Chapter 4

Essential relationships of a temporary ens with the sentient principle

1139. Any ens whose concept excludes the possibility of succession is said to be eternal. Such are ideas,(102) and such is necessary being, God the Almighty.
Note that an ens can be called eternal only if it excludes the possibility of succession as well as actual succession. In other words, thinking of succession in it is equivalent to destroying it. Thus, an immobile atom of matter has no succession, but it could have. Changes could be thought of in it without destroying its concept. It is not, therefore, eternal.

1140. Succession implies change: consequently that which is eternal is also unchangeable.
In the same way, that which has begun to be, or even that which, without contradiction, can be thought to begin is not eternal. If something can begin, there is nothing to prevent the thought of something else beginning before or after it. One could also think of its ceasing after it had started. It is possible, therefore, to think of this thing as the term of a successive series, in other words, it allows of succession. The same must be said even of space, the concept of which easily allows a beginning without destruction of the conception.

1141. We have to consider carefully the concept of succession, a concept necessary to that of time.
Succession supposes a series of several events. Each single event does not form succession or time, but all together contribute to form it. If time does not consist in each single event, however, time is outside events, each of which is essentially singular, and complete in its singularity. Its concept does not require nor has it any essential relationship with some other event. On the contrary, time consists essentially in the relationship of several events with each other.

1142. But if the relationship which constitutes time is not found in events, where is it to be found?
This realised relationship is found first in the sentient principle, which apprehends several events disposed in successive order, a fact noticeable only to interior observation. We can analyse this fact and, by considering its nature, investigate the conditions according to which the sentient principle can apprehend several successive events, for example, several of its own modifications.

1143. If the sentient principle is to apprehend several successive events as its term, it seems necessary for them to be rendered contemporaneous by remaining in it in some way. If one were apprehended but were then totally eliminated only to be succeeded by another, singular events would indeed appear in the sentient principle as they are in themselves, but the relationship of succession between them would not be apprehended; it would not exist in the sentient principle any more than in the events. Thought reflecting on these things would find no succession there.

1144. Note carefully that thought takes things as they are, as they are given to it by feeling. It does not change them.(103) It is necessary, therefore, that succession, in order to be thought, should exist in feeling before being thought. It is true that thought conceives this succession as possible and, as such, renders indefinite the finite succession presented to it by feeling. It does this with the idea of possibility, as we have explained elsewhere.(104) Nevertheless, it is also true that feeling must first have presented to thought some finite succession in its own reality. This will be understood better if we consider that memory itself would be impossible without the help of feelings which noted things in the idea of being. It is certain that if every feeling ceased for the intellective soul, all memory of events or real things would cease in the soul. Nothing would remain present to the soul except ideal being, without any kind of determination or inequality. There would be nothing by which particular, real things were designated in ideal being. Only certain aptitudes, potentialities, habits of the soul, incapable of passing into act, would remain.

1145. To see the varying roles played by thought and feeling in the constitution of time, we have to investigate more carefully the fact of memory, a faculty which pertains to the order of intelligence, and properly speaking to the potency of reason. We shall speak about memory here. It has two principal functions, one called retentive and the other reminiscence. The task of the former is to retain information; of the latter, to recall information, when needed, to the reflective attention of the mind.

1146. We shall not delay over the second function, but must spend some time on the first, which is either unconscious or conscious.
The unconscious retentive function is what the ancients called 'the habit of memory', through which information remains in us without our giving it any reflective attention.
The conscious retentive function is the activity through which we have information present to our reflection and consciousness. We either recall the information with an act of reminiscence or we reflect upon it continuously.

1147. We say, then, that for a past event to be present to our consciousness:

1. It needs some trace of the event in our imagination or in our feeling. This trace is not the event of which we are thinking, which is already past, but a kind of sign of it.

2. It is necessary, therefore, that some special power of thought be added, in addition to the trace we have mentioned, which enables our mind to pass from the sign to what is signified. The mind, with the help of the trace which remains, can transport itself to the event which no longer exists and thus finish its act of thought in the past as in its term. This is not too easy to explain but, having done so elsewhere, I will summarise what has been said as a help to readers.

