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Governmental Right In Theocratic Society

Chapter 2

Governmental right in perfect theocratic society

736. So far we have outlined the character of theocratic society, and examined the four levels by which it rises to its full being in the Redeemer. We must now set out the nature of its government, and the right bestowed upon it for its suitable direction. We need to keep clearly in mind the distinction between the power of dominion, of which we have spoken, and the governmental power of which we have to speak. Simple dominion is extended even over those who are not members of the theocratic society, or have renounced membership, and over inanimate creatures.

737. We must note, however, that all divine dominion, in creating, conserving and disposing all things, is ruled by infinite wisdom and providence, which guides its exercise for the good of the theocratic society.

738. Moreover, both the power of divine seigniory and governmental power can be considered under two aspects: as a fact, or as a right.

739. What is the de facto power in the theocratic society of Christianity?

We saw that this society is founded in the hidden action exercised by God himself in the substance of the intellective soul. This substance is essentially sensory. The de facto power found in this society, therefore, is a mysterious but wholly real power not existing in created nature, but exercised in it by God himself directly. In a word, it is an essentially divine power.

740. The de jure power has its title in this de facto power, the action of God, by which God really communicates himself to his intelligent creatures and, uniting them to himself in order to beatify them, creates theocratic society. The society's founder, the Creator, has the right to administer and govern it because it was created and founded by him, and because it involves the fullest submission of the creature to the Creator.

741. The call to such a society, and enrolment in it, is a supreme, gratuitous benefit from God. Man's refusal to enter into society with God would be infinite foolishness and impiety.

742. Nevertheless, this society must be voluntary, like every other. No one adheres to God socially except through willing assent. God wanted enrolment in the theocratic society to be similar to that of every other human society. It was to come about by contract, renewed many times, as we can see, with the Hebrew people. Christ himself left the decision about following him to human will, without imposing it upon anyone, `If anyone will come after me, let him follow me'.

743. On God's part, therefore, enrolment takes place at the moment of baptism through a divine, deiform action; on the part of the baptised person, it takes place through express consent and the promise made to adhere to the Church and to her faith and maxims. By this promise, the Church acquires the right to unremitting membership from the newly baptised (cf. USR, 450-451).

744. Those not belonging to the theocratic society remain subject, with every other creature, to the absolute dominion of God. But he is only their master, not their fellow-member. For those not accepting his society, he is a just master, and most holy vindicator of his justice. Those who attempt to renounce the perpetual pact they have sworn to him on their entrance to the society are justly punished as rebel members of the society and of the lord, its head.

745. The de facto power of theocratic society is therefore infinitely great, and essentially supernatural.

746. At the same time, it is a power de jure, in such a way that God both possesses and exercises it in perfect justice. Hence all the conditions necessary for the subsistence of a theocratic society are present; a divine power is present de facto and de jure.

747. The divinity exercises this social power in seven ways.

748. The first way consists in the aggregation of human creatures to the society, and in the ordained constitution of the society. As we said, this comes about through the intimate, hidden action by which God really communicates himself to souls, giving them some perception of himself. - The three sacraments of baptism, confirmation and holy orders are ordained for this purpose.

749. The second way consists in the sacrifice in which God died to save the world from sin, offering himself honour equivalent to the greatness of his majesty. Because he is not subject to death, God took up human nature into a divine person. By giving this human nature of his over to death, he could be said to have died, because his soul was in fact truly divided from his body. This separation of Christ's body and soul must rightly be considered as a sacrifice God made to himself. The person of the Word could say truly, `No one takes my life from me (it was his very own human life), but I lay it down of my own accord. I have the power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again.'(118) - The sacrament of orders is additionally intended to perpetuate the divine sacrifice.

750. The third way in which God exercises theocratic power consists in the manner by which he nourishes the members of the society with himself. He does this by feeding them with the body of his Christ. - The sacrament of the eucharist exists for this purpose.

751. The fourth way consists in removing the obstacles to participation in the common good that spring from the sins of the members. This is the purpose of the sacraments of penance and extreme unction.

752. The fifth way consists in the grace by which God disposes the natural society between spouses to the service due to theocratic society. - The sacrament of matrimony was instituted for this reason.

753. The sixth way consists in an infallible teaching of supernatural truths. - This is the purpose of the ministry of the word.

754. Finally, the seventh way consists in the prudential, disciplinary and external order amongst members living here on earth. Such order comes from the Spirit of Christ. - This is the purpose of the power of jurisdiction in the episcopate.(119)

755. These seven ways of exercising social power, or seven branches of power in the theocratic society, contain everything necessary for orderly government in its entirety.

The first branch of power is that which constitutes and brings together the society: its constitutive power. But because aggregation demands unlimited submission of the creature to the Creator, the second branch is concerned with sacrifice: liturgical power.

The third branch bestows upon members in the fullest manner the good they are to enjoy as a society of fruition. This enjoyment generates action, that is, the strength to act: eucharistic power.

The fourth branch removes the obstacles preventing members from obtaining the end of the society: power of purification, power to bind and loose, healing power.

The fifth branch fuses the natural longings of humanity with the longing of theocratic society by consecrating to theocratic society not only the individual human being, but the human species: hierogenetic power.

The sixth branch develops the fundamental feeling of God infused at baptism. This feeling instructs the intellect, freeing it from error so that human beings can put to work the social good bestowed upon them at the moment of aggregation: teaching power. - This power has various modes of activity such as defining the truths to be believed, interpreting holy Scripture, preaching, teaching, and so on.

Finally, the seventh branch regulates external means wisely so that the attainment of the end may not be harmed by outward disorder. The aim is to help the collective body of members to reach the social end through the body's perfect organisation: power of organisation. This power also has various modes of activity, such as legislative, judicial, executive and penal or sanctioning power.

756. JESUS Christ exercised these seven branches of divine power, and on leaving this world invested his Apostles with the sevenfold power, `As the Father has sent me, even so I send you,'(120) and `Lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age.'(121)

757. These last words of Christ show that it is he, in his divine person, who carries out theocratic activity while making use of human beings as his ministers and instruments. As the divine person made use of human nature united to himself to carry out divine actions, so the same person makes use of other human persons whom he has really incorporated to himself by uniting them to his divinity and his humanity.

758. We are now in a position to sum up what has been said.

1. The Church of Christ is the society of mankind raised to the dignity of perfect theocratic society.
2. This society completes the destiny and the end of mankind, which is to be found in truth, virtue and happiness. The Church has as its own proper end God, where truth, virtue and bliss have their source in his essence, reality and absoluteness.
3. Hence, all human beings are called to the Church, although not all respond to their sublime vocation.
4. The head of the Church is the Word Incarnate, the divine person, who carries out the divine activity proper to theocratic society.
5. Finally, becoming invisible to human eyes, he chose from mankind visible ministers ordered towards unity through the primacy of Peter. These were to be instruments of his divine activity, and constitute the Catholic hierarchy.(122)

759. A fourth mark, apostolicity, has to be added, therefore, to the three already indicated.

760. The first three marks are held in common with the universal society of mankind, although in the Church they are realised, perfected and raised to the supernatural order. The fourth mark is proper to the Church alone.

761. The mark of apostolicity shows the Church coming directly from Christ because the Apostles, sent by Christ himself, have been made suitable by him for handing on to future generations his teaching and the supernatural gifts of his Spirit.

