relationship of end and means between master and bond-servant, and demands privileges for the former which give him advantages over the latter. We must also note that demanding privileges in face of civil law pertains, properly speaking, not to the notion of seigniory but to the abuse and selfish spirit of seigniory.

2070. The third law, which requires that the norms of rational right be observed in respect of persons outside civil society, establishes the equality of all human beings before rational law. This is opposed more to unjust tyranny of all kinds than to just seigniory.

2071. Granted this, we see how the eight general goods, which must constitute the best civil state, proceed as necessary effects from the three laws or principles of the civil ideal.
If social government regulates properly the modality of all rights, all rights are guaranteed (the first general good), because defence of rights is the first purpose of regulation.

2072. If government regulates only the modality of rights without disposing of their value, all citizens enjoy concurrence for all social and extra-social goods, because their right of relative freedom (RI, 80-83, 273-281, 1667, 1673-1677) is maintained and guaranteed in all its extension (2nd general good).

2073. If no one is denied either active concurrence for a private concern or passive concurrence for public employment, the means for improving one's state are open to all. In the matter of private concerns and public employment, everyone is responsible for his own advancement by use of intelligence and diligence. Unless actual unsuitability is evident, the law excludes no one through bias. It is clear that society remains free to choose the most suitable of its citizens, whose choice is of concern to society.

2074. This concern to choose for office the most suitable citizens, independent of any other qualification, must suggest to society the appropriate means for discovering the actual suitability of the citizens to be chosen. Hence, the preservation of the full, relative-jural freedom of all citizens, and their equality before the law, brings in its wake the maximum facility, open to all, for improving their fortune (3rd general good).

2075. The relative freedom of everyone must be acknowledged as an intangible right that allows everyone completely free concurrence for every kind of work. Only an actual lack of real suitability can exclude a person from social responsibilities, not unfair laws or suitability presumed or invented by the law. Granted these conditions, it is clear that the result will inevitably be the most natural, extensive development of every good beginning, enterprise, branch of study and every talent.(252) In these conditions, a society's concern, and the recognition of its duty to choose officials, urges it to choose for office those citizens who are in fact most suitable (4th general good).

2076. The result of this universal free concurrence for every unoccupied good, in conformity with activity and merit, is the best possible economic-moral situation at least for the greatest number if not all of the citizens (5th general good).

2077. As a result of their morality and foresight, population is balanced by production, the former growing in proportion to the latter (6th general good).

2078. The three principles of such a society, obviously seen as useful to all, must produce political uniformity of thought (with consequent annihilation of political parties) and the greatest defensive force against external assailants (7th general good).

2079. There can be no doubt that in a society as equable, moral and prosperous as this, any unfortunate person, even a foreigner, who turns to it, must find abundant refuge and aid (8th general good).

2080. In France, after 1789, the struggle between family and civil society became fearful, sinister and bloody.
Some clear-thinking people have noted that the progress of civil society towards its ideal had at that time been obstructed by arbitrary ordinances, and that consequently society, needing to sever its fetters and move forward, had turned violent [App., no. 6]. This may be true but does not affect the truth of the following observations.

2081. The social element reacted beyond the limits of justice; it attempted to invade the seigniorial element and, out of hatred and vengeance, destroy it. Indeed, having resolved to reign alone, it invaded the whole of individual Right under the pretext that there could be no Right except social Right. This claim was a natural consequence of its ferocious persecution of the seigniorial element, which pertains to individual Right where every individual right is a power, a principle of seigniory.(253) In such a state of things, civil society tyrannised individuals and smaller societies (RI, 1652-1654).

We need to take careful note of this fact; an investigation of this important period of struggle between civil and family elements does more for the progress of the philosophy of Right than a mountain of speculations. Hence we must pause to see how the aroused social element came to tyrannise over the seigniorial element. An impressive document which summarises the thought of the time is the Declaration of the rights of man and the citizen (1789). I will discuss a few articles from it - sufficient to show how the puffed-up social element tore the family, seigniorial element apart.

2082. `Article I. Human beings are born and remain free and equal in rights. The sole foundation of social differences is common utility.'

1. `Human beings are born free'. — In so far as they have personal dignity, they have personal freedom (RI, 48-52), but they are born in a family, this is, under paternal dominion (RI, 781-790). The Article totally forgets Right in the family.