1148. We must bear in mind, above all, that the mere concept of an event is neither past nor future; it is present in the idea. This conception, therefore, does not give any knowledge of the event except relative to its nature and its possibility. There is no question of time, which is a relationship proper to real entia, not to pure ideas. But the conception or possibility of an event, precisely because it is immune from time, can be applied to every time. I can think of an event as possible in the past as in the future. We have to investigate, therefore, how we can pass from knowledge of a possible event to knowledge of a real event which is situated at a given point in time. A real ens, we recall, is known only through feeling. This shows once more the necessity of feeling if we are to be able to think of the time of an event.

1149. But the feeling of the perception by which we were present to an event gradually ceases. This is true, but we have to notice that perception is conceived through a judgment. Indeed, perception accompanied by reflection of one kind or another, as occurs in adults, is accompanied by several judgments which provide the spirit with information about an event. We must examine both these judgments and this information.

The judgment proper to perception is this: the event, the fact, the ens in question, subsists. Thus the spirit acquires information about the subsistence of that entity ('entity' is a word that embraces every ens, every event, fact or action). This judgment is accompanied by many others which determine the entity through the contemporaneous relationships it has with other judgments. That entity is not perceived by itself; many other entities, surrounding it and co-existing with it, are perceived with it. This provides further information for the spirit. The amount of new information is in proportion to the judgments with which it is affirmed that that entity co-exists with others.

Again, amongst the entities which exist along with the entity we have in mind, several began prior to that entity, others began after. Our entity started, therefore, while others existed. Other entities again either finished before our entity, or continued to last after it had ceased. The spirit, therefore, acquires in the act of perception (or better, in the act of many contemporaneous perceptions and the reflective judgments which accompany the perceptions) information about the chronological order in which contemporaneous entities began. But because the whole of life is a continuous series of perceptions and reflections, of judgments and chronological information, it follows that the spirit comes to know the chronological order of the entities or perceived events, as long as this information remains in the spirit. Everything, therefore, is reduced to explaining how this information is kept in the spirit. Granted the preservation of the information, the spirit already knows which event has come first and which later; it knows whether a given event has few or many events prior to it. In other words, it knows succession and time. Little by little, it comes to measure time more or less accurately through various periods. We need to see, therefore, how chronological information and the events acquired as a result of contemporaneous perceptions are preserved. I mention contemporaneous perceptions because it is always a contemporaneous event which indicates the beginning and end of some other event. In its turn this other event signals the beginning and end of events contemporaneous with itself, and so on successively.

What is this chronological information? It is made up of various affirmations, judgments and persuasions. But an affirmation is an act of the rational principle. If this act never ceased, it would follow that the information which it produces in the spirit would equally never cease; the information would always be present to the spirit. For example, consider this: a friend living at a distance arrived before sunset. If the affirmation we enunciated at our friend's arrival were to remain actuated, the information also would remain ever present to our spirit. Note, that in this supposition of the immobile presence of such information before our spirit, the object of the information would never vary as time went by; it would remain what it is. What we knew when we first pronounced the judgment, that is, 'Our friend reached us before evening', we would always know in the same way. These two events (the coming of our friend and sunset) would always be located one after another in our information. This is, therefore, an extremely important fact to which we must hold firm that as long as some information lasts, the object of the information does not change with the passage of time but remains identical: we are always dealing with a friend and with evening, however many centuries pass. Now, this identity of the object of some information is preserved not only in the hypothesis that the information remains before the spirit, but also if we are able to recall it after it has ceased. It is true that our spirit, by turning its thought once more to the information, would carry out a new act different from the first.

Nevertheless, the object of that new act would be identical with that of the old act which had ceased, and it is the identity of the object which constitutes the identity of the information. This is true not only relative to chronological information, but relative to information of any kind. I may think a thousand times that 2 + 2 = 4. If I do, I carry out a thousand different acts, although the object of all these acts is always the same and the information identical. I may think a thousand times that 'Alexander, the son of Philip existed'. Once more, I carry out a thousand acts, but always with the same object. In each of these acts, I think always of the same Alexander, the same Philip, and I think of them as father and son; the multiplicity of my acts does not multiply the objects. This is true whether we are dealing with a necessary object of information, such as the arithmetical truth that 2 + 2 = 4, or whether the object is contingent, as for example the truth of the existence of Alexander, son of Philip.