This `note' also distinguishes the true Church from other communions separated from it.(123)

762. Let us now examine briefly the special rights in the theocratic society of the Redeemer. First, let us see how these rights can be classified.
In the first place, we can make use of two classes analogous to those applied to the rights of human individuals which, as we said, are composed of connatural and acquired rights.

763. Connatural rights in theocratic society are those springing from its nature in such a way that the society, once it begins to exist, is furnished with these rights.

764. Acquired rights in theocratic society are those which it obtains through some legitimate act, but to which it has no title by constitution or essence.

Let us list both kinds of rights briefly.

765. Rights connatural to the Redeemer's hierarchical Church, that is, the Catholic Church, regard either all human beings living on earth, or the Church's members only.

766. The Church's connatural rights in its relationship to all human creatures can be reduced to five: the right: 1. to existence; 2. to recognition; 3. to freedom; 4. to propagation; 5. to ownership. Let us say a word about each of these rights.

767. I. Proofs of this right:

1. The Church has the right to exist because it is a lawful and just society. All lawful and just societies have a natural right to existence.

768. 2. The Church is the society of mankind raised to the supernatural level, and thus realised, is complete. Its only aim is to give human beings full truth, full virtue and full happiness. Now, the society of mankind is of absolute natural right; it is the supreme and essential right of the human species, and its object is the end and destiny of the species. Human society cannot and will not renounce this end.(124)

769. 3. The society we are speaking of is superior to all other societies, and is their foundation. It cannot, therefore, be abolished or supplanted by other societies.

770. 4. Voluntary adherence to such a society is also the supreme, essential right of every human individual. The exercise of this supreme right cannot be forbidden or blocked by any force or power. Truth, virtue and happiness are connatural and inalienable human rights, the foundation of all other human rights, and consequently the foundation of all possible powers on earth (cf. RI, 44-127).

771. 5. The Church of the Redeemer, therefore, is in possession of all these rights even if it is considered simply as identical with the natural society of mankind which it helps, develops, realises and sublimates. It lacks the imperfection and powerlessness present in the natural society of the human race, which points to man's destiny but cannot lead him to it; in fact, it points imperfectly to this destiny because it indicates abstract truth, natural virtue and limited happiness. The theocracy founded by Christ, on the other hand, points man securely to truth, virtue and happiness and bestows them upon him in reality. If, therefore, natural society has an absolute, inalienable right that cannot possess greater force when considered from the natural point of view, such a right, when looked at in Christianity, receives an infinitely greater value and produces an infinitely greater obligation. Right takes its value from the good which produces it,(125) and good in natural society is increased infinitely in Christianity. What was ideal is now real; what was insufficient is now more than sufficient; what was difficult and impossible to achieve, is now easy and assured.

772. 6. The Catholic Church, therefore, has a connatural, absolute, inalienable, supreme, overwhelming right to exist. It possesses this irrespective of the right received positively from God, who founded the Catholic Church. What we have said springs from consideration of its intimate nature viewed in the light of right reason.

773. It may be objected that not everyone recognises the divinity and rights of the Catholic Church, and that not everyone wishes to belong to it.
I reply that the error of some does not destroy the right proper to others. I grant that the person possessing a right must take precautions when exercising it in order not to offend those in the wrong, amongst whom he must be careful to distinguish carefully those erring in good faith from those in bad faith. The former he must treat with the respect we have spoken about elsewhere (cf. RI, 457, 1827).

774. Secondly, the error of those not accepting the Church cannot prevent others who believe in the Catholic Church (and I am writing particularly for believers) from recognising the justice and cohesion of my deduction about the Church's connatural right to exist. Catholics cannot support the objection I have just dealt with.

775. Thirdly, the Church's right to free association, held in common with all other naturally lawful societies, requires only the principles of rational Right in order to be recognised. Its lawfulness can only be denied by those wishing to calumniate the Church. But there is no right to calumny. Everyone has to admit the Church's right to exist.

776. Fourthly, persons inside and outside the Church have to recognise facts, and it is an undeniable fact that the Church sets itself no other end than that of helping human beings to reach their natural destiny, which consists in the possession of truth, virtue and happiness. There are only three ways in which objectors can err:

1. By denying that human destiny consists in the possession of these goods; in this case, they err about the elements of rational Right which does not cease to be such because some people ignore or disregard it.

2. By denying that this is in fact the Catholic Church's end; in this case, they show their ignorance of fact, and facts do not change because some people ignore them. Individuals should inform themselves, and recognise the Church's end, purpose and character.

3. By denying that the means used by the Church to reach the end it proposes are suitable for guiding human beings to their destiny; in this case, we have another error of fact regarding the divine mission of the Church, its divine power, and so on. People should begin by approving the end the Church sets itself, and then argue about the means by examining the history of its foundation, which presents ample proof of its divine, heavenly origin. This divine origin, and the marvels and other arguments that have persuaded generations for nineteen centuries, and convinced the two hundred million people now believing in the Church, remain what they are. The proofs and truth professed by the whole of the civilised world, by the barbarian world civilised by truth, and the savage world it is civilising now, do not change. Nor is it just or equitable that those knowing the truth should renounce their rights to it or suspend the exercise of these rights until other people have come to know the truth - some will never attain it because they do not want to do so.

777. The Catholic Church and its members would contradict their faith if they did not recognise the Church's right to existence, as set out above, and act in accordance with it.

778. II. The sanction of this right. - The lawful sanction following from this right is apparent in the character and nature of the right, which we have described previously.
The Church's right to exist forms part of essential right (cf. RI, 48-52); damage to this right involves essential injury (cf. RI, 87-127). We have already treated at length the question: `What kind of force can be used in defence of connatural rights?' (cf. RI, 139-238). What we have said can be applied exactly to defence of the right to exist possessed by the society of mankind when raised to the state of Catholic Church.

A few observations need to be added.

The essential right of which we are speaking is by nature totally individual. Man possesses it as an individual of the human species, whether he is in the natural state with its barely developed personship, or has been raised, as a Christian, to a state of sublimated, developed personship.(126) The faculty for defending such a right forcefully, in the manner indicated, is proper to each human being and to each Catholic Christian.
This faculty, therefore, forms part of communal Right.

779. Does it not also form part of governmental Right in Christian society?

We have seen that government in theocratic society has jural power to teach its members and direct them to their end.
It is the responsibility of Church government, therefore, in so far as it possesses teaching and ordinative power, to teach and direct the members of the Church in the holiest and most effective exercise of their rights.(127)
Church authority, therefore, can assist its members in the defence of their essential rights(128) by means of instruction and direction.(129)

780. Every lawful society has the right to come into being and to exist. In addition, it has the right to recognition (cf. USR, 439-445).
The right to recognition means the right according to which all other human beings and societies, without distinction, recognise the bond established within a society by its members; others have to recognise this bond as a jural fact giving rise to rights and obligations. It also means the right according to which all other human beings and societies, in dealing with members of this society, are obliged to respect the rights and obligations which its members have agreed upon amongst themselves, and which constitute their jural state.

781. It follows that recognition of the Church's existence implies recognition of her constitution and of her hierarchic power, together with willingness to treat each of her members in such a way that none of them, in relationship to their fellow-members, is constrained or led to neglect their obligations, or deprived of their socio-theocratic rights.

