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CONNATURAL RIGHTS

Chapter 7

139. Right is an activity rooted in the supreme, active principle of the human being (person). As we have seen, one of the characteristics of right is to act with force either to remove obstacles opposed to it or in general to maintain its activity at a constant level.(52)

140. Because the use of force at the moment of exercising an act proper to right is inherent to right itself and manifested concurrently with the act, such use could more suitably be called a function of right. However, if we are to proceed with strict logic and provide proof of everything we say about jural force, it will have to be dealt with separately, as though it were a right on its own account. This is particularly necessary because the use of force in the exercise of rights often requires special consideration and reflection.

We shall examine the possible use of force in the exercise of connatural rights by dealing first with personal freedom, and then with force relative to connatural ownership.

141. As we have seen, the immediate injuries done to person are of three kinds because they are attempts to deprive human beings of truth, virtue and happiness, that is, of the elements which constitute the threefold origin and term of personship.(53)

142. Any attempt to deprive us of one of these three terms of our personal act can itself take three forms: 1. an attempt to despoil us of any one of the three terms of our personal act; 2. an attempt to destroy the power with which we arrive at and adhere to that term; 3. unjust prevention of those acts pertaining to the sphere of our jural freedom which could help us arrive at or better adhere to the threefold term in which our excellence is founded.(54) Thus, altogether, there are nine kinds of injury.

143. We shall now consider these ways, by which our personship can be directly offended. We shall look especially at the way in which the attempted injury threatens not the power of which we are speaking (person), nor the free acts of this power, but the threefold personal good to which this power is ordered of its nature.

A. The general right to do justice

144. First: `Can the supreme active principle, which is able to carry out its own acts with all the force of which it is capable and which it finds at its disposition, lawfully use this force in favour of justice in cases concerned not with its own justice (there would be no doubt in the case of injury to its own right) but with injury done to the right of another?'

145. If this question relates to human beings in fully constituted civil society, it is certain that an individual cannot undertake to set right the offences committed against himself or others. In such circumstances, this will be done more surely on his behalf and in accordance with what has already been decided by the judiciary.

146. If the question is considered solely in relationship to personship, without reference to constituted civil society, it seems we could resolve it positively provided certain precautions and limitations are observed.

147. With this in mind, we also remember that these rights cannot be exercised in civil society possessing a judiciary except in rare, extraordinary circumstances. Granted this, we have to affirm in general that each of us possesses the following rights, which have to be considered relative to the strength of our personship (the extension of this strength is the extension of connatural right):

1. To speak the truth.
2. To judge actions in the light of truth and justice (if we can do so, and according to our capacity).
3. To reprove anyone who sins.
4. To act with force in order that justice may prevail.
5. To re-establish justice, by means of just punishment, when justice is threatened.
6. To restore things to their pristine state through forced restitution if such restoration is just and possible.

148. If all this were done prudently, carefully and justly, the person performing such an action would be considered a great benefactor. The benefits he bestowed would be a prelude to the establishment of civil society and to his own elevation as head of that society.

149. Such rights are effectively exercised at the origin of civil governments. Many just, courageous people have set out on the path to government by carrying out beneficent acts of this kind.

150. The feeling for such rights is clearly prevalent in the early days of established nations. And careful consideration shows that these rights are exercised at the beginning of civil history. The constitution of ancient nations is very much inclined towards democracy despite the obedience proffered to an individual. What happens is this: each individual person retains the rights he previously held in the state of nature only a short time before, but now united in assemblies, all exercise these rights collectively. Each individual votes, and all are happy that each has an equal vote, or can even set up before the public a kind of tribunal whose equity is judged by the people itself.

Until the end of the period of the Judges, something similar often took place amongst the Hebrews; and the people never entirely abandoned the exercise of this right, which had been received and established by their law.(55)

Moses exercises a natural right of this kind(56) when he revenges his companions; the young Daniel exercises a similar right in the story of the unjust condemnation of Susanna at Babylon. The people, who permitted and applauded what took place, recognised fully that despite the presence of appointed judges, Daniel did not usurp undue authority, but acted according to natural justice which obliged the people to accept and protect him.

151. These rights, proper to individuals, were then attributed also to the tribes of the Hebrew people, each of which as a collective person was persuaded it possessed the faculty of overseeing, judging and reprimanding the faults of the other tribes.(57)

152. The reason behind this faculty of the human person for exercising justice, even when the case is not concerned with one's own well-being, is found in the objective nature of justice, which is absolutely and essentially good. Whoever does justice therefore, provided he does it truly, does something which cannot not be good. He becomes an author of good.

153. In the second place, the human person tends to the objective, personal justice for which he was made in such a natural way that he forgets himself in the act of justice. This altogether special and most noble spontaneity brings about forgetfulness of self for the sake of seeing justice living and triumphant. It is impossible to fight or repress this spontaneity because it is produced and authenticated by justice itself.

154. Those acts of justice, to which people are moved by pure zeal for justice, are particularly praiseworthy and just. As Scripture says, zeal `devours'' man, that is, makes him forget himself and every other consideration except that of the rights and glory of justice, ardour for which grips him and draws him out of himself.

155. However, these rights cannot be exercised by individuals 1. if individuals are not certain of the truth of the justice they are carrying out; and 2. if there is a more secure, orderly and complete way of maintaining and restoring justice. Consequently, it is not easy for the exercise of these rights to be carried out fully and equally in every human being, especially where there exists well-developed civil society in which the maintenance of justice is in great part suitably provided for. Moreover, it is rare for an individual to be undisturbed by passion; he may also pass judgment lightly, and often rashly therefore, on his brother.

156. In general, the right to carry out justice is not concerned with harm to one's own right alone, but harm to any right whatsoever, even that of another. Moreover, this right to carry out justice, although it can be extended to the defence of one's own and others materiated rights, remains pure-formal right whenever it is exercised purely, that is, for love of justice alone which pertains solely to the person.

157. It would be different if, in exercising this right, we sought something other than the triumph of justice alone for example, the protection or maintenance of some other just, eudaimonological good. In this case, the right would belong to the class of materiated rights. But when there is a question of pure, objective, impersonal justice, even in the defence of some materiated right, pure-formal right is exercised.

158. Of itself, the universal right to defend and fight for justice contains pure-formal right; but it can concern the defence either of pure-formal right, or of a materiated right.

159. We need to note this because fighting forcefully for a pure-formal right is very different from fighting for a materiated right. Here defence is mentally conceived as possible because it is clear that circumstances inherent to a case of this kind can always impede the exercise of a materiated right. But this is not so when we are dealing with the defence of a pure-formal right. The use of force in this case can be sustained only with difficulty: it is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve the purpose intended.

160. We shall first deal briefly with the question of doing justice in the case of an attack upon pure-formal rights themselves. This may occur either when we are dealing with the removal of some obstacle to our own rights or in the case of the defence of anyone else's pure-formal right.

