Universal Social Right
Chapter 2
The concept of society differentiated from similar concepts
40. What I have said is sufficient to enable us to distinguish the concept of society from similar concepts with which it could be confused. Having established the possibility of society solely on the four proximate causes (factors, as I have called them), it is not difficult to understand: 1. That the coexistence of two or more things is insufficient to constitute a society. In this respect, society has to be distinguished from simple coexistence.
41. 2. That the coexistence of two or more animate things is insufficient, even though they are drawn together by instinctive animal force. This would be the case with beasts, which lack any intelligent and moral characteristic. In this respect, society differs from gregarious living.
42. 3. That the coexistence of persons, who are naturally related by moral, jural bonds, is insufficient. In this respect, society differs from jural relationship.
43. 4. That the coexistence of two or more persons bound by conventions is insufficient. In this respect, society differs from the conventional bond.
44. 5. That the coexistence of two or more persons, even in jural relationship and bound by conventional bonds, or bonds of dominion and servitude, is insufficient. In this respect, society differs from the bond of seigniory.
45. 6. That the contemplation of the same truth by two or more persons and their isolated enjoyment of it (each is ignorant of the others) is insufficient. In this case, although the object contemplated and enjoyed is common to all, these persons are unconscious of any communion, and are not at one in the act by which they will and enjoy the object. Only an agreed act of will and enjoyment would, by uniting their wills in the truth, associate them in the common good of truth. In this respect, society differs from simple, direct communion in good.
46. 7. That benevolence of one person towards others is insufficient to constitute society. Benevolence exists in one person alone; nothing is placed in common, even if we suppose the existence of a feeling of gratitude in the other. In this respect, the social bond differs from the bond of benevolence and of beneficence.
47. 8. That society is not included even in the simple concept of
friendship, although friendship always gives rise to at least potential
society. In fact, the concept of friendship is the result of two elements: 1. a
desire that the other have all that is good (love); and 2. a longing that the
other desire the same for us (being loved). The first of these two elements
forms the concept of benevolence, but the second, which leads an individual to
rejoice in being loved in return, completes the concept of friendship. However,
one person can befriend another even if the second does not respond. In this
case, the other, who does not love in return, would not be a friend.
It is not absurd, therefore, to find friendship in one of the two, and not in
the other. If there is a mutual response, they are two friends who jointly want
good for one another and rejoice in the love they have for one another.
Nevertheless, society is still not present because nothing is as yet placed in
common.
However, the friendship we have described obviously contains that which causes a society of friendship. If I desire all good for another, it is natural for me to want all that I have to be of assistance to him; if I desire that the other desire all good for me, and rejoice in this desire or love from the other, I also desire that the other help me with what he has. This explains why things belonging to friends are said to be held in common (ta twn filiwn koina filian isothta) and give rise, as a proximate effect of friendship, to community in goods and society. In other words, there exists an interior society in which each would wish to be transformed and dwell in the other.(12) Friendship, therefore, as a cause of society is, when carefully considered, distinct from society itself.
48. On the other hand, the name `society' cannot properly be denied to certain unions amongst evil people, even if such societies have an evil purpose or conspire to use evil means. Such societies are immoral and unjust, but retain the concept of society. They are de facto, not de jure societies (non-jural societies(13)). The only qualification, as I have shown, is that such societies could not exist without including as least a principle of justice.(14) We may add that individuals, because they are naturally made for good, deceive themselves every time they desire evil. Societies formed for a truly evil end are an illusion (although a culpable illusion), willed by human beings who have not truly desired them. They could be called apparent, rather than true societies. In willing evil, an individual wants what he does not want. He is split by an intimate contradiction, and dwells in a desolated kingdom.(15)
49. The act which forms society is a complex of contemporaneous, consenting acts of will of two or more persons who place something in communion. This 1. complex of acts, 2. plurality of persons and 3. that which they place in common, are the sole elements, the sole conditions, essential to society. I sum up by saying that the word `society' cannot be used of coexistence, gregarious living, of the union of two or more persons in the state of nature (there may well be a relationship of individual rights and duties between persons; contracts may have been stipulated between them), of aggregation whose purpose is to benefit an individual (such as dominion and subjection), nor of a state of simple contemplation or love when found in one person alone. The nature of these relationships differs considerably from that of society.
Notes
(12) Hence Cicero's noble definition of friendship is that of true, totally perfect society. `A common feeling, united with supreme benevolence, for divine and human things' (De Amic.).
(13) As Roman law states: `Clearly there is no society if society is formed for the sake of wrong-doing. Generally speaking, it is agreed that there is no society in the case of immoral activity' (Dig., bk. 57, tit. 2, l. 57).
(14) Cf. SP, 39-40.
(15) A very deep meaning pervades St. Augustine's appeal to worldly persons: QUAERITE QUOD QUAERITIS, that is, `Seek, but seek truly, the good and tranquillity that you seek! What is it other than God? - You seek a life of bliss in the region of death. It is not there' (Confessions, 4: 12).