Connatural Rights
Introduction
24. We have said that dissociation and society are the two most general states in which human beings can be considered. In `general state' we include many other states, because even the individual human beings whom we imagine and suppose in a state of dissociation can be found in a great variety of particular situations and circumstances.
25. Relative to the derivation of individual rights, it is necessary to distinguish carefully two situations. The first is that in which human beings have rights arising solely from their human nature — we call these rights connatural, although they are normally said to be innate. The second situation is that in which new rights are added to individuals as a result of their acts; these rights are called acquired. We must first discuss connatural rights.
26. The question immediately arises: `Does a new-born baby have rights? Are there rights which come directly from human nature?' If we consider new-born babies, we find them in a condition so far removed from ours that they seem to have a different life. Consequently we have difficulty in seeing in them the traces of intelligence found in ourselves as adults. And because we find no intellectual acts equivalent to our own, we are inclined to deny them all use of intelligence. This error has continued for centuries. Nevertheless, even though we tend to deny the baby any use of intelligence, we have to grant it fundamental, innate rights in order to avoid the absurdity of an existent, intelligent being without rights, in the way that in animate and unreasoning things are. It is certainly not the first time that we human beings have been made aware of our errors by the repugnance we would experience in admitting the consequences of those errors; our darkened reason is helped by a more honest feeling. We must therefore investigate the following questions: `Do innate rights exist? What are they? Can they be modified?' But first of all, what do we understand by innate or connatural rights?