161. Force must not be used unnecessarily to uphold one's own rights, that is, when there are other means of making them prevail.

162. This limitation in the use of force seems to exclude almost entirely any possibility of using it to protect our pure-formal rights. There is, indeed, no doubt that the good (that is, truth, virtue and happiness) which involves these rights, depends upon the freedom that a person possesses. In fact, by using our freedom, we can avoid being evilly deceived, led astray or made unhappy. In these cases, therefore, we must not react with force to those who injure us. By offering moral resistance, it is always possible to avoid in some non-violent manner the harm springing from the assault. And this is truly the great foundation of evangelical meekness.

163. In most cases the validity of this argument cannot be denied. Moreover, if the practical force of freedom were full, as it could and should be in perfect human nature clothed in grace, the argument would be effective in all circumstances, and thus exclude the possibility of any right to use external force in the defence of pure rights rooted in person. In such cases meekness alone would reign in place of just force. The Gospel was able to proclaim such a law of perfection because only the Gospel was capable of bringing to the human spirit the moral virtue that stands unconquered before all pleasure and all pain.

164. Writers on natural Right have for the most part considered human beings abstractly. Their abstract view of human nature has in turn presided over the formation of many positive laws in every age and in all States. As a result, positive legislation, which supposes that pure-formal right pertains more to ethics than to Right, normally excludes coercion in cases of violation of such right. It does this because in human nature the internal personal principle, whose dignity alone is in question in the cases indicated, enjoys, abstractly considered, a force of resistance greater than the attacking force. Consequently, it has no need of help from any external force.

165. Nevertheless, peoples in every period have been conscious of something different. History provides examples of nations rising as one man to vindicate or defend such pure-formal rights as religious freedom, one' of the greatest and most solemn of such rights.

166. A more complete consideration of human beings, and of the state and events in which these intelligent animal beings are implicated, shows that the consciousness of peoples is correct. We would have to deny all experience in order to disregard the fact that the forces proper to freedom are in reality limited (although freedom considered in itself is also a physically supreme force).(58) We simply do not have available the proximate power to conquer all temptations by opposing them with the power of free will alone. Hence the origin of the moral duty to avoid everything that could be a proximate occasion of sin for us.

The right to use force corresponds with this moral duty whenever 1. the attack springing from another's perversity becomes a proximate occasion of sin, that is, a temptation capable of making us waver in virtue, and 2. we cannot avoid it except by use of force. Thus a virgin, already in the power of someone attempting to defile her, may even go so far as to kill her aggressor if she is afraid that her spiritual constancy in virtue will fail.(59)

167. What is said about one's own rights has to be affirmed also about the defence of the rights of others. A parent can kill a person intent on undermining the innocence, virtue and religion of his children if the assault is sufficient to place them in proximate danger of prevaricating and there is no other means of liberating them from the overbearing power of the tempter.

168. Everyone who acts like this on behalf of a fellow human being, granted the conditions we have mentioned, exercises humanity to a splendid degree. It is a case in which courage shines with purest light a case where bravery and glory form a single truth.

169. We can judge certain wars of religion according to this principle. In fact, we are obliged to say a few words about them because they are often judged badly, or rather very lightly. But I would ask my readers to listen and consider peacefully and calmly what I am going to say peacefully and calmly.

170. People exist, apparently religious, who seek only temporal good from religion. Polytheism of any kind, for example, offered only temporal good to human beings. We must note carefully, however, that by `temporal` we mean not only good things existing on this earth, but whatever has such a nature even though it is imagined and longed for as part of future life. Muslims, for example, look forward after this life to enjoying the company of beautiful women of an angelic nature. The good proper to such apparent religions, and in general any good of this kind sought in any religion whatsoever, is not the object of the pure-formal right which we are considering. Here, the right to use force in defence and maintenance of personship cannot be upheld.

171. But there are people who conceive religion in a true, elevated manner. They think of it as a moral truth, and seek in it the realisation of justice and the happiness that flows from the attainment of justice.

172. This moral justice and perfection, together with its consequent bliss, which human beings seek in a moral religion,(60) can have different subjective grades, that is, grades relative to ignorance and wisdom in the subject.

173. Let us imagine that someone has lived in a wilderness, or even in the midst of ancient paganism, and has adhered with his spirit almost entirely to that complex of truths which religion and natural law present to the mind. This person's religion would be imperfect, but would interiorly possess morality. The heart's desire of such a person could be focussed directly on a moral good, the term of the person.

We could also imagine someone before or after Christ who lives where the Gospel is still unknown, or who at least has not heard it. This person could have added to his religion and to the natural law certain revelations and traditions of divine truth which illustrate and complete the natural law, although the religion itself is still not perfect in the way that Christianity is. The Hebrews, and others scattered amongst the peoples, were in this state before the coming of Christ. Certain peoples are perhaps still in this state and, more generally speaking, some human beings alive today, who are known to God.

Amongst Christians, there are very probably persons of good faith who, because born of heretic parents, are divided from the body of Christ although they believe explicitly in many Christian truths, and adhere to others implicitly. They suffer no harm if through invincible ignorance they mingle errors with truth, provided the errors are held only on the authority of their teachers and in such a way that the errors do not diminish the moral quality contained in their general faith.(61)

Finally, we have the Catholic Christian Church, `the pillar and bulwark of the truth'', as Paul calls it. Those giving it their adherence in the way they should possess in an altogether complete way both natural and supernatural justice and the means to increase this justice in themselves continually.

174. We still have to see the right that each of these classes of persons has to defend their own religion by using force against others who assail it through seduction or violence or in any other way. It is understood that we consider the use of force only in the case of these persons, their children or others, when there seems no other method of defence against the proximate danger of perversion or abandonment of their religion.

It is also part of our argument, as we have seen, that all those under threat see and seek in their own religion the truly moral good which it offers them. Without this, there would be no question of the personal right of which we are speaking. This right refers solely to a moral good.

We must also keep in mind that the religion upheld by the first class of persons we have considered offers a moral good less perfect than that of the second class; that the religion of the second class of persons offers less moral good to human beings than that of the third class; and that this religion in turn also offers less moral good than the religion of the fourth class of persons. Finally, the last religion we have mentioned contains the fullness of both natural and supernatural truth and moral good. Consequently, it is also taken for granted that the fourth religious state we have indicated contains the moral good of the third, the third all the moral good of the second, and the second all the moral good of the first; at the same time, each contains in a more advantageous manner the lesser moral good of the prior class.

175. Granted these conditions, which are undeniable, at least for that large portion of the human race who profess Catholicism, and considering the matter simply, the following propositions immediately present themselves to the mind as apparently true.

First proposition. One or more persons of any of these four classes see that their own religion or the religion of their religious counterparts is in danger through the efforts of one or more persons wishing to despoil them of that religion by putting an immoral false religion, or atheism, in its place. In this case, those attacked could defend themselves with a just religious war if they had no other way of defending themselves.

