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Rights in Civil Society - Section Two

Chapter 8

The sanction of civil rights

2301. In civil society two supreme forces constitute the sanction of all social rights: 1. material force, and 2. prevalent public opinion.

2302. The supreme material force must be in the hands of the governors of society (cf. 1640-1642); otherwise, government of society would be impossible.

2303. Public opinion constitutes the sanction of the rights proper to the governed.

2304. Civil society's growth in perfection keeps pace with the growth of the two forces. Justice becomes more secure and civilisation continually makes greater progress.

2305. In Europe both forces have undergone extraordinary growth: the material force of the State through the outstanding Napoleonic law of conscription; the force of public opinion, through the press, popular discussions and movements, and through the holy Alliance where we see the principle of justice battling against the evil principle of utility. These causes united many scattered, divergent opinions, and undertook the great task of uniforming the opinion of the modern masses about social justice, a task that is making rapid, unpreventable progress.(321) Uniformity of opinion in political matters is, as we have seen, the legitimate force of the people.

2306. Political policy which prevents the people from acquiring uniformity of opinion about political justice is blameworthy and false because:

1. Uniformity of opinion leads civil societies to their highest perfection.

2. The governed have an inalienable right to use all means conducive to this purpose.

3. Obstructing the means for attaining this desirable uniformity can never be the task of society, which essentially desires and tends to it. Obstruction would be the work of a party seeking to dominate society with tyranny, or of a master ignorant of his duties. But uniformity of opinion reconciles all interests and brings peace; to oppose it is to foment war and renounce the peaceful settlement of quarrels, a duty incumbent on all (RI, 462, 501, 1026).

4. Such uniformity cannot arouse fear or reasonable suspicion on the part of social government; on the contrary, it alone offers definite norms which government can follow unerringly in its dispositions (RI, 1672, 1687-1688).

2307. Nevertheless government, which leaves free for the governed all the means able to guide them to uniform thinking in the matter of civil justice, can and must use the same freedom. It can and must use its influence to rectify public opinion, particularly and perhaps solely by informing the people of public facts and their circumstances, by telling them the reasons for its dispositions, and thus by interesting them in its ends of common or public usefulness. Finally it can and must punish severely all those who `can be convicted of having spread false facts among the public with the intention of misleading public opinion' or, even without this precise intention, with malice or excessive irresponsibility. Public opinion is always misled by lies about facts. When malicious diffusion of false facts is declared a crime officially by public magistrates, the probity needed in forming public opinion is sufficiently safeguarded.

2308. Government can and must desire in all its citizens the formation of uniformity of thought about questions of social Right: hence, 1. it must not obstruct the means or suppress the speech of those who wish to discuss these questions freely; 2. it must promote and protect the means, and 3. use its own means to obtain this uniformity. These, as we have said, lead to clear, full knowledge of public facts (without the government assuming the office of teacher, which is not its function) and suppress all publicly disseminated, malicious, falsified facts.
This last duty of government seems to me so important that I consider it requires its own very extensive law, drawn up in such a way as to be effective. The time will come when we will feel the importance of such a law. The nation which first undertakes to formulate it will show how its advance in civilisation outstrips that of the other nations.

2309. When this precious uniformity, the maximum power of nations, has been procured, a new, very felicitous duty is initiated for governments, which guarantees public tranquillity and the greatest possible development of national prosperity. This great duty consists in always maintaining perfect agreement between the two supreme forces of society, the material force (which must be in the hands of government) and public opinion (in the hands of the governed). In other words: `It will be the sacred, supreme duty of government to rule civil society according to prevalent public opinion, not according to particular theories.'

2310. A government acting in this way is secure and very strong, and can do everything for good. Society cannot be disturbed because every dangerous disturbance always arises from the real or imagined opposition between the material force and the force of public opinion. When these two forces work together, no other power can offer the least resistance.

2311. I say `real or imagined opposition' because the public can for a short time be deceived. Demagogues of any party can make them believe that government, contrary to fact, is against public opinion. But if trouble-makers are not supported by real governmental errors, their words are completely empty. We have said however that government must take care to rectify public opinion, repel the calumnies with which parties burden it, and present in full, public light the truth of the facts, its own intentions and the reasons for its actions. In short, it must continually, frankly, intimately and trustingly communicate its feelings to the masses it governs. If the masses are kept fully informed of the government's wisdom, they will be steadfastly affectionate and obedient, and love the government more than their own life.

2312. But if public opinion is unknown, how can a government regulate its dispositions to fully reflect public opinion? And how can it know public opinion whose manifestation it prevents?
Obviously a wise, non-partisan government which truly wishes to be guided in practice by public opinion must allow such opinion ample opportunity to manifest itself. It has nothing to fear from revelations it truly desires to follow. One of its duties, therefore, is its jural, prudent responsibility of allowing the masses to freely manifest their opinion, which it then uses as a basis for its own wise, beneficent action.

2313. This doctrine will, I hope, appear so obviously true to anyone unfettered by narrow theories that he may wonder whether it is even possible for `a non-partisan civil government ever to want to act against prevalent public opinion.'
The query does in fact merit an answer, as follows. As I said, civil autocracy is not a naturally inalienable right, as political sophists have claimed. It can in fact be alienated like any other man-made right and conferred on either a collective person (pure aristocracy) or an individual person (pure monarchy) (USR, 312-314). Thus, two cases must be considered: in the first, civil autocracy remains in the hands of the fathers; in the second, it is conferred on an individual or collective person.

In the first case, the fathers can govern by themselves (pure democracy), although this cannot be realised except perhaps in a very small civil society; or they can set up a delegated or ministerial government (USR, 312-214).
Only when the fathers retain autocracy and exercise civil government is there no collision between the material force and formed public opinion;(322) in this case public opinion is the very opinion of the fathers who govern.
In all the other cases, government, whether autocratic or administrative, is not directly guided by public opinion, and can collide with public opinion, by ignoring it or making private, dynastic aims prevail over social-civil aims.

2314. We must bear in mind that, once uniformity of opinion has been sufficiently formed among the masses, a wise government never lacks the force to protect all its own civil rights and those of the people it governs.
Such a government can be correctly called all-powerful for good when it ceaselessly strives 1. to increase uniformity of thought in all about the maxims of public justice, and 2. to apply its enactments impartially and flexibly in accord with prevalent public opinion, rather than accommodate a priori systems or partisan suggestions, or the limited calculations of a few particular counsellors. In this way it avails itself of the two supreme forces of society, its material force and the support of prevalent opinion.

