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Universal Social Right

Chapter 3

Classification of more or less general concepts of society

50. My reasons for considering the nature of society in general before speaking of particular societies are, I think, clear. Experience shows, however, that some comment on the method of reasoning used in scientific treatises, and the reasons supporting it, is never wasted. Pointers of this kind indicate the path to be followed by the mind; they make the way easier and more secure. Here I want to descend gradually from the general notion of society, which includes that which is common to all societies, to particular societies by classifying these according to the breadth of their concepts.

51. Some qualities and entities of things are common to a larger number of things than others. As a result, concepts are said to be more or less general in relationship to their different breadth.

52. The more common qualities are contained in the less common; the quality serving as the basis of a genus is always present in the quality that serves as a basis for the species. Equally, the broader concepts are contained in the less broad. Animality, for example, is contained in humanity; consequently, the concept of the former is contained in the concept of the latter. There is, therefore, a long ladder of more or less general, broad concepts involved with one another. At the head of the ladder stands the essential idea, that is, ideal being, which is common to all concepts. At the other extreme we have the less extended concepts, that is, the ideal object furnished with all its substantial and accidental characteristics. Between the idea and the most highly determined concept, which I call the full species, there lies an indefinite, intermediate series of concepts.

53. Each of these concepts enables me to know the essence of the thing known through the concept. These essences, therefore, are more or less general.

54. Distinguishing these essences, knowing the place occupied by each in the ideal hierarchy which they naturally form, and distributing them suitably in their order is the work of an extremely dialectical mind.

55. Distribution of this kind becomes necessary, whatever the subject, if the aim is to follow a rigorous, scientific process. If concepts are included in one another, it is obvious that clarity requires a natural order in their development. Simple, that is, more general, concepts should be presented before complex concepts, which contain the simple. The same is true of less general concepts.

56. If we apply these logical requirements to social theory, we find that clarity depends on beginning, as we have done, from the most general, simple concept of society which is found in all the less extended concepts.

57. The less extended concepts of society will be deduced only by the addition of determinations to the most general concept. The more determinations we add to the concept expressing the pure essence of society, the more we restrict its latitude. We shall thus arrive at more limited concepts that enable us to know less extended societies.

58. But how shall we add these determinations to the general concept of society? What order shall we follow? Which determination comes first, which later?

Clearly, all possible determinations flow from the four factors in society which I have described. Every time we find some change in one or other of these factors, a change, a new character, is manifested in the society produced by these factors. If the factors making up society are, therefore, taken without any determination (as we have listed them in their pure, general essence), they provide the concept of society in general. As soon as we begin to determine them by assigning them particularities, we immediately have a more determined concept of society. Moving from one factor to another, I shall add to each those determinations, or special notes, of which they are susceptible; we shall then see what kinds of different societies result from this procedure.

59. The first of the factors mentioned is `the involvement of two or more wills in an object'. Here we have three indeterminate elements: the number of wills involved, the nature or proper characteristic of the involvement, the object with which they are involved.

60. If we want to determine the number of wills involved, the concept of society soon takes on determinations. Instead of a concept of society formed of an indeterminate number of persons, we have the concept of a more or less numerous society, down to that of two persons, which is the smallest number possible in a society. This is the first classification of societies, deduced from the number of persons composing them.

61. This classification, however, has something accidental as its basis, generally speaking, rather than something which changes the nature of the society. It may be compared with the ancient classification of animals - dependent on the number of their legs.

62. Nevertheless, although the number of persons composing a society does not determine its nature, the nature of a society can determine the number of persons, as in the case of conjugal society.

63. We also have to note that a very great difference in the number of social persons influences the need for a different internal organisation to such an extent that the nature itself, the characteristics and the spirit of the society seems to change completely.

64. The second element to be determined in the first factor is the nature or proper characteristic of the involvement of the wills. This involvement can vary according to the degrees of unity and intensity with which these wills tend to their social object.