This means that the object of information is immune from time because time (which passes) and events (which succeed one another) do not change the object. Note, however, that this object although immune from time as an object of information, is not immune from time in itself because what is contingent is subject to time. In fact, there was succession and consequently time between Philip and Alexander. We have to conclude, therefore, that thought apprehends time, but not temporally. It apprehends what is temporary, but outside time. This is very similar to what we have said about the extended element's being apprehended by the spirit in an non- extended way. If the object of information, therefore, is temporary, and yet in so far as it has become an object of some information in the spirit is no longer subject to time, and is thus apprehended by the spirit outside time, where does the spirit apprehend it? We have to conclude that thought apprehends time and what is temporary in what is eternal. If we exclude the possibility of time, as we said, eternity remains.

1150. We can explain this if we reflect that, granted feeling, we see in ideal being, which is necessary and eternal, even what is contingent and successive. We also see reality itself as able to subsist (idea of reality). We affirm subsistence by joining this reality with the essence of the thing. Consequently, every time affirmation makes some judgment about subsistence, it indicates the reality of the same essence and, therefore, the identical thing. This shows that thought, judgment and affirmation, when repeated, do not change their object; they take hold of it and place it before the mind in an eternal, unchangeable mode.

1151. We have now introduced two hypotheses. First, that the judgment producing the chronological information about entia for the spirit when perceptions take place lets this information remain in the spirit, as though it were deposited there. The second hypothesis is that the judgment reproduces the information after it has vanished. Relative to both hypotheses, we concluded that once a succession of several entities has been known, we can then know many others in the same way. The passage of time is no obstacle to this. But to avoid leaving anything that could disturb the mind of those who are following these investigations, I have to ask: 'Which of the two hypotheses conforms to fact?' The second is generally preferred because experience shows that a great deal of information is first forgotten, and then recalled through reminiscence. Consequently, it does not appear to be preserved in the spirit continuously. Here, however, there is a real difficulty. If this information is not retained, at least weakly, we would have no explanation for its recall. Where or how would our spirit have found what was lost? We cannot say this would come about through the association of this information with other present information. If the previous information were altogether lost, there could be no association. Nor could the recall be made as a result of instinct. Instinct supposes sense, whose movement it is, and consequently also supposes information retained in some way in feeling. In addition, the recall is often made not instinctively but through an arbitrary decree of will. On the other hand, there is no doubt that we lose consciousness of this information, and then revive it again.

All these difficulties vanish for persons who know the theory of consciousness. They will easily understand that acquired information can remain present, actual and alive in our spirit without, however, entering consciousness. I have already shown, that 'no act of the spirit is known to itself'. Such an act is always directed to knowledge of its own object, not to knowledge of itself. To know that we know a reflective act by which the act of the spirit becomes object must be followed by another reflective act. We must, therefore, choose the second hypothesis. We have to say that it is not sufficient to have information, but that in addition we have to have it preserved in ourselves if we are to become conscious of it. Hence it is not absurd to say that information once received in the spirit remains there. What ceases is the act of attention(105) that the spirit gives to the information, and the act of reflection. Without these acts, we have no consciousness of anything in our spirit.

1152. We return now to the argument. Thought knows succession, although not successively, provided that succession has already been offered to thought in perception and in the reflective judgments which accompany perception. But, as I said, perception and its concomitant judgments offer succession to thought. While we perceive one entity, others are perceived which begin or end. These successive perceptions leave in the spirit chronological information about events. This, however, presupposes the duration of perception. In fact, we could not conceive any succession of events unless there were some duration between one and the other. But duration supposes that which endures, for example, the perception itself. Duration is proper to that which exists. Nothing can exist in an instant which has no duration; an instant is only the principle and term of duration. The succession of events, that is, of their beginning and end, presupposes the duration of an ens. This duration is like a thermometer marked with all the events that have begun or ended, or changed and succeeded in that duration. Time, therefore, can be defined in itself as 'the relationship between duration and succession'. The concepts of duration and succession are correlatives; one can neither be known nor exist without the other. Just as there is no succession between one event and another (which always means a beginning or an end) without some duration, so duration is not understood except through the possibility that there is a certain succession of events to which it may be referred.(106)

1153. We need, therefore, to consider the nature of duration. First, the duration of thought, then of intellective perception, then of feeling, and finally that of material ens. When our understanding has been satisfied as a result of our consideration, the nature of time will have been sufficiently explained for us.