2315. This kind of government is in a position to repress any injustice whatsoever against public order or private rights; it is a government that completely protects all rights.

2316. Such a government need work now only for unity of organisation in which authority and material force are sufficiently centralised. This condition is fully verified in monarchies. For example, if the autocracy of a certain society is in the hands of a single individual, and all its material force is bound to the autocracy (as it must be), the individual autocrat can freely repress even the injustices perpetrated by magistrates or ministers of the society who, precisely because they do not share in the autocracy, cannot easily exempt themselves from due punishment. The masses, pleased at seeing crime punished everywhere, have nothing more to do or desire than praise their very just ruler.

2317. But what if government, and autocracy itself, abandon this safe line of conduct? What if a government's dispositions oppose public opinion about right, or the masses see all rights harmed rather than protected by government blindness or malice? Do the citizens themselves have a legitimate sanction for rights violated by social power or in its name; and if so, what is this sanction? This most delicate and difficult question of social Right, cannot be avoided (RI, 459). I will therefore propose the opinion which seems to me to conform with truth and justice, although I am ready to change it as soon as I am shown something better.

2318. Defence and restitution is a function connected with all rights (ER, 246-251). The exercise of this function can be very difficult to carry out without exceeding its limits. This is precisely the situation of those citizens who intend to defend or restore rights of their own injured by civil authority or, more accurately, in its name or under its pretext.

2319. Before beginning such a difficult discussion, I must present the principles which direct the exercise of the right of defence, or more generally, of sanction. I will draw these principles from various parts of individual Right and from the two books that precede it [ER], where I discussed them.

First principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. The coercion present in every right is personal force (ER, 246-251). Because right is essentially moral, this force must be exercised morally (RI, 383, 400, 923). Hence whenever the exercise of coercion is morally tainted, it ceases to be right. This is the first and most important limit to the right of coercion.

Second principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. Consequently, the exercise of coercion, when involving violence which harms the person over whom it is exercised, can be and is totally forbidden by morality. This is the case of a son who can never strike or injure his father to enforce respect of his rights. Immorality is always involved in an act of this nature (RI, 843, 1792). The same is true for a wife relative to her husband (RF, 1431-1443).

Nevertheless, although the exercise of a violent and injurious defence may never take place in certain cases, we cannot conclude that true right is absent. The essence of right does not require the force which guarantees it to be continually in act, as we said in the case of a father enfeebled by old age (RI, 858).

2320. Third principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. I cannot defend myself by inflicting harm on another unless the culpability of the person who prejudices my right is certain. The prejudice itself however need not be certain (RI, 1747, 1823, 1830).

2321. Fourth principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. In cases of doubt, we must accept there is no culpability in the person who acts, according to the saying: `Everyone is presumed good until proved evil' (RI, 1840-1847).
Note that every administrator or governor has the duty and right to administer and govern according to his view of things and to do all he considers helpful to his government. When he has done this, he is no longer responsible to those he governs for his human errors, nor for the greater good he could obtain for them but does not because of his limited faculties and abilities, that is, because of his invincible powerlessness. The governor of a society is the competent judge of the mode of governing. Although the governed have the right to place before him what they believe necessary for his office, they cannot blame him if he omits what they see as better. On the contrary, they must accept the consequences of the institution of government, just as they must accept the decision of a competent judge (RI, 610-612, 631, 713).

2322. This does not prevent us from being judges of our own good and evil (RI, 630, 713). In our case, the greatest good of each of the governed is certainly that of being governed, although in every human government imperfections and defects play a part. If each of the governed claimed to direct the government, government would be impossible on earth. Even if this were possible, imperfections and defects would still be present, because every person governed would cause other imperfections and defects inherent in the manner of government he thought best and most preferable. To avoid this great weakness a unique social-mind was created to direct and govern civil society. Moreover, the good a social government can effect and the evil it can remove is neither a good nor a right of the governed. On the contrary, the object of their right is solely the good effectively and really procured for them by the government. A distinction must be made therefore between social gain, and ownership and individual rights:

a) Social gain, which is produced by governmental administration, consists in the evils avoided and the good acquired. The government is the competent judge of the manner of this administration. The governed must be content with the large or small gain they obtain from it, even if convinced that other ordinances would have resulted in a larger gain. They only have a right ad rem to the social gain, and do not determine its quantity, which depends on the degree of perfection of administration over which the government has the right.

b) In the case of ownership and of rights of the individual, a government may lay its hands on goods which are the object of these rights. It can do this either by providing equable indemnity and compensation (given or promised), which is a governmental act of which the government is the sole competent judge; or by seizing goods without promise of compensation or any social title, which is an act of injustice committed in the name of the government, and an abuse of authority. Here, the competent judge is the person harmed, who has the same right relative to those invested with power as to others because society and government are jurally equal to every other subject of Right (cf. 2181-2187).

2323. Fifth principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. The right of coercion must be used only when it can obtain its effect, and even then not always, but opportunely.
A person whose right has been injured causes greater harm only to himself whenever he wants to use his insufficient force for self-vindication. He is thus obliged not to use his right of coercion because the occasion is lacking, which is a jural condition for exercising one's rights.

It cannot be objected that right in this case depends on the accident of force, contrary to what we have said elsewhere (ER, 246-251). We must distinguish between right and its exercise. Right remains unchanged as a faculty. For the faculty to be actuated, it must always find in reality certain conditions which render its act reasonable in all respects. This complex of conditions I call `a favourable occasion for exercise'. It is possible for right to have the occasion to exercise some of its functions but not others. As long as the latter lack an occasion, they remain suspended, and the desire to exercise them is contrary to reason, that is, to jural law. Good sense acknowledges this when it judges an undertaking correct from its successful outcome. It would judge differently if it had not succeeded. Thus common sense recognises the condition for justice present in the prudence of those who have brought an undertaking to a happy conclusion. A weak person who, although in the right, wishes to sustain an unequal struggle in which he loses profitlessly, is not justified, is not really exercising a right. His duty is to surrender and commend the defence of his rights to divine Providence.

2324. Sixth principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. Force may not be used in defence of one's rights if harm is done to the innocent (RI, 1747-1757).

2325. Seventh principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. Force may not be used to defend one's rights when the harm done to the guilty assailant is far greater than the value of the violated rights (RI, 1803-1819).