65. The greater the harmony between the wills of the members as they tend towards their object, the greater union, internal force and consistency in the society. Harmony depends upon convergence, a lack of distractions and intense, ardent application in the very desire for the object.

66. This determination provides a second classification of societies which has as its basis greater or less cohesion and internal union of the societies themselves.

67. This determination does not distinguish societies according to their nature, but according to various degrees of perfection. Nevertheless, the different nature of a society considerably influences the internal union with which it is furnished. It is also true that this union, when it reaches extraordinary levels, provides the society with such a new aspect and physiognomy, as it were, that it appears different and capable of producing very different effects.

68. The third element to be determined in the first factor is the object of the wills' involvement. The object of a society can only be some good, or something considered as good by the members. The will cannot but tend to good, whether true or apparent, objective or subjective.

69. The good that societies propose for themselves receives merely accidental determinations, for example, determinations in quantity, as we know. These provide a new way of classifying societies which, however, are distinguished only accidentally by the quantity of good to which they tend, although, if the quantity is immensely different, the societies are scarcely recognisable as possessing the same nature.

70. If the good which serves as the possible object of the societies is determined by means of specific differences, these naturally different objects determine naturally different classes of societies. We cannot say, for example, that a literary society whose object is the acquisition of systematic knowledge has the same nature as a business society directed to profit. We shall, however, speak again about this manner of classification and in part develop it.

71. As we said, the second factor of society is social consciousness or awareness within an individual of the co-involvement of his own will with that of others towards the same object. There are several degrees of this consciousness.

72. Not all members of a society have an equal realisation of their obligation to be involved, or of their actually being involved, in the end of the society. The dissolution of societies is, in fact, signalled beforehand by the loss of social consciousness amongst the members whose sole consideration is to a great extent their own individual activity.

73. Social consciousness is itself a first bond uniting members to one another. Through it, each senses his own social existence and lives almost a new life, the life of the collective body. Through this feeling, individual forces increase as courage increases. Each member rejoices in no longer feeling himself alone; he is, as it were, many, because he forms part of many.

74. The degrees of intensity of social consciousness determine societies in a new way by dividing them into different classes dependent upon some quality which reflects their level of perfection.

75. The degree of consciousness of which we are speaking produces a notable modification in the uniformity and intensity of the involvement of wills if such consciousness is raised to another order of reflection.

76. The third factor is the act through which the spirit, after acquiring consciousness of the involvement of its own and other wills in the tendency towards some good, positively desires this involvement in such a way that the involvement itself becomes part of the social object, that is, of the object in which the wills are involved.

77. The desire to be involved increases the closeness of the union and consequently the force of the society.

78. There are two reasons why a society is stronger as a result of greater union amongst its members:
1. The uniformity and intensity of wills involved with the same object, as we have said.
2. The intensity with which the wills desire involvement.

79. These two quite distinct causes should not be confused. Two or more wills could be involved with the same object without their being aware of their involvement; it is another matter if each will not only wants the same object, but also wants to be involved with other wills in the same object and wants other persons to be truly involved with itself.

80. The different degrees of desire for being involved with others could be taken as the basis of another classification of societies. In this case again, societies are not divided according to their nature, but according to the level of a state of perfection dependent upon the degree with which the wills of the members are brought into the involvement itself as their proximate object; in other words, to the extent that each will desires to have all the others involved with the same intention.

81. Finally, I posited the fourth factor of society in willingness on the part of those involved to posit something in common. The determination of this last factor provides the basis for the most important classification of all: that which distinguishes societies according to their nature rather than their accidents. This occurs, as I said, when we take the end or social object as the basis of classification.

82. At this point, we must be careful not to confuse the object with which the wills of the members are involved, and whatever it is that these wills place in common. Although the common element can sometimes be identified with the object of the wills, as for instance when we are dealing with societies of simple enjoyment, it very often remains distinct, as in the case of societies devoted to the acquisition of goods which are not yet possessed and cannot therefore be placed in common.