176. Second proposition. The first class of persons sees some danger to their religion or that of their religious counterparts through the efforts of one or more persons attempting to despoil them of their religion in order to substitute another which not only preserves all the moral good of their own religion, but elevates it to a higher and more perfect plane. This would happen if there were a question of substituting the second, third or fourth of the above mentioned religions for the first. The attack would not endanger moral good; on the contrary, such a good would be preserved, stabilised and enlarged. In this case, it could not be maintained that pure-personal right authorised this class of persons to defend their religion with force. Rather, moral duty would oblige them first to come to know exactly the newly presented religion and then, having found it morally better, to embrace it as a benefit bestowed upon them.

177. Third proposition. For the same reason, if the second class of religious people we have described were to see some danger to their religion, but from an attempt to substitute the third or fourth morally better religion, they would wage an unjust war by defending their own religion.

178. Fourth proposition. In the same way, there would be unjust religious war if the third class were to undertake the defence of their own religion against an attempt to substitute it with the fourth degree of religion.

179. Fifth proposition. On the other hand, the fourth religion could be defended in a just religious war against the three preceding classes of religion, the third against the other two, and the second against the first. In each of these wars an infinite, personal, moral good would be defended.

180. I have said that these propositions are apparently true. But are they true in fact? We cannot decide until we have heard the objections against them which have now to be weighed carefully and impartially.

FIRST OBJECTION

181. The first objection is very common. Everyone will say that such teaching deprives many people of the right to defend their own religion against attack. If we grant that one human being has this right, we must grant that all have the same right whatever religion they profess. In fact, everyone professing a religion will believe that it is the true religion and better than all the others. Everyone, therefore, has the right to defend his own religion. This right arises from individual persuasions whose sole competent judge is the individual holding these persuasions.

REPLY

182. `No one is judge of other people''s persuasions. This proposition, if understood in the sense that no one is judge of the truth and morality contained in a religion professed by others, is true only for those who affect a kind of universal scepticism. They consider themselves unsure of every single opinion they hold, and think that all they know (if this word can be used in their regard) is only probable or likely, but nothing more.

I would be the first to agree that such people are totally without the right to judge the opinions and beliefs of others. They do not possess this right because they lack the physical faculty that forms the first constitutive element of right. And they lack this physical faculty because they themselves are persuaded that they possess nothing that is absolutely certain. Consequently they remain deprived of every certain principle and criterion according to which they may regulate their judgment and come to some decision. I agree completely that `judgment about the truth and moral worth of a given religion is impossible for all those in this world who profess scepticism in theory or in practice. Such people have no firm persuasions, and do not believe that they undoubtedly possess the truth.'' It follows that the five propositions explained above cannot be applied to a society composed of such persons. It also follows that the objection would be altogether valid if the world w ere made up only of people uncertain about what they know. At the very least we would have to say that `the right to defend one''s own persuasion would be possessed by all or by no one.' Everyone would be in the same state of uncertainty as everyone else; no one's persuasion, opinion or belief would have any advantage over that of another; everything would be equally uncertain for everyone; no one would feel himself capable of judging others' opinions without leaving himself open to rash judgment.

183. We have to admit that many persuasions have been disturbed in the human spirit from the time of Luther's pretended reform until today. It is not a question only of doubt about errors and prejudices buried deep in minds; doubt has arisen about the most incontrovertible truths. The second half of the last century is a case in point. If we take into account those whose opinions prevailed through books, speeches or public administration we would find that the majority perhaps were totally bereft of firm persuasions, devoid of unshakeable theoretical opinions, and incapable of following any guide other than that of the utility to be derived from the senses. The great principle marking the passage from the medieval to the modern world is that of utility founded in feeling.

The same practical criterion flourished during the decadence of Greece and of the Roman empire amongst sceptics who on the one hand denied any human capacity for knowing the truth, while on the other desired human beings to direct their activity according to the utility derived from experience. Only this kind of utility was to be the practical criterion, as they called it, of true opinions.

Note that laws and the accepted dicta of public opinion are established by the influential majority. As we said, this majority was composed of people, unsure and hesitant in all their beliefs, who had no faculty (and therefore no right) to judge the truth and morality of the different religions professed by mankind. It is clear that in such circcumstances maxims of a particular kind relative to religious truths would prevail amongst the public. These maxims necessarily harmonised with the capacities of their authors who, doubtful about everything, were unsuited to pass judgment on anything. Their maxims had to be reduced, therefore, in our present argument to this: `People must abstain from judging about religious truths professed by others.'' Another maxim followed from the first: `Indifference in religious matters.'' This indifference consisted in treating all religions as more or less equal, that is, as more or less equally uncertain. With religions thus placed on the same level of uncertainty, it is clear that `anyone preferring his own religious belief absolutely to that of someone else, and in such a way as to condemn the other''s religion, must be considered temerarious.'

In these circumstances the choice of one belief rather than another does not depend upon the truth known about the belief, but on mere conjecture and the great principle of utility, that is, on the feeling and taste that each person has for one belief rather than another. Each individual must be free to satisfy his own individual tastes and feelings, and the conjectures made by each must be equally respected. Because no one knows which may be true and which false, an injury could be unconsciously inflicted upon the truth if all religions are not given due consideration. Every effort to take away a person's religious belief, whatever this may be, is an injury inflicted upon that person's right and an injured right can be defended by force. We have to conclude not only that the truest and most moral religion can be defended against a less true and moral religion, but in general that each person has the right to maintain and defend his own belief however true or false, moral or immora l, it may be.

184. This is the doctrine of religious sceptics and indifferentists. It has been confused with the doctrine of freedom of conscience, although the two are totally dissimilar.

185. Here I wish to declare myself a supporter and promoter of freedom of conscience, properly understood, but at the same time opposed to the teaching of sceptics and religious indifferentism as I have explained it above. I grant, however, that the teaching I have expounded is the only equable, logical doctrine available to a society made up of the indifferent and sceptical. But how does the jural teaching about freedom of conscience differ from the jural teaching of religious scepticism?(62)

186. The use of force to constrain another to adhere to a religious belief, even to a true belief, is a logical absurdity and a manifest injury to right.

187. It is a logical absurdity because a useless, improportionate means is used to bring about the adherence of an individual to a given belief. The intellect is convinced by reason alone; the spirit bows only to persuasion; physical force has power only over the body.

188. It is an injury done to right but not however to the right claimed for each human being by which we can all hold any false opinion, even when it is known as erroneous. I can only protest in the strongest terms against this totally absurd right. There is no right, no moral faculty for consenting to an error known as error, or to immorality known as immorality. The injury done to right, in the sense in which we are considering injury, does not consist in an attack on such an imaginary and absurd right, but in the use of force to inflict harm upon another by imposing some penalty upon him. In inflicting harm and imposing punishment upon another, we enter the sphere of the other's ownership; each of us, as we know, has the right `not to be harmed in our ownership''.