2326. Eighth principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. The harm done to the guilty must be necessary for defence. If we can safeguard our rights without harm to the guilty we must do so (RI, 1793-1802, 1989-1993).
We must choose the least harm possible to the guilty. Hence material force may be used only when peaceful ways of obtaining the same purpose are precluded.

2327. Ninth principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. This follows from the previous principle. If someone culpably attacks our right by misuse of his own, we must be content to prevent the misuse without despoiling him of his rights (USR, 382).

2328. Tenth principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. Consequently, we distinguish the offending subject as offender from all the innocent persons united to him, together with all his other accidents, qualities or rights which are not related to the offence. As far as possible, we preserve everything connected with him which does not form part of the efficient cause of the offence itself.

2329. Eleventh principle regulating the exercise of the right of coercion. Finally, no one may use the right of coercion except in legal and jural ways. If his right still has no defence, he must impute this to his ignorance alone.

2330. Discussing the opinions of authors, we find they are divided on this very difficult question, just as they are on other questions. Some grant to the governed the right of coercion relative to those governing; others deny this.

2331. This disparity of opinion seems to arise because some authors consider the matter in the abstract, others in the concrete.

2332. The former are evidently satisfied to establish the existence of unquestionable, reciprocal rights and duties between the governed and those governing. They can therefore conclude that both sides must possess coercion, the function accompanying all rights.
This is the opinion of Grotius, Pufendorf, Horn, Burlamachi, Vattel, Rousseau, Berkeley, Höpfner, Fichte, Meister, Blackstone, Locke, Scheidemandel, C. L. Haller and others. However they strive hard to restrict the use of such a dangerous right to a varying number of conditions; some in fact grant it only to the majority of a nation.

2333. Those who deny the right base themselves mostly on one or other of the following arguments:

A. The duties of civil authority are solely ethical, not jural;(323) such duties have no corresponding right of coercion. — We have seen however that the nature of jural duty consists in respecting the right of others (ER, 268) by not entering the sphere of their ownership (ER, 341). We would therefore either have to deny all rights of the governed relative to those governing — an absurdity never professed by anyone of balanced judgment — or grant that the duties of those governing are truly jural. And if we claimed to define jural duty as that which has no corresponding right of coercion, the argument would be a vicious circle.

2334. B. A doctrine that grants the right of coercion to the governed is dangerous. — Those who disagree reply, `It is indeed dangerous if proposed purely in itself, but if kept within its limits, it becomes extremely helpful both for the governed and for the preservation of the authority of those who govern. On the other hand, jural questions are not about whether particular opinions are dangerous because they can be easily misused, but whether they are true in themselves without relationship to abuse (RI, 459).

2335. C. Supreme civil authority comes from God. — Not only civil authority but every right, authority and power, even pure de facto power, comes from God, according to the well-known axiom, omnis potestas a Deo [all power is from God]. In other words, legitimate power, and right of any kind, come from God through jural law. Consequently, if rational jural law grants a right of sanction to the governed, which is our quest, it also comes from God. The question is not solved by the divine source of authority but by consulting the proximate source of rights, that is, jural reason; only this can tell us whether the right of coercion under discussion exists. And granted that jural reason really admits the right of coercion, we are at once in a position to argue that this right, like all other rights, comes from God.

2336. D. The governed are unable to judge whether civil authority acts well or badly, because only those who govern can judge how civil society is to be governed and directed. — This argument, unlike the previous ones, cannot be answered briefly. I need to put forward as thoroughly as possible the reasons of those who maintain the contrary opinion, so that full light may be thrown on the matter and all doubt removed.

We must first do away with the superficial distinction made by some authors between judging the acts of civil authority as such and judging their effectiveness. They allow the former but not the latter. But I understand `judging their effectiveness' means judging them, and on the basis of this judgment, being able to redress the wrongs received from the use of material force. In this case, the distinction, resting on the solution given to the previous problem, is useless for solving the present problem. Leaving aside therefore such an inept distinction, let us see whether the argument based on the principle that the governed have no right to judge those who govern, can in effect remove the right of coercion from the governed.

In the first place, the principle that the governed are not competent judges of governmental acts is true only within certain limits. In fact the following are cases where the governed are undoubtedly competent judges of the acts of civil authority, not directly but indirectly:

1st. case: the judgments of the governed concern their own moral duties and only indirectly the acts of civil authority; for example, if civil authority were to force them to do an intrinsically evil action. Baroli says:

2337. 2nd. case: the governed make judgments concerning certain moral duties of others. If I can and must judge that an action (for example, an assassination or perjury) is something intrinsically evil, I can and must also judge that it is evil as much for others as for myself, and that the authority imposing it acts unjustly whether it imposes it on me or on others.

2338. 3rd. case: the judgment concerns the harm done to the ownership and other rights of an individual without corresponding compensation. Here, the offended individual is the competent judge of the violation of his right and of the harm done him (RI, 610, 631, 713).

2339. 4th. case: the judgment concerns a person's ethical duty to help or defend either others when the governor is trying either to draw them to commit evil or to harm relative rights of ownership; for example, the obligations of fathers to defend the chastity of their children, or even their possessions. In this case the competent judge is the subject of the moral duty, according to the established principle that `everyone is competent judge of his moral duties' (RI, 195).

In these four cases at least, the competence of the governed to judge is verified.

2340. On the other hand, those who govern are certainly the competent judges about how government should be directed; their judgment is competent when they choose one rather than another among possible governmental ordinances, provided that all, considered in themselves, are legal and just. It does not matter whether the ordinances bring greater or less good to the governed, or protect them more or less effectively; those who are governed must submit rather than use coercive means, even if they think they know better, have more effective means, or consider other means imprudent.
This principle seems so evident that without it a society could neither subsist nor obtain its end. It simply demonstrates that coercion by the governed cannot be applied in doubtful cases; presumption must always be in favour of those who govern. However, the principle does not demonstrate the absolute exclusion of coercion in certain cases. The sentence of a competent judge loses all authority against the evidence, because no human being can ever cease to be reasonable, as God made him (RI, 610-612, 631, 713).

2341. It is true that in very special cases, such as that under discussion, the degree of evidence necessary for resisting this kind of competent judgment must be greater than in ordinary cases. But this does not mean that such evidence can never be obtained.