83. The difference between that which is placed in common and the object towards which social wills tend is again illustrated when we realise that the object can only be some good, as I said, while the thing placed in common may be simply a means for obtaining this good.

84. In order to determine societies, therefore, we have to determine what is placed in common. The first difference between all the things that can be posited together is this: either they are goods to be enjoyed by the members, and nothing more, or they are means with which to obtain the good which is the final object of the society. In the first case, what is placed in common differs from the object of the society only in the way that good differs from its effective enjoyment.

85. Two great classes of societies can be deduced as a result of this determination of what is placed in common: societies of fruition, as we can call them, and societies of action. Another class would be that of mixed societies, in which both fruition and action have some part. Properly speaking, however, this class does not differ in nature from the first two, but depends upon their mixture in which fruition and action can always be mentally separated and distinguished.

86. The concept of societies of fruition may not seem to require that members place in common of their own accord the good they enjoy together. This good could be provided or come to them from elsewhere. We must note, however, that the wills have at least to receive it and consent to enjoy it in common. Without this, they could form only an apparent society.

87. This leads us to another determination of societies of fruition which divides them into two minor classes: 1. that in which the members place in common the good they enjoy; and 2. that in which they receive from elsewhere the good they wish to enjoy, and do in fact enjoy in common.

88. If the act of placing this good in common were to be considered as a social action, the first class of these societies would form part of mixed societies because the class would result from action and enjoyment. Such hair-splitting would lead us, however, to say that in every society there is always some action (besides that of enjoyment) because there is at least consent on the part of the will, that is, the act with which the will desires the association (the involvement of other wills). In this case, societies of mere fruition would cease to be.

89. I think it better to retain the distinction made between societies of action and of fruition because of the fairly precise characteristic that distinguishes them. In fact, societies of action have as their end the attainment through united effort of some good that could be enjoyed either separately or in common. Societies of fruition have as their end the enjoyment of some good they already possess; there is no question of attempting to attain the good through united effort, but only of placing it in common or of giving assent if that good is placed in common by others for common enjoyment.

90. Societies of action, therefore, serve as means; societies of fruition as ends. The object of the first is the attainment of some good, the object of the second the enjoyment of some good. In the first, the will of each member desires the involvement of the wills of all only for the attainment of the good; in the second, the will of each member wants the involvement of all in the enjoyment of the good, whether the good is consumed during the enjoyment or not.

91. Clearly, societies of fruition are ends to themselves; the enjoyment of the good is the final thing sought in the good itself and constitutes its formal reason.(16) It is also clear that societies of action are means to some other end outside themselves, that is, to the enjoyment of the good acquired by these societies which are, therefore, only a method for attaining the good. This is precisely what we have called civil society. Societies of action, therefore, have to be subordinated to societies of fruition, or to the end of the fruition which lies outside society, and for which mankind works.(17)

92. We must now try to determine more closely, and thus classify, societies of fruition (we shall deal later with societies of action). The first determination that can be added to the general concept of society of fruition has already been indicated: the good which the associates wish to enjoy in common, whether it comes from them or from elsewhere.

93. This determination produces a difference dividing these societies into two lesser classes: those in which the individual members form the society by positing and enjoying something together; and those in which the members form the society by accepting and enjoying something in common. The difference lies in the first of the two acts, which changes. In societies of the second class, the members put nothing in common, but accept in common the good presented to them.

94. The good enjoyed in common in these societies is another element which allows many determinations and as such becomes another basis for classification. Indeed, because the indeterminate concept of good can be determined in different specific and generic ways, it is clear that each way can give rise to bases of different classifications of these societies.

95. We next have to consider that the different kinds of classification of societies, founded on determinations and differences in the good at which they aim, are equally applicable to societies of fruition and to societies of action. The latter have some good as their aim, although it is not necessarily enjoyed in common, as in the case of societies of fruition. The classifications which, as I will indicate, arise from the variety of good which societies set before themselves as their end, may be considered as common to both societies of fruition and societies of action.