2. `Human beings are born equal in rights'. — This is true only in the case of those rights that are founded on human nature possessed equally by all human beings. Again, however, human beings are born in the family where parents and children are certainly not equal in rights. Moreover, families are not equal either in number or in the quality of acquired rights. Not even a new member of the family, who possesses rights in solido (RI, 1271-1275), can always be considered equal in rights to the children of other families. Hence, to say that human beings are born equal in rights is to forget once again family Right.

3. `Human beings remain free'. — If we mean essential freedom, human beings certainly remain free. But a relationship of seigniory and servitude, recognised by rational Right (RI, 531-553) also exists. Hence, the unconditional statement that human beings remain free cancels seigniorial Right.

4. `Human beings remain equal in rights'. — They remain equal in connatural but not acquired rights. Here, acquired individual Right is forgotten, together with the whole of family Right.

5. `The sole foundation of social differences is common utility'. — When the input of the members of a society is unequal, as in the case of multi-quota societies, the difference of input produces different social rights, for example, a varying quota of what is useful (USR, 141, 216-254, 334-341). In civil society the contribution and the quantity of all that is useful varies in proportion to the greater or lesser ownership of the members. This is a social difference founded not on common utility but on individual, family rights. Furthermore, anyone who enters civil society intends to preserve all his rights of jural seigniory, for example, paternity. These require a distinction between master and subject, a distinction which affects social rights. Thus, a son under paternal authority cannot, according to rational Right, be a member of the civil legislative assembly if the father does not make him his representative (RF, 1418-1430, 1455-1512). There are therefore social differences which have their origin in the varying quantity of seigniorial rights. Consequently, if we acknowledge only those rights which are founded on common utility, we remove from individual Right of ownership and seigniory, as well as from family Right, all the authority due to them in civil society.

6. Furthermore, the extension of common utility, being uncertain, is equivocal. What does common utility mean, and who judges whether a particular social difference is founded on it? If everybody judges, we are in a state of anarchy. Why draw up a Constitution?

2083. `Article II. The purpose of every association is the preservation of natural and imprescriptible human rights. These rights are freedom, security, ownership and resistance to oppression.'

1. Here, `every association' can only mean civil association. Civil association therefore replaces all other societies and drives them from this world. There is no worse tyranny.

2. In addition to `natural and imprescriptible human rights', acquired rights must be preserved. The defence of only natural rights allows the plunder of all acquired individual and family Right. The Declaration, which makes no mention of acquired individual and family Right, speaks only about the proud human being and citizen who protects the so-called lesser man.

3. An association whose sole end is imprescriptible rights could not proceed coherently, unless prescription were abolished from the code of its national assembly. But this would mean the loss of one of the foundations of rational Right, principally seigniorial Right.

4. Is external ownership always an imprescriptible right? Is it a natural, rather than an acquired right? Is there anything in nature other than the faculty to acquire ownership? Is there equality in rights of external ownership? Acknowledgement of ownership therefore contradicts both this and the first Article.(254)

2084. `Article III. The source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body of people, no individual can exercise authority which does not emanate expressly from the nation.'

1. What is the nation? Is it the whole of the French people, including women and children, or simply the majority? Is it the fathers of families or the majority of a few taxed fathers, or of taxed fathers who actually vote? — Unless all this is defined, the Declaration says nothing by affirming that the source of all sovereignty is resident in the nation. The word `nation', having no definite meaning, is determined by the free decision of all the parties, who afterwards can always exercise tyranny in the name of the nation. — Furthermore, if the nation means the majority of those citizens, taxed or non-taxed, who actually vote (this is what the nation normally amounts to in the reality of popular governments), we are dealing with three million out of thirty million.

In this case the ruler is the will of a million and half plus one. These command and make ordinances affecting the other twenty-eight and a half million minus one, so that the latter have no authority which does not emanate from the former, who become the source of all obligatory law (Art. V). — In the third place, an unorganised people is certainly not a nation. So, who will organise it, and how? The non-existent nation cannot help; we have to turn to those different ways of constructing civil society that I discussed. The Declaration of 1789, which wants to form society, begs the principle by presupposing it. To say that sovereignty comes from the nation presupposes the existence of a people organised into a nation. In such a people sovereignty is already formed. Why then try to form it? The real desire was the destruction of the existing sovereignty and the establishment of another, the removal of a monarch who exercised a centuries-old sovereignty like a master and family head, and the enrichment of the citizens, members of the society. This is simply war made by society on seigniory, the usurpation of seigniorial and family Right by civil instinct.

