Development Of The Human Soul

Appendix 12. (1368).

The ancients disputed whether Parmenides posited two kinds of things: ens, the object of truth (*) and non-ens, the opinions of the commonalty (*). Alexander maintained that Parmenides rejected as pure fallacy non-ens and the opinions of the commonalty. Simplicius disagreed, maintaining he accepted both (Simplicius, Phys., 1, f. 9). It is clear however that Parmenides 1. certainly spoke about the opinions of the commonalty, which he explained in the second part of his poem, but 2. at the same time rejected them as false, and accepted ens alone; indeed according to him, a single, unique and extremely simple ens existed which was all things at once. This is sustained by all the passages where Aristotle speaks about Parmenides, for example, Metaph., 1: 6 and De Gener. et Cor., 1: 8. In these two places Aristotle says that if Parmenides accepted sensible things, we must understand that he accepted them as an argument illustrating the false opinions of the commonalty, which is really a non-acceptance of them. I am surprised that the learned Karsten, referring to Aristotle's words, says that Parmenides 'neither accepted one truth nor disdained opinions. He did not exclude either, but granted each its place' (Philosoph. Graecor. Veterum reliquiae, vol. 1, p. 145, Amsterdam, 1830).

Indeed Karsten, acknowledging the opinion that Aristotle had not interpreted Parmenides well or judged him equably, was forced to conclude that Aristotle's witness was not very great at this point. In his first book of Physics, Aristotle says that Parmenides' argument for proving the unity of ens does not pertain to physics, but nevertheless always supposes that Parmenides, in accepting one ens, wanted to establish a principle for explaining natural things. As Karsten himself acknowledges, this is clearly false because in fact Parmenides distinguished between the teaching about ens, which for him was the teaching of truth, and opinions, which refer to natural things and are, according to him, a false way. Karsten, opposing Aristotle, acutely notes, 'When he (Parmenides) considered the nature of ens, he was not looking for the principles of the world. He did not bring both arguments together; in one, he considered truth alone; the other he attributed to what opinion saw. But later thinkers, particularly the sceptics, emulated the Eleatics in many things, usurping and purloining their arguments for the purpose of refuting the tenets of the physicists, and overthrowing the whole nature of things.

Many of these thinkers wrongly considered the physicists' opinion to be common among the Eleatics' (Sext. Emp., Adv. Math., 10, 5.33; Fabricius, ibid, and Ad Calcid., bk. 1). In some places Aristotle, clearly taking the one of Parmenides as the principle of natural things, censures him for it. In others (Metaph., 1), he turns to the two principles of heat and cold, which Parmenides takes as the opinion of the commonalty, not as truth. According to him, Parmenides 'was compelled to follow appearances, and therefore thought that things were ONE ACCORDING TO REASONS and MANY ACCORDING TO SENSE'. If Aristotle had wanted to refute Parmenides fairly, he should have shown that 1. ONE ACCORDING TO REASON did not exist, and 2. the MANY ACCORDING TO SENSE did not sufficiently explain the principles of heat and cold, etc. Instead, in many places he exerts himself to show that the one does not explain natural things, which was precisely Parmenides' intention. Nevertheless I think Parmenides, as a disciple of Xenophanes, had in mind physical things, even if he does not say so, and that in conceiving his one ens he was speaking solely of the universe. Aristotle makes the following distinction between Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus:

But all this is conjecture on the part of Aristotle. Parmenides' arguments are certainly drawn from the CONCEPT OF ENS, but some expressions of his (and Melissus may have spoken more openly on the matter) show that he had in mind the immensity and continuity of space. Examples are: the attributes of continuity, divisibility and immobility, which he attributes to ens, and his description of it as one ens adhering to another ((*), cf. Karsten v. 80) and homogeneous in its parts:

Parmenides' speculative mind may well have contemplated ens in the pure idea, and at the same time retained something of the sensism from which it was so difficult to be free. After all, philosophy was just beginning, and the nature of spirit had not yet been sufficiently considered. In fact the problem was so great that philosophy was never fully liberated from it, even by Plato, as I could show - but not without prolonged discussion. But I will offer other arguments on the problem when I deal with it in other places. I will conclude this long observation by noting that Aristotle could perhaps be excused for using the one of Parmenides as the principle of things because, as I said, Parmenides spoke rationally about ens while keeping an eye indirectly on the material universe. It remains true however that Aristotle did not see the necessity for excluding the continuum and the continuously changeable, and that he was wrong in censuring Parmenides for saying that ens is continuous (*) and indivisible (*) - according to Aristotle, only a mathematical point is indivisible (Phys., 1, 3). Extension is certainly continuous and indivisible, although it possesses these qualities in the sentient principle, as I have shown.