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Communal Right In Perfect Theocratic Society

Chapter 3

Rights proper to members of the faithful

889. We have distinguished three classes of Church rights: 1. her connatural rights relative to all human beings; 2. her connatural rights relative to her own members; 3. her acquired rights.
We could follow the same classification in dealing with the rights of individual members in the Church, but the Church's rights relative to mankind correspond with certain rights that all human beings have relative to the Church. These we have already examined (cf. 800-803). Although not proper to the faithful, they belong to them as members of the human race.
Consequently, we shall consider here only the connatural rights and acquired rights of the faithful.

890. Two things happen when an individual is aggregated to the Church (at baptism): 1. he is consecrated to divine worship and, through this consecration, sanctified, provided he places no obstacle to his sanctification; 2. a contract is established between God and the Church on one hand, and the individual who joins the Church on the other (cf. 741-742). Consecration to divine worship is an interior operation wrought in the soul by God who invests the human being with a priestly character and dignity, later increased in confirmation and completed in holy orders.

891. The priestly character common to all the faithful(183) involves:

1. elevation of the human being to the supernatural order;
2. possession of the human being by the Lord, who destines the individual to his everlasting service in supernatural worship;
3. the faculty to carry out certain acts of supernatural worship, and to receive and exercise certain offices in the Church.

892. This faculty for carrying out acts of supernatural worship and exercising certain offices in the Church is the ESSENTIAL RIGHT of every member of the faithful. It is a CONNATURAL RIGHT (the FIRST RIGHT of its kind), given to the individual at the moment of his supernatural generation, that is, at baptism, and hence the source of every other right that a Christian possesses or can possess.

893. This priestly character has its source in God alone; it does not depend upon human will. The faculties that come with it cannot therefore be lost by the individual, although their exercise may be impeded.(184)

894. In virtue of this character, every member of the faithful shares in some way in each of the seven powers of the universal Church. He has (special) connatural rights relative to each of them, although he does not participate in them in the same way as those special persons invested with the external priesthood conferred in holy orders, when a more noble priestly character and dignity are bestowed. The external priesthood must never be confused with interior, first-level priesthood,(185) common to all the faithful, which could also be called private, individual priesthood to distinguish it from public, social priesthood conferred by the imposition of hands. The former indicates the individual's society with God; the latter the society between human beings associated with God.

895. The acquired rights of the faithful and their communities have ultimately the same source and principle. Let us see, therefore, how this individual, private priesthood gives the Christian a share in the seven priestly powers conferred by Christ on his Church, and how Christ has made the Christian capable of procuring other rights for himself.

896. People are enrolled in the Church when baptism is conferred according to the Church's intention. Properly speaking, it is the bishop's right to confer baptism, but it may also be administered validly by any person, whether belonging to the Church or not.
If a member of the faithful baptises in case of necessity, he exercises his private priesthood, and performs an act of greater worship and dignity before God (although the effect on the newly-baptised is the same) than that carried out by a person not a member of the Church. Consequently, the well-disposed Christian can gain special merit from his act.

897. With regard to liturgical power, the faithful as such do not possess the faculty of immolating the victim of the New Testament through the consecration of bread and wine, but they have the faculty of offering that victim to the eternal Father.

898. In addition, they have the faculty of immolating themselves by their union in spirit with the victim of propitiation for the world's salvation. The Christian's self-immolation comes about through his sacrificial love, which keeps him constantly prepared to undergo actual death for the sake of witness to Christ, for justice and the increase of God's kingdom.

899. In the same way all the prayers and actions offered to God by the faithful acquire special efficacy and value through the priestly character with which the faithful are invested by God himself.(186)

900. The power of consecration, which constitutes external, public, ministerial priesthood, includes the power to bless and consecrate all things. In virtue of this power everything is directed in an ordered way to human salvation through divine action. The character impressed on all the baptised does not give them the power to bless, properly speaking, but to receive the effects of the Church's blessings, and to benefit by the use of blessed objects, or sacramentals.

901. In virtue of their baptism, the faithful acquire the right to receive the other sacraments.
Above all, they share in eucharistic power because the priestly character enables them to receive the holy Eucharist and the graces flowing from this sacrament, if they place no obstacle to them.

902. In case of necessity, they can also administer this sacrament to themselves and to other baptised persons.

903. In virtue of the character, the faithful can receive the sacrament of penance and be absolved from their sins.

904. For the same reason, the Church can exercise her power to bind the faithful, by retaining their sins without absolution, or by holding them under her censures.

905. The faithful can also receive the healing sacrament of extreme unction, which confers grace when no obstacle is placed in its path. This sacrament, too, operates in virtue of the priestly character impressed on souls as a fruitful seed of grace.

