Appendix 1. (108).
Jurists distinguish society from communion, and normally say: `We contract society, but "fall" into communion'. Properly speaking, however, individuals do not `fall' into any communion of good without at least presumed consent in the eyes of the law. A nominated heir, for example, does not possess the inheritance in communion with his co-heirs until he has accepted the inheritance. It is, therefore, false to say that the kind of contract present in society is not present in communion of good. The case in point is only the occasion for a contract, and thus seems to imply that we enter into communion involuntarily. But careful consideration shows that the occasion provided for entering into communion is not equivalent to actually entering. The occasion is given by the case; the actual entrance is the work of the will. - Jurists also say that `society is de jure, communion is rather de facto'. Such a difference would seem to divide just communion from unjust communion (for example, that of thieves in common possession of stolen goods). At the same time, it would show that just communion (we are speaking only of this) is true society because it is indeed a communion de jure, not merely de facto. - In the third place, jurists say that `society is proper to persons, communion to things'. This distinction separates society from material communion (the kind that beasts have relative to the same food). We, however, are speaking of jural communion where there is always true union not simply of things, but of persons precisely because there is union of rights. What is put in common is not detached from the person, but considered as owned by the person who puts it in communion or consents to have it in communion. This truth is acknowledged by jurists themselves when they distinguish associates into capitalists (who simply provide capital) and personalists (who only provide work). Capitalists, who merely have some communion of things in the society, are nevertheless called and are members. Jurists are inconsistent in separating communion from society by imagining that communion is made up of things, not of persons, while recognising the existence of societies of mere capital. - Finally, they maintain that minors, infants, lunatics and idiots cannot contract societies, but can enter into some communion of good. This is not so. Unless such persons are represented by others, they cannot even form a communion of good, nor have any external ownership. Civil society assigns them people to look after their interests, defend their goods and exercise those acts of right of which they themselves are incapable. In this way, such persons can indeed be members of a society. There is nothing to prevent an infant or an imbecile, aided by the law, from being a capitalist in a commercial or industrial society, or from fulfilling their obligations as members by means of their representatives.