2. No body of people, no individual can exercise authority which does not emanate from the nation. — These fatuous words abolish all seigniory and societies, in fact all human rights, because every right implies an authority. Their material sense is that the nation (civil society) absorbs everything - ideas, expressed as badly as this, were certainly confused! This exaggerated statement was not simply written but put into practice at the time of the Terror. When people act according to what they write, they certainly write according to what they think. Benign interpretations have no place here.

2085. `Article IV. Freedom consists in being able to do all that does not harm another. Consequently, the only limits to the exercise of all human natural rights are those which guarantee for the other members of society the enjoyment of these rights. These limits can be determined only by law.'

1. Freedom is spoken of as if the only freedom were civil freedom. Once again, civil society substitutes itself for morals and for God himself. It draws everything to itself.

2. There are certainly other limits in addition to those mentioned in the article; there are moral limits. But these have been forgotten in face of the barbaric invasion carried out against humanity by arrogant civil society. - Moreover, why restrict the limit of freedom solely to actions harmful to the other members of society and not harmful to all human beings? Clearly, the pupil human being is sacrificed to the teacher citizen.

3. The article certainly wishes to speak about civil law. But because it speaks of law absolutely, no other law is recognised. Here again we see a violent invasion by selfish social instinct.

4. To understand the strength of these observations we must note that the document under examination bears the title: Declaration of the rights of man and the citizen. The freedom, the law and the limits of rights mentioned in the declaration, however, are those of the citizen who absorbs and annihilates the human being.

2086. `Article V. Law has the right to prohibit only actions harmful to society. No one may prevent what has not been prohibited by law, nor be forced to do what is not commanded by law.'

1. This article begins by giving a law to law. It says that law has the right to prohibit only actions harmful to society. But why to society and not to individuals? Do the latter possibly not exist? In any case, who imposes this limit to law? Doesn't the previous article say that only law determines harmful actions? We have then the greatest confusion of ideas, the most glaring vicious circle: only law determines which harmful actions limit freedom, but law can punish only harmful actions!!!

2. `No one may prevent what has not been prohibited by law, nor be forced to do what is not commanded by law.' Thus, a father or master can no longer prevent his son or bond-servant from doing anything whatsoever, if not prohibited by civil law. The son and bond-servant can always reply to their father's and master's commands: `You can only force me to do what you want by showing that the law of civil society commands it.' Again, civil society, by means of this article, abolishes the whole of family and seigniorial Right, or grounds these not in reason and nature but in itself, as their only source.

2087. Similar observations can be made about the other twelve articles of this memorable Declaration. The same spirit permeates them all: disturbed and demented civil society will recognise nothing in the world except itself, and will annihilate every other right. This is truly absurd; society is condemned for its temerity in contradicting itself in the very title of its scientific manifesto. Although the title is Declaration of the rights OF MAN and the citizen', the manifesto allows no other authority to exist on earth except that of civil society, and authorities stemming from it and existing through its good. It also speaks about natural rights but makes every authority and power originate from the nation. Does the nation create both natural and imprescriptible rights? If so, why call the proclamation `Declaration' and not `Constitution'? What wretched, illogical philosophy!

2088. Where there is passion, there is confusion of ideas. The movement of 1789 was a movement of upheaval; civil society did not move forward peacefully but raged against seigniorial and family society. Ideas necessarily became horribly confused.

Now that the bloody experience has passed, and discussion of principles is exhausted, we can, I am sure, make a calm judgment about the event, and confidently agree that, in the abyss of evil, a good, salutary seed was at work.

2089. For a long time civil society had felt the need to move towards its ideal. If upright, religious people had lovingly tried to nurture this good social instinct and help society take the desired step, humanity, spared the horrors of the revolution, would have recognised their merit. Virtue would have been boosted and religion glorified. Unfortunately, upright, religious people understood neither the ardent longing and urgent need of their own society, nor their own vocation. This failure is the greatest misfortune of nations.

2090. And what are the consequences? There is among all the peoples of earth a restless portion, torn by its own vices, wicked, whom Scripture calls `sons of men'. They are ceaselessly driven by a relentless need 1. to satisfy the immoderate demands of particular passions (hence party interests and naked robbery); 2. to satisfy the general internal desire for movement, confusion and wrong doing; 3. to give free rein to their intense anger against truth, religion, Christ. This rabble of a people was captained by the so-called philosophers and illogical thinkers of the eighteenth century, who availed themselves of civil society's real need for progress. They incited society to satisfy this threefold evil tendency, promising to guide it to the desired progress which it could not itself determine or execute in some external form. The rabble put their trust in the first and only leaders to come forward. Tragically, these leaders were sophists and wicked men, and the cause of progress was now horribly bound up with that of anarchic, atheistic, popular passions. A thousand, contrasting ideas were aired, and the resulting chaos passed sadly from concept to reality.

