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The Right Of Seigniory In Theocratic Society

Chapter 7

Three marks of divine seigniory over human beings

What has been said indicates three sublime marks of divine seigniory over human beings: it is reasonable, natural and highly beneficial, although the beneficiary is not the lord, but his servants.

573. The first of the three titles we have indicated in divine seigniory gives rise to its reasonableness.

574. This title consists in the authority inherent in ideal being, the form of every intellect. It is obvious that servitude to God, as the first and supreme reason, is not only reasonable, but is reasonableness itself. Acting reasonably, and obeying or serving ideal being, is one and the same thing.

575. The second title on which divine seigniory is founded, that is, God as the principle of every contingent being, gives rise to the naturalness of divine seigniory.

576. It is a universal, ontological law that everything aspires and tends to unite itself with its principle, provided we understand `principle' as the fount of a thing's being and of everything that belongs to its being. This law, as we have already noted, is marvellously unfolded in human activity. In fact, human beings are so constituted that every being is a good for them, and a greater good if greater being.(52) But an entity, to be such for human beings, must be known by them. To be good for them, knowledge of the entity must be their own work, that is, human beings must want to know the entity as good. To know it as good is to esteem it; this constitutes what we call practical knowledge.

If, however, human beings are not active relative to knowledge but merely passive, their knowledge is incomplete; it remains in the form we have called theoretical knowledge, which is ineffective because it does not put human beings in real communication with known entities. Only when humans contribute to knowledge their own spontaneous activity by which they unite themselves with what has been understood, does a being as known become for them the principle of all their special activity, including their exterior activity.(53) In this case, they act intelligently as a result of their will which, at its origin, is simply the faculty enabling them to understand forcefully and feelingly relative to the object understood.(54) All beings are destined to be good for humans in this way; greater beings are greater good; and the greatest being of all is the maximum good. God, the being of beings, is rightly called by St. Augustine `the good of every good' (bonum omnis boni). If something is good for human beings, it must somehow perfect and complete their nature; but the ultimate completion and sublimation of human nature is the possession of God.

577. It is clear, therefore, that human nature tends to God because it must tend towards its highest good as a result of tending towards good as such.

578. Human servitude to God consists in such a tendency of human nature, seconded and determined by will. This servitude, therefore, is entirely in harmony with human nature. Divine seigniory, on its part, is wholly natural to human nature.

579. The third mark of divine seigniory is unlimited disinterestedness and beneficence.

580. As we have said, God would not be less God, nor less perfect and blissful, if he had not wished to create the world. In creating it, he acquired nothing that he did not have previously, and is now as he was from eternity. His creative act has not changed him.

581. The world, and the reverence the supreme Being receives from the world's inhabitants, produces no benefit for God. All the benefit is for human beings alone whose highest good lies precisely in the servitude they render him to serve him is to reign.

582. We need to think of the matter in this way. Granted the act with which the Creator has freely willed to give subsistence to contingent beings, this act, containing creation, conservation, providence, judgment, reward, and so on, is undivided from the act with which he is. But the act with which God is, the act of divine essence, has suffered no change, nor has it become greater or fuller related to exterior works. Consequently, God's bliss has not increased. On the contrary, although the creatures' act in offering him worship adds nothing to him, it does bring perfection to them, just as an act opposed to the worship of the supreme Being does great damage to them by depriving them of their moral perfection and integrity.(55)

583. Such an argument cannot be understood completely unless a careful distinction is made between subjective and objective good. Only by grasping this distinction can we see how moral evil, committed by creatures when they dishonour God, is `an objective evil done by a subject'. The subject neither harms nor can harm the object, essentially immune from all damage, but does great harm to himself.

584. It follows that the servitude due to God implies no obligation whatever to give something to God in a true sense, as though he as subject could receive something from us. But it does imply an obligation to reverence him as object, not because this object, considered as subject, can be benefited, but simply because he as object is unchangeable, remaining what he is. When we adapt ourselves to the exigency of the object, which in our case is an exigency of absolute subjection, we simply do what is good in itself. The natural effect of this good is to enoble and enlighten us.

585. We can now see more clearly how divine seigniory is essentially different from every other. Every other seigniory exists for the lord's benefit, not for that of the servant; every other seigniory has the master as its end as worthy of respect and as beneficiary. Divine seigniory is quite different: the master is indeed the end of the servant, but it is the servant alone who benefits, and to the greatest extent, from such a state. Because the servant alone benefits by his servitude, his service does not diminish his standing as end. Thus we come to understand more profoundly the words of Scripture we quoted above, `He disposes of men WITH GREAT REVERENCE'.

Notes

(52) Cf. PE, 21-42.

(53) Cf. ER, 108-112.

(54) Hegel was aware of this truth, but he exaggerated it. When he says: Der Wille ist eine besondere Weise des Denkens, he expresses the truth; when he adds that the will is das Denken als sich iibersetzend ins Dasein, he still states the truth, but his metaphorical way of speaking inclines him to overstep himself if iibersetzend (passing) is not interpreted properly. At this point, however, he further explains his thought, adding: als Trieb sich Dasein zu geben (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Berlin, 1833. Einleitung).

This produces the ambiguity that destroys his system in which, having reduced will to thought, he also wants to assimilate the objects of thought to thought itself, converting them into his hold-all idea which includes everything. It is true that the will tends to bestow on itself an ever greater degree of being and perfection; it is also true that it tends to make beings its own; but it does not tend to make them ITSELF. Hegel, despite his acuteness, did not see that it is impossible to reduce subject and object to a single principle; he did not see that they are two primitive, original forms of being which cannot be confused, although they necessarily exist together, complementing and perfecting one another. It is, in fact, their unremitting, absolute distinction which lies at the basis of their relationship.

(55) St. Augustine's wonderful statement about God: `For you had no need of me, nor am I some kind of good that you need, my Lord and my God. I am not here to help you, as though you would grow tired without me, nor is your power less if it lacks my respect. I do not cultivate you as though you were land that would remain desolate without my labour. I serve you and I cultivate you THAT I MAY BENEFIT FROM YOU. YOU HAVE MADE ME THAT I MAY BE FOR YOU, O MY GOOD. (Confessions, bk. 13, c. 1, cf. also c. 4).

Chapter 08

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