Chapter 5

Continuation — Law of synthesism of thought

1337. The law of objectivity gives rise to the law of synthesism (cf. 34-44). Although the object is united to the subject, there is no fusion whatsoever between them; by the very act of union, the object keeps itself separate from the subject and posits itself for what it is in itself. At the same time it initiates an act in the subject which terminates in the object, not in the subject. Subject and object are therefore united in such a correlative way that their union is essential to both;(173) it constitutes them both in such a different way that one is not only separate from the other but also opposed to it.

1338. Because the ancients did not know this law,(174) they fell into inextricable speculations and very serious errors. Ignorance of the law shored up Parmenides' (*), as we can deduce from a place in the dialogue which Plato named after that truly great Italian. In the dialogue, Socrates urges objections against Parmenides' system that 'all things are one single ens'. He maintains that although species is one for many individuals, species are distinct from individuals and from each other; they are entia in themselves. In reply, Parmenides points out the absurdities that would result from such a supposition. For him, the supposition is not justified, and even if it were, there would be great difficulty in showing how species can be known and, through them, individuals. To prove his point, he makes Socrates grant that every essence which exists in itself cannot be in us. Granted this, Parmenides concludes that species are unknown to us because we do not share in them.

However, if Socrates had known the law of synthesism, he would never have accepted Parmenides' claim that species were something in themselves and could not be in us. On the contrary, he should have determined that the intellective species (not to be confused with the image) is being itself in its ideal form. Being is so totally in itself that it cannot not be in itself nor can it receive anything from us. However, it can be intuited by us exactly as it is in itself, and not otherwise. We share in it, and in this sense it is in us. This proves that the species must be united to us if we are to intuit it and use it to know other things. But it does not prove the impossibility of its being intuited by us and remaining a being of a nature different from ours. This would certainly be the case if it were proved that what is in us has to be a part or modification of ourselves. But this is false and gratuitous. We see therefore that Parmenides' error was a result of the same arbitrary principle from which modern thinkers have derived their subjectivism. But his logical mind went much further and concluded that all things had to be one single ens. This argument, which Plato puts in the mouth of Parmenides, is clearly Parmenides' own. In the extant verses of his work, Parmenides endeavours to explain cognition by saying that knowing and being are the same thing,(175) and again (according to Karsten's translation):

These places can throw considerable light on the passage in Plato's Parmenides to which I have referred.

1339. Furthermore Parmenides uses another argument to prove to Socrates that things cannot be known if species are given an existence in themselves and distinguished from each other. He grants that what exists in itself cannot represent things, because existence which is in itself is not relative to anything else; it is closed within itself. Hence, he reasons, not even God would know human things or have power to govern them. The very art of disputation would be annihilated if things had to be known through these kinds of species, each of which would have a proper essence distinct from the thing itself. Parmenides goes on to say that some thinkers, having seen these consequences, held back and doubted whether ideas existed, because ideas cannot explain knowledge.

This is precisely the case of the modern Scottish school, which denied ideas. I myself have explained, perhaps with even greater efficacy, the uselessness of ideas when we claim that their only function is to be representative and that everything is known through representation.(177) But this is manifestly false because the essence of the idea is not seen in the idea. Instead we see the essence of ens, and ens is identical under both its ideal and real forms. Hence, in my opinion, the idea is simply being intuited by the mind(178) in its own essence, which is eternal. This essence however can include the realisation of being (in which case it is infinite being, that is, God, who is not seen), but can also not include the realisation of being (in which case it is ideal being, to which we refer the realisation apprehended by us through feeling). Hence the known, real thing is simply realised ideal being. Consequently the object of knowledge is the result of the two elements described above, 1. the ideal element, and 2. the real element, which is the complement of the ideal element. What is ideal is not representative in the same way as a real thing, for example, as the form of a statue represents another form, that is, the person whose statue it is, but as the essence of a thing represents the realised thing. The realised thing is not separated from its essence; if it were, it would no longer be a complete ens. Essence therefore is the act by which an ens exists in the ideal world. Realisation is another act of the same ens as act by which the ens is in feeling, that is, it feels or causes feeling. This feeling is added to the ens in the perceiving spirit as the completion of the ens. We must also bear in mind that existence in the spirit does not remove existence in itself; on the contrary, it constitutes it.

Notes

(173) It must be understood that the object is necessarily in a mind, not essentially in a human mind but an eternal, divine mind.

(174) Aristotle, noting that some accidental forms are ordered ad invicem , distinguished two kinds of predicating per se one thing of another. In the first kind, what is predicated is understood in the essence of the thing of which it is predicated, for example, 'The intellective soul is incorruptible'. In the other kind, what is predicated is not understood but necessarily found with it, for example, 'The surface is coloured', where the surface is not a coloured being but is found inseparably with colour, or according to the Scholastics, 'Surface is the preamble to colour'. In observing all this, Aristotle noted a special case of the law of synthesism. Cf. St. Thomas, S.T. , 1, q. 76, art. 3.

(175) Karsten, v. 41 [Philosophorum graecorum veterum reliquiae ].

(176) Ibid ., vv. 93-96.

(177) NE , vol. 1, 104-108.

(178) It has been objected that I use 'idea' in different meanings. But those who think this have not considered that I define idea as 'being, intuited by the mind'. According to this definition, I distinguish in the idea the act of the mind, which I call 'intuition', from the object of this act, which is being , ens , essence , as it is more appropriately called according to the different relationships under which it is considered (NE, vol. 2, 646-659). Thus, when I consider essence in itself, I call it 'essence'; when I consider it as object of the intellect (intuited essence ), I call it 'idea'. But because the idea has many relationships, it is given various names which however do not affect the definition 'intuited being ', or even 'being known per se '.