782. For example, a priest in the United States of America explained that the confessional secret formed part of the constitution and laws of the Catholic Church. As a result, it was felt necessary in that country to release the priest from giving witness in court to what he had heard in confession. In fact, recognition of the Church's jural existence clearly involves corresponding recognition of a Catholic priest's duty towards the secret of confession, and recognition of the socio-theocratic right of the penitent to secrecy about the sins he confesses. If the temporal power had taken a different attitude it would have attempted to constrain the priest to neglect his social obligations, and to deprive the faithful of their social rights. The same argument can be applied proportionately to the purely ministerial secret.

783. The Catholic Church, therefore, has the right to be recognised. The jural state of its members, whether simple faithful or rulers holding hierarchical authority, must be recognised by all people and by every society. In a word, recognition is due to the whole complex of their socio-theocratic rights and their obligations.

784. This right springs from the Church's existence as a lawful society, but it is greatly reinforced by the divine marks which confer upon the Church a much firmer right, or rather authority, to exist. These marks have been listed above. The right to recognition is the necessary, proximate consequence of the right to exist.

785. The Catholic Church's right to exist, and her consequent right to recognition, have their source, as we have seen, in the essential right possessed inalienably by every human individual. We have called this right the right of absolute freedom. By reason of this right, human beings enjoy freedom that can never be justly taken away from them, nor lessened (cf. RI, 60-62, 66, 251).

786. In this right to absolute freedom, a distinction can be made between power and virtuality, that is, between the power of such freedom and the acts virtually contained in the power (cf. RI, 82).

The right to absolute freedom possessed by every human being refers not only to the power but also to the virtuality of absolute freedom.
We have listed several specific actions constituting this virtuality (cf. RI, 267), each of which, we said, is the subject of a connatural and inalienable right. One of them is the right of association (cf. USR, 432).

787. These rights belong to all individuals as human beings, essentially members of the universal society of mankind.

788. They are also rights possessed by all individuals making up the Church of JESUS Christ.
When individuals enter the Church, their humanity develops and increases, and their personship is enhanced. This is a jural fact, an element in supernatural Right. In virtue of this fact, the person, or essential freedom of the human being, requires an infinitely greater respect.

789. The right to freedom, held by all members forming theocratic society, consists in their not being impeded by anyone in the fulfilment of their social obligations and in the exercise of their social rights. Just as these social obligations and rights must be recognised by all (right to recognition), so they must be respected by all in such a way that no obstacle is placed to their fulfilment (right of social freedom). Moreover, there must be no attempt to impede the fulfilment of these rights and duties, unless this occurs indirectly as a result of the exercise by others of their own rights.

790. Freedom in perfect theocratic society, therefore, implies free exercise of all seven powers recognised in it by the members forming the society.

791. Freedom in the same society implies recognition and respect for its suitability and faculty to acquire all rights that can be acquired by naturally lawful, collective bodies in virtue of the natural titles to these rights possessed by all human beings and every other society.

792. The Catholic Church's right to propagation is established on the following titles:
1. The Catholic Church teaches the truth, and all human beings have the connatural right to communicate the truth to others (cf. RI, 147, 267).

793. 2. The Catholic Church is a school of virtue, and all human beings have the connatural right to persuade their fellows to be virtuous (cf. RI, 267-269).

794. 3. Membership of the Catholic Church does no harm to anyone; it does good to those joining her. All human beings have the right to do good to others (cf. RI, 228-238) (the right to proselytise).

795. 4. The Catholic Church is a lawful society. All lawful societies, having the right to exist, also have the right to invite to membership those wishing to join them.

796. 5. The Catholic Church is the society of mankind elevated to the supernatural level. Hence every human being has the right and the duty to belong to it as soon as he learns about it. The Catholic Church, in working appropriately (cf. RI, 269) to draw all to itself, is only helping them to exercise their rights and fulfil their duties. Everyone has the right to offer such beneficial assistance.

797. 6. Finally, the right of propagation comes to the Church from the right of seigniory belonging to God, who has instituted the Church. The right of propagation extends to all human beings and to all societies because God has commanded the ministers of the Church to preach the gospel to all nations and to baptise them, that is, to enrol them in the theocratic society of Christ.(130)

798. Finally, the Church has the connatural right to ownership. It is a lawful society, and all lawful societies have this right (cf. 446-449).
We have already seen this, and have moreover shown that no one and no society can limit such a right under the pretext of damage that may ensue from the accumulation of wealth. This damage either does not exist, or can be forestalled, or put right in other genuinely jural ways.
We added, however, that the right to possess ceases in a society when the right is exercised in open contradiction with the end of the society. Can this occur in the case of the Church? We shall discuss this later when we examine the questions of acquired rights in the Church and, in particular, of the property and wealth already acquired by her.

799. We have spoken elsewhere about the sanction of connatural rights (cf. RI, 161-238). We have also mentioned sanction related to the Church's right to existence (cf. 778-779). The reader may refer to what we have said.

800. The Church's rights relative to all human beings and all societies, which we have mentioned above, call forth corresponding rights towards the Church in all individuals and societies. These rights are as follows.

A. The right to know the Church. People could not be obliged to recognise the Catholic Church if they did not first know her for what she is. - The right to know the Church is connatural in all, just as their right to know the truth is connatural. The exercise of this right is linked with their duty to acknowledge the Church, which they are obliged to acknowledge practically only in so far as they know her. If they know her as a lawful society, that is, free from immorality but nothing more, their obligation to acknowledge her is not as great as it would be if they knew her as a society founded by God himself for the salvation and perfection of mankind. - The right to know brings with it the right to examine, but it does not authorise wrongful or biased examination, nor illogical method in correct examination, nor any other abuse in the employment of such a right.

801. B. The right to join. Because the Church is the society of mankind raised to a sublime level, every human being, precisely because he is human, has the right to be accepted for membership in the Church when he believes in the gospel he has received. This right is conditioned, however, by the individual's willingness to submit to the social conditions required of persons joining the society.

802. C. The right to protection. - Every human being and every society has the right to protect the rights of others, but especially the rights of the Church. This is a beneficent and religious act (cf. USR, 167-168). It does not mean, however, that anyone possesses a right of wardship over the Church. Such a right involves superiority, and no individual or society is superior to the Church.

803. We also need to note that the right to protect the Church does not justify interference in her internal affairs. This applies even more strongly to the use of force against the Church's rulers in order to impede their freedom of government. Nor does the use of this right allow the usurpation of other rights. The abuse of the right to protection is not to be confused with the exercise of such a right.

804. Relative to its members, the Church has the right to exercise freely the seven powers we have listed. All the members have the jural duty to submit to the sevenfold power, which they have acknowledged by their entrance to the Church.

805. Every ordinary member of the Church depends upon her government, as the member of any society depends upon its government. We have already stated the principles according to which this dependence is determined. The most important is consideration of the requirements of the society's constitution.

806. Here it is sufficient to note that directive power (cf. 779) in the Church is intended to regulate the life of the faithful and the exercise of their rights by aiding, not impeding their sanctification. Consequently, such power is very extensive, and has a lawful, although indirect and moral, influence, even over temporal matters.

We offer some brief observations about the sanction governing these rights in the Church.

807. To which power does the Church's right of sanction over her members belong?

Sanctions can be considered as a function proper to every right.(131) From this point of view, each of the seven powers provides its own sanction. The sanction of constitutive power, for example, is a function of this power, and so on for the other powers.