The duration of thought consists in the identity of the object. We have seen that every object of intellective information is, as such, immutable. If thought turns to some other object, it is immediately another thought; it is not what it was. But because the object is unchangeable, thought remains unchangeable until the spirit turns to some other object. In fact, the object, which determines a given thought to be what it is, is never lacking because the object of any information is eternal and thought is possible whenever the object is present. It follows that the duration of thought is a participation in the eternity of its object. It is the limitation of the thinking subject which causes the thought to cease and finish while the ens which is its object remains. This cessation is precisely the instant which terminates the thought's duration.

1154. The information that one event has preceded another is received by the spirit through perception. But how do we explain the duration of perception? - Perception can only endure if the feeling to which it is referred endures.(107) Nor can the feeling last if the sentient ens and the felt ens do not last. We must, therefore, explain the duration of the felt ens which is the object of perception. How can the duration of entia be explained?

1155. The subsistence of a contingent ens is simply the realisation of its idea. This realisation is brought about by creation, the first cause of things. But the supreme cause is necessary and eternal, and the idea is also necessary and eternal. The supreme cause creates or realises contingent entia by way of understanding; this is an act of God's practical reason, of his acting thought. God, the Almighty, makes things subsist with an act analogous to that with which human beings think of things as subsisting. We saw that human thought, from the point of view of the known (although contingent) object, that is, of the information, is immutable and eternal. It ceases, however, because of deficiency in the thinking subject. On the other hand, while the immediate object of God's thought is indeed eternal, the thinking subject, that is, God, is also eternal and never-failing. Hence, created things can last as long as God wills.

This will does not in fact regret what it has done. Entia, therefore, once created, never cease because they are the work of God. Their actions and passions, on the contrary, do cease, because their subject and proximate cause are the contingent, deficient entia themselves. Actions and passions begin and terminate; they begin again and again with unceasing variety and succession.
We have to say, therefore, that duration is a participation in God's eternity, and that succession is the effect of the limitation and deficiency of creatures. Time, therefore, is precisely succession brought back to and gradually marked on duration.

1156. Thus, it is clear both how entia last and succeed one another and how their duration is measured by the number or series of their successive actions.(108)

1157. Having expounded the nature of time, we can return to our question. We want to know if time is in material things, in feeling and finally if thought alone forms time.
It is clear from what has been said that time cannot be in material things; their unity, and hence their duration, is due to the sentient principle in which they exist. They have no unity or duration of their own. The relationship between succession and duration is not, therefore, something that can exist in any assignable part of matter, as matter, because no parts are posited without continuous extension. This, however, is not proper to matter as matter.

1158. Moreover, if we set aside the phenomenal changes which appear in matter as a result of its relationship with the sentient principle, and take matter in its own pure concept, we find it impossible to conceive any change in it except that of motion, which is a relationship with space. But space, the continuum, does not pertain to pure matter. It is impossible, therefore, to conceive in it, purely in it, any change or even succession.

1159. Again, matter has no multiplicity because each portion of it is one and remains one. Each portion finishes in itself without being able to form a single unit with any other portion, from which it has an entirely separate existence. These portions have no reality in common.

1160. It is true that if a sentient principle were present in a material ens, the ens could carry deep within itself a succession of events which would have a physical nexus with the immutable, lasting principle of the ens. In such a case, time would, as it were, be realised. If, however, we remove feeling from corporeal matter (feeling does not pertain to the concept of corporeal matter), simplicity and unity of every kind is no longer present in corporeal matter. Any corporeal principle we admit cannot be either body or matter, precisely because it is their principle. Even if we suppose that this corporeal principle had time in itself, the purely material ens would not have it.