96. `Good' can be either absolute or relative. Absolute good is God and everything that finds its roots in God (truth, moral virtue, full enjoyment, which are the formal cause of contentment, happiness, bliss(18)). Every other good is relative and subordinate to absolute good.

97. Hence, two classes of society: moral-religious societies that have absolute good as their aim; and all other societies which have relative good as their aim.

98. Relative good is subordinate to absolute good as means are subordinate to end. In the same way, societies with relative good as their aim are subordinate to societies tending to absolute good, which they must serve simply as means. This explains the natural primacy of moral-religious societies over all others, and the moral duty to acknowledge and maintain them.

99. By determining the natural duration of the good which forms the aim of society, we can, if we wish, distinguish between good that is naturally eternal and inexhaustible, and good that can be diminished either because it can be consumed as it is enjoyed in common or because it ceases of itself. Food, for example, is consumed at a meal; communion of life in marriage ceases at the death of the spouses. The primary goods which of their nature last forever are absolute and, as I said, the aim of moral-religious societies. The class of societies constituted by good of this kind has its roots in the same class as moral-religious societies, that is, in atemporal societies which presuppose the immortality of the soul. In other words, these societies are eternal, like the good they have for their aim.

100. Temporary good, which is subject to other determinations, gives rise to other ways of classifying societies. Relative good, the aim of these societies, can be classified by the threefold determination of its duration:

1. Some good ceases only at death as, for example, in marital society whose aim is the good called `communion of life'.
2. Some good ceases, but is reproduced, and through its reproduction lasts indefinitely as the object of societies. This good is the aim of commercial societies or productive industries.
3. Finally some good ceases or is consumed without its being reproduced as, for example, in popular societies dedicated to pleasure.

These societies are classified as follows: lifelong societies, which necessarily last for the whole of life, societies of indeterminate duration and temporary societies.
We move now from classifications resulting from the variety of good that members can enjoy in common to the various classifications possible to societies of action.

101. I have distinguished mixed societies from societies of fruition and action. In mixed societies both the action with which the members procure the good they seek and the possession and enjoyment of the good that has been obtained by their united forces become part of the societies. Nevertheless, mixed societies could be posited indifferently as a species of both the genus of societies of fruition and the genus of societies of action. If we consider fruition as the principal part of mixed societies, action becomes their specific difference. In this case, societies of fruition are divided into societies of simple fruition and societies of fruition preceded by action. If, however, we prefer to consider the active aspect of mixed societies as the basis of classification, fruition becomes the specific difference. In this case, we again have two classes: societies of simple action and societies of action followed by possession, or even by common fruition.

102. In these classes I have added possession to fruition as a determining factor. It is one thing to possess some good in common, and another to enjoy it in common. It is true that possession could reasonably be considered as a principle of fruition, but it seems more accurate and useful to keep its concept separate.

103. Consequently, societies of action are sub-classified into societies 1. in which a commonality of possession of the good attained is added to the commonality of forces, and 2. in which is added a commonality both of possession and fruition.

104. Note that a commonality of possession of the good attained is connected with almost all societies of action. This is explained by the lapse of time following the acquisition of the good by the united forces of the members. During this period, the good remains common to the society before it is divided amongst the members, who then dispose of it and enjoy it separately. It is indeed difficult even to conceive mentally of the existence of a society that unites its forces to obtain some good which, as soon as it is acquired, becomes individual property. If this were the case, the good would be acquired by the individuals without its being divided. It would, as it were, fall straight into their hands.

105. However, the concept of such a society is not absurd. Some complex of forces may be set up by two or more persons so that each person of himself may be enriched or acquire some other good with the assistance of those forces. Examples of these societies are found in forces, such as vigilantes or business-security groups, which unite to protect individual action. Other examples are societies whose aim is to obtain forces united in achieving some effect which serves as an indispensable condition for action useful to individuals. For instance, a society could be formed with the intention of knocking down a column that could not be brought down by a single individual. The aim would be to get at the large sum of money, say, which was on the top of the column; the members would agree that each should take as much money as he could collect. This would be a society of pure action. Only the action or the means of action are placed in common. There would be no commonality either of possession or fruition of the good aimed at.