2091. The effects, like the cause, were inevitably mixed. Some effects corresponded to the true desire and need of society, others to strong passions occasioned by and under the pretext of social progress. The former, which were good but mixed with the latter, which were evil, were for a time almost hidden from view and beyond belief. Later they were recognised with difficulty, more in the form of a chrysalis than of a butterfly.

2092. The revolution produced a famous son, Napoleon, who blamed all the evils of the revolution on the False philosophy of the time and Impiety. His verdict, expressed to the Counsellors of State at the time of Mallet's conspiracy (1812), was:

Having seen the evils of sensist philosophy, he could not speak about them in any other way. As early as 1800, in his address to the clergy of Milan, he spoke about the evils of the wicked philosophy he had seen:

2093. Just as seigniorial families in Europe were compelled by the irresistible force of events to move closer towards civil societies and embrace that element of civilisation which would wonderfully ennoble and perfect them, so civil societies together with their representatives felt the need to draw closer to seigniorial families after having being separated from them, and to have them as their natural protectors.

2094. This movement of civil societies towards seigniorial families is evident in France after the horrors of the Terror. Having embroiled herself in this great agony, she felt ever more urgently the need for a unique protective force of right.

2095. Napoleon, the true representative of France, underwent a change in thought and feeling. His way of thinking and feeling became perfectly harmonious with that of the society he eminently represented, and at the close of his life he correctly presented himself as the mediator of the two worlds:

This hurler of lightning bolts of the 13th vendémiaire said on St. Helena where he had been taken:

2096. Why then did this mediation between the civil and the family elements not succeed? Or why did the mediator himself fall victim to his own mediation?

My answer would be: Because the only mediation possible between family and civil society is that which is spontaneously carried out by truth, justice and religion. I have already indicated that today the prevalent force in our Christian societies consists of these three elements; they are the substance of social order.(255) The uneducated mediator did not know this sufficiently.

2097. Napoleon, instead of putting his trust in truth, proclaimed enthusiasm for pagan glory, the glory of the great men of Greece and Rome,(256) and released a torrent of exaggerations. His vain enthusiasm ceaselessly deceived himself and continues to deceive others. Hence, changes to the truth, which popular manifestos abound in and in his own most solemn acts. Humanity was inevitably discontent, because it is made for truth.

Instead of trusting in justice, Napoleon thought he saw the destiny of the world and of himself in force. This was a direct consequence of the system of the utilitarians to whom, thinking himself justified, he so often appealed with wonderful simplicity. But force is an accident, not the substance of the great cause which moves humanity and gives it an unperishable law.

Instead of having faith in the omnipotence of the One who protects the Church, Napoleon considered the Church and its rights to be purely a matter of politics, or at least he acted as if he believed this. His acumen and his power were ensnared by the net of Pius VII's simplicity. It is clear that the great man did not sufficiently see where the real connection of power lay. Consequently, his mediation was bound to be imperfect: mediation destroyed the mediator.

2098. Today, perfect mediation between family and the City, which must lead both family and civil society to the ideal of their perfection, can be carried out only by truth, justice and Catholicism (the one perfect form of Christianity). All who apply these three means to theory and to the realisation of civil order assume the office and dignity of mediators; their mediation will not oppress or destroy them.

2099. They will never be destroyed because, although truth, justice and Catholicism may have their implacable enemies, this hatred will not annihilate the work of such mediators, whose task has ended with the crown of martyrdom. In the measure that truth, justice and Catholicism increase in splendour and clarity every day, these three things will have less and less need of witnesses by blood. Society will no longer be the persecutor; only individuals, whom society will punish as murderers.

2100. But we need to explain how truth, justice and Catholicism are called to exercise so great an influence on the organisation of humanity and destined to accomplish such a sublime mediation.
To simplify the discussion, I will class these three great means under the single name `justice'. It is reasonable to call truth justice because it is just that everyone possesses, expresses and uses truth as the rule of their actions. It is also reasonable that the most perfect justice be seen in Catholicism because, just as its theory is pure truth, its practice is the realisation of consummate justice raised to the supernatural order.