906. Where a matrimonial contract exists between Christians according to the conditions required by the Church,(187) the baptismal character enables this covenant to represent the union between Christ and his Church and to bestow grace corresponding to such a union. In a word, the Christian marriage-contract is also a sacrament.

907. Consequently, their priestly character makes Christians ministers of this sacrament (this is the more usual opinion amongst theologians, and one I hold as certain). Although the character bestows on the faithful only a passive faculty to receive other sacraments, it gives them an active faculty to administer and effect that of marriage [App., no. 5].

908. Although preaching the gospel is a responsibility proper to bishops, and priests missioned by bishops, the ordinary members of the faithful are also called in part to the ministry of the word because:
1. They are obliged to confess JESUS Christ before others when the Saviour's glory requires this.(188)

909. 2. They can enunciate teaching received from the pastors of the Church, and under their direction communicate it to others by word or in writing (the office of teacher or writer).

910. 3. They sometimes find themselves in circumstances obliging them to hand on their faith. Parents, for example, have a duty to instruct their children in sound doctrine not only through others, but often as part of their own everyday life.

911. 4. The faithful also have the right to compare the teaching of an individual pastor with that of other pastors in the universal Church, and to reject the former if it is contrary to the decisions expressed by the universal Church, or to choose the most common, authoritative opinion in the case of doubtful matters.(189)

912. This last right, common to all the faithful, is also the source of rights in civil authority, or rather in persons invested with such authority. As members of the faithful wishing to direct themselves rightly in their private and public lives, they can investigate the doctrine of the universal Church by comparing the teaching of individual pastors with decisions of ecumenical councils and the global consent of tradition.

913. It is clear, therefore, that certain abstract rights claimed for civil authority by modern publicists are erroneous and without foundation. An example is the jus reformandi which, according to some modern authors, consists in the faculty of deciding whether the Church is to be admitted into a State, and under what conditions. This `right', however, is a consequence of the misuse of the word `Church' by Protestants. If the Church is one, as it is defined in the apostolic creed and recognised by Catholics, non-Catholic bodies cannot truly call themselves `churches' without abusing the word. It is absurd to maintain that civil authority has the responsibility of deciding to permit the true Church into a State. Those exercising this authority, together with all citizens making up civil society, have a manifest duty to admit the true Church, and hence have no right to refuse it entrance.(190)

914. Relative to the true Church and her teachings, civil authority has no other rights than those of the faithful. That is: the right to verify the existence of the true Church in order not to confuse her with misleading, false churches; the right to know the dogmatic decisions of the true Church; the right to compare the teaching of individual pastors and masters with dogmatic decisions of the Church; the right to acknowledge legitimate pastors and distinguish them from intruders. The rights of civil authority go no further than this; and at this point its duties begin.(191)

915. It may indeed be the case that civil authority has a jus reformandi relative to communions outside the Church, but such a right must be exercised non-violently. Violence is to be reserved for the repression of crime or wrong doing against ownership, or attempted violations of ownership. Some communions separated from the Church, have, however, surrendered themselves totally to the exercise of civil power, which thus acquires special rights over them.(192)

916. Because of their priestly character, Christians have a special aptitude or right to exercise these actions, relative or analogous to teaching power in the Church, and can obtain corresponding merit through the grace accompanying them.

917. Certain matters in the Church and its government have already been determined by her Founder and are therefore unchangeable.
Others remain to be determined by the wisdom of the teaching Church, assisted by the Holy Spirit, according to the needs of the times. A general name for such directives is `church discipline', the sphere within which ordinative power evolves.

918. Power over church discipline has been entrusted in its fullness to the head of the Church. It is held in a subordinate manner by the bishops, who exercise it in part through their priests. Finally, the ordinary faithful have some share in it, and this we must now describe.

919. The faithful have a right to influence, and to a certain extent do influence, the government of the Church in determined ways recognised and accepted by the pastors of the Church. Their influence extends to the choice of persons for the government of the Church, to disciplinary laws, and to church temporalities.
These are the three objects to which are referred the influence that all the faithful can exercise in the ordinative power of the Church.

920. Although the people have no right to choose and appoint their own pastors - this is proper to the clergy - they have a right to be given acceptable pastors enjoying their esteem and trust.