189. Nor may we say that a deserved punishment can be inflicted upon another in virtue of each one's innate right, indicated above, to do justice. This right cannot be applied without a prior, firm decision about fault. But which of us is capable of passing a sure sentence on the good or bad faith with which others follow religious opinions that are not absolutely and intrinsically immoral? No one is able to discern the hidden depths of the spirit visible only to the eyes of God,(63) invisible to human eyes. The right of each to remain unharmed and sure in his ownership is under attack when one person decides to inflict punishment upon another by brute force in order to constrain that person to abandon certain false religious beliefs and to hold certain other religious beliefs which the attacker believes true, and which in this case I suppose to be true.

This is the teaching about freedom of conscience which I fully accept.

190. But it is immensely different from that of religious scepticism.

As we said, this kind of doctrine asserts that each individual has an equal right to hold any belief whatsoever. Because all beliefs are considered uncertain, individuals cannot judge that one is true in preference to others. Each person has to believe that he could be mistaken in his opinion, if indeed he has an opinion. In this system, religious belief is a need independent of truth and dependent upon individual taste. Religious beliefs have to be considered as satisfying religious feeling in various kinds of way, and individuals have a free right to choose whatever satisfies them most. All tastes can be catered for. I cannot in any way give my assent to such teaching, so contrary to human nature's essential need for truth and virtue.

191. We can take comfort, however. Scepticism is a temporary transition now past as we move from one state of the world to another. We have entered a new age in which great strides are being taken towards solid persuasion. We are gaining confidence in our activity and can turn like the man who

thrown from the sea upon the beach
looks back upon the threatening waves.

192. We now have to examine possible jural teachings about religious beliefs when society is composed of people who believe fully and are deeply persuaded that the opinions they profess cannot in any way be deceptive. We are not dealing, therefore, with doubtful, indifferent or sceptical society. In explaining these jural teachings we believe that we can open a path to reconciliation between the opposing parties into which the world is divided, that is, between those who have no firm religious beliefs and those who do. We have already seen what the former teach; now we have to examine what is and what should be the teaching of the latter.

193. The reconciliation we are talking about consists in showing that the first group, devoid of religious beliefs, acts coherently and equably in following the teaching it professes (as long as its adherents remain in a state of uncertainty). However, if the second group wished to follow the same teachings as the first and make these its rules of conduct, it would be untrue to itself and act unjustly. The principles of the second group must be different because they spring from a different state of mind and spirit. Moreover, it is not at all reasonable for one side to complain about the other because of this difference. As far as I can see, the mistake made by each side, by each of the two societies, lies in their claiming that the jural teachings proper to each of them are absolutely and universally true and just, and should be followed by everyone without distinction. But this is not how things stand. Such teachings pertain not to absolute but subjective justice, that is, justic e relative to the state of the different subjects who make up society.(64)

194. The jural doctrines about religion, in the case of those who hold firm and unshakeable religious beliee the following:

First, we have to note the error present in the all too common belief that individuals can deceive themselves in good faith about everything. This is totally false. Things exist about which we cannot deceive ourselves in good faith. Proof of this assertion will be found in The Origin of Thought(65) where we have shown explicitly that good faith is impossible in all intrinsically immoral beliefs.(66) If, therefore, we are dealing not only with a false, impious belief, but also with one that is intrinsically blameworthy and immoral, persuasion about it, however strong, never gives an individual the right to propagate it in the minds and hearts of others. Every effort in this direction, granted the intention of propagating such immorality, is an injury done to human nature. Everyone can defend himself against this injury provided the rules moderating just defence are observed.

195. The usual objection (`Who can possibly judge the immorality of a religious belief?'') has no force here. Every individual has the right and duty to discern that which is intrinsically immoral and that which is not. Without such discernment, it would be impossible to live a good life. Moreover, this discernment is possible because, as I said, no one is forced to assent to what is intrinsically immoral, nor can such an error be made in good faith.

196. Second, it is possible to find beliefs which, although not immoral considered in themselves, are false and senseless. Like the previous kinds of belief, these beliefs are not truly religious, but superstitious. Nevertheless, good faith can be present in so far as these beliefs have been received into the spirit on authority from others rather than reached through one's own reasoning. However, persuasion about these beliefs, whatever its force, does not give rise to a right in those who are thus persuaded to propagate their superstitious errors. There is no right precisely bec are errors and vain superstitions.

197. A person holding these persuasions and communicating them to others is in the same condition as a person who believes in good faith that he exercises a right, or at least makes use of his jural freedom and perhaps confers a benefit upon others, although this is not in fact the case.

198. In such a case, we have to act as though we were dealing with an individual who is following an erroneous, but innocent persuasion. In other words, his endeavours have to be combated with the same arms that he himself uses. If he is content simply to discuss the matter, we can argue peacefully with him and provide him with information and explanations in favour of the truths opposed to his errors. If he uses force, force can be used against him, not because he is a false believer but because he has first used undue violence against us. If he then goes on to use seduction, fraud and lies, he can be confronted as an already blameworthy individual, convicted of bad faith and immoral assault.

199. We can add that any individual who possesses truly moral beliefs worthy of God is competent to act as judge in deciding which superstitions are devoid of morality. Every human being can and must distinguish moral belief from that which possesses no morality.

200. The contrary is true in the case of an individual whose faith is immoral. He is equally obliged by the natural law itself to listen peaceably to the arguments of others and to acknowledge their moral truth. It is only blameworthy passi blameworthy passion, or a blind, unreasonable attachment to the authority of others that impedes the tranquillity of spirit with which he listens and assents to the truth known through another's reasoning. Anyone refusing to do this is ipso facto blameworthy and unjust.

201. There is, however, a more frequent and complicated case of opposition between two religions, both of which contain true and moral elements. In this case, one of them also contains many errors and the other few (or none at all because it is entirely true). Here, good faith is possible on both sides which should therefore treat each other with great sensitivity.

202. In saying that each side should treat the other sensitively, I am speaking of the manner with which each should use its right. I am not speaking of the right considered in itself.

203. A careful distinction has to be made between questions about the existence of a right, and the just manner of exercising it.

204. It is certain that `moral-religious truth can always be justly defended, and that error can never be justly defended.'' This is a conclusion that must be safeguarded relative to the existence of right. We have dealt with this in the five propositions explained above.

205. There is, however, a totally different question to be faced relative to the just, equable manner of putting this defence into effect in particular cases and circumstances. A person upholding error in good faith has the right to be treated without punishment. He is without blame, although without any right to sustain his error despite his belief in it.

206. If, therefore, he upholds his error only through argument, and without the use of force, he should also be dissuaded from it by reasoning. For example, a person who in good faith possesses what belongs to another, must not be immediately dispossessed by force. Another's title to the thing under consideration, and his own unlawful possession of it (which means that he cannot retain it in good faith) should be proved to him.

