SCHEMA OF CONCEPTS OF SOCIETY
DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO THEIR VARIOUS CLASSES
I
The most general, completely indeterminate, pure concept of society
II
Determinations of the pure concept of society. -
More or less general concepts of society.
I.Societies in which the first factor, the involvement of one or more wills in an object, is determined.
| I) |
If the number of wills is determined, we have: the concepts of societies differing in number. |
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| II) |
If the involvement of wills is determined, we have: concepts of more or less united, efficacious societies resulting from direct volitions |
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| III) |
If the object in which the wills are co-involved is determined, it can be further determined: |
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| A. |
Relative to the quantity of good, in which case we have: the concepts of societies tending to greater or less good |
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| B |
Relative to the species of good, which can be further determined: |
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| 1st. |
According to the degree of immediacy of good, which gives us the concepts of societies with an immediate or useable good, or a more or less mediate or useful good, as their object. |
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| 2nd. |
According to the degree of definiteness of good, and we have: |
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| a) |
The concepts of societies with a definite good as their object. |
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| b) |
The concepts of societies having a more or less indefinite good as their object. This indefinite good can be further determined because it consists either in an increase of rights, or in an improved modality of rights. Hence the concepts of societies aiming at the acquisition of rights and of societies aiming at the modalities of rights. |
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| 3rd. |
According to a categorical distinction of good. Hence the concepts of societies having absolute or relative good as their object. |
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| 4th. |
According to the manner of acquiring good, that is, either progressively or all at once. Hence the concepts of progressive and of final societies. If progression is determinate, we have the concepts of equable or non-equable progressive societies (which may or may not hold firmly to their state of equability). |
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| IV) |
If the moral or simply eudaimonological motive, which can or must impel the will to co-involvement, is determinate, we have the concepts of obligatory and non-obligatory societies, and, when the quality of moral obligation is determinate, the concepts of morally obligatory societies, and the concepts of societies which are also obligatory from a jural point of view. |
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II. Societies in which the second factor, that is, consciousness of the involvement of one's own will with that of others, is determined. We have therefore: the concepts of more or less intense, uniform societies as a result of varying degrees of reflective knowledge.
III. Societies in which the third factor, the will to be co-involved, is determined, which gives us the concepts of more or less united, efficacious societies springing from a greater or lesser degree of intensity in the reflective volitions
IV. Societies in which the fourth factor, the common contribution, is determined. What is contributed may be either some useable good or a useful good (a means to obtain an useable good), or a burden (some kind of servitude, responsibility or obligation). Hence
| I) |
The concepts of societies of fruition which hold some useable good in common. This good can be further determined: |
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| A. |
By the different way in which the members place the good in common. Hence the concepts of contributing societies and societies of fruition, as well as societies of acceptance and fruition |
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| B. |
By the nature of the good which is absolute or relative. Hence the concepts of moral-religious societies, and of societies which have some relative, useable good as their object. |
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| C. |
By the duration of the good. Hence the concepts of eternal societies, and of societies of indefinite, perennial, or temporary duration. |
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| II) |
And the concepts of societies of action in which we can determine: |
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| A. |
Their adjuncts, which give us the concepts of societies of simple action;of action and possession; of action and fruition; of action, possession and fruition. |
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| B. |
The quality of their consolidated action, which gives us the concepts of societies of bodily forces, of abilities of spirit, of external means, of two of these things taken together, or of all three taken together. |
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| C. |
The quantity of what is contributed in common, which gives us the concepts of more or less extended societies.(23) |
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| D. |
The way in which the common contribution is made, which gives us the concepts of societies. |
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| a) |
Of internal origin in which the contribution of the members can be determined, which gives us the concepts of uni- and multi-quota societies; together with: the concepts of equal and unequal societies.(24) |
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| b) |
Of external origin; when this is determined, we have |
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| 1st. |
the concepts of societies of external, independent origin; and |
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| 2nd |
the concepts of societies of external, dependent origin. Finally, from the determination of the degrees of dependence arise the concepts of societies subject to absolute dominion and of societies subject to moderate dominion |
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| E. |
The duration of the action, which gives us the concepts of societies of indefinite, life-long and temporary duration. |
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| III) |
And finally the concepts of societies springing from obligations, servitude, burdens. |
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| . ANNOTATION In the preceding schema, the determinations added to the indeterminate concept of society are the result of determining the individual factors of a given society. Clearly other, even more determined concepts of society would be present if instead of the determination of a single factor, those of two, three or all four factors (with the exception of those which are incompatible) were added to the general concept.. |
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Notes
(23) The species of society differ, and the rights of societies are more or less extensive according to the common contribution made by the members. `This contribution may consist in individual things, or a quantity of money, or an entire kind of things, as for example, all one's goods, produce, immovable goods or finally one's entire substance, nothing excepted' (Austrian civil code, §1177).
(24) I call those societies equal in which all the members are under the same social law before which they are all equal. Unequal societies are those whose members have their own social laws. According to this definition, uni-quota and multi-quota societies are equal societies because the rights of all the members are regulated by the same law, although one member's contribution may be greater than that of another's. In fact, the law which states: 'Let each member have an effective share proportioned to his contribution', is equally valid for those who have contributed greatly and for those whose contribution is less. The fact constituting the title of rights does not dissolve the jural equality amongst the members; the law, if it is different for different members, removes this equality. Conjugal society and parental society are, therefore, unequal because the law determining the rights of the wife and children is different from that which determines the rights of husband and parent.