921. From very early days in the Church's history, the local bishops and clergy would assemble with the people of the diocese to choose a new bishop for the vacant see. The people's presence on such an occasion helped to indicate the person enjoying their esteem and trust. Generally speaking, the bishops' chief responsibility was to judge doctrinal soundness in the candidate; the local clergy bore witness to the candidate's holiness and prudence; and the people showed their esteem and trust in the person proposed as their pastor and father. The qualities required in a good pastor capable of ruling the people are in fact: sound doctrine, holiness, prudence, and the weight of public opinion.(193)

922. The Christian people's right to pastors they trust is inalienable. Sovereigns holding nomination to vacant sees are obliged to respect it.(194)

923. The choice of a pastor in the Church is accompanied by a test destined to show that he is not unworthy of the office to which he is called. This process is the responsibility of the bishops of the province and the pope, but all the faithful can act as witnesses.(195)

924. The people are also invited to reveal matters indicating unworthiness in a candidate suggested for promotion to sacred orders. This is the reason for announcing the names of ordinands from the pulpit.(196)

925. If a pastor is unfortunately guilty of serious misdemeanours through neglect of his sacred obligations, the faithful can appeal to superior hierarchic power in the Church for a remedy to this deplorable state of affairs.(197)

926. Through their generosity and pious endowments, the faithful acquire certain other rights regarding choice of persons for church office. However, this is not the place for a study of rights connected with patronage in so far as they are already determined by positive laws, although we must at least indicate some that follow from rational Right.

927. Church ministries can be divided into those involving the care of souls, and those not involving it.

928. If a member of the faithful founds and endows out of his own pocket an ecclesiastical office unconnected with the cure of souls, equity requires that the choice of persons in charge of the work should be left to the founder, if he so wishes, provided that the bishops in charge of local churches recognise the candidate as not unworthy, and suitable for the work.

929. The case is different where there is question of the cure of souls or a public office.(198) Divine as well as rational Right requires the best and most suitable person available for the work. The faithful are not competent to judge which of the candidates is the most suited; this falls under the responsibility of the churches' rulers. Again, long experience shows that members of the faithful are subject to human passion, to partiality and to opinions that do not give sufficient guarantee for presuming that their nominations will take account of the most worthy and suitable subjects for office. Moreover, if a benefice is at stake, there is greater danger of violating the divine Right requiring the best candidate. Benefactors will perhaps prefer priests of their own families to enjoy the material advantages of the foundation, with grave, consequent danger of children without a call being forced by ignorant pare nts into the ecclesiastical state.

930. It would seem that the right to nominate to such offices could be entrusted to faithful of great virtue and wisdom only in exceptional cases. The right would have to be strictly personal, as required by reason and the spirit of the Church, and non-transferable. Descendants of a person holding such a right offer diminishing guarantees to the Church in so far as their suitability is unknown.(199)

931. Nevertheless, there could be such a scarcity of churches and priests that the public good might seem to demand the foundation of churches and pastoral offices with right of nomination in the benefactors, if there were no other way of satisfying requirements. If this were the only way of providing for the Christian people, it would certainly be a lesser evil to have suitable rather than the most suitable persons in the care of souls. Such circumstances explain in part the present growth of church discipline.

However, although the Church's favourable consideration of such a case appears justified in the circumstances outlined, as far as she is concerned, there is on the other hand no justification for the patron to demand such an unreasonable right as a condition of his generosity, provided he is instructed about the right and its underlying principle which requires the most worthy and suitable priests for the care of souls. Such a principle can best be put into practice only when the clergy themselves make the choice [App., no. 6].

932. Although the pastors of the Church have exclusive power, not shared with the faithful, to make obligatory laws, and to impose morally obliging commands, the faithful subject to this legislation rightly influence these disciplinary requirements, with the consent of the pastors themselves. The reason for this indirect influence, and the limits of its extension, are clarified in the following propositions.

933. 1st proposition. All the faithful are obliged to desire the greater good of the Church, even at the cost of some material damage to themselves.
This is evident, just as it is evident that the greater good is to be preferred to the lesser good, public good to private good, and moral good to every other good.

934. On the other hand, it is certain that moral good can sometimes be in collision with material good. This, however, is only accidental, in the sense that the complex of effects obtained in seeking the greater good will also bring about indirectly, and perhaps unexpectedly, greater temporal good.

935. 2nd proposition. The Church's government alone is responsible for deciding which laws and directives are for the greater good of the Church. The faithful are obliged to obey these commands.(200)
Two reasons will suffice to prove the point. First, governments are always the competent judge of what serves the society they administer.(201)

936. Second, the faithful must believe that church government is divinely assisted, and therefore worthy of their confidence.

937. 3rd proposition. The faithful have the right and duty to know church laws and directives, and to distinguish them from those which pass as such. Similarly, they have to compare them in cases of collision, and follow those emanating from higher authority. In a word, they have the right to know the true, obligatory will of the Church in order to fulfil it.
There is no need here to demonstrate this. The faithful's duty of obedience is sufficient to bestow these rights upon them.