207. The sole difference between unlawfully holding a material object and upholding an erroneous opinion is this: when a person in good faith possesses a material object, he ceases to be in good faith after sure titles of another's dominion over that object have come to his notice. In this case, the true owner can dispossess him of the object even with force if he does not listen to reason. The same cannot be said about error. It cannot always be said that the one who errs ceases to be in good faith even after others' convincing opinions against the error have been expounded. On the one hand, the person in error may not have understood them sufficiently; on the other, it is impossible for one individual to deprive another of an error by force as though the error were some material object like a coin, clothing or some possession. All that remains to the one possessing the truth is the right to defend it for himself and others with the mildest means possible. These means should also be graded in the sense that they should cause the least disturbance to a person who remains fixed in his error after hearing the contrary reasons, and even wants to propagate it.

208. At this point the usual difficulty arises: who is to be judge in this case? If both sides think they possess the truth, will either be convinced of his error?

209. It is a serious prejudice to suppose that a third party is always necessary to act as judge between two litigants in order to bring about a just settlement, which can sometimes be reached without the presence of any judge.

210. In fact, two parties who have recourse to a judge to end their dispute only do so in order to hear which side is right and which wrong. The judge could not say that one side was right unless it were already in the right even before he said so; nor could he declare a side in the wrong without its being wrong independently of his judgment. The judge does not create justice and injustice. He simply acknowledges the presence of justice and injustice in the conditions of the case laid before him.

Justice therefore exists independently of the judge, whose only responsibility is to state where justice lies. Our work in writing this essay is designed to establish the rules of justice and right according to which the judge himself can correctly give his decision; the purpose of the essay is not to discover ways of making justice and right prevail, or bring them to be recognised in society. We must remember that we are dealing with the science of`rational right which continues to exist even after the establishment of civil society, whatever certain absolutist writers maintain. It does not draw its titles from society itself, which it ignores, but from human nature.

It is impossible, therefore, for anyone to maintain that if two people have a dispute in the state of nature where no court exists to resolve the question, one of them cannot be right and the other wrong. It is equally impossible to maintain that one of the two parties, because of the lack of a judge to uphold his right, cannot defend that right against his assailant when he sees the right to be injured. Certainly, the one who believes himself injured must ascertain the fact carefully before proceeding to inflict damage on his assailant. He has a moral-jural duty to examine the case carefully and impartially. But if, in the last analysis, he finds that he has been attacked and injured, he has the right to defend himself fittingly and to demand reparation.

211. `But he could be deceiving himself!' He could indeed be deceiving himself because this is the lot of all mankind. But does this matter? If an infallible decision about the truth of the right and of the injury were necessary for exercising a right, no one, either in the state of nature or even in civil society, could make his rights prevail. Infallible decisions about human things are impossible here on earth. The individual judging his own right, the judge and the tribunal called to intervene and pronounce between the parties, are all fallible, as we can see continually from the differing decisions which tribunals, even within the same State and following the same legislation, make about identical questions. Not only courts of different instances, but different judges in the same instance, and the same judges when they change their minds as they often do provide examples of this fallibility.

Totally infallible certainty is not necessary, therefore, if human beings are to make their rights prevail. It is sufficient `that an individual remain sincerely certain about his right, and act with good faith while using the means within his power to avoid self-deception.' Once he has acquired this certainty, which in our case could be called jural,(67) he can act inculpably to defend those rights of his which he believes have been violated or are under attack.

212. These are general principles. They are valid relative to the defence of any right whatsoever. They can therefore be applied to the personal right to preserve for oneself and for others the truth and morality of one's own religion.

213. I must insist on the certain duty to ensure that only truth and morality are being defended in one's own religion. No extraneous element must be involved. This is especially the case when force has to be used as an element of defence either as a reply to force already exercised against oneself, or because all other means within the person's power have been undertaken fruitlessly. But, granted these precautions and limitations, the defence of such precious beliefs for oneself or others against all sophistry, seduction or violence will always lie within one's right. The absence of a human judge, recognised by both parties to decide which of them is right and which wrong, is irrelevant in cases of this nature. It is always a fact that only the one who defends for himself and others the possession of religious truth and morality is right and acts according to justice; the other is wrong. And that would still be the case even if there were a judge with human authority who decided i n favour of the one who was wrong, and against the one in the right.

214. But can there be a competent judge in such a case? A careful answer is necessary to this question because it will provide greater evidence for what we have said.

215. We must first note, therefore, that no human being whatsoever, precisely because each is a rational being, can be judge in such a case without being part of the case itself.

216. This is very clear. No human being exists without his either possessing or not possessing some religious belief. If he has no religious belief, he takes his place with the indifferent he has already given his adherence to one of the two sides previously mentioned, and will necessarily judge according to the principles of indifferentism which we have explained. He will judge, therefore, as one of the sides in the question, that is, he will make his judgment in favour of his own state of spirit relative to religious beliefs. If he professes a given belief, he will judge in favour of this belief and consequently as one of the parties to the case, according to his own principles, and in his own favour.

217. It is impossible, in the decisions about religion that we are considering, for an individual to be neutral. There is no one in all the world who can be put up as third-party judge of the opposing sides, equally distant from them both. We have to say that each individual, who is necessarily both judge and party, has the right and duty to judge uprightly in this matter. We conclude that there are as many judges as there are human beings; that the more popular religion has more judges in its favour, the less popular, less judges; that we are suffering not from a lack of judges, but from a superabundance of discordant judges. Each one is responsible for doing his own duty, the only way in which all can be brought to agree. Those who do not carry out their responsibility, and consequently make themselves the cause of discord, stand subject to one single judge, GOD. No human authority can intervene without entering the case as an individual who is both judge of a nd party to the dispute. If such a person takes it upon himself to judge without admitting that he is a party to the dispute he lies by pretending to be God.(68)

SECOND OBJECTION

218. `This teaching provides not only a faculty for self-defence to those who hold true and moral religion, but for attacking other believers in so far as their religions are immoral and false.'

REPLY

219. As we have said, it is not lawful for anyone to attack another's religion by inflicting or threatening to inflict physical punishment. Lies, deception and other immoral ways of opposing the religion of others are even worse.

220. The use of words is different; freedom to speak cannot be denied to truth and morality.

221. The word of truth is essentially free. It does not offend personal right; and its exercise is supremely holy. It is a benefit which renews the personship offended in others by error and immorality. No sophistry or hair-splitting can prevail against this precious freedom; it shines with the clarity of evidence.

222. But if you admit freedom of speech for an individual because he believes that he possesses the truth, you should admit it equally fo another who also believes that he possesses the truth

It is not correct to say that I admit freedom of speech for an individual because he believes that he possesses the truth; I admit it only because he truly possesses the truth, that is, on condition that he possesses it.

223. But who judges between two people holding different opinions, both of whom believe they possess the truth and therefore have a right to freedom of speech?

I have already shown that there is no need for any hypothetical judge to act as a third party in the dispute. Moreover, judges are not lacking in this situation because there are as many judges as there are onlookers. And all are fallible.