106. Societies of action are, therefore, divided as follows: societies of

1. pure action,
2. action and possession,
3. action and fruition,
4. action, possession and fruition.

107. A sub-classification is presented as soon as we try to determine action in solido. This could consist in bodily forces, in capacities of spirit and in external means. These three differences give rise to three classes of societies. When placed in conjunction, another four classes are found because there are four ways of conjoining the three differences. We have therefore seven classes of societies 1. of bodily forces, 2. of spiritual capacities, 3. of external means, 4. of forces and capacities, 5. of forces and external means, 6. of capacities and external means, 7. of forces, capacities and external means.

108. We have already seen, when speaking of societies of fruition, that what is placed in common can be posited either through some positive action (the members posit something that can be enjoyed) or through an agreed action (they receive from elsewhere something they wish to posit in common). The same observation can be applied to societies of action. The difference in origin of what is placed in common provides a new basis for the classification of societies both of fruition and of action. If what is held in common has been posited by the members, they themselves are the sole authors of the society; if it comes from elsewhere, the existence of their society depends for its origin on the person who provides what is held in common [App., no. 1]. We have two classes of societies, therefore: societies of internal and external origin.

109. The external origin of society can, however, be further determined and thus give rise to a new basis for sub-classifications. First, the extraneous person who provides what is held in common can do this either directly, or indirectly by simply bringing the thing into existence and enabling it to be placed in common. Someone who discovers a mine, for instance, gives rise indirectly to a society by providing the condition without which the forces of various individuals could not be united. The same can be said generally speaking about the person who is author and willing possessor of any one of the conditions which alone make the society possible.

110. In addition, this extraneous person, who has thus given rise to a society, can either hold or not hold some dominion or authority over it. This is the source of the very important classification of dependent and independent (free) societies.

111. If we go on to determine this dominion according to its species and degrees, we immediately have the basis of new sub-classifications. Given, for example, that the owner of a mine leases it to a society, the society depends on him, but only to the extent determined by the conditions of the lease.

112. Independent societies must not have any dependence of servitude even on their members. In other words, all the members themselves must be mutually free. Dependent societies, therefore, are subdivided into those which depend on an external person, and those which depend on an internal person or member who, besides positing the act of association common to all the members, also influences in particular the existence of the society and, to this extent, has some dominion over it.
Societies exist, therefore, connected or unconnected with some dominion over them. Amongst those subject to dominion, some are subject to the dominion of an extern, some to the dominion of one of their members.

113. We can go further: in societies connected with dominion from above, the master can be such from the nature of the society. This is the case when his dominion is so connected with the existence of the society that the society could not be conceived without him. In these circumstances, the lord or master cannot even will to renounce his position. We are dealing with dominion which results from the nature of things and is independent of his free will. Hence two more sub-classes of societies: societies essentially subject to some dominion, and societies not essentially subject. The latter are the result of an act of will on the part of the master or even of the societies themselves.

114. In societies essentially subject to a master, the master can even be a member of the society (this is the case of father relative to child) or the master can be an outsider relative to the society (this would be the case in a society set up by a master amongst his bond-servants).

115. Let us now examine the classification of societies which are not essentially, but willingly dependent. This classification comes about as soon as willing dependence arising from the will of the master or from the will of the societies themselves is determined. In the first case, the master must have the right and power to dominate; in the second, the master is constituted by the societies and has simply to give his consent.

116. The members of a society who of themselves are unable to attain the end may be in this position for several reasons. First, as a result of causes which impede only accidentally the formation of the society; or for causes which are an absolute impediment. If the means of attaining the aim of the society is totally lacking, the society is impeded absolutely: the individuals cannot obtain the end without some particular help. The society cannot exist independently of someone who, by augmenting the forces and means at the members' disposition, renders the end possible.