938. 4th proposition. If churchmen abuse their power by employing it in their own interest, each member of the faithful and each society has the right to self-protection against material damage. No one, however, has the right to judge rashly, or to regulate his conduct according to harmful suspicion, or to fail in obedience towards authentic church laws and precepts, or to demand safeguards which exceed the right to protection (cf. RI, 1820-1900).

939. 5th proposition. Although the government of the Church is the sole competent judge of the greater good accruing to the Church from ecclesiastical laws and directives, and hence solely responsible for such dispositions, the Church sincerely desires such good to be obtained without prejudice to the temporal welfare of the faithful, or at least with as little prejudice as possible. But the competent judges of the possible damage are, in this case, the faithful themselves, or the civil government acting for them (cf. RI, 610). The faithful, and the civil government representing them, act according to their right and in conformity with the intention of the Church herself when protesting to the Church about temporal harm resulting from church directives. Similarly they may, together with the Church, add conditions which avoid temporal harm without loss to spiritual good.

940. This proposition shows:
1. The error of politicians and publicists who maintain that the Church's rights have been satisfied when she has been granted the faculty of making arrangements in essential matters of religion, that is, in those matters without which she could not even continue to exist. The Church's right is not restricted to satisfying the necessities of the faithful; it extends to what helps them reach the sanctity and perfection of their Gospel call, which must be given preference to temporal matters.

941. 2. That the faithful, and civil governments acting on their behalf, can hold discussions with ecclesiastical government for the purpose of qualifying and re-arranging disciplinary dispositions that could harm temporal welfare. They must do this in good faith, however, not for the sake of disputing with the Church or harming her. And they must suffer in peace.

942. 3. That although the faithful have no right to know and examine church dispositions before they are published (this could harm the greater good of the Church by causing delay and other difficulties in the presentation of ecclesiastical directives), church authorities are obliged to consult the faithful if disciplinary dispositions seem harmful to their temporal welfare. The faithful are competent in their own temporal affairs, and their advice and judgment should be considered. Similarly, authority should take in good part the complaints of the faithful, and evaluate them carefully in all good faith. If the desired modifications are compatible with the greater good of the Church, they should be accepted.

943. We have already seen that relative to temporalities, the clergy have two principal rights:

1. to be maintained by the faithful;
2. to acquire temporalities in the name of the Church, and of the faithful in need, under just titles which allow all individuals and societies to exercise ownership, according to the conditions agreed between Church and State.
The first right rests upon a title proper to the clergy; the second depends upon titles common to all citizens.

944. Relative to the first title, the faithful, the community of the faithful, have the right not to give more than is sufficient for the maintenance of the clergy.

945. Relative to common titles, the faithful community must allow them to subsist. It cannot extinguish them without harm to the clergy and to church society.

946. Granted the existence of church temporalities acquired under just titles, according to rational Right, the faithful have or can acquire two rights in their regard:

1. the right of administration;
2. the right of calling in aid.

947. The right of administration can be held or acquired by the faithful within the limits or titles outlined in the following norms:
1st norm. Temporalities destined for the maintenance of the clergy and of worship must of their nature be administered by the clergy themselves, unless testators or donors have indicated otherwise.

948. 2nd norm. Temporalities destined for works of charity must be administered by the corporations formed of persons benefiting by the works, or by those lawfully acting on their behalf. These representatives have almost always been the pastors of the Church,(202) unless testators or donors have indicated otherwise.

949. 3rd norm. The clergy, that is, those holding authority in church government, always have the duty and the right to see that these temporalities are used for the purpose intended, and to demand an account of stewardship from administrators,(203) unless the testators and donors have indicated otherwise.(204)

950. 4th norm. Because the will of a donor is an obligatory law, the faithful appointed by the donor have the right to administer goods destined for pious works.

951. 5th norm. If a pious legacy cannot be executed in the present or future, it seems that rational Right would indicate its passing to the designated heir, or the necessary heir. If there is no heir, or the work cannot be continued after the death of the heir, it would seem right and wholly in keeping with equity and piety that the Church, in her own name and that of the community of the faithful, assign the temporalities to some other good work in accordance with the presumed intention of the benefactor. In such a case, when temporalities are without an owner, it can certainly be presumed that a Christian wishing to act charitably would leave the decision in these circumstances to the pastors of the Church.

952. The right to defend the Church and her temporalities is proper not only to the faithful but to all human beings (cf. RI, 267). Such a right is a beneficence, and every individual has the right to benefit others (cf. 802).