1161. We return, therefore, to the sensitive ens where we find a simple principle as the source of different sense-experiences and modifications, of activity and passivity. The concept of this sensitive ens contains duration pertaining to the principle, which itself remains identical; the concept also contains succession in its particular sense-experiences; finally, the concept contains a physical nexus between the duration of the principle and the succession of its passions and actions. These passions and actions are contained virtually in this principle; given certain conditions, they arise from this principle, and pertain to it as to a subject. These three elements, duration, succession and their nexus, complete the concept of time which exists in the nature of feeling. But when we begin to discuss this, our mind encounters points of great difficulty that will undoubtedly cause hesitation and unease.

1162. It will be useful if we discuss these difficulties. If we passed over them, our argument would not fully persuade us of the truth.
When transient and successive acts of a sentient principle cease, they either leave some trace in the principle or not. If they do not, there is no possibility of any succession of acts remaining contemporaneously in the principle. This, however, is necessary for the existence of time. As we have seen, time implies succession which is not present unless it can exist altogether and, therefore, contemporaneously. In other words, something is needed to unite the links of succession. But if successive acts do in passing leave traces of themselves in the sentient principle, these traces are not the acts themselves. The sentient principle does not, therefore, retain in itself any succession of acts, but the succession of their traces through which time would have to be created. Now, the succession of these traces is not their duration because there is no succession in simple duration. The succession of these traces is simply the way in which one begins before another or, if they finish, the way in which they finish. Our supposition, however, is that they remain permanently.

The beginning of each trace, however passes in an instant, without leaving any trace; it is the trace which lasts, not the instant in which it begins. The 'before and after' of the beginning of the traces, which forms succession, is simply a series of instants, the first of which is no longer present when its successor arrives. We have to say, therefore, that succession does not endure; it is not obtained from some ens which holds it present to itself. The sentient principle does not retain the various beginnings of its traces. These beginnings pass because of their essentially instantaneous nature. Consequently, we have the same difficulty in understanding how the sentient principle can assemble in itself the entire succession of traces left by its acts as we have in understanding how it can assemble and retain in itself the succession of its passing acts. We must find another way to overcome this difficulty.

1163. We shall find the right path by considering the nature of duration.
The concept of duration that we have given is: 'A participation in eternity.' Ideal being, as we know, is totally immune from time. Its realisation shares in this immunity, although in a limited way because it is incapable of anything else. This participation is duration, which therefore supposes identity. The essence of an ens is identical in whatever instant it is considered. In the same way, a real, simple ens is equally identical in every instant in which it acts and suffers. Granted this, it follows that the identical sentient principle which carries out an act is also that which carries out all successive acts. Because of its identity, it is present to all the acts it does.

It is, therefore, present to the whole of succession without itself being subject to succession, or being a link in succession. When we consider the sentient principle in this way, we easily understand how it assembles in itself both the entire succession of its acts and equally the succession of the traces which its acts leave in it, even though the terms of the succession of the acts and of their traces pass in such a way that one is not present to the other. Yet this is necessary if they are to form succession. We have to grant, therefore, that the principle, if it is to accept succession in itself and thus place time in existence, is outside time. I must insist that 'time cannot exist except in that which has no time as its term.' Here again, the entire difficulty consists in persuading ourselves that the sentient principle (like every other simple ens) is not subject to time. Properly speaking, it is in eternity, or as we normally say, it pertains to the metaphysical world.

1164. As far as I can see, this entire argument is inviolable unless we want to impugn the duration of the sentient principle, that is, its identity relative to all its successive acts.
Let us suppose, therefore, that this duration is under attack. We now have to sustain it. If I do so with invincible arguments, I shall have confirmed my conclusion. This is the essential point of my argument.

The first proof that I shall give of the identical duration of the sentient principle will be a general demonstration of the necessity of the duration of entia. Let us suppose that an ens had no duration. It is clear that it would no longer exist. Instantaneous existence is absurd. An instant is nothing other than the beginning or end of some duration. But if an ens endures, even though the duration may be very limited, it must be identical as long as it endures. Otherwise, there would be no duration in it but a succession of equal entia, each of which remained for an instant. This, I have to repeat, is obviously absurd. We could not even think that any of those entia would exist because in the same instant in which they were, they would cease, they would not be. But to be and not be is a contradiction. Moreover, these entia could not form any succession because there would be no duration between them. Duration, as we said, is impossible without the possibility at least of one enduring ens.