2342. E. It is not possible for the governed to use their right of coercion without producing a greater harm than that which they wish to avoid. Hence they have no right to posit coercion in act because of the principle mentioned above in principles regulating the exercise of the right. — Bossuet makes much of this argument. He says that the reason forbidding peoples to exercise the right of sanction in any case whatsoever is similar to the reason which

2343. These words of Bossuet generate many observations by those who hold the contrary opinion:

1. They deny that any use whatever of coercion by the governed must inevitably promote anarchy and its accompanying horrors. The denial gains much more force when the doubt is applied to nations well on the way to civilisation. In these nations, discussion, the wisdom of the leaders and people, the justice of the cause, and uprightness of intention exercise a great influence. Bossuet's adversaries say that the exercise of coercion is certainly dangerous and blameworthy when exercised by an unbridled, corrupt multitude, as happened in France. But the same cannot necessarily be said about a people long instructed in the most moral and religious feelings, exhibiting that great unanimity in principles of social justice which keeps even the most powerful masses in order.

2344. 2. Is it true that coercion applied by the governed does greater public harm than good? Can this be easily calculated, particularly when it is a not a question of redressing an accidental and inconsequential wrong, but of restoring public order, which is the necessary basis for a nation to progress century by century to its greatest maturity? Monsignor Marchetti, a very Catholic author, further reflects that this kind of specious reasoning lacks sufficient force for quelling the multitude. He says:

The truth is that common sense (not popular passion) can read tomorrow's book better than today's. It can sacrifice the passing present good for a long-term, enduring good. Sometimes, a sublime, immortal, providential feeling thrusts an entire generation down into the abyss, bringing about the salvation of many generations who, after making progress and being rejuvenated, live lovingly and peacefully in their own country.

2345. 3. Relative to Bossuet's example of military government, Mons. Marchetti makes the following observation:

2346. 4. Bossuet himself, however, had no intention of including all cases in his theory. The minister, Jurieu, proposed the case of a ruler who commanded half his subjects to slaughter the other half. Bossuet replied that a purely hypothetical case had no place in the argument. Mons. Marchetti makes the following reflection:

Bossuet's solution, although certainly good, concerns only cases outside the question; the most difficult and complex cases, covered by the question, are not dealt with. This is a facile way to reply to serious difficulties, but philosophers cannot be satisfied with it, still less the people.

2347. Although the authors' observations mentioned above are indeed wise, they do not completely settle the question concerning the right of the governed to use coercion. We need to go gradually deeper into the matter, trying first to determine certain particular propositions which will make the general solution much easier.
I first affirm that through socio-rational Right the sovereign's person must in every case be inviolable.

2348. I mean of course the sovereign in monarchies, because the proposition is not so evident in democracies and aristocracies. In these forms of government no individual person enjoys sovereignty, which lies solely in the social body. Consequently every individual is partly subject to the ruling collective person, so that sovereign inviolability would refer to an abstract person. But this is not the case in monarchies. In these, the sovereign, a real individual, is not subject to other individuals or to the nation itself.

2349. It would be possible to demonstrate the personal inviolability of an individual sovereign with moral arguments similar to those I used to demonstrate that a son cannot use his right of coercion against his father to the point of bodily injury (RI, 842-843). But the quality proper to sovereigns results from a special cause which protects it from harm.

2350. Sovereignty, considered independently of every seigniorial right that may be joined to it, and solely as a person's own right to govern civil society, indicates an office different from the concept of member of civil society.(330) Thus, whenever a citizen is raised to the rank of sovereign, he ceases to be a citizen; instead, he becomes head of the citizens. This needs to be carefully understood. A lawmaker, in his quality as lawmaker, cannot be subject to the laws; he exercises an office whose concept is outside society; he is above society. Society is that for which laws are made, that which wants to be governed and submits itself to common regulations in order to obtain the resulting common advantages. The sovereign however is the person who gives laws to the members and sees that they are carried out. As such, therefore, he is outside civil society.

2351. It is true that many sovereigns wished to be considered citizens relative to their temporal goods, making these subject to the same modality as the members' goods, and paying taxes into the treasury.

2352. But their person itself could not be placed in society and made subject to the penal laws common to the citizens because of the clear contradiction between making a law and receiving it. People may object that there is no absurdity in the sovereign's freely willed submission to such laws, but that would, in my opinion, destroy the hypothesis which posits an individual exercising a social autocracy which he does not abdicate. If he is responsible for judging everybody, who could judge him?
If there were someone in the society able to judge the sovereign in virtue of social Right, such a judge would share supreme authority with the sovereign. There would no longer be an absolute monarchy, which contradicts the hypothesis, but government by two individuals, each of whom judged the other.

2353. In civil society therefore no power exists that can judge the sovereign person. Penal social right does not exist for him. His person is correctly said to be inviolable.(331)

2354. Finally, the inviolability of sovereigns is given a more majestic characteristic by the Catholic Church's consecration of their person.(332)

2355. The royal right of inviolability is valid for individual sovereigns whether they have received unconditional or conditional sovereignty, provided the conditions of the latter do not remove autocracy.

2356. But the individual invested with unconditional autocracy has another royal right: he cannot be deposed from the throne.

2357. One of the principal reasons for this right is that while we can defend ourselves against others' abuse of their rights and even suspend the exercise of their rights, we can never despoil them of their rights. In reality there is never a need to go to such an extreme, because the governed always have other more moderate means for protecting their rights.

2358. A still greater injustice would be to deprive an entire royal family of sovereignty because of abuse by one or two individuals. It is a strange contradiction that, while some political sophists denounce as barbaric and cruel the confiscation of goods and similar penal laws on the grounds that this punishes the children for the fathers' crimes, they do not scruple to punish reigning families by depriving them of the throne.

2359. This proposition is self-evident. Anarchy is the greatest of all social evils, the complex of all disorders. Any teaching therefore that promotes it is clearly the negation of every right, and persons whose actions directly or indirectly encourage it are guilty at one and the same time of all social crimes.(333)

2360. There are however today well-intentioned but deluded authors who justify anarchy as a temporary state on the way to a better organisation of civil society.(334) Unfortunately they have forgotten the first words of morality which forbid us to do evil that good may come, and also the first words of Right which forbid us to infringe any right whatsoever of others, even when we expect the greatest utility from it (RI, 1696-1703).

2361. We can see from all that has been said that legitimate means for the governed to guarantee their own rights vary according to different forms of government.
My intention is to discuss first of all the means which social Right authorises for use in the most absolute, unconditional monarchies. In this I will principally follow C. L. Haller, who is also followed by Baroli.
I shall show that in this form of government the governed never lack the most effective means for guaranteeing their rights, that they have no need to use the right of coercion, and that consequently the use of coercion is always illicit and unjust (RI, 1764-1768).

