Chapter 3

Activity and passivity of potencies

945. Granted that the soul's activity arises in virtue of the action of the term, passivity and receptivity must, in the logical order, be conceived before activity.

946. I say 'in the logical order' because in the chronological order activity does not always come after passivity. Accidental, second acts must be distinguished from the first act which posits the soul in being.
Observation reveals that in the case of second acts passivity precedes activity in the soul in both logical and chronological orders; the soul first feels and receives, then moves and acts. But this is impossible relative to the first act, because the soul exists through this act and cannot be passive before existing. Hence, in the first act, passivity and activity must be contemporaneous.
On the other hand, as soon as we see that the relationship between passivity and activity in the first act is considered similar to that of cause and effect (because the first act arises in virtue of the term's action), passivity is said to precede activity in the logical order, although no ens exists as long as there is no activity.

947. Granted that activity arises from passivity, we need to know whether passive potencies are specifically distinct from active potencies.
I said that potencies are distinguished according to the specific distinction of the terms. Consequently, passivity and activity do not properly speaking constitute different potencies, but rather different faculties or functions of the same potency; activity is the continuation of the movement that begins in passivities, just as a line is the continuation of a point.(71)

In fact, the term is in the principle as agent, causing the principle to appear passive. At the same time, the principle has come into act and operation, and thus become active, that is, an individuated principle. Once posited in being, it can be first passive in its own way and then active. Hence, in the series of second acts, we can easily conceive a kind of passivity that precedes activity both logically and chronologically.
Because the soul's activity begins in passivity, which gives rise to the spontaneous or free movement of the active principle constituting the soul, the passive and the active faculty corresponding to this activity constitute a single potency. Although this single potency has a single term, it is distinguished into two faculties according to the different mode of its exercise.

948. We must note that in the intellect receptivity takes the place of passivity. The term is produced neither partly nor totally by the principle's activity; it is by nature utterly immutable, so that between it and the soul there is properly speaking no relationship of action and passion but only of presence and intuition. Such is ideal being. The felt element on the contrary receives its nature as felt from the sentient principle itself, as I said. The felt element is posited and constituted as such, that is, as felt, by the principle itself.

Notes

(71) AMS, 367-370.