Rights in the Family
Appendix 5. (1161).
Incorporation into a religious order is finalised either by religious profession in the strict sense or with profession in the less strict sense. The former is a perpetual personal self-surrender to the religious order with full and absolute acceptance on the part of the order; the latter is a perpetual personal self-surrender, united to the three substantial vows, accompanied by a conditioned acceptance on the part of the order. When the selfsurrender and the acceptance are absolute on both sides, the vow is solemn. Prior to the institution of the Society of JESUS, this was the only kind of vow that served as a diriment impediment to marriage because it was the only kind of religious profession recognised. The decree of Boniface VIII (In Sexto, bk. 3, tit. 15) was understood in this sense:
| By this present decree we declare and sanction that the only vow to be called `solemn', relative to annulling any marriage contracted after it, is that which was solemnised through the reception of holy orders or through expressed or merely tacit profession in one of the religious orders approved by the Apostolic See. |
However, in the Society of JESUS, before religious profession in the strict sense in which the acceptance of the oblation and the self-surrender to God is absolute on the part of the religious order as well as on the part of the person making the profession, a lower grade of `scholastics' was instituted which was accompanied by another kind of profession. This, as we said, comes about by means of the three substantive vows and the oblation and self-surrender on the part of the person making the vows who intends it as absolute and perpetual. It is accepted by the religious order, however, only for a time, that is, until the order either admits the person to profession in the strict sense or dismisses him. In this case, dismissal frees him from his vows.
In these circumstances, the vow of chastity is not called `solemn', because this title had come to be applied properly speaking only to the vow solemnised by the first kind of religious profession (even though it was pronounced without any external rite or even tacitly) or by sacred ordination. Nevertheless, it is a diriment impediment because it is united to an offering and self-surrender that renders the person making it a true religious and because it includes a kind of profession.
The Institute of Charity also has this way of uniting substantial vows to the perpetual offering and self-surrender which renders the person making it a true religious, even though it is accepted with certain conditions by the Institute and by the Church which has approved the Institute.
Authors pose the question: `Does the vow render marriage null of its nature or through a positive law of the Church?' Steyaert (§9, n. 3 ss.) gives the arguments in favour of the former answer; Wigger (De Relig., Tract. 8, c. 4), the arguments in favour of the latter. The two opinions can be reconciled as follows:
1. If the vow of chastity under discussion is not accepted by the Church, it
does not render the marriage null because it is a simple promise, not a full
contract handed over and accepted.
2. The Church accepts this vow when the person makes it in the act with which
he becomes a religious.
3. By divine institution the religious state requires for its
constitution the three substantial vows, which must either be expressed or
included in the vow of obedience. To these must be added that recognition and
approbation of the Church which brings about an ecclesial state. All
this was true even of the religious of antiquity who were not united in
societies. Such religious, however, are no longer recognised; their state,
therefore, is not an ecclesial state.
With this in mind, we can see: 1. that the recognition and approval of the religious state pertains to positive Right; 2. that after recognition by the Church, the religious state can be joined to a given vow of chastity. This vow of its nature and according to rational Right must render marriage null because it includes, of its nature, the alienation of the right to marry and corresponding acceptance on the part of God by means of the Church. This completes the contract and passes over the ownership itself (which happens in all determined promissory contracts (Cf. RI, 1072-1080).
Hence Gregory XIII, in the Apostolic Letters Ascendente Domino (25th May 1584) says, against those who denied diriment force to the simple vows of scholastics in the Society of JESUS:
| They forget that the solemnity of the vow is dependent upon the constitution of the Church alone, nor do they realise that the three vows of this Society, although simple, were accepted as substantial religious vows by this See and truly placed those making them in the religious state. Those making such vows dedicate and actually surrender themselves through the vows to the Society, binding themselves by their vows to the divine service. No one besides the Roman Pontiff can intervene in such vows. |
We see from these words that:
1. The solemnity of the vows was introduced by Church law in so far
as solemnity is understood as every formality or external rite required
as a condition of acceptance by the Church;
2. This solemnity is distinguished from the substance of the vows (vota
substantialia);
3. The vows are `substantial' as soon as they constitute a religious state.
They do this as soon as the Church accepts and recognises them as such, even if
the external solemnity indicating this acceptance, and the conditions laid down
by the Church for these external solemnities, are changed;
4. Before the introduction of the Society of JESUS, the
Church required as a condition for such acceptance religious profession in the
strict sense. In confirming the Society, however, the Church was content that
persons making the vows `dedicate themselves through the vows, handing
themselves over in act to the Society, binding themselves by their vows to
divine service.' The Society, however, accepted this perpetual self-offering
only for a time.