808. In the second place, the right of sanction can be considered as a force or effective power (the `matter' of right). From this point of view, the power of sanction is the result of linking several powers, amongst which are the power of binding and loosing, of imposing penances, of depriving the faithful of ecclesiastical benefits, and so on.

809. Finally, the right of sanction can be considered as an executive means. From this point of view, it belongs to directive power, which includes executive power, and becomes one of its functions.

810. What kind of sanction does the Church use to strengthen the exercise of its powers relative to its members?

We have seen that the Church's rights relative to all human beings can be defended against aggressors even by external force, provided it is employed correctly. As we said, anyone may help the Church in this way (cf. RI, 144-238). This is not the case with the Church's rights relative to her members, that is, with the rights that church government possesses relative to its subjects. Sanctions of these rights are essentially pacific.(132)

811. What gives rise to the difference between the sanction of the Church's rights relative to all human beings, and that of the rights of church government relative to the members of the Church?

The rights of the Church relative to all human beings are those which bring her into existence and maintain her power to act. Defence of these rights is defence of her existence and her activity. External force can help to prevent the Church's overthrow in a country, and can therefore be used by anyone against others who abuse force by attacking the Church or her freedom to act (cf. RI, 203-207).

812. On the other hand, all the rights of church government towards her members tend solely to the sanctification of the members which is not brought about by force. An individual is good and holy only in so far as he clings to justice and charity through his own interior, spontaneous act. Force would be useless for such a purpose because it could not conserve the sole good sought by the Church in the exercise of her rights, nor could it maintain the rights of which we are speaking. Right deprived of its good is no right at all.(133)

813. We must also note that the external force which sanctions the Church's rights relative to all human beings, is not to be used, properly speaking, by church government, but by the members of the Church. Ecclesiastical government itself has a pacific mission, the sanctification of the members of the Church.
The right of sanction relative to the Church's right to exist and operate freely is a right inherent in every individual as such. Its origin is not to be found, strictly speaking, in church government, which can only direct human beings in the best and holiest exercise of their rights. It cannot give them the rights themselves, nor exercise them in their place.

814. What sanction can church government use to maintain the rights it exercises relative to the members of the society it rules?

The sanction consists in two powers:

1. the power to impose penance, and
2. the power to deprive the unrepentant of the benefits they possess in the Church.

815. The power to impose penance extends to inflicting corporal and temporal punishment of all kinds (the first type of punishment), except capital punishment and punishments which of their nature slowly destroy life. These lawful punishments, although corporal and temporal, do not in fact come under the heading of sanction by force, because this is imposed with violence. Penances imposed by the Church are always accepted voluntarily by the faithful on whom they are imposed. Faith alone, not external force, is the stimulus prompting the members to accept the penance, because they believe their eternal salvation depends upon reconciliation with God and the Church. Penance is imposed as a condition of their reconciliation. Here, the Church although lawfully exercising power over temporal things, does not impose it violently. It is accepted willingly by the members, as their duty demands.(134)

816. The power to exclude the unrepentant from sharing in the benefits of the Church (the second type of punishment) consists principally in refusing them absolution from sin. This is a spiritual sanction, nothing more, and is carried out fully when exercised by the Church through excommunication.

817. Although this power is entirely spiritual, it has certain necessary temporal consequences, as we shall see immediately.

First, participation in church benefits requires external acts. Those deprived of these benefits are excluded from the external, material acts by which they are benefited. Refusal of these benefits itself entails external, material acts.

Second, the Church sometimes excludes the unrepentant from external acts common to the body of the faithful for two reasons: to help them realise the horror of the fault committed; and to safeguard the rest of the faithful from infection.

Regret and punishment, which must result as the guilty see themselves cut off externally from other members, is a kind of penance and, in so far as the separation is something they have to accept for themselves, an obligatory command that can be carried out only spontaneously and willingly. In so far as the rest of the faithful are obliged to have nothing to do with excommunicated persons, such ecclesiastical punishment can be considered globally as a penance inflicted on the persons excommunicated, as a public profession of faith by those avoiding them and thus manifesting their disagreement with them, and finally as a precaution against the spread of the contagion amongst the faithful in general.

818. A third kind of punishment may be inflicted as a mode of forceful sanction of the Church's laws. In this case, sanctions are employed to overcome material obstacles to obedience to the laws; force helps persuasion by correcting recalcitrant animal instinct, and is useful in dealing with children, with the insane, and with uncouth people, as I have noted elsewhere.(135) Great wisdom is needed, however, in applying this force, which is more of a stimulus than a sanction. Its use should be moderated according to the grossness of the persons concerned, and abandoned as soon as it is clear that opposition to church law arises from lack of instruction or from badly disposed will, rather than from material instinct.

819. Nevertheless, this kind of force also is never inflicted directly by church government, although it can be employed by a Christian people, by a father towards his children, by superiors towards their subjects, and so on.

820. This kind of force, and the other sanctions we have spoken of, are not to be confused with punishments inflicted by temporal government upon heretics or others whose offences against the laws of the Church are considered harmful to the State. This is a fourth class of punishment aimed at eliminating failings against the rights of the Church.

821. Punishments of this nature have a place provided they are aimed at truly criminal offences, such as riots and rebellion, disturbance of individuals' civil liberties, violence, killings and so on. Such crimes deserve punishment, irrespective of their cause, although the cause may justly provoke severer punishment necessary to suppress the criminal impulse producing the cause.(136)

822. Finally, we should note that these last two classes of punishment have sometimes coincided. When civil government wished to suppress disorders in civil society arising from rebellion against the Church, and the Church wished to chastise her children in order to lead them to penance, church and civil authority agreed in inflicting certain punishments on offenders.(137)

823. As we have seen (cf. RI, 284), the right to innate, relative freedom is the source of acquired rights.
Such freedom is proper to isolated individuals, and to individuals in association, that is, societies (cf. USR, 426-449). It is a complex right, embracing the right to every kind of ownership.

824. Generally speaking, every society possesses this connatural right to acquire all kinds of ownership and material dominion, provided it does so under just titles common to all mankind (cf. USR, 446-449).
In applying this principle to the Church, we concluded that she was as free as other individuals and societies to acquire rights and ownership of any kind without limit, granted just title.(138)

825. The various jurisdictions and acquired rights of the Church are dominion and ownership accruing to her by just title, and every other right which is not a necessary consequence of her constitution and of divine right.
An objection is possible at this point. As we said, a society's end sets limits to its social right to ownership: societies can own only if, and in so far as, their possessions are not excluded by their end, or are not harmful to that end. But the end of the Church is totally spiritual; it has been founded only for the sanctification of mankind. It would seem, therefore, that temporal rights of ownership and dominion are excluded from the Church's end.

826. This objection merits careful attention. From the time of Julian the Apostate, it has often been repeated, and on occasion has prevailed as solid right.

A society's end can be related to temporal goods in three ways:

1. It can require them if their acquisition constitutes the end of the society, or if they are indispensable means to the attainment of its end.
2. It is able not to reject them although they may not be absolutely necessary to the society's end.
3. Finally, it may exclude them and totally reject them.