953. This right is limited and conditioned, however, by the will of the Church. Individuals and societies have no right to protect and defend the Church and her temporalities in cases where the Church does not want them to do so. Moreover, where the Church wishes to be defended, the way in which she wishes to be defended must be respected. The Church is the sole judge competent to decide when and how protection, defence and calling in aid, together with acts dependent upon such titles, assist or harm her.

954. The greatest injustices have always been committed in the name of right. The imperfect description of rights provided by publicists leaves a gaping hole, not a tiny crack, open to human ill-will. A vague, abstract right, isolated from its limits and conditions, is not a right. Or, if it is a right, it is also a very satisfactory vehicle for human injustice carried out by people believing (or pretending to believe) they have no obligations to keep to the limits and conditions of the right simply because they proclaim it without limits or conditions. This explains the Church's miserable enslavement to persons who, while boasting of their right to protect(205) her under the pretext of their right to be called in as aid, oppress her in so many ways and expropriate her temporalities. There is no unlimited, unconditional right to protect and defend the Church; the only existing right depends upon the Church's willingness regarding the occasio ns and means of exercising it.

955. This vile abuse of the sacred right to protection and calling in aid was strengthened as it became a positive, permanent(206) office attached to dignities or families. In such cases, the quality of the person holding the office was always in doubt: he might be good or bad, just or unjust, prudent or imprudent. In addition, when such offices became permanent in families, or connected with dignities, the abuses became customs which then displaced laws and right. Yet there were times when lack of organisation in civil society, or bad organisation, made defence and protection of the weak an urgent necessity. In periods like this it seemed imperative to depend for security on extraordinary, exceptional and extra-social protection; privileges seemed to afford greater safeguards than imperfect, inefficacious common laws.

956. So it came about that

Notes

(183) 1 Pet 2: 9. The very early fathers of the Church speak of this first grade of priesthood common to all the faithful. St. Irenaeus (d. 201), Contra Haereses, 4, 20; Tertullian (d. 215), De Orat., c. 28; Origen (d. 234), Hom. 9 in Levit., n. 9. The separated Greek Church has maintained the same teaching about the private priesthood shared by all the faithful, which it calls `spiritual' or `mystical' to distinguish it from the sacramental priesthood proper to priests alone; cf. The Orthodox Confession, Peter Mogilas, Bishop of Kiev (OrqodoxoV omologia thV katolikhV kai apostolikhV ekklhsiaV thV anatolikhV, first published by Dragoman Panagiota, with a preface by the Patriarch Nectarius, and with a Latin translation, Amsterdam, 1662). This work, approved by four patriarchs and other bishops, states: `The priesthood is of two kinds, one SPIRITUAL, t he other SACRAMENTAL. All orthodox Christians enjoy the communion of the spiritual priesthood. - But the offerings are of the same kind as the priesthood, that is, prayers, thanksgiving, the rooting out of the evil desires and affections of the body; voluntary acceptance of martyrdom for the sake of Christ; and other things of this kind.' (p. 1, q. 708., Wratisl., 1751, in 8).

(184) Consequently, priests and prelates of the Church do not lose their authority, or the power of their ministry, by falling from the state of divine grace. The foundation of their ecclesiastical power is the character which they never lose. Bellarmine writes: `I say, therefore, that an evil bishop or priest or teacher is a dead and not a true member of the Christ's body if we are speaking about the notion of a member as a living part of Christ's body', that is, in so far as he has broken the social contract, and lost social good; `nevertheless he is a true member if we are speaking about the notion of instrument', that is, in so far as the operation by which God has united man to himself as his instrument - the source of the power of the character - never ceases. `In other words, the pope and the bishops are true heads, and teachers are true eyes and true tongue of this body. This is the case because living members' - those sharing the life of Christ, which comprises the social good - `are constituted through charity, which is lacking in the case of the impious who, however, are constituted as operative instruments through the POWER both of orders and jurisdiction' which finally is rooted in the order itself `and which can exist without grace' (De Ecclesia militante, bk. 3, c. 9).

(185) The catechism of the Council of Trent speaking in the following terms calls these two kinds of priesthood `interior' and `exterior', p. 2, c. 7: 44-47. The heretics of the 16th century confused these two priesthoods, reducing them to a single thing. Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 23, c. 3.

