Appendix 1. (544).
[Rosmini's philosophical and theological work had met with strong, but anonymous opposition. In particular, an author calling himself `Eusebio Cristiano' had attacked Rosmini's ideas on original sin and on conscience. Rosmini's reply to this attack was in turn opposed by Fr. Dmowski S.J. Further exchanges led to this note to 544 which we reprint here as the first number of the Appendix]
The truth [that babies are moral beings] can be verified by philosophical observation and is confirmed by Christian theology. But our anonymous `Eusebio Cristiano' protested strongly against it, as everybody knows. My reply to him is also known to everyone. Nevertheless Fr. Dmowski of the Society of Jesus has reiterated the opinion of the anonymous Eusebio in his so-called Analisi of my Risposta to the footnotes he inserted in his Istituzioni filosofiche, and I would like to use this opportunity to comment on this work (printed at Lucca in 1841).
First, he roundly expresses his surprise that I should be offended at his disagreement with me. But this is not true. What I said is in print and my sole complaint was that, instead of arguing philosophically, he preferred to spread doubts publicly about the soundness of my religious teaching.
Furthermore, he affirms that I have badly misunderstood what he proffers as a compliment when he says: `I intended to be courteous to the intelligence of this author who in pursuing an idea is always trying to relate all knowledge and practice to it' (Analisi, p. 5) But this is not true Father Dmowski did not compliment me on my intelligence but on what he sees as my attempt to make my system universal: plurimum cl. autori gratulamur quod suum sistema universalissimum reddere satagat. This in its turn is neither complimentary nor courteous nor sincere because 1. an author's attempt to make his system universal is not something to be complimented about; 2. the attempt is something Father Dmowski presumes (there was no attempt); 3. he could not be sincerely satisfied with an attempt to make universal a system of which he disapproves; 4. the words he then adds indicate that he cannot really see how the system will be widely accepted: optaremus nihilominus illud eo usq ue minime promoveri, ut, etc.; and finally, 5. according to the Father's judgment, such a system would change and exclude the common opinions of doctors of morals and would therefore be very pernicious: optaremus nihilominus illud eo usque minime promoveri, ut communes praesertim moralium doctorum sententiae doctrinaeve nedum necessario immutandae, sed penitus quoque excludendae censeri debeant. To say that I reduce all knowledge and practice to one single idea simply shows that Father Dmowski does not know my teaching. I teach that nothing real can be known with the idea of being alone (except for the necessary-real, God). Consequently neither knowledge nor practice can be drawn from it.
In the third place, Father Dmowski acknowledges the mistake he made by thinking that to the definition of law I applied the three conditions I had given only for the application of the law (Analisi, 19). But is this admission frank and honest, as he claims? If so, why didn't he emend his mistake in the next edition of his Istitutiones Philosophicae (Turin, 1841) instead of reproducing and confirming it by adding to it? Surely it was his duty, after imputing error to me and admitting his mistake, not to communicate this error to the public? He did indeed apologise for his mistake (p. 19), trying to show that he had good reasons for making it. But even if this were true, he was still obliged to delete from later editions what, according to his own admission, was falsely imputed to me in the first edition against my express words.
Moreover, the very reasons with which he justifies attributing to me the opposite of what I expressly wrote are non-existent. Let us examine them:
1. He says: `Defining law as a notion used for making a judgment etc., (Rosmini) leads us to understand that, according to him, this notion, in order to be law, must be actually in the subject, that is, received into the mind of the one making the judgment.' Not true; the notion, considered in itself, has the aptitude to act as a norm for judging what is lawful and unlawful either in the mind of the Legislator or in any other mind whatsoever, and this aptitude is essential to the notion for it to be law. But any particular subject cannot really make use of the notion and apply it to judge actions if this subject has not received it into his mind. The condition applies to the use and application of the law, not to the law itself. Fr. Dmowski has confused the notion's aptitudefor acting as a rule with the real use the obligated subject makes of it. He has confused potency with act.
2. `Furthermore, I see the following words clearly and expressly stated in the second edition: We can therefore say that the notion is promulgated in the subject and, properly speaking, begins to have the nature and force of law. From this he (Rosmini) argues that what properly speaking constitutes the nature and force of law necessarily pertains to the essential concept of law and therefore to the general definition which must express it' (pp. 19, 20). This deduction extends further than my premises. I was speaking about the promulgation of the law in a particular subject, and said that once promulgated in a particular subject, it begins to have the nature and force of law. Because he has omitted the particular subject of which I was speaking, he concludes that, according to me, law can have the nature and force of law only when the second condition of promulgation in a particular subject is verified! With due respect, a law which is not promulga ted in a particular subject has in no way the nature and force of law in that subject, although it certainly has the nature and force of law in itself, either in the mind of the legislator or of all those who know it but have not submitted to it. He wrongly claims therefore that, according to me, the second condition pertains to the definition itself of law.
Finally, Fr. Dmowski declares that it is far from his intention to spread doubt about the soundness of my religious teachings (Analisi, 4). Is this true? The reader can judge from the footnotes and Analisi. I am content simply to quote a piece of his Analisi which clearly shows he agrees with the anonymous authors of the booklets published against me. He writes: `To start by defining conscience totally differently from ancient and modern authors; to claim that all have erred concerning the very first element of moral science; to widen the sphere of true morality in such a way that there is true morality in willed but not free actions; to establish morality without conscience; to remove from moral science duties towards oneself, and reduce them to duties towards human nature in general these teachings and many others of the same kind, if we examine them closely, tend to exclude the most accepted and solid ideas of teachers of m orality. Rosmini's notions are indeed expressed in an entirely new moral language', but under cover of the words they significantly change basic concepts' (Analisi, 6). Are these assertions of Father Dmowski true or false? I have given proofs of everything that I have said, proofs taken from the Fathers, from doctors and moralists, and I have shown how my teaching is the same as theirs. I have reconciled many different opinions by going to their roots and finding agreement with the majority of the greatest masters, precisely by reconciling their sometimes apparently different opinions. Are a few gratuitous words Fr. Dmowski enough to destroy an author's long, arduous studies?
And where did Fr. Dmowski find that I had ever claimed that all the ancient and recent doctors had made a great mistake in defining conscience? I would ask him to quote a single place in my works where according to him I have spoken with such little respect for the Doctors. On the contrary, I offered my definition of conscience as a more precise interpretation or expression of what everybody, even the uneducated, understand by conscience.
The fact that morality is sometimes present where there is no freedom or conscience is not something new but a DOGMA of the Catholic Church, which acknowledges a morally reprobate state, a state of sin, in a new-born baby, and a morally good state, a state of justice, grace and holiness in a baby reborn through baptism.
Finally, where did he find that I have done away with duties towards oneself? I certainly said that in my works on ethics I happily chose the more logical division of the Gospel instead of that of the philosophers, because JESUS CHRIST taught that there are two precepts of charity. I divided all duties into two classes, those towards God and those towards human beings, and I divided the latter into those towards oneself and those towards others. In doing this, I am surely not rejecting duties to self; I am surely not using `an entirely new moral language, which `under cover of words significantly changes basic concepts'?
I am only asking for the truth, therefore. Fr. Dmowski is free to think what he likes provided he speaks the truth.