827. Only in the last case, as we said, is any society constitutionally incapable of ownership. Amongst such societies are those religious orders whose members have vowed publicly to renounce any kind of civil possession. This is not the case, however, with church society in general whose end, therefore, does not exclude its faculty to acquire temporal rights, and to possess.(139)

828. What is the relationship between the Church's end and temporal goods and rights?

The word `Church' is sometimes taken to mean the government of the Church, the clergy, the complex of its ministers. Sometimes it stands for the community of all the faithful. Let us examine the relationship between the clergy's end and temporalities, and that between the end of the community of the faithful and their temporal goods.

829. First, the clergy's end requires some temporal goods as a condition of their subsistence. The clergy's right to depend for subsistence upon stipends for time dedicated to the exercise of the ministry, and therefore no longer available for earning a living or decently enriching oneself, is assured by rational, theocratic Right, and by divine, positive right.(140)

830. The clergy, therefore, have in common with all men and women, and with all societies, the right to acquire temporal goods on the basis of just titles. In addition, they have their own proper title, in their quality as church ministers, to require their necessary sustenance from the community of the faithful to whom they minister spiritual things. The faithful are jurally obliged to provide what is necessary for the purpose.

831. What is the relationship between the end for which the clergy exist and the temporal goods superfluous to their maintenance? Are these required necessarily by their end, or excluded and rejected by the end? - Neither one nor the other. The end for which the clergy exist does not absolutely require these goods, nor does it exclude or reject them. The only condition to be observed relative to this end is that the clergy use goods superfluous to their maintenance for pious purposes. In this way, such temporalities are not an impediment, but an aid to the sanctification of the faithful, the end for which Christ instituted the clergy.

832. Having distinguished what is necessary for the clergy's maintenance in their special work from what is superfluous to such maintenance, we have to conclude:

1. That the clergy have a special, proper title to maintenance which obliges the Christian community to provide for them.
2. That while the clergy have no special, proper title to what is superfluous to their maintenance, no one is free to deprive the clergy of the jural freedom by which they acquire such goods in accord with just titles common to all individuals and to all lawful societies. Moreover, the clergy cannot be deprived of the freedom to administer and dispose the temporalities they have acquired, although they are obliged to use them for pious causes, that is, in encouraging piety and in exercising charity.

833. It is true that temporal charity, which can be exercised by all the faithful, is not work exclusive to the clergy. Hence, when the clergy feed the hungry, clothe the naked, care for the sick, and carry out other works of corporal charity, they do not, strictly speaking, act as clergy.
And this shows even more clearly that the clergy have the right to use in pious works the temporalities they have acquired by just title, or hold as trustees or administrators. Members of the clergy do not cease to be members of the Church, nor do they lose the rights inherent to their position as simple faithful. The greater contains the less.

834. Each of the faithful can exercise temporal charity on his own, or through others.

835. If the Christian people, of whom the clergy are a part, entrusts to the clergy temporalities which it consecrates to works of charity and religion, it does not exceed its rights. Nor do the clergy overstep their right in accepting administration and distribution of these goods. It is natural, useful and fitting that matters should be arranged in this way.

836. It is natural, because to trust its teachers, its shepherds and spiritual fathers is natural to people who see that certain persons have been set aside from earthly things for the sake of divine service, and have undertaken to live as models of virtue.

837. It is useful, because the clergy offer the people the best possible guarantee of faithful and enlightened administration, granted their knowledge and virtue, and granted the special circumstances which enable them to recognise and provide for real human necessity in the most suitable way. In fact, delicacy is often needed to avoid embarrassing indigent people; impartiality and economy are required in the distribution and administration of goods; finally (this is supremely important), there is the problem of spiritual assistance for those being helped materially. All this can best be faced by the clergy.

838. We should recognise that material help can be of great assistance in the sanctification of the faithful, which is the special work of priests. When material help is employed for this purpose, it not only alleviates misery, but eliminates its causes.

839. Finally, it is fitting because it is becoming that through such works, which generate greater respect and affection for those to whom they are entrusted, the clergy's most holy work of ministry should be facilitated. In any case, the clergy have the right to intervene in administration to ensure that the will of the donors is not frustrated.(141)

840. Churchmen, therefore, administer and distribute goods set aside for pious works, but they do this, as far as strict right is concerned, as simple members of the faithful designated for the purpose by their fellow-members. But it is especially fitting that they should be designated for this work.

841. At this point, we can examine the Church's right to ownership relative to her existence as a fellowship of the faithful, not simply as clergy.

842. The fellowship of the faithful, amongst whom the clergy are certainly included, is a society capable of common, unlimited ownership, on the basis of just titles.

843. The title to ownership is normally that which also determines the use of the goods.

844. I say `normally' because it is certain that Christian fellowship would act within its rights if it were to accumulate goods without any attempt to determine their use, leaving this to the free decision of the fellowship itself. In this case, however, such temporalities could not be called `church goods' because they would not have been devoted to pious or charitable uses. The faithful would have simply acted as human beings. They do not cease to be such because they are faithful, just as churchmen do not cease to be members of the faithful.

845. But if the goods which they have put together are dedicated expressly or implicitly to charity or religion, this end must be maintained. If a person has left money or property for the construction of a church or hospital on a given site, the local community of the faithful is indeed the owner of these goods. Its ownership, however, is restricted and conditioned by the object for which the goods were donated or willed. The community of the faithful cannot use them for a purpose other than that established by the will of the donor.

846. If the donor's will cannot be carried out, his disposition, according to simple rational Right, becomes null.

847. Ownership lasts and is transmitted as long as the community for which it is given remains in existence.

848. If the administration of gifts has not been established by will of the donor, the community for whose use they have been donated and which has become their owner, can choose the administrator it thinks most suitable. In the case of a Catholic community, however, equity, utility, fittingness and church law naturally require bishops and lower churchmen to undertake the major part of this duty.

849. On the other hand, justice demands that goods be applied solely to the objects determined by the express or presumed will of the person donating them. People using them for other purposes lose their just title and become thieves.

850. Temporalities of this kind do not belong to the nation, or municipalities, but to the community of the faithful, to the Church. The nation, or municipalities, may belong to a different religion from that destined for the pious legacy, or it may embrace people of various religious communities. The Church, I have to insist, is different from the nation, dioceses are different from civil provinces, and parishes from municipalities. The two societies, civil and ecclesial, cannot be confused. As jural persons, they are distinct from one another.(142)

851. It is clear from what we have said that the proposal of the unwary bishop of Autun, and the consequent decree of the national assembly declaring church goods in France to be temporalities belonging to the nation,(143) denied all competence to jural titles. The decree was carried out by brute force, and entailed as many thefts as there were testators and donors who had willed to the Church goods destined for religious or beneficent purposes.(144) This was not the first, and it will not be the last, but it is certainly the greatest usurpation achieved until the present.

852. Lately, revolutionary, anarchical and totalitarian principles of public utility and reasons of State have lost some of the power they exercised over men's minds. Already room is being made for the eternal dictates of rational Right as sources of peace and order. It has been recognised in many places that church goods, that is, those destined for worship or for charity, are essentially different from national goods, and can never be confused with them. Various constitutions have explicitly declared `that such goods can never be incorporated into the State demesne'.(145)

853. The Church's acquired rights would be stable and suffer no violation if RIGHT itself were fully and universally known, and had received from states and nations the respect it deserves. Yet because it still needs to be understood that RIGHT alone provides an unshakeable guarantee of peace and prosperity, it is not a waste of time to consider the possibility of some sanction for maintaining the rights acquired by the Church, and ask if it differs from the two kinds of sanction proper to connatural rights.