(186) The Catechism of the Council of Trent speaks in the following terms of the functions proper to the interior, private priesthood, possessed by all the faithful: `As far as the interior priesthood is concerned, all the faithful are priests after they have been washed in the saving water. This is particularly the case with the just who have the spirit of God and have been made true members of JESUS Christ by the gift of divine grace. These immolate spiritual sacrifices to God on the altar of their heart through faith inflamed by charity. Such offerings are in general all good and decent actions which are done with reference to the glory of God. Hence we read in the book of the Apocalypse: "Christ has freed us from our sins by his blood, and made us a kingdom, priests to his God and Father" (Apoc. 1: 5-6). In the same way, the prince of Apostles has said: "Like living stones be yourselves built into a spiritual house, to be a holy priesthood, to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God through JESUS Christ" (1 Pet 2: 5). The Apostle also exhorts us to present our bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is our spiritual worship (cf. Rom 12: 1). Long before, David had said: "The sacrifice acceptable to God is a broken spirit; a broken and contrite heart, O God, you will not despise" (Ps 51: 17). All these things are easily understood as applicable to the interior priesthood' (Catechism of the Council of Trent, p. 2, De ordinis sacramento, n. 23).

(187) When the Church establishes certain formalities, such as the presence of the parish priest and two witnesses, for the validity of the sacrament of matrimony, she decides and determines only the matter of the sacrament. The matter of the other sacraments has been precisely determined by their divine Founder, but in marriage JESUS Christ has indicated it only in part by deciding that it must be a monogamous contract between baptised persons. He has allowed the Church to regulate the formalities which at various times render marriage a legitimate contract worthy to represent the union of Christ and his Church. These formalities thus become matter worthy of such a sacrament.

(188) The character impressed on the faithful by the sacrament of confirmation forms and disposes them in a special way to profess their faith courageously before the whole world.

(189) Cf. SP, 476-486.

(190) Restoring the correct use of language is one of the means of helping towards mutual understanding in many difficult matters. The introduction of defective language has certainly been instrumental in leading the world to falsify many ideas. The word `religion', for example, has been applied to all `superstitious beliefs', and the word `Church' to indicate communions separate from the Church. Using these two words to indicate the opposite of what they mean has produced all kinds of fallacious reasoning. Theodosius spoke out on behalf of accurate logic as well as justice when he decreed that only those should be called `Catholics' who held the teachings of Pope Damasus and of Peter, Bishop of Alexandria. Others were to be called `heretics', and their assemblies were forbidden to name themselves `Churches' (bk. 2, Cod. Theod., De Fide Catholica, 28th February, 380). For a description of the sophisms arising from the ap plication of the word `religion' to all superstitious beliefs, cf. my Frammenti d'una storia dell'impietà (Apologetica, p. 326 ss.).

(191) For example, in times of schism. J. Schell writes: `Before the schism under Urban VI (1378-1389) there were scarcely any signs of such [royal] placets. And even in unhappy times, for the sake of caution, we see this right exercised so that the bulls of the true pope might be distinguished from those of the anti-popes. Consequently, when the cause ceased, the exercise of the royal placet also ceased' (In his additions to the Institutiones Juris Ecclesiastici P. Mauri Schenkl (§364, B). - J. Jung, (Orig. hist. iuris sacro. commentar.) showed that there is no example of the modern placet regio prior to the 16th century. Its origin is to be found in the Protestant territorial system which subjects the Church to the government of a territorial lord.

(192) The following is the sense in which jus reformandi was introduced in the treaty of Osnabrück (art. 5, §30): `The sovereign is granted the faculty of examining his subjects' profession of faith in order to acknowledge and accept it when it accords with the true Catholic faith. If it does not so accord, he can amend it according to justice and prudence.' In this sense, there is no absurdity in such a right. The civil authority, however, cannot lay claim even to jus cavendi related to essential matters of religion such as dogma, dogmatic formulae, and morality. There is no danger to the public good from such things. Cf. Institutiones juris ecclesiastici Mauri de Schenkl, §361, Landishut, 1830.

(193) Cf. Thomassin, p. 2, bk. 2, c. l; De Marca, bk. 8, c. 2, ss. Van Epsen, p. 1, tit. 13, c. l; and the important work of the brothers Lamennais on the appointment of bishops.

(194) St. Alphonsus de' Liguori shows that popes and kings SIN MORTALLY when they appoint worthy, but not THE MOST WORTHY, candidates to the episcopate. He says the same about benefices with cure of souls. `We have to distinguish between benefices with cure of souls and simple benefices. If we are dealing with the former, it is certain that patrons of episcopates, such as rulers, are held to this.' Again: `There is no doubt whatsoever. . . that in cases of benefices with cure of souls, the patron, even if a lay person, is gravely bound to present the most worthy candidate' (Th. M. bk. 4, 91-111).

