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Rights in Civil Society - Section Two

RIGHT IN ALREADY CONSTITUTED CIVIL SOCIETY

Introduction

2175. So far we have explained the concept of civil society (cf. 1564-1731) and its Right (cf. 1732-1741). We have also shown how the concept, conceived by the mind, could be realised factually among human beings, and we discussed the origin of such a society (cf. 1742-1895).

In order to know this origin without being misled by imagination, we had to look at history and see how civil society, at the very beginning of nations, established itself in different ways in different regions. After we had classified these ways, reduced them to their ultimate species, supplied where necessary what was lacking and perfected them by philosophical reflection, we drew from them the theory of the origins of civil society.

We saw that the concept, the model of civil society, was expressed factually at various stages. To determine the different levels at which civil society in its institution expresses its nature, we felt the need first of a better general concept of society. Then, by clothing this concept with its various conditions and bringing it into reality with its own special elements, we had to take it to the point where it expressed perfect civil society. We thus discovered the archetype, the ideal, of civil society (cf. 2064-2079).

We also had to note the historical steps by which society progressed to maturity, and indicate the stimuli which goaded human beings on in this work. In short, we had to deal with the successive formation of the City, that is, with its progress towards that perfect state in which, purified of every heterogeneous element, it no longer assumes responsibilities not contained in its concept but does assume every office present in that concept. For centuries, struggling against the obstacles it meets, the City follows these two ways of progress. And because it has not yet completed this task, we saw what remains to be done and will be done.

2176. All this pertains to philosophical Right in civil society as civil society is in the process of being constituted, not with the Right of already constituted civil society. In this last sense, the part of Right we have explained so far concerns individual Right, or rather that part which unites individual Right with social Right and concerns the acts of individuals when they wish to associate civilly.

2177. In any case, the theory of society has the nature of Right. In its jural concept, society is simply an aggregate of rights and obligations arising from acts of association (USR, 1-20).

2178. Under another aspect, Right which presides over civil society in the process of being constituted (discussed in the previous section) can certainly be considered a part of civil-social Right. Even after constitution, civil society needs to move forward. Hence, all the acts it does after its constitution, or are done for it by its government, influence either its better constitution or the preservation of the level of formation already obtained, or even its deterioration and destruction. These acts can become unjust simply by altering the nature of society instead of continually improving and completing it.

2179. Our task therefore is to explain the Right of constituted civil society. We say at once that such society must first do everything in keeping with its essence and natural constitution, as we have described them. This fruitful principle gives rise to that part of Right to which this Section is dedicated. I will divide the Section as follows.

2180. Seigniorial Right relative to civil-social right was dealt with sufficiently when we discussed the nature and formation of the City. We showed how seigniory can in reality be mingled with society.

The other two parts of civil-social Right, communal and governmental (USR, 145-153), are better not divided, I think, but treated together. We need to continually compare the proper rights of government with the common rights of citizens, and to consider their mutual help and mutual guarantee. Because our purpose is to express in the clearest light possible what is just, I think it better to consider first what is unjust, in the way that the dark areas of a painting make the light areas stand out. We can then come down to particular organs and limbs by which the civil body moves, noting their ramifications and upright, equable movement. Finally, after considering civil society according to the bonds that constitute it, and the organs of its action, we will investigate the relationship between social-prudence and social justice, and conclude: `Granted the meticulous observance and fulfilment of the prescriptions of Right, the natural constitution and action of civil society is that which continually orders and adapts it according to the norms of prudence' (cf. 316-317, 346-366). In this way, the Philosophy of civil-social Right is joined with the Philosophy of Politics. Although these two disciplines must never be confused, a golden link unites them so tightly that the second begins where the first ends.

This section will therefore have three parts:

Part 1 Contents

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