2101. Justice in this fuller sense, therefore, reconciles and perfects two opposite societies, domestic and civil, by influencing them and moderating their instincts. It does this in the following way:

1. The theoretical and practical principle of all justice exists in humanity. It was placed there by Christianity, which alone possesses the theoretical principle in the truth it teaches, and the practical principle in the grace with which it strengthens the will. — First stage.

2. The theoretical and practical principle of justice is applied to the two societies, domestic and civil, which it must perfect. From it are deduced the special laws of these societies, and the solution to their complex, difficult juridical cases. Centuries of effort are needed to deduce consequences and to struggle against error introduced with brute force, and sometimes under the guise of positive law. Error disturbs the great work of minds, and at certain times seems actually to pervert that work. — Second stage.

3. Finally, when the special laws of domestic and civil society have been deduced from the principle of justice, the third and most important step must be taken. The laws must become part of the people, put into every mind and imprinted on every persuasion. Only when everybody knows them and is persuaded of them, do they acquire a new light, an unexpected power and public observance, which no individual force or evil mind can oppose. — Third stage.

2102. When does justice really begin to show itself as a prevalent force in human affairs? At the third stage, when everybody begins to think in harmony with it, that is, when there is UNIFORMITY OF NATIONAL THOUGHT ABOUT THE LAWS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE. This is the irresistible force that enthrones justice. How magnificent it would be to have a people fully instructed about just, social maxims, completely uniform in its judgments about the prescriptions of both domestic and civil society. In its majesty and security, such a people would be a king, a lion at rest.

2103. Uniformity of thought in social justice has in fact already begun, and in some nations is well advanced (Ireland, for example). These nations offer an image of great human dignity whose like we would not find in all history. That is why I confidently said, `Today we have begun to locate the strength of the social force, the very substance of society, in full justice' — government today is with and through justice.

2104. In the midst of the atrocious experiences sustained by France, errors and prejudices fell from people's minds, passions grew weary and became exhausted. Parties were destroyed or weakened; sensist philosophy became dumb, wickedness ashamed. Hence the inexplicable need felt by civil society for progress towards its ideal. Under this pretext it struck out at itself; it disencumbered and freed itself from many unfortunate elements in which it had lain confused and oppressed. The good seed, having escaped the hands of wickedness that held it prisoner, slowly developed. The people even began to agree to a few maxims of social justice. Such is the present strength of France and the cause of the peace we have enjoyed for thirty years.

Here, I must quote a few passages (if only they were more than passages!) from the speech given recently by Lamartine at the banquet of Mâcon (1843):

Such was the beginning of the uniformity of thought about political justice; it was also, in that nation, the beginning of conscience, as the above words demonstrate.

2105. If however social justice is to become national opinion, and its maxims are to enter uniformly into every mind in the nation, a great deal of open, free discussion is needed. Without this, the individuals who compose a nation cannot understand each other. To accomplish it, they need to share their feelings continuously over a period of time and engage in earnest debate. Errors must be eradicated from people's minds and, when fully revealed, be completely refuted in all these forms. The imperfect ideas of individuals must be perfected by encounter with the ideas of all. The exchange of ideas must lead individuals to distinguish between the view which is accepted by all and receives immense authority from the support of all, and the view which is merely individual and easily abandoned as soon as those who hold it see they are alone in holding it. Finally continual dialogue must convince individuals that they already agree in many things without knowing it; the difference lies only in expressions and forms — deep down, thought is the same, so that frequently the only thing required for agreement is a common, uniform mode of speech. Human beings soon find a common mode of speech if they realise that this is the sole cause of division among them, particularly if dialogue urges everybody to learn everyone's mode of speech, which then becomes the same language for all.

2106. The harm done at certain times in political matters by freedom of the press is all too well known. But it cannot be denied that nations, once they have reached the third stage described above, rightly or wrongly demand freedom of the press because they feel the need to form a common, popular, national opinion about the principal maxims of social justice,.

In this case it is no longer a matter of knowing `whether censorship prevents many evils' but `whether censorship is possible', or even, `whether the harm it averts is greater or less than the harm resulting from its suppression'.(257)

Napoleon, on his return from Elba, made the following declaration which was stimulated by the very force of events, not by some theory, and still less by any inclination to do so:

Napoleon is aware that the nation he is addressing has reached the third stage. All his victories and glory could not make the nation return to the second or first stage. He declares his conviction that he must change the system. Necessity solves the most difficult social problems.