117. The causal impediment is accidental if the individuals have the necessary forces and means to attain their end, but lack the will or even the thought of involving their forces in the formation of the society. In this case, it is sufficient for the formation of the society if someone, in a conversation or through a simple direction, prompts the thought or stimulates the will.

118. In both cases, the society exists because some person has brought it together. In the first case, this person is essentially necessary, in the second accidentally necessary. We have to distinguish, therefore, between societies which depend essentially or accidentally on their originators. In the case of accidental dependence, societies have a duty of gratitude, but not of subjection. Such a duty requires a free act on the part of the individuals who choose the originator as their master, and on the part of the master who agrees to accept such seigniory.(19)

119. The person bringing a society together may also provide the means indispensable for social action. If so, these means are either provided once and for all to enable the society to make its own way, or have to be provided continuously.

120. In the first case, the originator of the society can make an agreement with the individuals whom he intends to draw into a society and require, as a condition of his liberality, that he retain some form of seigniory over the society.

121. This dominion can never be presumed if these means are provided unconditionally, that is, without the reservation of dominion over the society. The matter will have to be decided in the following way. The benefactor has no further right over the society if he declared that he donated the means; all that remains is the society's moral debt of gratitude and observance towards its benefactor. If he did not make any declaration about the means, but simply gave them, his maximum right would be that of repossessing the quasi-loan he had made. It is his maximum right because the society, having restored what it received, has no further obligation. Indeed, even the right to repossess what has already been given is not always present. Circumstances could show more clearly whether it was the benefactor's intention to make a donation, and the society's intention to receive a gift rather than a loan. In any case, the obligation of restoring the means cannot require that the individuals fall into a worse state after the restitution of the means than that experienced before receiving them and becoming associates as a result of their help.

122. Clearly, if the provision of these means is continuous and constantly dependent on the will of the originator, the society depends on him as its natural master. Nevertheless, the members would be free to disband the society if there were no other impediment, or they had not made some agreement of servitude with the originator.

123. This kind of dependent societies can be classified in yet another way by the determination of what is provided in common. In societies of fruition this is either the good to be enjoyed or the enjoyment itself. We have already spoken about this kind of provision. In societies of action, what is provided can be either the internal power forming the society, or the instrumental power.

124. Individuals can in fact lack internal power, that is, the efficient cause of society which serves as the source of the act of association. In this case, the originator is the person who increases the forces of this power by making it capable of attaining the common good. It could also happen that the power, once assisted, is then of itself capable, without other help, of reaching the aim of the society. Ignorance, for example, could be an obstacle to the formation of a society, but an instructor would no longer be needed once he had sufficiently instructed the members. It could also happen that internal power needs continual support and strengthening, as for example in the case of human dependence on God for continual preservation. These differences also were mentioned previously.

125. Secondly, the deficiency preventing members from attaining the end of their society could be some kind of lack of material or instrumental power. All human societies need some kind of extrasubjective instrument, at least as a means of communication, because the constitution of human nature is partly spiritual and partly material, partly subjective and partly extrasubjective, partly active and partly passive - in a word, body and soul. The instrument, if there is one, needed by pure spirits in the formation of a society is certainly not of the same nature as the instruments needed by human beings. The bodily instrument necessary to human society constitutes, therefore, a difference separating and distinguishing this society from society in general, which could be conceived mentally even amongst pure spirits.