854. It differs in the sense that the rights of the Church can be divided into three classes according to the quality of their sanctions. The three classes are made up of: 1. connatural rights relative to every human being; 2. connatural rights proper to the Church's own members; 3. acquired rights. The sanction proper to the first group of connatural rights is force; to the second group, spiritual penalties; to the third, whatever defends and maintains the rights of nature itself (ownership and dominion) for all other human beings.

855. Owners and those possessing material dominion find in the force proper to civil society the means required to help them protect what they have against injustice and rapacity. For the same reason, the fellowship of the faithful and the Church can make use of the courts to have their rights upheld.

856. It is certain that if civil courts did not exist, or did not enforce proper justice, natural sanctions would be available to the Church as they would be for any other proprietor. (cf. RI, 146-151).

857. If we consider the matter historically and factually, we can see that civil authority has never given the same degree of protection to church temporalities and rights as it has to lay temporalities. Very often those in charge of government have taken control of those goods and rights in the name of civil authority. As a result, the Church, the clergy and the communities of the faithful to which the clergy belong have stood before civil society and its government in the same jural relationship as that possessed by one person towards another in the state of nature.

858. This is an undeniable historical fact. The principal violations of acquired rights, and despoiliations of ownership suffered by the Church from people invested with civil authority, and often acting in the name of that authority, are briefly described in a modern German work:

Later, in the 16th century, we find the Church suffering enforced despoiliation of her goods. In Russia, Catherine II (1746 AD) took her turn in grabbing church property, which she first placed under the administration of an `economic committee', and finally within the sphere of State ownership. The clergy were then given salaries. Catherine's policy has recently been repeated by the reigning Czar against the temporalities of the Catholic Church in Poland.(158) We know only too well what happened to church goods in France at the time of the revolution.(159) In Germany, church lands and episcopal domains, along with goods belonging to chapters, abbeys and monasteries, were secularised to indemnify secular princes, although goods used for worship and charitable foundations were respected.(160) In Sweden, church goods were severely attacked; two-thirds of abbatial tithes were confiscated by the crown (1528). In Denmark, church goods were divided equally between the throne, the Church and the pastor. Revolutionary Spain imitated France by declaring church temporalities to be `goods belonging to the nation'. In Switzerland flagrant attempts to confiscate church goods are being made at the present moment. The combination of an apposite Article (12) in the federal agreement, of the influence of the great powers of Europe and of the threat of civil war were not sufficient to guarantee the defence and maintenance of goods belonging to a few poor monasteries of the tiny canton of Aargau.

859. Notorious, constant and repeated facts of this kind show clearly that the rights and temporalities of the Church have never been sufficiently defended by civil laws ensuring private ownership. Such laws deserve scrutiny by decent, religious, Christian legislators.

860. What are the possible causes of the great diversity between security granted by civil authority to the rights and property of private individuals, and the lack of protection afforded to church rights and goods? There are two principal causes, and they merit careful consideration.

1. The imperfect state of the science of Right. As long as this science has not been firmly established and universally determined, it gives rise to false ideas about the power of civil authority. Such theories sometimes play down the powers of civil authority, and sometimes exaggerate them; they may spring from people hostile or obsequious to the State, or from others who wish to cover unjust actions with a cloak of decency favourable to their own interest. As long as the science of Right is uncertain and obscure, each section chooses without hesitation the teachings that confirm its own advantage, and maintains that its actions are justified by one or other of the controverted theories of Right. The voice of conscience is more easily suppressed if the chosen theory favours the extension of civil authority, because anything supporting civil authority is seen as respectable and sacred. Theories of this kind are highly suitable for easing the consciences of people who recognise their advantage. High-ranking persons always see them as more favourable than the other theories (although in reality this is not the case) and thus have no difficulty in seconding them. The Church has been legally despoiled of her rights on innumerable occasions by such theories and will have to wait until sufficient progress has been made in the study of rational Right in order to enjoy the solid guarantees she needs. Meanwhile, she must continue her work of establishing the true, impartial principles of Right in men's minds. The best parts of modern legislation do in fact depend upon what the Church has given to the world.

861. 2. The imbalance between church ownership and civil power in which the Church shares. - This is a reason founded in the science of political equilibrium, with which I shall deal in the fourth book on social right. De facto civil power is only an aggregate of the powers of all the members of civil society. If every citizen contributed to the formation of de facto civil power in proportion to the quantity of his property, ownership would be assured. If an owner contributes less to the formation of real power in civil society than his property warrants, his possessions are in danger. I shall demonstrate this principle clearly; it explains the history of every revolution in human affairs. For the moment, however, I want to insist that church ownership has never possessed proper weight in the balance of political power, and consequently has never been solidly assured. This is truer now than ever [App., no. 4].

862. When necessary, therefore, the Church has the same sanction for its rights as all individuals and societies found in the natural state. This is an evident conclusion from the principles of rational Right, and altogether independent of ascertaining whether the Church wishes to use such a right, or thinks it in keeping with her spirit of generosity and meekness, or whether she judges its use prudent only at certain times and with certain qualifications, or has special instructions about the exercise of the right from her divine Founder - all this is completely outside the ambit of rational right and within the sole competence of divine, supernatural right.

863. According to natural right, therefore, the faithful under the leadership and direction of their pastors, and in addition to their status as citizens, have the right to unite and to deal peacefully with all matters pertaining to the jural defence of their rights and of the goods belonging to their society (the Church) in the same way as any other owner, just as universal-social right teaches.

864. The Church can also add spiritual penalties to support the defence of her own goods and rights, as she has always done. She defends herself in this way against those invested with civil authority `whatever their imperial or royal dignity', as the Council of Trent declares, if, under pretext of this power, `however it may be exercised', they usurp these goods, or prevent their possession and use by those for whom they are destined, or change their purpose.(161) Such penalties are effective against Christians, but they cannot restrain avidity when faith is dead. They are non-violent sanctions, and hence cannot curtail the activity of violent people, but are most fitting for the Church, and the only penalties worthy of her.(162)

Notes

(118) Jn 10: 18.

(119) `The Holy Spirit has placed you bishops, TO RULE the Church of God' (Acts 20: 28 [Douai]).

(120) Jn 20: 21. With these words, Christ gave the Apostles the faculty to send others with the same faculties in the way he himself had been sent, and empowered by the Father to send others.

(121) Mt 28: 20. It may be objected that because baptism can be validly conferred by every human being, Christ did not confer this power upon his Church alone. However, every person who baptises must have the intention of doing what the Church does when she baptises. Otherwise, the baptism is invalid. It is therefore the intention and faith of the Church which is important, and it can be said that a non-believer makes himself an instrument of the Church when he baptises. Cf. Catechism of the Council of Trent, p. 2, c. 2: 22, 33.

(122) Because I am writing for Catholics, I have no need to prove what they believe. Proofs can be found in books of dogma and apologetics, where they can be consulted if readers wish to do so. My principal aim is to put the ideas together logically, and to offer readers a coherent treatise which itself offers strong proof of the truth for a person who feels that the intrinsic characteristic of truth lies in its perfect, interior harmony.

