Chapter 11

Is 'substance' distinguished from 'substantial form' in the soul?

847. We have examined the nature of the intrinsic order of the ens called body. In this order, we distinguished: 1. matter, the first subject of the other qualities, or substance; 2. substantial form, and so on. Matter, however, is not present in the human soul. Is there no distinction, therefore, between substance and substantial form of the soul?
Every question requires a prior understanding of the value of the words in which it is expressed, and this one is no exception. In other words, we have to define our language accurately, and then go forward in accordance with the definition given. So, what do I understand by the phrase 'substantial form'?

848. By 'substantial form' I mean 'an act perfecting another act in such a way that a substantive used to name the new act expresses the perfection which the new act receives' (cf. 52). Thus, matter is not called body unless it is conceived with those determinations, a given size, shape, and so on, which are necessarily conceived in bodies.

849. Granted this, we have to note that 'the act which perfects another act' can be conceived in two ways.
1. 'the perfecting act gives perfection and completion to an act in which and through which the perfecting act itself exists.' This occurs even in matter, in which (as in a subject) and through which its determination (its size, its shape) completes and perfects it. Or
2. the perfecting act can be understood in such a way that it gives perfection to another act through which and in which it does not exist, an act, that is, different from that in which and through which it exists. So the soul is conceived as the form of the extrasubjective body in so far as the animated body offers to external observation life-phenomena which are considered as its perfection (relative to ourselves).

The body, when considered subjectively, results from 1. an action of an agent in the soul; and 2. from the nature of the effect that this produces in the soul (the effect is the felt element and its mode, that is, its extension).

But because these effects take place in the soul and through the essentially feeling nature of the soul, it is the soul again which is modified in such a way that it presents such feelings in itself. When human thought takes these feelings and unites them to the agent, that is, to the sensiferous element, the latter receives from the soul the sensible qualities together with their extension. Again, it is still the soul and its act that clothes the body (the term of the agent) and what is called 'substantial body'. The soul, therefore, even from this point of view, gives matter its substantial form. I say that it gives matter its substantial form because in this operation the substantial form of the body is more an effect of the soul, and the internal term of its operation. Here, it is not the soul itself which is the substantial form of the body.
If we consider the soul as perfecting and informing the body, it is the substantial form not of itself, but of some other ens, that is, of the body. Considered in itself, the soul must simply be called substance rather than substantial form.(48)

850. But isn't it of the essence of the soul that it should be the form or entelechy of the body? — I have already shown in the first part how this is to be understood, but something can be added here to resolve the objection. If by 'body' we understand an ens different from the soul, we cannot say that the essence of the soul consists in being form of the body because the action or relationship between the two entia never constitutes the essence or the substance of either of them. This relationship can indeed follow necessarily on the substance of one or other of these entia, but that which follows on substance is not substance. I say 'which follows on substance' because substances are so united amongst themselves and, as it were, inexorably joined in the nature of the universe that one sustains and produces the other. In other words, they are reciprocal conditions of their existence. I call these consequences synthetical consequences of substances.

851. However, if we consider the substance of the soul in se, and not in its synthetical consequences, we first have to distinguish between the merely sensitive soul of brutes, and the human soul. The sensitive soul must certainly have, besides the principle, the term (felt-extended) of its act. Its substance, however, does not reside in this term, but in the principle; this term is only the condition of its existence and the reason for its individuation. But if we want to call this term the form of the soul in so far as it perfects the act through which the soul is, and individuates this act, it does not follow that the informing element is matter. What informs is conceived as principle and act; but the essence of matter is to be term. On the other hand, matter understood as sensiferous is the occasion when form is aroused. This form is the fundamental felt element; it individuates the soul and is where the sentient principle resides and unfolds itself. The felt element, therefore, but not matter, can be called the substantial form of the soul. What is felt does not receive its perfection from the principle, but rather gives it to the principle. This is the contrary of what is achieved by matter, the most imperfect, highly indeterminate(49) element that can be thought in bodies. Whichever way we think about it, therefore, the notion of matter cannot be harmonised with that of soul. This will be understood more clearly if we consider that the very term of the soul is in the soul as in its principle, as I shall explain shortly. In the soul of brutes, therefore, we find sentient and felt, substance and substantial form, both of which are united in such a way that one cannot be thought without the other. But there is no matter in the soul.

852. Speaking about the soul which is both sensitive and intellective, we saw that its essence consists in being a rational principle, and that the sensitive principle itself receives the nature of term of such a principle in so far as it is united to the rational principle by natural, continuous perception (cf. 264-273). Relative to the rational soul, therefore, we can exclude matter by using the same reflections that were employed with respect to the merely sensitive soul and, in addition, the particular arguments that prove the intellect to be immune from all matter as a result of the logical opposition existing between the essential characteristics of soul and matter.

853. Consequently, we have to say that while we distinguish between substance and substantial form in the soul, the substance of the soul does not include the concept of matter, but of act-principle — although in this act-principle we can distinguish something that perfects and individuates it, and is included in the notion of term. Nevertheless, it remains that the soul is essentially principle even in this its term. This perfection and term can be called 'substantial form'.

Notes

(48) St. Thomas says that there is no distinction between form and nature in simple things; the distinction is present only in things composed of matter and form. 'Form is the very nature of things, as in simple things, or it is a constituent of the nature of things, as in things which are composed of matter and form' (S.T ., III, q. 13, art. 1).

(49) It is what is thought as extremely imperfect and indeterminate in bodies, provided that the nature of matter is preserved. In other words, it is something imperfect, something indeterminate, relative to bodies.