2362. The means I shall list presuppose above all that the governed have solid grounds for appeal against social authority.

The first duty of the governed is to be completely certain that grounds for appeal exist; in case of doubt, presumption is in favour of those who govern, as we have seen. Whenever a people is alert to this, has no preoccupations about it, and does not let its imagination run wild or its passions be enflamed by rabble-rousers, many causes for complaint vanish of themselves. Baroli says:

2363. We also saw that the governed have the moral-jural duty not to claim the best of all government administrations as such, but simply a government that strives for the relative best, that is, strives for all it can procure with the means that it possesses and can use in good faith.

Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the good behaviour of citizens can preclude and forestall any call for appeal.

1st. means. The first and best means of defence is the moral goodness of the governed. Coercive laws that restrict freedom and impose heavy burdens on the people to their great harm are in most cases provoked by the immorality of the people themselves.(336) Revolutionary doctrines in particular, sown in the minds of the masses, have a tremendous influence rendering government oppressive, and indeed force it to be so. Baroli describes these pernicious doctrines as follows:

If evils result from the immorality of the governed, they no longer have a right to apply coercion. They must remove the causes of the evils by changing themselves for the better.

2364. 2nd. means: the diffusion of knowledge of socio-rational Right; the ceaseless proclamation of its inviolability and usefulness. This means is most effective. It leads to the formation of that uniformity of social thought in the masses which is the most powerful guarantee of public order and all human rights. It shines resplendently in nations, once they have come to a certain level of civilisation. Baroli writes:

2365. Although diffused knowledge of the principles of rational social Right must be the basis for that uniform opinion which is the greatest guarantee of civil nations, it is helpful if positive-social right and its history are diffused as well. This knowledge draws the hearts of both the people and the sovereign back to ancient national practice, weaning their spirit away from harmful new practices. Haller says:

3rd. means: religious influence. Uniformity of faith in religious belief is simultaneously the extremely solid foundation and keystone of that very powerful uniformity of opinion in moral and jural principles which, as I said, is destined to give immovable solidity to civil order in Catholic nations.

Napoleon's statement, `I see the mystery of social order in religion. It is grafted on heaven by an idea of equality which restrains the poor from slaying the rich', can be very fittingly applied to subject and sovereigns. Religion in subjects forms the power of rulers, because subjects, without any conscience to subject them, are stronger than rulers. Religion in rulers is the best guarantee of the subjects' rights. Vattel proclaims:

Atheistic philosophers are no sane choice as governors compared with religious rulers!

2366. 4th. means: persuasive influence exercised on the monarch. Although the monarch is endowed with free will, it would be a great mistake to think that the members of the civil society he governs have no influence whatsoever on his conduct. We will leave aside his family on the worst possible supposition that the only kind of dynastic tradition it can offer is arrogant despotism. But outside his family, the members of the society he governs, considered as a whole, have an immense influence on the formation of his character and in the direction of his governance. Some are responsible for his education; others are his counsellors; others, ministers and officials, in other words, those who carry out his ordinances. The education he receives, the opinions in which he is formed, the counsels, suggestions and co-operation given him in the execution of his wishes: all these come from citizens, and are the real cause of the good or harmful effects of his governance. This observation has the following important consequences:

2367. a) The citizens as a whole can never have the right to use violent coercion against their supreme governor. Some of them will necessarily be accomplices of his injustice and consequently have in their power a peaceful means for eradicating it. They can cease to co-operate.

2368. b) Those closest to rulers are themselves influenced by other people, who contribute to their education, form their character and refine their passions, etc. These people depend in turn on the influence of others, and so on. Clearly, therefore, all civil society is an interconnection of reciprocal influences; not a single human being is without influence on others. Not even the majority of citizens, therefore, can ever have a just title to exercise the right of coercion. In the absence of other peaceful means of defence, only pure necessity can justify coercion. But this is never verified in reality in public matters, where an immediate emendation of the government would take place if the reciprocal influences of the citizens were changed from bad to good. Anyone who considers the complex of influential causes must see that governments are precisely what people make them, and that corrupt rulers come from corrupt people; in other words, the people have the ruler they want. If justice, morality, order, diligence, strength prevail in the complex conduct of the mass of citizens, the result must be a just, moral, ordered and strong government.

2369. c) The effective injustice of a government's acts are in effect the result of a combination of very small cases involving citizens' unjust, lascivious, conniving and immoral acts. Even if this could justify (which it cannot) violent coercion, the coercion should never reach the ruler. Rather it should be directed against the executors of his unjust decisions. Even if it is supposed that all the decisions were entirely his alone and not inspired or suggested by perverse citizens or the contaminated atmosphere of a corrupt society, it is a principle of right that coercion is not exercised against unjust thoughts but against their external realisation by wicked, cowardly citizens (RI, 1770-1778).

2370. This is the jural reason why ministers, but never the sovereign, bear responsibility in constitutional States.

2371. d) It may be objected that, if the false way pursued by a government shows the wickedness of the complex of reciprocal social influences, this does not alter the fact that in societies some citizens are upright and totally innocent. They cannot be forced to suffer injury to their rights which is neither an indirect nor a direct effect of their perversity. — I reply: Who can be certain of total innocence in the social situation we are discussing? Who can be completely certain of not having been infected by the fetid atmosphere of the society in which he has been born, educated and lived? Who can be sure of never having committed any base act, spoken falsely, spread pernicious prejudices, even under the pretext of good? And finally, who is so perfectly good that he dares to condemn the mass of citizens, considering himself one of the few untouched by social corruption, of which we are frequently ignorant and from which we cannot escape? Even if we could be certain about all these things, it is a principle of right that coercion cannot be exercised unless a prevalent force can be used with inevitable effect and without doing further harm. In such a society the small number of the elect, granted they could be brought together, will never be in this situation. Even if they were, ought they to sacrifice the overwhelming majority for themselves?

2372. e) Even in these situations, particular or special societies can often obtain redress for their wrongs through commendable prudence and wisdom rather than through violence. Haller says:

2373. f) Finally, good people can counter injustice with heroic meekness. This is not only a moral means of perfection and of divine merit in this life, or at least, in the next; it is abundant compensation for all wrongs received from others and, although slow, it is also a most effective means of persuasion, gently influencing the wills of rulers.(342) It serves as an example, as instruction for the people and a medicine for corrupt, violent society. Throughout history this moral, divine cure was applied by Christ and his disciples to healing an unjust, violent, cruel world. Its secret power effected the humanity of the present generation, the attractiveness of our manners and the desire for peace embedded in all Christian peoples, for whom violence is becoming more and more repugnant.
In short, it has brought about European civilisation whose prosperity we enjoy and whose future shows great promise.