2107. We would really have to lack common sense to be ignorant of the immense harm produced by freedom of the press in political matters.

We must note however that freedom of the press in political matters, desired by the people, becomes less harmful in nations that have reached the third stage where the laws of social justice are sufficiently developed and need only be diffused. Public need for this freedom increases and harm from it diminishes in proportion to the degree that the power of public opinion favours justice. Freedom of the press is fatal for those whose opinions on questions of social justice are formed day by day solely by biased authors. The harm that prejudiced authors can do is in inverse proportion to the immense power of public opinion for good. Authors must respect this power and, kept in check by prevailing opinion, be guided along the right way. If they abandon it, the most severe, terrible censorship awaits them.

2108. But, as we said, the level of public opinion for good varies in relationship to the number of people in agreement, and the number of moral and jural maxims they accept. In fact, no people has reached such a stage of agreement that they are unharmed by freedom of the press. Indeed, every people feels the need to apply some restriction to the press and some co-active law to prevent abuses. The problem lies in finding the most just and equable ways to do this satisfactorily, considering the circumstances of different peoples.

2109. The ways proposed so far have been prevention and repression. The former always causes grave difficulties when applied by nations which have reached the third stage of opinion about social justice and are in the process of forming a common opinion about socio-jural principles. This kind of opinion has already begun to emerge in England, the United States, France, etc.

2110. It is not our business here to investigate whether prevention is possible, suitable or useful among these nations; this is a question for Political Science rather than Right. The little we have said is sufficient. However we cannot overlook the question of the justice of prevention; no author of socio-rational Right can remain silent on such an important jural point. Publicists have probably never treated the matter under this aspect. I simply want to offer to my readers' discernment a few thoughts which, like everything I write, are motivated by a spirit of reconciliation, equity and peace. Reconciliation and peace, I am sure, spring spontaneously from the depths of what is just.

2111. Prevention as a method of avoiding many abuses of the press consists in submitting authors, publishers, printers or editors to certain formalities prior to the publication of their works, for example, to an examination of their work, presentation of manuscripts in a certain form, delay in publication, etc.

2112. Granted that these formalities and modalities are carefully carried out and guided solely by wisdom, truth and honesty, they can undoubtedly prevent abuse by the press and defend society from the influence of harmful authors. I do not wish to investigate the degree of difficulty required to obtain this, or whether it is in fact possible. These are important questions but outside my purpose. I take for granted that the laws and officials responsible for applying these modalities are not defective. I limit my investigation to this question: `Does civil society have the right to defend itself in this way from its adversaries?'

2113. First, I note the following: 1. if the modalities intended to prevent abuse by the press do not harm those subject to them; and 2. if the written material is such that the author or publisher is not worried about delay in publication, no one can complain when civil society obviously exercises a right proper to it by imposing modalities in self-defence. We have seen that not only civil society but private individuals can mutually impose modalities on the exercise of others' rights when such modalities do not diminish the value of the rights, that is, of the real good obtained by their exercise. One of the principal rules of moderation governing the exercise of a right is: `Everyone must so exercise their right that it imposes the least possible limit to others in the exercise of their rights' (RI, 958).

2114. Moreover, these modalities often cause only slight inconvenience. In times of peace, for example, academic and scientific questions, and purely literary works unconcerned with important social issues, are normally published for pleasure, to impart harmless instruction or communicate scientific information to the world of culture. Even important questions about humanity itself are discussed abstractly without reference to the passions of the day. Publications could in fact be brought forward slightly or postponed without adverse consequences to publishers, authors or anyone else.

2115. On the other hand, writers and publishers may voluntarily submit their works to examination and delay in publication either because 1. this is the custom, or 2. everyone, including authors, feels the need for special, exceptional precautions in the absence of informed public opinion, or 3. writers themselves, having a love of public good in common with the government, are ready to make some particularly virtuous sacrifice of their own freedom without being obliged to this by strict, jural necessity. This is no dream. It has happened often and in many places, and does honour to peaceful people who, willingly united with their government, are prepared to make sacrifices in their constant movement towards public good. Lack of jural resentment in the face of censorship certainly gives government the right to profit by it and shows that the time is ripe for censorship.

