Appendix 12. (1653).
Cicero, for example, glimpsed pure justice when he established as a general formula that it was not lawful to harm another for the sake of one's own convenience (De Off., 3: 5). He offers this beautiful formula as one suitable for resolving every possible collision between justice and utility. Again, Cicero had a flash of light, and confessed: `There are certain things so abominable that no sage would do them, even to preserve the fatherland' (De Off., 1: 45). But is he consistent? Elsewhere he himself deduces the whole of morality or at least the whole of justice from the principle of sociality. Moreover, he calls such justice the mistress and queen of all other virtues (cf. De Off., 3: 3). But when he endeavours to determine the superiority of one virtue to another, he finds himself in difficulty. On the one hand, his lack of clear knowledge of true spiritual good forces him to reduce everything to the external good of society, to which the indi vidual is sacrificed; on the other hand, reason shows him the existence of goods different from and greater than social good. He comes to grief on this rock; his thought becomes obscure, confused, contradictory.
After distinguishing the four cardinal virtues, or the four parts of righteousness, he asks which of them has to be given precedence in the case of conflict. In his system justice, which he calls the virtue of the community, should be preferred to all the others. In fact, he immediately begins to show that it is preferable to prudence which he calls the virtue of knowledge. `We willingly grant that duties springing from community are more in harmony with nature than those which spring from knowledge. This can be confirmed' (note this) `if we think for a moment of the life of a wise man who abounds in every kind of affluence, has the leisure to consider and contemplate his possessions, which are worthy of thought, but is so cut off from others that he never sees anyone else. Such an individual would simply fade away and die' (1: 43). This wisest of Romans found nothing in the spirit of the lone person which could keep that person alive. To live, one had to immer se oneself in society. The individual is a spent force, without any life of his own; only the social human being is alive. But is there truly no virtue to be preferred to that which is relative to society? Is there no essential good for the human spirit more useful than that which can be drawn from society?
Here Cicero begins to flag. What he considered as the greatest virtue is no longer the greatest. Social justice, which he had placed above prudence, now falls below temperance. `Perhaps we ought to ask whether this community, which is in harmony with nature TO THE HIGHEST DEGREE, is also to be preferred always to moderation and modesty. THIS WOULD NOT BE A HAPPY SOLUTION. There are some things which are so unseemly on the one hand, and so harmful on the other, that no sage would do them even for the sake of preserving the fatherland' (1: 45). His moral feeling irresistibly overthrows his error of reasoning. Nevertheless, he refuses to acknowledge the difficulty: `But IT IS BEST TO SAY that there could be no moment in which it would be good for the republic if the sage had to do anything of this kind' (ibid.). Those who today wish to reduce everything to society and thus destroy the individual have led the human spirit into the same anguish of contradiction face d by paganism.
Even the phrase, `The human being is born for the human being', offers no secure light relative to justice. Each individual could in fact ask why he should be born for others rather than for himself. Humanity renders his fellow human being worthy of respect, but humanity is found as much in him as in his fellow. Why, then, should he believe he was born for his fellow rather than for himself? The Stoics did not answer this question, and without an answer their maxim is worthless. Society, or humanity, which is found in other human beings, cannot be the unique, supreme source of justice. If humanity is to be revered in others, it is equally to be revered in ourselves. Society and I are therefore two persons, not one; and one cannot be sacrificed to the other.