2374. 5th. means: passive resistance. Whenever these means of persuasion do not obtain redress for wrongs, human beings must take comfort from the thought that no power can divest them of their true and absolute good, which is their essential right and the seat of all human dignity. No force exists that can constrain us to act contrary to moral laws and stain ourselves with sin. Whenever we are commanded something unlawful, we have the right of passive resistance, that is, not to obey. We are required by justice to hold uprightness and virtue in such high regard that we find in them and in God an entirely sufficient reward for our suffering, and in our suffering a pledge of immortal glory. To value them less is a moral defect, baseness. There have always been sublime human beings, armed with this moral feeling, who have preferred to die rather than kill. These are perfect Christians, who often showed this sublime cause of their patience before tyrants, and like lambs let themselves be dismembered by wolves.(343)

2375. Matters however seldom come to such an extreme, and civilisation grows in proportion to the rarity of such cases. In most instances, passive resistance, while remaining firm, can be exercised with such attractiveness and prudence that it becomes less displeasing to the person commanding an injustice. Haller writes:

2376. 6th. means: the exercise of the right to express one's feelings in the correct way, to tell the truth (RI, 101-121) and to make the necessary suggestions to the ruler for emending legislation (ER, 1-20; RI, 1672, 1687-1688). The exercise of these rights has been sufficiently discussed elsewhere.

2377. 7th. means: the exercise of the right of remonstrance and petition. Baroli argues as follows:

2378. In absolute monarchies the right of remonstrance and petition is the most precious right of all. When given total freedom, such a right is sufficient to render useless, and consequently illegitimate and criminal, the coercive methods of the governed.(346)

2379. To exercise this right most effectively and in its rational-jural integrity the following is necessary:

1. Every collective or individual person who has rights to defend must be able to exercise it; every citizen, every lawful society, a group of citizens, the majority, the whole body (all of whom are different subjects of social right) must be able to petition and remonstrate (USR, 367).

2. The remonstrances must be well thought out and weighed. Petitioners must be allowed sufficient discussion to agree upon wise and fully mature remonstrances which they can submit to the ruler.

3. The remonstrances need not be secret; indeed it is helpful if they are public, at least when this is the wish of those making them. In this way, if they concern matters that cannot be granted, impartial public opinion will uphold the ruler's refusal.

2380. These conditions make the right of remonstrance and petition a very effective safeguard for the rights of the governed. Exercised with maturity and wisdom, the right is a means of informing the sovereign clearly about the justice of the cause. If, however, the petition were to contain defects of form, the cause would lose its force; false counsellors could base a negative answer on it, or interested parties with influence over the sovereign could make bad use of it.

Furthermore, the right can often sincerely and faithfully express public opinion, which is the best rule for good government and, when uniform, an irresistible, persuasive, moral force. Any wise government therefore would want to know and acknowledge this opinion as its sole infallible guide and most faithful counsellor.

2381. 8th. means: the right of pact. In my opinion, a people has no right to limit sovereign authority, nor the right to forcefully impose constitutions which limit it. I accept Baroli's opinion that

Note however that no authority can be said to be limited when determined exactly according to the law of reason, provided no arbitrary decision dictates the determinations, which must be formal, not material. Here, I refer the reader to what I said in general about Right of jural claim (USR, 160-167, 182, 196-197, 207-208, 212, 220, 232, App. no. 2), Right of guarantee, and of pact (RI, 524, 1703, 1837, 1863-1881).

2382. 9th. means: the exercise of the right of emigration I have already discussed emigration (cf. 1632-1639). Haller notes:

2383. Today, this teaching should be universally known. It should be taught to the peoples at large, and firmly impressed on their minds. Total sincerity and openness is required, however, if people are to be persuaded of its truth. We must also be convinced that today nothing can be kept hidden from the consideration of entire nations. Whatever monopoly of knowledge and information existed in the past has vanished today. For civilised nations, underhand social teaching has become petty, hateful, impossible trickery.

People also need to know the objections that may be made against solid maxims. Difficulties should be set out, expounded vigorously and completely, and answered with impeccable logic. Only then can we hope to persuade minds and hearts. Objections passed over in silence by official teachers gain greater force in all minds; objections dismissed as insignificant develop forcefully; reticence counselled by false prudence provides a pretext for discrediting the best maxims in the world, which then remain entirely undefended.
I would be avoiding my own responsibility if I omitted anything that has been said or could be said by way of objection. I hope that my replies will be fully satisfactory.

2384. As far as I can see, there are two cogent, possible objections against the teaching on peaceful means:(350)

1st. Objection. The masses have great difficulty in coming to know these peaceful means. They find it difficult to understand the order of their distribution, or how to use them effectively, to foresee their results and wait patiently for the outcome. Even a wise, self-controlled person can hardly do this. The civilisation of nations may have begun but ignorance and its consequent recklessness of action are characteristics of the majority of the masses. This has been the situation of the European nations for centuries. Surely, undeveloped nations can exercise their right of coercion, when their ignorance of other ways makes violent coercion absolutely necessary for the defence and guarantee of their rights?

2nd. Objection. By supposing that the nine peaceful means mentioned above are practicable, we have done what Bossuet did. When the minister Jurieu proposed the case of extreme tyranny, Bossuet replied that it was a hypothetical case, outside the scope of theories. In fact, for the most upright, moderate publicists, the question whether the right of coercion can be exercised against unconditional autocracy is only an extreme case concerning the worst of governments. If government is the worst, as the hypothesis says, its despotism would undoubtedly prevent citizens from using any of the peaceful, persuasive means they might possess to give lawful value to their argument. The means you indicated apply to another case, therefore, not to the one under discussion.

Furthermore, an autocratic, unconditional government has a thousand ways of suppressing the most legitimate freedom, particularly if the government combines force with cunning.
For example, you propose the diffusion of knowledge of the principles of social rational Right. But this is precisely what a misguided government prevents by great cunning united with force. It bans discussion of these principles, and in the schools only tolerates teaching that excuses its conduct. In a word, it ensures ignorance, nurtures prejudice, teaches errors; above all, it is afraid that those whom it governs might form a uniform opinion about the principles of justice, which would raise an insuperable barrier against the abuse of its power.