2116. However, this does not entirely settle the question.

It is certainly not true that what is just in one place and time is just always and everywhere. We too often err in laying down universal rather than particular propositions when truth is found only in the latter, and in wanting to find abstract justice where we should be applying it to circumstances.

Let us suppose that: 1. circumstances are different from those described above, and the present question is raised in a nation which has formed a great commonality of thought regarding the mean principles of social Right and Morality; 2. literature is obliged to be the organ for perfecting this great public opinion; 3. the press, because of its deep involvement in all private and public interests, exerts a great influence on the happiness or unhappiness of many people; 4. in this nation, culture is widespread, intelligence active, everything expeditiously executed, and constant discussion is a natural and habitual need; 5. it is a nation where there is always a danger of one party taking exclusive possession of the press as a very powerful weapon for subjugating other parties whose voice they wish to silence, or rather, a party taking possession of censorship in order to silence truth and justice and overthrow emerging upright opinion. We are, in short, talking precisely about France as it was at a particular time.

Moreover, in this nation, even good people and the most fervent friends of truth and holy religion have the greatest interest in freedom of the press. Because all can read and write, the circulation of written matter is extremely large, and the rapidity of its propagation has become an important means for obtaining the desired effect, on which all parties rely. In such a nation what will be the best solution to our question?

The least delay in the publication of material, the rise in costs and the increase in inconvenience cause real harm to those who are interested in the publication of written matter. The cause of truth, justice and religion (and religion has no other appeal than public opinion) is endangered. Can civil society inflict this harm on individuals under the pretext of the public good; can it arbitrarily prevent any appeal to universal justice?

According to the principles I have proposed, we must first decide whether perverse literature has increased and become pernicious to such an extent that we can reasonably fear it will replace society with anarchy, and whether any other means exists for avoiding such a danger. There is no doubt that society can defend itself with preventive law against abuse of the press. This is a political matter, and affects the interests not simply of the majority, but of all, even of those who suffer partial damage from such prevention. As we said, harm done by civil society to individuals is abundantly compensated by the benefit they receive. In this case, we presume first of all that government, acting in the name of society, is truthful and limits itself to preventing social anarchy.

2117. If, on the other hand, the danger of subversion of public order is remote or can be avoided by other means, censorship and all other preventive ordinances are intended either 1. to remove the evil feared for people who become victims of perverse literature, or 2. to prevent defamation and calumny to decent persons who are the target of malice. But here the good of only a few, not of all, is involved and, as we have seen, some cannot be made to suffer harm for the good of others.

2118. However, there is certainly some defence against the guilty, provided that the necessary ordinance is laid down only for them. The defect inherent in preventing abuses of the press lies precisely here: although people must be considered innocent until proved guilty, authors and publishers are harmed by preventive ordinances — in the circumstances we have described — before they are proved guilty, despite the fact that the ordinance is intended to examine their possible guilt. It may be objected that prevention is not considered a punishment but a caution, and that the delay it produces in publication together with all the inconvenience it causes is only an accidental consequence not intended by the legislator. But we have already shown that right is offended equally by direct and indirect acts, and that justice is always violated when harm is caused to another either directly or in consequence of our action (RI, 1700-1703, 1898-1900). Innocent and guilty are certainly harmed by prevention, not because this is intended to inflict harm or punishment, but because, in the circumstances, it actually does so, even contrary to the intention of its user.

2119. This would not be the case if prevention, instead of being general, were reserved solely for those already proved guilty. I have established that we can defend ourselves against probable injuries, even with harm to those who cause them, provided they are first known to be guilty. A person who has once been guilty gives others the right to fear him as a result of his guilt. If prevention were reserved solely for those already convicted and punished juridically for composing and diffusing perverse material it would contain no injustice. The harm suffered would be imputable solely to the perpetrators (RI, 1832-1838).

2120. Repression, however, knows no exceptions and is always a sacred right of society. It is the right of defence which society has for itself and its members against present injury; it is also the right of compensation. Through the right of defence, civil society can punish guilty literature with all the severity necessary to distance people from this crime because the degree of defence, as we have seen, extends as far as necessary for repelling harm. Through the right of compensation, society can establish punishment for the guilty that compensates both itself for the reasonably calculated harm it has suffered, and private citizens for their damaged reputation.(259)

2121. We can now draw some conclusions from what has been said.

If societies were composed not of fallible human beings but of angels confirmed in grace, they would not need material force to make justice and virtue prevail. But because this is not the case (indeed, human beings bear within themselves a seed of infinite wickedness), civil society cannot survive unless the judgments of its tribunals and of its just laws are sanctioned by force.