126. Another particular characteristic of human societies are their two parts, one external, the other internal. The constituent law of the internal part, common to pure spirits, is the formation of an affective person, and consists entirely in a commonality of interests. The constitutive law of the external part is the faithful representation and execution of the internal part. The law of its administration requires that the external be led to express, complete and augment the internal part. A merely internal, natural society is impossible for human beings, granted the intimate, necessary connection between human thoughts and affections, and between affections and external actions. An external society is possible, however, without an internal society, only in the way that an individual's likeness can continue to exist even in his absence. Internal society can be called formal society; external society, material. The proper quality of human society, therefore, is its constitution of matter and form, corresponding to the body and spirit which constitute human beings.(20)

127. This particular characteristic of human societies provides the basis for a new classification. Because such societies need an instrumental power, that is, external means placed in common, the instrumental power itself also needs some special administration which varies in free societies according to the will of the members and, in dependent societies, according to the will of the master on whom the societies depend. The will of the master can enter in varying degrees (dependent on the level of dominion) into the constitution or determination of the social administration. Every variety of origin or nature in the administration can be considered as determining a different class of societies.

128. Dominion over a society is said to be absolute when it is so all-embracing that the person possessing it is alone responsible for establishing the administration of the society. When the master has only a part in setting up the social administration, and the members themselves have another part, the dominion is said to be tempered.

129. The administration, or government, of a society must not be confused with dominion. Government is necessary and is found equally in free and in subject societies; dominion is not necessary, and is not found in free societies. Government certainly involves the concept of dependence and obedience on the part of the members of the society, but it does not involve any idea of servitude.(21)

130. Dependence on government has its source in the nature of society; dependence on the dominion of a master is against the nature of society. It is a kind of irregularity, an element heterogeneous to society. Dependence on government is relative to every member; dependence on a master is relative to the society itself. The former does not render the society dependent; the latter does.

131. Finally, instrumental, material power, when contributed by the members, can give rise to several special determinations. It can be contributed by the members in equal or unequal portions. If each member contributes the same portion of power, societies are founded in which all members are equal and enjoy equal rights. We call these uni-quota societies. The other kind of societies, formed by unequal members who contribute different portions and consequently have different quantities of rights and expectations, we call multi-quota.(22)

132. At this point we have to turn back a step to the third element of the first factor of society which, as we said, is the object of the co-involvement proper to societies. Societies of action, as we have just seen, were also classified according to the nature of their action or the means contributed in common, and according to the internal or external origin of these means. We now have a third base on which to found another classification of societies of action, that is, the object they intend to attain.

133. As we said, the object or scope of societies is always some good. This good, however, is capable of receiving different determinations in societies of fruition and in societies of action. Previously we were unable to complete the list of determinations of which the concept of good is susceptible because we had not yet indicated the distinction between these two kinds of societies. We shall now complete that work by determining the kinds of good suitable as aims for different societies.

134. First, good in societies of fruition is whatever has been contributed for enjoyment or is enjoyed together. Granted this, the good has necessarily to be fully defined. In societies of action, on the contrary, the good may or may not be defined. A society set up to raise a sunken ship has a fully defined, real good as its aim. A society with whale-hunting as its aim tends towards a good which is not wholly determined because the catch may be scarce or abundant (it will never be entirely precise). Societies of action are divided, therefore, into two principal classes: those which aim at a defined good and those which have a undefined good indicated solely through an abstract concept.

135. We must now consider this second, undefined good. Clearly, the concept indicating it can vary in its degree of abstraction. In other words, the good under examination can have various degrees of indefiniteness, the greatest of which would be a total indefiniteness present, for example, in the formation of a society which set out to attain as much unspecified good as possible through united effort.

136. In the second place, societies of fruition require an immediate good as their aim because their good has to be useable. In societies of action, the good can be mediate because a society can be formed to attain something which although not good in itself, is valued as a means for attaining something good in itself. Societies of action therefore are classified as societies with some immediate or useable good as their aim, or as societies with some mediate, non-useable good as their aim.

137. If we go on to determine the mediate good, we soon find various levels of mediacy, and a consequent series of societies which have as their aim different kinds of mediate good.