(195) C. 8, d. 64 (Council of Nicea, 325 AD). - C. 3, d. 65 (Council of Antioch, 332 AD). - C. 6, d. 61 (Council of Laodicea, 372 AD). - C. 5, d. 65 (Council of Carthage II, 390 AD). - C. 2, §3, d. 23 (Statuta eccles. antiq.). - Innocent. I, epist. 24, ad Alexandr. episc. Antioch. 451 AD, c. 1 (Schaenemann, Epist. Rom. Pontif. t. 1, p. 603). - Council of Chalcedon, 431 AD, c. 28. - Damas. epist. 8, ad Achol. 380 AD, c. 1, 3; epist. 9, ad eund., c. 2 (Schaenemann, p. 366-69). - Council of Constantinople, epist. 13, ad Damas. 382 AD, c. 5, 6 (Schaenemann, p. 396). - Boniface, epist. 15 ad episc. Maced. 422 AD, c. 6 (Schaenemann, p. 746). - Leo the Great, epist. 69, 70, 104, 122, 129, 130, ed. Baller.

(196) Church law on this matter is found in the Roman Pontifical: `Those who are to be raised to major orders will go to the bishop a month before ordination. He will order the parish priest, or anyone else whom he may see fit, to make careful enquiries from people worthy of faith about the place and date of birth of the ordinands, their morals and their life, after their names and desire to be ordained have been publicly displayed in the church. The person nominated by the bishop will send testimonial letters containing the result of the enquiries as soon as possible' (De ordinibus conferendis).

(197) `The pope (Alexander II) sent legates to Milan in order to eradicate the disturbances (1067 AD) once and for all. The legates promulgated constitutional rules and saw that they were observed. At the same time, enlightened persons took a stand against the objections arising from ignorance, or rather from licence and obstinacy. Such an objection, lying at the root of great abuses, was the claim of some bishops that their subjects had no power to accuse them. Truly learned men took exactly the opposite point of view and maintained that in the case of suspicion it was completely reasonable to require bishops and lower churchmen to show their innocence or humbly to confess their guilt. St. Peter was reproved by St. Paul, his inferior. If prelates could not be judged, no one would willingly submit to canon law. If children of the Church could not say a word against their pastor (there would scarcely be witnesses to his behaviour outside the parish), the way would be open to all kinds of unreproved licence and to the destruction of discipline (P. Dam., bk. 2, ep. 12). Henrion, Storia universale della Chiesa, bk. 32.

(198) The spirit of the Church requiring freedom for bishops in their appointment of priests to the cure of souls, and the way in which such freedom was filched from the Church, can be seen by examining the origin of lay nomination to benefices with cure of souls. One of the origins of this patronal right was the existence of private oratories required by the great landowners for themselves and their serfs. Private oratories naturally provided a kind of private service, and it was fitting that the choice of priest should be left to the owner who maintained the chapel. The Church simply reserved the right to see that unworthy priests were excluded. The gentry's right relative to their private worship passed over to public worship, however, when population-increase changed these private chapels into parish churches. The proprietor's successors maintained their right of nomination to the parish although they sometimes no longer po ssessed the territory comprising it. Decr. p. 2, caus. 16, q. 7, c. 35 (Capit. Ludov. P. 829 AD, c. 2); c. 36 (Council of Trier, 895 AD); q. 1, c. 59 (Capit. 1, Car. Magni. 803 AD, c. 1); ibid. Corr. Rom. The word `owners' is relative to `tenants'. Ecclesiastics appointed to chapels established on estates by landowners were compared to `tenants'. Cf. c. un. C. Th., ne colon. inscio domino (5, 11); c. un. C. Th. de colon. Thrac. (2, 51).

(199) The right to nominate ecclesiastics to churches does not appear in the Church until the 5th century when bishops in Gaul who founded churches in other dioceses were granted the faculty of choosing priests for this work (c. 10, Council of Orange, 441 AD; Council of Arles. 452 AD, c. 39). This raised no difficulty; the right invested in the bishop was simply personal. Until the 5th century, lay founders were not given the enjoyment of this right, which they obtained in the 6th century, but even then it was granted only on personal grounds, without their being able to transmit it to their successors (cf. Nov. Just., c. 2, nov. 123, c. 18. - Decreti, p. 2, c. 16, q. 1, c. 31 (Pelagius I, c. 557 AD); - idem cod., c. 18, q. 2, c. 4, 30; - Council of Toledo IX, 655 AD, c. 16, q. 7, q. 92).

(200) Civil authority is simply the authority of lay people regulated by an administration. Lay faithful invested with civil government can, of course, regulate the rights of individuals subject to them, but not increase the sum of these rights. Hence the truth of the proposition is affirmed by sound canonists: `The civil power has no deliberative right over essential or accidental religious headings in matters proximately relating to the salvation of souls' (Maurus von Schenkl, Institutiones Juris ecclesiastici, §360).