Religious influence also would be of no avail if the government held religion in bondage, claiming authority over it and honouring it only on condition that it co-operates with and ministers to its despotism.
Again, the exercise of the right to express one's feelings, to speak the truth and to suggest ideas necessary for the emendation of legislation by the supreme power is of no avail if the people have been silenced. A great number of speakers and authors would be so corrupted by money that they would justify the most enormous arbitrary decisions invested with legal form. A depraved government would have no difficulty enacting minute, complex, voluminous legislation, and thus blocking all honest public and private criticism. When the critics' silence caused offence, they would be condemned as lacking respect, as enemies of the government; seriously suspected of conspiracy, they would already be considered as rebels. And all this of course would be done in the name of law, after the government had deprived their opponents of all possible concurrence for posts of employment and social honours (considered solely as sovereign favours), caused them widespread trouble, and handed them over to the police (if not worse). All this would follow upon frequent paternal warnings or convictions for breaking the sovereign laws. Who knows what the final outcome would be?

You speak about the right of remonstrance and petition, but you cannot be taken seriously. Nothing could be easier for a degraded government than to abolish this right or, if that is hypocritical (which it is in the majority of cases), render it useless and a pretext for greater oppression. Initially, the government will grant the right in writing precisely to hide its despotism better. Later, by requiring innumerable formalities which cannot be fulfilled, they render the right ineffective. Initially the right will be limited to private concerns, but the government will consider it a serious evil if remonstrances multiply, or many citizens support them, with the result that the right becomes more and more the organ of public opinion. The government will then obstruct the means which the remonstrating citizens can use to draw up a respectful petition that has been carefully prepared, contains only what has been well tested and cannot be reasonably rejected. In order to draw up the remonstrance, wide consultation and long discussion of all its articles, of its phrasing and of individual words, is necessary, but the government, which is afraid of everything and only seeks motives and pretexts for rejecting the remonstrance, will be suspicious of such discussion and prohibit it.

History has shown time and time again how a petition containing a very just appeal has been rejected, and in fact regarded as criminal evidence because it contained expressions less than respectful, or spoke the truth without flattery. When the request has been substantially irrefutable according to right, a way has frequently been found to reject it by insisting on some accessory point, overlooked through insufficient consideration, in which the petitioners were wrong. In the years immediately prior to 1790, many petitions of this kind were presented to European sovereigns with the most deplorable outcome, simply because they were defective in their composition and in minor points, although their main argument was well grounded.

2385. Finally, the right of emigration can easily be abolished by positive law. In which case, flight, even that described by Christ, `When you are persecuted in one town, flee to another', can be declared a crime against the State!

If therefore you intend to keep to the particular case of a people subject to the worst and most cunning government imaginable, your suggested means are valueless.

2386. In reply to the first objection I say that the right of defence can be exercised only within the limits proper to the right (RI, 1769-1819). Under the given conditions, it is not possible for a primitive people (the kind in question) to have the ability, insight and tranquillity of soul necessary for using the right. The case is similar to a person who has a doubt about the lawfulness of an action but is unable to use a reflective principle to solve the doubt. We have already shown that in such a case the person is obliged to follow the safe way, a way which does not expose him to the danger of injuring uprightness and justice. This explains why moral teachers in primitive, undeveloped peoples are consistently tutiorists. Because they can find no other way of avoiding the danger of sin, tutiorism becomes obligatory.(351)

The same argument applies to a people whose intellective faculties are undeveloped. Heroic patience in bearing the evils of an unconditional, legitimate but despotic monarchy becomes a strict obligation for them, precisely because they are unable to evade the obligation in the right way and without sin. This was the path followed by the first Christians. Many fine moralists have taught the same system, a system which was just because necessary at the time they wrote.

2387. To the second objection I reply that a government may obstruct some but not all of the above-mentioned means: the first, fourth and fifth means are always available. Nor can it obstruct the others entirely, but only render necessary greater skill and virtue in their implementation. For example, the influence of religion, particularly in Catholic nations, cannot fail totally. Jesus Christ established pastors in his Church, imposing on them the strict obligation to lay down their lives for their sheep. They are also obliged to take care of the soul of the sovereign and make him feel his subjection to the supreme Being, no matter what harm they suffer. This heroic ministry is especially the responsibility of the Head of the Church.

In the same situation, every citizen can make use of the sixth means. Speaking the truth is sometimes a strict obligation which must be fulfilled even at the cost of life, especially when the horrors of revolution have to be avoided. In this case, good citizens sacrifice themselves for their country.

2388. Relative to the fourth means, anyone who examines the argument attentively will see that the objections carry no weight. Such a person will be convinced that the sole cause of the wickedness and incompetence of such an oppressive government is the wickedness of the governed themselves. If the people reform themselves, they will reform the government.

2389. Both the civil head and the citizens are obliged by the pacts they make, and by the conditions stated or certainly understood.
If this reciprocally binding contract is broken by the civil head, the offended side can certainly use its right to free itself from the conditions of the contract. The reader can find sufficient teaching about the use of this right and about the religious-moral cautions to be observed in its application in the various places where I have discussed such rights. A longer explanation, relative to Catholic States, will be found in Conferenze di ragion pubblica to which I refer the reader for the sake of avoiding repetition.(352)

2390. These forms of government normally have legal means, laid down by their constitutions, through which citizens can obtain redress for wrongs suffered. These means must be added to those proper to absolute monarchies.

2391. Granted a pure democracy, violent coercion would clearly be eliminated and could never be exercised against supreme authority. Because every citizen is a part of sovereignty, sovereignty is present if the citizens all agree, with the result that no one will make war on it. If they disagree, their dissension must be judged with the principles of extra-social Right. This kind of war is made by partial, independent societies.

2392. The same must be said about a pure aristocracy whenever discord arises among the nobility. As far as the people are concerned, who have no part in the sovereignty, we must apply to them what was said to be licit for those who are governed without being simultaneously governors.

Notes

(321) A symptom of this progress is 1. the contemporary need for religious and jural convictions; 2. the proclamation of the moral duty to make known one's convictions, a duty which has been so supremely and recently expressed by the Gospel as the work of faith. In this regard, I think the work of Vinet, Essai sur la manifestation des convictions religieuses etc., Paris, 1842, is symptomatic and worth noting.