224. What can government do then?

Government can certainly prevent external violence and punish the first contestant to introduce intimidatory force, or calumny or other injury into the discussion. But government will only do this because the attacking party has, independently of the argument he is sustaining, offended the other's rights.

225. In that case, government would also have the right to silence error.

The case between truth and error, morality and immorality, concerns human persons; it is not a case for government, but for humanity.(69)

226. Is it impossible for government to do anything in this exigency?

As far as I can see, what I have said shows that I am opposed to considering things in the abstract. I do not want to look at matters in the systematic, exclusive way used so far for political questions, and often jural and moral questions. If I understood as `government' some kind of mental entity that remained suspended as it were in the clouds beyond contact with human individuals, I would undoubtedly have to grant the consequence which according to you seems to flow from my principles. I would have to say, as someone has affirmed recently, `the law is atheistic'.

But in my opinion government is only an aggregate of human beings, of real flesh and blood, who govern society. They may do this of their own right, or through delegation by those who are or who wish to be governed by them. As we have seen, all human beings, including those employed in government at any level, are judges in cases of truth and morality. All of them are judges, from the highest to the lowest. And it is lawful and sometimes obligatory for those who govern, as it is lawful and obligatory for all other human beings, to defend their own and others' religious beliefs, if true, when they are threatened. In the same way, they can, like all other human beings, use the means in their power for defensive purposes. Amongst these means is government influence.

Any opinion contrary to this constant, common sense way of considering matters would either be a contradiction or provide rules of conduct not for human beings, but for imaginary entities.

227. We have to add, however, that persons composing government must observe, in their defence of the truth and morality in which they believe, the same moral laws which moderate the defence offered by an individual for his own or others' rights. That is:
1. This defence must be carried out with upright means, not deceptively, etc.
2. It must be the minimum possible defence in which methods of persuasion are employed when the aggressors are not guilty of deception or violence. If they are guilty in these respects, their deception and violence can be punished and repressed for what they are, independently of any religious motive.

228. If it is a question not of defending one's own true religion but of opposing the false religion of someone else, government can act in the same way as all those intimately persuaded of possessing the truth and certain that in propagating it they are performing a benefit to mankind. In other words, government can do this provided it does not enter the sphere of others' absolute or relative rights, and provided it always uses persuasive means, not brute force or punishment, or actual or threatened harm.(70)

229. Within these strict limits, laws and all other means available to governments can and must be ordered to the defence and the propagation of truth, morality and true religion. As we have shown at length elsewhere, this is the final end of civil society.(71)

230. Moreover, while laws and all other means available to government can and must be ordered to propagate what governments have solid reason to believe is truth, morality and true religion, this corresponds to the way in which things have always been done. They could not have been done differently in any rational, coherent system, whatever its denomination: absolutism or liberalism in politics, atheism or Catholicism in religion.

231. Theorists of any kind in politics or religion should pay careful attention to this last proposition. Provided they grant me two truths, which I think are evident and which I believe I have demonstrated elsewhere with the rigour proper to mathematical theories,(72) I would submit: 1. that civil society is formed and can be formed by human beings alone, for the sake of mutual help in progress towards true human good (moral-eudaimonological good); and 2. that those who govern have the responsibility for promoting this good which is the aim of the existence of civil association, and which they must achieve with civil means.

232. Granted these two principles, common to all who have not abandoned morality and reason, it must be obvious to all rulers of society that in order to reach their aim they have to use the concept they have formed of the aim itself. And this concept of the ultimate aim of society, that is, of true moral-eudaimonological good is formed by them (and by all other individuals) as the result of their own beliefs and interior moral-religious persuasions.

All those who govern, whoever they may be, hold one system or another if indeed they intend to steer the boat entrusted to them to the port for which it is destined. In doing this, they can make use only of the knowledge and persuasion they have about the location of that port, and about the journey needed to reach it. A helmsman can steer the ship only in the light of his own knowledge of geography, maps and compasses, knowledge which he uses as best he can.

233. Some may affirm that this is not the case: government, they maintain, must not concern itself with religious or moral matters; its responsibility extends solely to material things.

But this kind of objection depends either upon people's ignorance of the final and principal end for which civil society is instituted (the end for which human beings operate and which they cannot renounce), or upon people who contradict and oppose themselves, or finally upon indifferentists in religious matters, that is, people who recognise nothing as true, or people who believe it impossible to recognise the truth amidst everything else.

The last category (individuals without any firm beliefs) is composed, as I was saying, of the great multitude of those who would have government totally disassociated from everything religious. However, in maintaining this opinion, they do not avoid the necessity we have indicated. In fact, they themselves are acting in conformity with the principle that we hold as a de facto universal and necessary rule of conduct for all human beings alike. When they affirm that government, that is, the people who govern, must not pay any attention whatsoever to religion because it provides nothing stable, they simply act according to their own persuasions. If people of this kind were placed in government, they would without doubt act reasonably and coherently in accordance with their own convictions. In other words, they would act in the same way as those who are inwardly sure they possess what is true, just and holy, and use their influence and power to communicate such a good to their fellows. The error of indifferentists is found rooted in their indifferentism.

234. Nevertheless those who hold firm persuasions and beliefs can always be mistaken.

The objection is always the same. They can indeed be mistaken, but this does not mean that the teaching they propound is false. Or are we going to say that the helmsman's only possibility of not mistaking his direction is for him to let his rowers and the wind take the boat where they will? Is there to be no navigation because we are over-anxious about the captain's possible mistake?

235. In the second place, we are speaking about rights and, as I have already said, I acknowledge a true right not in the individual who erroneously believes he has a right, but in the one who actually possesses a right. I have also said that it is necessary to treat urbanely those who exercise a right which in good faith they believe is theirs. Finally, I said that the fear of a mistake about one's belief is not a sufficient reason for having to abstain from the exercise of what one believes is one's right. However, each individual is always bound by moral jural duty to proceed calmly with sufficient self-scrutiny.

236. Finally, careful attention should be given to the difficulty and quasi-impossibility of adverting to self-deception in the case under discussion as we have defined it.

I grant that error would be possible and extremely easy in the case of religious beliefs in general, that is, of all beliefs improperly called `religious'. But I allow a right of defence only to those whose religion is first of all moral. There is no right of defence or of proselytism for those who simply profess `some religious belief'. In the case of morality, nobody is completely deceived, strictly speaking, about the universal principles. If through self-deception people believe that something immoral is moral, they would not as a result attain any right, even the right which pertains to error in good faith. A formally erroneous conscience is not free from fault even when the person forming such a conscience seems to have no disquiet about his fault.(73)

237. Your teaching encourages false zeal in rulers, who thus offend and irritate their peoples.

This kind of statement shows that the question has been misunderstood, and two questions confused. The first question is general: can the person possessing moral-religious truth communicate it to others with every upright means available, and in doing so does he offend the rights of those who do not yet possess it? The second asks if the individual possessing moral-religious truth can try to propagate it even if he foresees that his activity would have an effect contrary to his intention and produce more harm than good. In other words, can he communicate it to others with means that, because of the evil they produce, are more likely to damage the good at which they aim?