(201) On the duty members have to depend in these matters upon the judgment of government in their society, cf. SP, 122.

(202) At first, the Apostles themselves administered the offerings of the faithful; later, they did this through deacons (cf. Acts 6[: 1-6]); later still bishops were administrators, according to the prescriptions of the canons (Can. Apostol. 40: 1, Praecipimus, etc. c. 7 and 8. - Council of Grangra, 333 AD, c. 24 and 25. - Council of Antioch, 345 AD, c. 22. - Council of Agde, c. 25, - Council of Orleans I, relat. c. 32, causs. 12, q. 2, etc., 7 causs. 10. q. 1, etc. etc.). Sometimes, however, they allowed the beneficiaries to administer the offerings for themselves (cf. Thomassin, pt. 3, bk. 2, c. 1-12; and bk. 3, c. 1).

(203) Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 22, De Reformat., c. 8. Supreme supervision over such goods belongs of its nature to the head of the Church; the popes have always legislated in cases of pious benefices and their administration. Pope Simplicius (457 AD) decided the equitable division of church temporalities, or perhaps renewed it (Epis. 3, ad episcopos Florentium, Equitium et Severum). Pope Gelasius did the same a short time later (Ep. 9 ad episcopos Lucaniae; cf. Rupprecht, Not. 1 in ius can. bk. 3, tit. 5, n. 8). Other examples of similar arrangements can be found in Gufi (Vindic. Iurium Stat. Eccl., pt. 1, n. 133 ss.), in the Decretals under the title De Rebus Ecclesiae alienandis vel non, and in the extraordinary constitution Ambitiose. Protestants themselves have acknowledged the usefulness of this papal right, and affirm that the popes have often been responsible fo r preventing the alienation of church temporalities (cf. Plank, Geschichte der Christlich-Kirchl. Verfassung; cf. bk. 2, Abth. 2, Abschn. 3, 386). This right was also solemnly acknowledged by the Apostolic See, and by recent concordats (French concordat, 1801, art. 13; Bavarian concordat, art. 8).

(204) The Church's respect for the desires of testators is such that she renounces the right of inspecting the administrative accounts of pious bequests when founders or donators require this. Cf. Council of Trent sess. 22, De Reformat., c. 9.

(205) Cf. Esposizione dei sentimenti di Sua Santità (Pius VII) alla dichiarazione dei principi e Stati protestanti riunti dalla confederazione germanica. `His Holiness is aware of the extent to which German publicists push the supreme rights of protection over the Church (we need not mention other reasons). He knows that this protection has been a pretext for attributing unlimited powers circa sacra to rulers, power unknown to our forebears and opposed to the divine prerogatives of the hierarchy.'

(206) `Calling in aid' had two purposes, one peaceful, the other warlike. The former was intended to assist the Church before the civil courts, to exercise civil jurisdiction in the name of the Church, or to help churches with economy and financial administration; the second undertook to defend church rights against violence and obtrusion. We must therefore distinguish `robed calling in aid' and `armed calling in aid.'

`Robed calling in aid' was 1. forensic, and as such divided into assistance given in civil disputes, and assistance in jurisdiction, rendered by exercising on behalf of churches the jurisdiction they possess; 2. economic; 3. total or partial; 4. basic, or delegated; 5. unshared, in so far as the founders reserved it for themselves, or chosen and planned, in so far as churches asked for it under the form of pact, or granted, in so far as the ruler exercised it for churches without being asked; 6th hereditary.

`Armed calling in aid' was 1. universal, and as such exercised by emperors from Charlemagne onwards in defence of the Apostolic See and the Catholic Church; 2. governmental, that is, part of Catholic civil government. The second kind of `armed calling in aid' is either general or special, that is, either the natural duty of protecting the Church incumbent upon government by Catholics, or the duty arising from obligations incurred by rulers or others as a result of treaties, oaths, etc. 3. The final division of `armed calling in aid' is that of simple protection. Cf. Institutiones Juris Ecclesiastici, Fr. Maurus von Schenkl, Landishut, 1830, §386.

(207) Such salaries were called advocaticum, advocatia, advocatio, advocatiae justitiae. Cf. Du Fresne, Glossarium, under `advocatia'.

(208) Cf. Gallade, Diss. de Advocatis Eccl., c. 6, §12; Van Espen., I. E. univ., pt. 2, tit. 25, c. 1, n. 26 ss.

(209) Fr. Maurus von Schenkl, Institutiones Juris Ecclesiastici, §386.

Chapter 04

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