1165. A second, particular proof of the duration of the sentient principle is drawn from the following fact. Often the successive acts of an animal are carried out in order; this shows that there is some entity in animal instinct, some cause that produces them. If there were no single cause of all the successive acts, if each act had a different cause, a different sentient principle producing it, there would be no reason for their order, no explanation of the singleness of the aim to which they often tend so admirably. In this case, each principle would be able to produce only a single act without any connection with the other acts. We would either have to have recourse to some pre-established harmony or to the immediate action of God as an explanation of the actions and passions of the animal. This, however, cannot be granted because of the innumerable absurdities produced by such systems.

1166. The third proof. If the duration of identical entia had been removed, the existence of new actions of entia would be impossible. Action is a second act which presupposes the first act of existence. Consequently, it presupposes at least two instants with an interval of some duration; otherwise there would not be two instants.

1167. The fourth proof, and here we arrive at the human being, is found in consciousness of the identity of the sentient principle relative to its acts. Reflective thought does not in any way alter things in their being, as I showed; it simply makes them known as they are. Reflection is a faithful witness that the sentient principle endures numerically the same.

It is not absurd, therefore, for the sentient principle to possess some duration. This means that it remains identical relative to all its successive acts. Indeed, this cannot in any way be denied. But it is in the sentient principle that the relationship, later called time, is generated.

1168. We conclude, therefore, that the unity of succession of acts, modifications, passions, beginnings and ends is due to a simple principle that possesses duration. In other words, this principle is identically present to all the terms of succession. Without this, there would be individual links, but never succession and hence never time. Nor could the links be explained as links.

1169. As a simple being, the rational principle carries out successive acts of which it is the cause and the identical, lasting subject. Consequently, in this principle also we find all the conditions required for the existence of time.

1170. We have to conclude:

1. Space and the extended element receive their unity from the animal-sentient principle; their succession, on the other hand, as well as time and temporality, receive their unity from a sentient principle of any kind, that is, either animal or rational.

2. Space is a concept consequent on the concept of animal ens. Time, however, is consequent on real ens as such, as soon as it becomes a subject of change. Identity, or duration, pertains to an ens as it undergoes change.

3. The concept of time is not found in the concept of pure space or of matter. Here we can think of duration, but not succession, and consequently cannot think of the relationship between duration and succession.

1171. We have to distinguish, therefore,

1. Real time, that is, time in so far it really exists in the nexus between an identical principle and the succession of its modifications.
2. Real time as known, which is time present to the thought that apprehends it. And
3. Ideal time, which is the concept, or mere possibility, of a nexus between duration and succession.

Notes

(102) NE , vol. 2, 797-799 -Rinnovamento , bk. 3, c. 39-53.

(103) Sistema filososfico , nn. 67-104. -Rinnovamento , bk 3, c. 47.

(104) NE , vol. 2, 776-778.

(105) Attention is the activity of an intelligent subject. Without attention, the subject receives, but does nothing; it has not yet undertaken a second act. The primal intuition is a receptive act , it is not an activated act .

(106) The concept of duration arises, therefore, from the concept of eternity , considered in relationship to some possible succession. Consequently, when we say that God the Almighty endures, or that an idea endures, we are referring to a relationship of opposition between the being of God (or of the idea) and contingent things subject to succession. In himself God the Almighty does not endure , but is.

(107) Relative to the duration of perception, note that 1. some elements can endure in perception while others change. This is sufficient to bring about some duration to which the changes can be referred. For example, although the accidents of light are changed during perception of the sun, the perceived sun is always the same at every hour of the day, or is considered as such; 2. renewal of the perception takes the place of its continuation because the identity of the object is preserved. For example, we do not keep our eyes on the sun all day; sometimes they are even closed for a while. Nevertheless, every time we come back to perceive the sun we consider the perception as the same in so far as it has the same object and its information remains identical; 3. in every lasting perception it is always an ens which remains identical. The actions and passions of the ens change. It is these actions and passions which provide the succession which is referred to the duration given by the same ens.

(108) The unity of these actions must be found by making them all equal, that is, of the same extension, as I have shown at some length in NE , vol. 2, 764-799.