238. The first question is one of right. This we have dealt with. The second is more concerned with prudence than with right. The first considers personal right in itself, devoid of the circumstances that are often found in its exercise; the second considers a precise, particular circumstance which sometimes impedes the exercise of that right. The first aims at establishing the existence of the right as faculty; the second limits the acts of this faculty according to the principle we have established (a principle scarcely ever taken into consideration): `No one has the right to misuse his right'.

239. After the defence of moral-religious truth, rational Right acknowledges as a result of war and violence that there is nothing more just than the attempt to defend oneself against the threat of slavery (taken in the strict sense) or to free oneself from such a state, so degrading to human nature.

240. Nevertheless, we have to note that a slave does not exercise a right if he is so corrupt that he wants freedom simply to abuse it and thus become more immoral than he would have been in the state of slavery. In regaining his freedom for this purpose, he is as unjust as the owner who keeps him in slavery. It is indeed sad for lovers of humanity, but true, that such things occur,(74) and there are facts to prove it. Indeed, there are many reasons drawing us to think that the profound immorality of the human condition disguises a hidden justification for Providence's permitting the slavery of so many thousands of unhappy wretches.

241. Let me point here to two opposite opinions about the natural right of slaves to liberate themselves by force: pagan opinion, which is entirely evil, and Christian opinion, which is highly beneficial.

242. Pagan opinion can be summed up in the words of Florus: `Who amongst the chief people of the world can possibly tolerate in tranquillity wars waged against slaves?' (75) The people ruling the nations thought it a disgrace that they had to fight against slaves who wanted to cast off their fetters. Such contempt arises from a feeling of habitual supremacy, now changed into a civil right. Subjective pride draws jural reason towards error. It dominates it to such an extent that lengthy oppression and permanent injury become a right of dominion and ownership.

243. Christian opinion originates from a totally opposite principle. Its source is not subjective feeling, but moral perfection, which is altogether objective. Dominion or the domination by one individual over many, ceases to be good for Christians, whose sole good is justice and beneficence. Christian opinion does not seek to subdue anything to itself, but wants to give to others. Armed with this sublime notion of good, such opinion is no longer interested in what it sees as useless questions about slaves freeing themselves with violence from slavery.(76) As it progresses, Christianity does indeed encounter the question, but bypasses it. The difficulty is resolved of itself, as it were, as Christianity goes forward, casting light in its path and sowing peace in human spirits. Christianity has no doubt that in accord with rational light an affirmative answer must be given to the question, and labours simply in order to make the questio n inapplicable.

As we have seen, the use of violence is justified only on condition that there is no other milder means for arriving at the preservation of one's right which, however, is right simply to the extent that rationally speaking it contains some value.(77) But Christianity provides us with another, peaceful means for freeing slaves from injustice. Enlightening the owner about the injustice of slavery and about his obligation to see a brother in every slave, it shines upon his mind and enhances his spirit and slavery exists no longer. This simple change produces of itself upright, moral servitude. Moreover, Christianity diminishes and even wipes out in the eyes of the slave the price of his freedom; it shows him that in slavery itself he can exercise heroic virtue, obtaining moral good to the highest degree and its consequent divine reward. And the content of this reward is the highest and most perfect freedom, which alone fulfils the concept of true good.

Christian wisdom saw that material freedom from slavery did not necessarily result in the betterment of the slave. On the contrary, the badly-disposed slave could be harmed in his moral good in passing from abasement to arrogance, as indeed occurred.

This sublime teaching of Christ, preached by his immediate disciples, is witnessed to by the great St. Ignatius of Antioch who, according to tradition, was the child put in the midst of the disciples as a symbol of humility and innocence.(78) In his letter to Polycarp he writes: `Do not despise bond-servants, male or female. On their part, they should not puff themselves up. Rather, let them serve more eagerly for the glory of God to obtain an infinitely better freedom from him. They should not desire to be granted their common freedom if afterwards they become only the bond-servants of desire.' (79) How great the wisdom, concept and new light for the times contained in these words!(80)

244. But is it then impossible, according to Christian principles, for the slave to throw off undue servitude?

I can only reply that the exercise of this rational right remains in force amongst those who have not reached the apex of gospel virtue. Freedom is indeed a natural good which is not compensated or sublimated in those who either do not fully possess supernatural good or who possess it in an insufficiently sensitive and operative manner. Even amongst Christians a distinction has to be made: some, the majority, remain at the normal level; others, but few, reach final perfection.

(52) Cf. ER, 246-251.

(53) Cf. preceding chapter.

(54) Cf. preceding chapter.

(55) The Hebrew law was entirely devoted to impressing ideas of justice deeply into the hearts of that primitive nation. By means of the law, divine wisdom, seconding the instincts of human nature, tempered and directed these instincts so that they did not act blindly. For example, in Deuteronomy (c. 17: [4-10]) God permits, or rather commands, all the people to stone those guilty of adultery: `You' (he speaks to the whole of Israel) `shall bring forth to your gates that man or woman who has done this evil thing, and you shall stone that man or woman to death with stones.' But he requires 1. that the crime should be carefully ascertained: `You shall enquire diligently, and if it is true that such an abominable thing has been done in Israel ...' There should be three, or at least two witnesses of the crime: `A person shall not be put to death on the evidence of one witness.' Moreover, the witnesses are held to the truth by being made the first to throw stones at the condemned, an act by which they protest their willingness to take responsibility for the blood of the innocent: `The hand of the witnesses shall be first against him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people.' 2. If the crime is uncertain, and the people are not sure how to judge it, God makes them turn to the priests and to the judge: `If any case arises requiring decision between one kind of legal right and another, or one kind of assault and another, any case within your towns which is too difficult for you, then you shall rise and go up to the place which the Lord your God will choose, and coming to the levitical priests, and to the judge who is in office in those days, you shall consult them, and they shall declare to you the decision. Then you shall do according to what they declare to you from that place which the Lord will choose, and you shall be careful to do according to all that they direct you.' The Mosaic law limits to t his case of doubt the need of recurring to the established priest and judge.

(56) St. Ambrose not only recognises that Moses, although a private individual, was exercising a right in killing the Egyptian whom he struck down, but calls this act a duty. He says: `Anyone ... who does not defend a companion from injury when he is able to do so, is as guilty as the one who does the injury' (I, Officior. 36). St. Thomas and other commentators also acknowledge that Moses exercised a natural right in his action, and some, like Toledo (in Lk 12, ann. 27) note that there was no judge to whom recourse could be made. Cajetan considers the overseers of the Hebrew workers as their public enemies, and affirms quite mercilessly that the Hebrews could kill them as enemies are killed in a just war (I think this is going too far). The fact that Moses exercised a natural right is not contrary to what some say about his being inspired from above in what he did. Rather, it harmonises better with what happened.