(123) `Let [the heretics] show the origins of their churches; let them put forward the order in which their bishops succeeded to one another from the beginning and show that their first bishop had as his maker and predecessor someone from the Apostles, or apostolic men who had persevered with the Apostles. This is how the apostolic churches make up their records. Thus the church at Smyrna has Polycarp, who was placed there by John, and the church of Rome tells us that Clement was ordained by Peter. Let the rest then show those whom they have constituted as bishops to be drawn from the apostolic seed' (Tertullian, d. 215 AD, De Praescript. haeretic. c. 32).

(124) Cf. SP, 219-220.

(125) Cf. ER, 252-255.

(126) Cf. We have shown elsewhere that the basis of human personship changes when human beings are placed in the supernatural order. Cf. Dottrina del peccato originale, q. 5.

(127) Christianity spoke to and cared for individuals rather than societies. Cf. SP, 476-486.

(128) Later in this book, when we analysise the ordinative power of the Church, we shall indicate the special powers of which it is composed.

(129) This teaching could be seen as a way of justifying possible abuse of church authority on the part of persons using it for their own special interests. Such a suspicion would be ill-founded. The teaching does not justify abuses, just as abuses do not destroy the teaching on rights. Cf. RI, 459, for the principles followed in developing the most delicate part of the teaching.

(130) Mt 28: 18-20; Mk 16: 15.

(131) Cf. ER, 246-251.

(132) It should be noticed that the Church's rights relative to all mankind are rights she necessarily possesses over her own members in whose regard she can uphold these rights forcefully just as she does with human beings in general. The Church can also defend her acquired rights with force against her own members, as we shall see later. For example, when Theodosius removed the Arian bishop, Demophilus, from the see of Constantinople (380 AD), he defended: 1. the Catholic Church's connatural right to exist (Arianism, which was not the Church, was killing the Church); 2. rights acquired over church buildings and other ecclesiastical possessions at Constantinople, usurped violently and unjustly by the heretics.

(133) `Some good present in the action', is the third constitutive element of right. Cf. ER, 252-255.

(134) Public penances go back to the first centuries of the Church's history. Cf. Tertullian, Apol., c. 39; De Pud., c. 5; De Poen., c. 9; St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer., bk. 1, c. 13, nn. 5-6.

(135) Cf. AMS, 735-737. The Scriptures speak of this kind of paternal punishment as useful and just. Cf. Prov 13: 23; Sir 30: [1-2].

(136) Heresies have always been the cause of public unrest. This is one of the principal reasons why governments decreed the use of temporal punishment against heretics (Cod. Theod., 1. Just. 1:1, De Fide Catholica; C. Th., 14: 4, De his qui super religione contendunt; Cod. Th., 16: 5, Just. 1: 5, De haereticis). In the 13th century, rebellion and violence compelled rulers to issue new, severe laws against heretics. Cf., for example, those decreed by St. Louis of France (1228 AD), and those of Frederick II (1234 AD). Spanish royal edicts are known only too well. In Russia, even in the last century, heresies originating in the Russian church were punished with burning.

(137) Examples of such mixed punishments are, I think, those sometimes inflicted by the Church herself with the support of civil authority.

For instance:
1. Exile, mentioned in the Roman Council (503 AD) under Symmachus; Constantinople III, Act. 7; Orleans IV, can. 29; Toledo XII, can. 10: S. Gregory the Great, bk. 2, ep. 71. ad Arthemium, and the Codex of Canon Law, can. 3, distinct. 3; can. , c. 3; quaest. 4; can. 3.

2.Floggings, mentioned in St. Augustine (Ep. 133, bk. 2 ad Marcellinum Trib.); St. Cyprian (5., Surio in the Vita di S. Cesario, 24th August.); St. Gregory the Great (bk. 4. Ep. 27; bk. 5, Ep. 65); Cassian (Instit. bk. 4, c. 16); Palladius (Hist. Lausic. c. 7); the Councils of Agde (can. 38, 41, ap. Labb. t. 5, col. 527-528); of Narbonne, under Recardeus (can. 13, ap. Labb. t. VI, col. 728); Epaon (can. 13, ap. Labb. t. 5, col. 713); and of Mâcon (can. 8, ap. Labb. 6, col. 660).

3.Fines, mentioned in Coun. of Carthage V, c. 400 AD (ap. Labb. t. II, col. 1454), in St. Augustine (Ep. 104), and St. Gregory the Great (bk. 4, Ep. 26).

4.Ecclesiastical imprisonment, mentioned by the Emperors Arcadius and Honorius (Leg. 30. Cod. Theod. de Haeret.); by Justinian (Nov. 79, cap. 2); by the Capitularies of Charlemagne (bk. 5, ap. Balut.); by Basil the Deacon (Libell. ad Teod. et Valentinian. in actis Concilii Ephes., P. 1, c.30); by Gregory II (Ep. ad. Leon. Isaar. ap. Labb t. 8, col. 671); by the Councils of Mâcon (ap. Labb. t. 6, col. 65); of Seville (ivi col. 1314), and of Epaon (ivi t. 5, col. 711).

(138) Although the Christian religion was not positively recognised by the government under the pagan emperors, no one doubted that it had the same right to possess as all other societies. Roman legislation implicitly recognised the right to possess in all societies not expressly prohibited by law or by the supreme power. Hence Christians could appeal to Aurelian when Paul of Samosata, excommunicated by the Council of Antioch, refused to leave the bishop's residence. The emperor decided (271 AD) that the decision about ownership of the house should be left to the Italian bishops, and in particular to the decision of the bishop of Rome (Eusebius, Histor., bk. 7, c. 23). Licinius' edict (313 AD) illustrates the same point. It does not authorise the Church to possess, but requires restitution of the temporalities of which she had been robbed. This shows that there was no argument about her natural right to possess, which was taken for granted. We have quoted elsewhere the relevant words of the edict.

(139) The best judge of what is required for a society's end is the society itself, because its end is as important to it as its existence. This principle is applicable in a special way to the Church, which is always assisted by her divine Founder. The Church has never doubted her faculty for possessing, as we can see in the references given in Mammachi who amply refers to and defends the Church's feelings in the matter. Here, I shall simply refer to certain councils which take for granted this right of the Church to acquire rights and temporalities. Ecumenical councils: Chalcedon (451 AD), Act. 6, can. 2; Act. 10, can. 26. - Lateran I (1123 AD), can. 1. - Lateran II (1139 AD), can. 25. - Lateran III (1179 AD), can. 15, 19. - Lateran IV (1215 AD), can. 46. - Lyons II gen. (1274 AD), can. 12, 22. - Constance (1414 AD), sess. 8. - Trent, sess. 22, c. 11. Other Councils suppose or declare the same right of the Church, amongst them the following: Ancyra (314 AD), can. 15. - Antioch (341 AD), can. 24. - Constantinople (536 AD). - Trullo (7th cent. AD), can. 35. - Mainz (428 AD). - Paris III (767 AD), can. 1. - Paris V (1050 AD), can. 9. - Paris VI (1105 AD), can. 15. - Arles (452 AD), can. 47. - Mâcon (581 AD), can. 4. - Lyons II partic. (567 AD), can. 2. - Tours (566 AD), can. 24, 25. - Orleans I (511 AD). - Orleans II (533 AD). - Orleans III (538 AD). - Orleans IV (645 AD). - Orleans V (1017 AD), cap. 13 ss. - Trier I (895 AD), cap. 7.

