Chapter 4

We begin to explain how the terms which give rise to the potencies of the human soul are distinguished

949. The potencies of the human soul are distinguished in the same way as its terms. Note however that the terms first inform the soul, that is, they give it its first act and then, when modified, arouse and occasion second acts without losing their specific nature. This activity of the soul considered relative to second acts is called 'potency'.

950. In the soul therefore, as I said elsewhere, there is a sensible and an intelligible element pertaining 1. to its nature, because they posit its essence in act, and 2. to its potencies, that is, potencies of feeling and understanding.

951. Because the diversity of the terms is fundamental to the diversity of the potencies, we cannot classify the potencies with philosophical rigour without investigating how the terms differ specifically from each other. Let us do this now.
The terms are entities acting in the soul. How they differ from each other concerns the intrinsic order of being. I said that the order of being cannot be found or discovered a priori; only attentive observation can present it to us as it is, and our knowledge of it will extend only as far as our observation. We have to be content with what observation gives us, unless we wish to create a philosophy of vain illusions.

All that we learn from observation about the primal order of being can be reduced to this: every thinkable entity whatsoever belongs ultimately to one of the following three categories: it is 1. a feeling or something that happens in our feeling, for example, the energy that changes our feeling, or 2. an idea, or 3. an order between feeling and idea. In each of these categories we find the same being. I call it real being relative to feeling; ideal being relative to idea, and moral being relative to the complete order between real and ideal being.

If we reduce all possible entities to these three categories, the terms of the soul, which are entities, must themselves first be reduced to these three modes of being. We would then be able to see that the trinity of the soul must be present in its essence and in its potencies. This presence would not prejudice the soul's unity, because in all three modes, being is one and the same, not divided but complete.

952. Note however that moral being, which results from the union of the first two, seems posterior to them in the logical order. We must however distinguish between finite and absolute ens. In the latter, moral being cannot be posterior because completion and perfection are essential to this ens. On the other hand, finite, intelligent ens, although constituted by being under the forms of reality and ideality, does not necessarily require being under the form of morality.

953. Nevertheless, wherever the two forms of reality and ideality are found united, they exhibit some tendency to order, because being necessarily tends to complete and be united with itself. This results in the third form, that is, the moral form in act. Consequently, while there may be no need in finite, intelligent beings for moral order in act (also called moral good), the potency to obtain it cannot be lacking, nor the tendency, and ultimately the necessity, if moral order is to be perfect.

The potency cannot be lacking because it is joined to the simultaneous presence of both real and ideal being. Real and ideal being, as term of the soul, arouse two potencies in the soul. These two potencies, joined in the unity of the soul, give rise first to a third potency, reason, which in turn gives rise to moral potency. Reason, perceiving what is real in the light of what is ideal, unites these two and sees the order of being. If the soul adheres to this order with all its rational activity, it becomes morally good; wicked, if it opposes the order.
At its beginning however the soul possesses this potency only virtually. Naturally speaking, it possesses not the order of being, but only being in its ideal form and partly in its real form. Hence, in the soul, moral potency is posterior and solely virtual.

954. We also need to consider how both ideal and real being concur in constituting the soul, because they do not do so in the same way. The difference is this: real being is both principle and term of the soul, and as principle, constitutes the essence of the soul. Ideal being on the contrary is only term, not principle. It does not constitute the essence of the soul but as formal cause or, if preferred, cause of the form, contributes to the production of the soul by arousing within it the act of intelligence.

955. Knowing that real being relative to the soul is of two kinds, that is, principle and term, makes it easier to see how the act of moral being is generated. Moral being is rooted in real being in so far as the latter is principle, not term. Strictly speaking, we understand morality as principle, not term, because it consists in the pleasure an intelligent subject takes in being known as such. This pleasure comprises the complete order between what is real and what is ideal. Reason however must first present this order to human beings as the object of their rational activity, that is, of their will, and thus constitute the term of moral potency.
Moral order therefore arises as follows: intelligent, real being knows being under all its forms in what is ideal, and takes pleasure in it proportionately. Why this pleasure? Because it knows being or, and this is the same, finds it in ideal being. By means of ideal being, intelligent, real being takes pleasure in being, that is, in being under all its forms. This taking pleasure is moral order in the soul, is good itself.

956. Summarising this chapter, we can easily understand that the presence of two actuated terms in the soul necessarily implies two primal potencies, that is, sensitivity and intelligence. Furthermore, the presence of a third term which is only virtually understood in the first two, gives rise necessarily to a third virtual potency, that is, morality.

957. If we add to this what was discussed in the chapter before the last, namely, that every potency begins by being passive or receptive, and then moves to be active, the two potencies of sensitivity and intelligence will each have two faculties, a passive and an active faculty.

958. Finally, moral potency does not have a term in act but only a virtual term necessarily produced by the act of the other two potencies, or better, of the rational soul itself which directs the potencies. Consequently, moral potency cannot have any passive characteristic; it remains a purely active potency, because the passivity related to it is simply that of the potencies producing it.