(57) Giovanni Jahn in his Archeologia biblica speaks about the right presumed by each tribe, §212: `Each tribe possessed a kind of right of inspection over all the others in order that the law might be observed. If the law had been abandoned, the negligent tribe could be denounced to the others and punished in war, if there were no other remedy.' He cites Scripture, Jos 32: 9, Judges 20: 1 ss., as his authority.

(58) Cf. SP, bk. 2, c. 12, for the rights arising in human beings from the limitation of the powers proper to their free will.

(59) The loss of material virginity without interior consent does not entail damage to personship as such. We are not dealing with this, but with the question of effective danger to personal dignity, to morality. If the virgin doubts her constancy she can kill her aggressor.

(60) Morality in religion is that endowment by which religion, through the relationship it establishes between the person professing it and God, effectively betters the worshipper. A religion without power to draw human beings near to God or (and this is more important) of joining God to human beings by making them sharers in the divine nature (holiness and consummate justice are found here), is not entirely moral.

(61) The teaching of the Catholic Church has always acknowledged the presence of persons of good faith amongst the children of heretics. These people are therefore said to be separated from the body of the Church, but not from its spirit. They can obtain salvation; Baius' proposition (n. 68), `Purely negative infidelity in those amongst whom Christ has not been preached, is a sin', was condemned. - St. Augustine denies that those born of heretics and educated by them deserve the title `heretic' if they love the truth with a sincere heart, seek it and, were they to find it, would be ready to embrace it. Cf. Ep. 43 in the Maurine edition. - Tract. 45, in Jo. - De Util. Cred., c. 1. - De Haeres. ad Quodvultdeus, c. 1.

(62) This sceptical teaching about religion has wrongly been called `theological tolerance'. The word `tolerance' does not express teaching, but conduct. Moreover, it implicitly contains doctrinal disapproval of the object of tolerance; we tolerate only what is bad. - I think it more important than ever today to avoid imprecise language of this nature which leads to endless questioning, and to discord where harmony should reign. I do not think it useless to remind my readers of this on occasion. My only desire is unity: `Peace! Peace! Peace! is all my cry.'

(63) The same cannot be said about individual, external and immoral acts damaging to humanity and resulting from false religious opinions: for example, cases of human sacrifice, the burning of Indian widows, sacred prostitution, and so on. Eliminating these injuries to human nature and saving their victims, even when this is done with the use of force, would be a benefit to humanity and a service to justice. - In practice, however, the exercise of this right would be dangerous. It could be used by the devious and powerful to carry out many violations of right.

(64) This is an example of the way in which the same species of rights assumes different modes in various human accidental states, as we said in the Introduction to this work.

(65) Cf. OT, 575-629.

(66) Cf. CS.

(67) We have spoken at length about this kind of certainty in CS, 474-528.

(68) An individual opposing the judicial authority of the Church would show that he has not understood my argument. There is no doubt that the Church is the supreme judge in matters of faith, but its decision is in fact valid only for its own children, in other words, for those who have the joyful courage to believe in her authority. But it is impossible to believe in the Church without first acknowledging the authority and worth of that in which one believes. And this is the internal judgment under consideration, which can be made only by the individual, not by others. - For a proof that this first judgment is necessarily individual, cf. my first letter to the Abbé Lamennais in vol 4, Prose Ecclesiastiche.

(69) I have shown, in SP (bk 4, c. 2), that human good or satisfaction is personal, and that governmental responsibility consists not only in removing obstacles to the freedom of individuals who have to act of themselves to attain this good, but in helping individuals to do this (bk. 2, c. 10).

(70) In the Middle Ages, some rulers employed violence to constrain others to embrace the Catholic faith. This brutal method of action seems to have been introduced into religious affairs as a result of the rough and ready customs of the northern peoples who preyed upon the Roman world. Mgr. G. B. Duvoisin, bishop of Nantes, notes this in his Saggio sulla tolleranza, an addition to the final Paris edition (1805) of his Dimostrazione evangelica. He says: `Although religious dogmas and morality are always the same, religion in practice takes on the characteristics and customs of the people professing it. The northern peoples who conquered the rest of Europe and knew no other law than that of war preserved their barbarous and bellicose mores even under Christianity. Their zeal for religion was the same as their zeal for honour, and they were under a self-imposed obligation to defend both by force of arms. The spirit of chivalry was not in favour of tolerance, and the unhappy prejudice which caused the introduction of duelling could not fail to make wars of religion an affair of honour.' - And, as we said, wars of religion in defence of true religion are truly holy.

(71) Cf. SP, bk. 2.

(72) Ibid.

(73) For a demonstration of the voluntariness of informal error, cf. CE, 1279-1334 and CS, 236-372. Further confirmation may be found in a recent work: `Every error is in general freely chosen. We are not deceived; we deceive ourselves. There is no falsity in our perceptions. Whatever we feel about the origin of our perceptions, we have to acknowledge that they come from God in a more or less direct way because he is the author of our means of knowledge. That is why perceptions are always true, although incomplete. "The intellect (that is, simple perception) spoken of by St. Thomas is never false as long as it is not mingled with any judgment. It simply does not embrace all its object" (S.T., q. 85, art. 6).' De la perfectibilité humaine, by A. M., Paris 1835, c. 4.

(74) This kind of injustice occurs more easily when the owner acts humanely towards a brutalised slave. Every time a slave who wishes to lay aside the yoke desires greater moral evil than that to which he is constrained by his master, he commits an injustice. He wishes to leave one immoral state for the sake of something worse.

(75) De gest. Rom. 3, c. 19.

(76) Note that we are speaking here of true slavery not about lawful dominion. The principle we are discussing is: `Can a master use his slave as a thing and even go so far as to destroy him?'

(77) The third constitutive element of right. Cf. ER, 252-254.

(78) Matt 18: [2]. - St. Ignatius had listened to Peter, John and Paul.

(79) Letter to Polycarp, 4. - We find the same wisdom in the extant letter of St. Barnabas, the apostle: `Do not give orders with a bitter spirit to your bond-servants, women or men, who hope in the same God. Be careful not to fall away like this from the fear of God who is over you all. He did not come to call us according to rank; he came to call those whom the spirit had prepared.' I omit the well-known passages of the Apostle of the Gentiles.

(80) Every jural consideration is contained in this evangelical teaching. Amongst others we find the principle we have previously indicated: `If an individual abuses his right, it does not follow that others can deprive him of it; they can only impede its use.' This principle is fully respected. The Gospel eliminates all that is abusive and unjust in slavery, leaving intact those aspects of seigniory and subjection which do not overstep the bounds of justice. Strictly speaking, what was unjust about seigniory over slaves was its excess. If excesses are removed, justice is re-established without need to break the bonds of seigniory and upright servitude, which can well remain.

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