(322) Note, I speak about already formed public opinion, that is, more or less uniform opinion. The profound defect of purely democratic governments lies in the great difficulty they have in bringing about this uniformity. Parties usually tear this kind of government apart, and the subsequent division makes it impossible for government administration to agree with prevalent public opinion. This is not because, granted prevalent public opinion, government could not agree with it, but simply because the opinion is either lacking or too imperfectly formed, or always undecided.

(323) Baroli maintains that the duties of sovereigns towards their subjects are purely ethical, not jural. Elsewhere he says that the duties of sovereigns are imposed by jural natural law (Diritto naturale pubblico interno, §215). He also says that the duties of sovereigns have corresponding true rights in the subjects: `The rights of the subjects, as such, correspond exactly to the ruler's duties towards the State' (ibid., §217). But it seems to me that just as duties imposed by ethical law must be called ethical, so the duties imposed by jural law must be called jural. Similarly, merely ethical duties are those to which there are no corresponding rights in others. Hence, when persons have true rights which are objects of duties, the duties must be called jural. This word, which comes from ius (right), means simply either the source of the duties (jural law) or the corresponding right in others by whom they are observed.

(324) Diritto naturale pubblico interno, 220, *2.

(325) Mons. Marchetti notes that Bossuet begins with the false supposition that only anarchy existed in the world before the institution of governments. Moreover he correctly censures Bossuet's concept of the state of nature, a state described by the eloquent prelate as that in which `we must suppose everyone to be independent of everyone else and also of the multitude' (Avertiss. 5, n. 55-64). Marchetti says: `Here Bossuet considers the human being as born free and in anarchy. This idea is not far removed from that which later became common among publicists of the Revolution' (ibid., sect. 2, 67). We see indeed how ancient the roots of error were; they penetrated even the best heads, among whom was undoubtedly the famous bishop of Meaux.

(326) Avertiss. 5 sur les Lettr. de M. Jurieu, n. 55.

(327) Della Chiesa quanto allo stato politico della Città, Conf. 9, sect. 2, 65.

(328) Ibid., n. 68.

(329) Ibid., n. 62, fn.

(330) Cf. SP, 111-131.

(331) The sacrilegious parricide of Louis XVI was carried out under legal forms in the name of civil society! This shows just how ignorant, false and wayward was the knowledge of social Right among those demagogues. The question that some ancient authors proposed, `whether for self defence, sufficient for safety, you can kill the unjust aggressor even if he is a sovereign', pertains to extra-social Right, from which we prescind, and does not exhibit the French sophists' crass ignorance of the principles of social Right. The same must be said about the other question concerning the defence of innate rights, which we have discussed in RI, 84-127, 141-238.

(332) I wish to give honourable testimony to Ab. Gioberti by quoting a passage from his recent work, Del primato morale e civile degli Italiani, where he condemns as crime all violent social revolution: `Catholicism gives special strength to political institutes in so far as it consecrates and deifies sovereign right, which it declares inviolable, and condemns all rebellion of subjects against it. This teaching is deeply philosophical because its contrary confuses and essentially nullifies the ideas of sovereignty of subjection. In every case, the opposite teaching severs, or at least endangers the nerves of power, which it sometimes considers violable. Nor does it matter that in certain cases rebellion may be helpful, and even seem necessary. The goodness of moral laws must on the one hand be measured by their more usual effects and on the other be absolute. Every exception mutilates and nullifies them. According to rational and Gospel ethics, every action which is generally and naturally harmful must be considered forbidden even in those few cases where it can be productive. If this were not the case, the moral rule would be subject to the narrow understanding and decision of the individual. Violent revolutions inevitably take place when they are necessary, which justifies Providence, which permits them in virtue of the good they cause in such occurrences. But this does not excuse their authors, because evil means can never be sanctified by the goodness and uprightness of the end.'

(333) The reigning supreme pontiff, Gregory XVI, most reasonably complains that `freedom of every kind is proclaimed under the desire for novelty and promoting rebellion. Disturbances are fostered in civil and sacred matters; all sacred authority is rent asunder' (Epistola Enciclica, etc, 18 Kalend, Sept. 1832.

(334) Cf. the second letter of Ab. De Lamennais in Apologetica, p. 440.

(335) Diritto nat. pubb. int., §222.

(336) Cf. SP, 432-448 for a discussion on laws provoked by the corruption of the masses.

(337) Diritto nat. pubb. int., §222.

(338) Ibid.

(339) Ibid., *1.

(340) Droit des Gens, t. 1, ch. 12, §125.

(341) Baroli, Diritto nat. pubb. int., §222.

(342) `This commendable conduct of subjects must succeed as a valid impediment to the continuation of the abuse of power. Meekness, patience, resignation are virtues that calm even the most enflamed anger and the most obstinate, mad desire for revenge, which is certainly not true of the case under discussion. In the eternal order of things, great evils and injustices do not last long. Likewise, nothing violent endures' (Baroli, ibid.).

(343) St. Eucherius' words about Maurice are well-known. When the emperor Maximian was trying to force the Christian Theban legion to sacrifice to idols, Maurice, who was head of the legion, answered: `Emperor, we are your soldiers, but freely confess that we are servants of God. — Life, our final need, has not forced us into rebellion. We have our weapons yet do not resist, for WE PREFER TO DIE THAN KILL' (Apud Ruinart., Act. SS. MM., de ss. Maurit. et Soc., n. 4).

(344) Baroli, Diritto naturale pubblico interno, §222.

(345) Ibid.

(346) Rulers and ministers who look upon numerous petitions as a nuisance and hindrance to their office, and use indirect means to reduce their frequency and bluntness, are greatly mistaken.

(347) Diritto naturale pubblico interno, §222.

(348) Ibid.

(349) Ibid.

(350) Note, it is not my intention to repeat the objections of those who consider the social contract as the only jural origin of civil society. Among these are radicals, communists, jurists of the French revolution, etc. As I have already refuted their system, I consider their objections void. I will confine myself to discussing those objections which I consider the most important, brought forward by people of good sense, unrestricted by ultra-liberal systems. In my reply, I hope to satisfy their expectations, especially as they are upright people of good faith who acknowledge intrinsically respectable principles of justice, without any reference whatsoever to their utility.

(351) Conscience, 799-801.

(352) The question is dealt with in the third part (Rimini, 1824, printed by Mansoner and Grandi). — The work is certainly badly written; it is prolix, caustic and sometimes partial. Nevertheless it contains very beautiful truths illustrated with considerable learning and acumen. A good Catholic writer who could reduce the three thick volumes to a single large one would be doing something useful for the progress of Catholic-social ideas.

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