138. The kinds of `mediate good' which a society intends to gain can be understood as an increase in rights, or as the good state of rights already possessed. What I mean is this: the right that I possess can be enjoyed and augmented by the prudent use I make of it. At the same time, my right is so related to the rights of others that the way they exercise their rights will limit mine in various degrees dependent upon different kinds of exercise. This leads to conventions aimed at establishing the best way of exercising rights and reducing to a minimum the mutual limitation of rights. Moreover, not everyone is content with the exercise of his own rights. Some are led by their waywardness to offend the rights of others; some even in good faith interpret their rights differently from others. This inevitably gives rise to discussion, quarrelling and greater harm. People can draw up conventions and establish rules to lessen these evils. All these things we call the `modalities of rights' because they are related not to rights themselves, but to the means or modes by which rights are defended and guaranteed reciprocally. These modalities, regulated for the common benefit, increase indirectly for the following precise reason: each member has a greater quantity of freedom as a result of the rules governing the modality of rights.
This enables us to indicate two more branches of societies with mediate good as their end: those with rights as their aim; those with the modality of rights as their aim.

Notes

(16) This may appear to contradict what I have said in SP, 212, where I stated that the remote end of societies is always outside society, that is, in the individual. I hope, however, that readers will have the patience to reconcile certain apparent contradictions which are almost inevitable in an author constantly engaged with the same subject, but always from new points of view. For example, readers will understand the truth of the affirmation: `The individual is always the ultimate end of society', as I have shown. At the same time, they will also understand the truth of the statement expressed here: `The society of fruition is its own end.' In such a society, the individual enjoys the communion of the enjoyment of good. As a result, the enjoyment of the communion, that is, of the society, becomes the end of the individual. The fact that the society itself is both end and good of the individual does not prevent the individual from being end of the society. The individual's intention is that the society of fruition should be his end. This intention means that the good he neither proposed for himself directly, nor even expected, redounds to his benefit.

(17) Cf. Preface to the Works of Moral Philosophy (PE, 1-17).

(18) For the distinction between these three states of spirit, cf. SP, 509-511.

(19) The questions: `What is the essence of society?' and `What is the origin of society?' are different. Confusing them has often caused error. Here we examine their relationship. The origin of society helps to explain its nature because it enables us to know whether a society is dependent or independent, and whether it depends accidentally or essentially on the person who brings it together. Normally, authors have their eye on dependent societies, which are usually the subject of their work. Almost without noticing, therefore, they slip from the question about the nature of society to that of its origin. The danger here is that unconsciously they substitute fact for right. Rousseau blamed Grotius for doing just this, although Rousseau himself fell into the same mistake. Grotius bases himself on historic fact; Rousseau on his social contract, an imaginary, chimerical fact which is not a fact at all. Grotius endeavoured to confirm his theory with facts; Rousseau deduced his from an imaginary, non-existent fact.

Let me make clear that I am not denying the existence of a social contract, but affirming the non-existence of Rousseau's social contract. Every right is preceded by a fact (cf. RI, 287). Deducing social theory from facts cannot therefore be condemned. Rousseau's error consists in having dealt hastily with the question of the origin of society without first even touching upon its nature. A person ignorant of the nature of civil society can neither deduce it nor find it in facts. He seeks its origin without knowing what he is looking for. He should first have a general idea which he then finds in fact, where he can analyse, illustrate and perfect it. If, however, we are dealing only with the class of dependent societies, the question of the origin of society arises immediately because this class of societies needs someone to originate them. They cannot, therefore, be understood from the point of view of their nature without some examination of their relationship with the person who initiates them, and consequently with their origin. Before approaching the question under consideration, I have in fact spoken about several classes of societies and, before that, indicated the most general notion of society without need to mention the origin of society. In a word, we have to know what we are talking about when we ask what something is dependent on. It is sufficient to have indicated the difference between the question about the essence of society and that of its origin, which will be the subject of the following section. For the moment, we shall carry on classifying societies, a task proper to investigation of the essence of societies.

(20) Cf. SP, 149-151.

(21) SP, 111-113.

(22) There could also be inequality relative to internal power. Although it would be difficult to indicate this inequality and illustrate its precise rights, theory requires careful consideration of this determination.

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