This force however can be entrusted only to imperfect human beings, who are constantly tempted to abuse it in contradiction of the justice they should defend. It is precisely here, as we have said, that the heart of the great social problem lies.(260)

We also investigated whether this great problem could be solved by one of the two political systems put forward by eminent statesmen, social antagonism and absolutism, but found both equally ineffective for solving this very complex difficulty.(261) We asked therefore whether the problem of social organisation were insoluble and whether we had to despair of ever being able to unite material force with the cause of justice in such a way that force could never serve any other cause. After examining all possible expedients, we had to conclude: `The only solid foundation for the health of civil society is the probity and moral virtue in the individuals who compose it.' From this we deduced the consequence that the greatest and most beneficent aim of society is `to plant early in the spirit of those who compose it, the knowledge, esteem and love of truth, justice and religion.'(262)

2122. This doctrine, propounded in Society and its Purpose, is further developed and perfected in this chapter.

My intention has been to show how in modern civil societies, granted the secret influence of Christianity, a moral force superior to every material force is slowly being produced and formed; a pure, incorruptible power destined by the eternal author of the human race to direct, dominate and save all other forces. This supreme power is `the uniformity of thought of the masses concerning the principles of social justice and the special consequences of these principles.'

This is the ballast whose great weight must safeguard the social vessel and prevent it from capsizing. It is a wonderful invention of Providence, not of human beings. It is a new force, greater than steam, condensed air and magnetism, which will safely guide the great ship to the port for which it is heading despite all storms and hurricanes.

Notes

(250) It would be totally worthless to have all the citizens equal before the social laws if these were evil. — For this reason, I have made equality before the law second to the principle that civil society should not touch the value of the rights of the citizens but only regulate the modality of their rights. This is the great principle which produces good laws and prevents bad.

(251) Is society obliged to choose the most suitable officials? I distinguish. If the society (the associated fathers) chooses on its own account, it has no jural obligation to do this, In reality, the choice usually falls on those known to be the most suitable, because society is moved to this choice for its own advantage. If however the choice is made by others in the name of or in place of society (for example, by its government, etc.), there is a strictly jural obligation.

(252) Time and the wisdom of civil governments are required for determining the best and most secure means for acknowledging this prevalent suitability without prejudice to any citizen; no citizen can be precluded.

(253) ER, 54-89.

(254) Here, rights of acquired ownership are under discussion, not fundamental ownership, which is the natural faculty to acquire. We see this in Article 17 which says: `Because ownership is an inviolable, sacred right, no one can be deprived of it except for public necessity legally and clearly verified, and on condition of a just, prior indemnity.' This article destroys all the theory presented in the preceding articles.

(255) The Summary Cause for the Stability or Downfall of Human Societies, 127-143.

(256) Benjamin Constant later wrote: `Today we have forgotten that towards the end of the empire the French were opposed to and even distressed and tired of the victories which France was condemned to carry off.' This is the real weakness of glory and military campaigns in our Christian, civilised times.

(257) It is purely a question of prudence, as was pointed out not long ago by one of those outstanding people who for the defence of the Church resisted napoleonic despotism. The immortal Cardinal Pacca wrote: `Prudence requires toleration of this freedom as the lesser evil' (Saggio sull'indifferenza, etc.).

(258) Why did he want so much? For the good of the world. But this is madness; the good of the world is JUSTICE; it is contained in these four words: TO EACH HIS OWN. Napoleon believed in the system of the utilitarians, offspring of the sensist philosophy which under the name of ideology the great man hated. This system ruined his empire and himself because it rests on feet of clay.

(259) What we say about civil society cannot be applied to ecclesial society. The first purpose of civil society is defence of the rights of all individuals; no one may be sacrificed to it. On the other hand, the purpose of ecclesial society is to build up the kingdom of God, to increase on earth virtue and happiness, the supreme good of the human soul. Because this society directs all human beings to this supreme spiritual purpose, it can oblige them not only to justice but to mutual charity, to dedicating themselves, their goods and rights to a single end. All this is required by the greatest spiritual good and growth of the divine kingdom on earth; it can subject human beings to all those prescriptions that help the good of the Church, among which is prevention against abuses of the press.

(260) Cf. SP, 111-131.

(261) Ibid., 265-282.

(262) Ibid.

Chapter 05

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