(140) Mt 10: 9-15; Mk 6: 8-11; Lk 9: 3-5; 10: 4-12. In these pages, JESUS Christ frees his ministers from preoccupation about necessary temporalities by obliging the faithful whom they serve to provide food, housing and everything else needed by their pastors. `Christ shows clearly why he did not wish them to possess and be burdened with these things. It was not that they were not necessary for sustaining life, but because he sent the Apostles in such a way as to show that they were owed these things, the soldiers' pay, as it were, by those believers to whom they would announce the Gospel' (St. Augustine, De Consensu Evangel. bk. 2, c. 30). JESUS Christ commands the faithful under grave penalty to provide what is necessary; he leaves further contributions to the generosity of the faithful. He wants his ministers to be content with what is necessary without refusing the spontaneous, additional offerings the faithful may care to make. `And remain in the same house, eating and drinking what they provide, for the labourer deserves his wages.' Cf. also 1 Cor 9: 1-15, and St. John Chrysostom, Hom. 66 in Mt 5.

(141) The Council of Trent permits donors to nominate lay people, as well as clergy, as administrators of pious foundations. Benefactors may also decide who are to receive the accounts submitted by the administration, although it is understood that provision should be made for the inclusion amongst these persons of the Ordinary of the diocese, `unless indeed this has been expressly catered for in the establishment and ordinance of such a church or building' (Sess. 32, De Reform. c. 9).

(142) This confusion of ideas still prevails in French law. Churches and restored presbyteries were declared town properties in the Avis du Conseil d'État du 2 pluviose XIII (22nd January, 1805).

(143) Decree of 24th November, 1789 (13 brumaire II). Ecclesiastical temporalities of the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine were also declared national property by the Consuls by decree of 9th June, 1802 (20 prairial X).

(144) Sièyes' speech on this occasion (10th August, 1789), printed under the title Observations sommaires sur les biens ecclésiastiques, merits attention. `Although the nation is the supreme legislator (it must be remembered that this was the period of revolutionary absolutism), it cannot deprive me of my property nor of my opinion. The principles of all legislation contain guarantees for ownership. How can the legislator deprive me of my ownership if his only reason for existence is to protect it?' Again: `Ecclesiastical temporalities, like all others, belong to those specifically named as owners by the donors who, although they were free to use them in any legitimate way, have in fact and under the disposition of the law BEQUEATHED THEM TO THE CLERGY AND NOT TO THE NATION.'

(145) The Constitutions of Poland, 27th Nov. 1815, §13 - of Baveria, 26th May 1818, tit. 4, §9, 10; Edict of Religion of Baveria, 26th May 1818, §3l, 44-49 - The Constitutions of Baden, 22nd August 1818, §20 - of Würtemberg, 25th Sept. 1819, §77, 82 - of the Grand Duchy of Hessen, 17th December 1820, §43, 44 - of Saxony - Saxe-Coburg 8th August 1821, §29, 30 - of Saxony - Saxe-Meiningen, 23rd August 1829, art. 33 - of the Electorate of Hessen, 5th January 1831, §138 - of Altenburg, 29 April 1831, §155 - of the kingdom of Saxony, 4th September 1831, §60 - of Hanover, 26th September 1833, §68.

(146) Chron. Virdun. (Bouquet t. 3. p. 364): `(Charles) dared to take away the ecclesiastical lands and hand them over to his comrades-in-arms. In the end, he was not afraid to give even bishoprics to lay people.'

(147) Capit. Caroli M. (743 AD), c. 2. Benedict. Levit. Capit. bk. 5, c. 6; bk. 6, c. 175. A compromise had to be reached with the king, to whom the Church ceded part of her possessions. The king granted them to those fighting for him, and paid a small recognition to the Church. At the death of the final beneficiary, however, such possessions had to be returned to the Church unless the king had obtained from the Church the faculty of granting them once more to others.

(148) Capit. Acquisgran. 816 (817 AD) c. 1. - Capit. Reg. Francor. bk. 1, C. 77; bk. 6, c. 427; bk. 7, c. 142, 261.

(149) This is shown in the concordat agreed with the bishops of the Council held at Beauvais (845 AD), c. 3: 5.

(150) Edict. Caroli II de tributo Nordmannico (877 AD): De ecclesiis vero, quas comites et vasalli dominici habent, etc. - Regino, De eccles. discipl. bk. 1, c. 10: Ut (episcopi) ecclesias tam a regibus in beneficium datas, quam et aliorum, summo studio provideant.

(151) Agobard. (d. cir. 840 AD), De dispens. rerum eccles. c. 15. `At this time, they have acted against the pious wishes of our predecessors by thinking that it is lawful to sell not only the fabric of the churches, which they have succeeded in vindicating for themselves, but those things which many of the faithful have devoutly set aside for their own burial or other holy purposes.'

(152) Council of Coblenz (922 AD), c. 5. `If lay people have their own chapels, it is irrational and contrary to authority for them to take tithes and use them for feeding their dogs and their concubines.'

(153) C. 17: 10, De decim. (3, 30); c. 7: 10, De praescript. (2. 26); c. 9: 10, De rerum permut. (3, 19).

(154) C. 14.

(155) C. 7: 10, De his quae fiunt a praelatis (3: 10); c. 3: 10, De privileg. (5, 33); c. 2, §3, De decim. in VI (3: 13).

(156) This is shown by the Diet of Gelnhausen (1186 AD) in which Urban III put pressure on Frederick I to propose the idea.

(157) Cf. M. Ferd. Walter in his outstanding Manual of Ecclesiastical Law (8th ed. 1839), bk. 6, c. l, §243-244.

(158) Ukase of 6th January, 1842, imposed on the sacred Synod, and the executive Senate. The Pope and the Polish clergy protested.

(159) Tithes in France were expropriated without any indemnity. Cf. Décret des 4-11 août, 1789, art. 5.

(160) Rapport de la députation de l'empire du 25 fév. §34-37, 61, 63, 65.

(161) Cf. sess. 22, De Reform., c. 11.

(162) The following Councils protested and imposed penalties against usurpations at the time of the Merovingians: Clermont I, 535 AD, c. V; Orleans IV, 541 AD, c. 25; Orleans V, 549 AD, c. 14; Paris III, 557 AD, c. 2; Tours II, 567 AD, c. 24, 25. - After the 10th century, the following popes and councils protested and formulated laws against rulers disposing of the Church's temporalities: Council of Rheims, 1094 AD, c. 3, 4; Council of Rouen, 1050 AD, c. 10; Council of Tours, 1060 AD, c. 3; Council of Rome V, 1078 AD, c. I; Lateran Council I. 1123 AD, c. 14 (c. 14, c. 10, q. 1); Lateran Council II, 1139 AD, c. 10. - C. 3, c. 16, q. 2 (Nicol. II. 1059 AD); c. 1, c. 16, q. 7 (Gregor. VII, 1078 AD), c.3, eod. Sive c. 13, c. 1, q. 3 (idem eod.), Lateran Council II, 1139 AD, c. 19 - C. 17: 10, De decim (3, 30), c. 7: 10, De praescript. (2, 26), c. 9, 10. De rer. permut. (3, 19). - Lateran Council III, 1179 AD, c. 14. This decree is also found in c. 19: 10. De decim. (3, 30).

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