Chapter 6

Second special law: the term of thought is that which is possible

1340. The word 'possible' in its logical sense means free from contradiction, but an ens admits no contradiction whatsoever. This characteristic, which makes an ens essentially concordant and harmonious with itself, is the source of the principle of contradiction that 'being and at the same time not-being is not being.'
If 'being and at the same time not-being is not being', thought is impossible, because the object of thought is being. In this sense logical possibility constitutes the thinkability of things.

1341. But where do we look for contradiction (if there is contradiction) deep within an ideal or real ens? We must look into the essence of the ens as seen in its idea. If the possibility of an ens is that which makes it thinkable, and if this possibility or freedom from contradiction is in its idea, the truth I established in the previous chapter is once again confirmed by a new, sound argument: nothing is thought without an idea. This does not mean that every human thought comes about exclusively through an idea, as some inattentive thinkers have attributed to me. In rational perception, where we think something real, the object of our thought is both ideality and reality; every perception has both an ideal and a real element. But sensism, by stopping at what is real and recognising it alone as the object of thought, is an erroneous system and so deficient in philosophical insight that it renders thought impossible by excluding thought in the very act of establishing it.
Moreover, granted that possibility is thinkability, and thinkability is in the idea, any reality separated from its idea is no longer thinkable. The idea cannot in any way originate from it, because the real thing is in the understanding solely by virtue of the idea.

1342. Again, what is real and divided from the idea is not of itself an OBJECT of the mind, because what is real receives thinkability only from the idea to which it is united in the human spirit. Thinkers who consider what is ideal as nothingness, claiming that the human mind would not have a true object unless it had something real as its term, show how little they have progressed in philosophical investigation. In fact the opposite is true: only ideal being, the essence of an ens, is OBJECT. Outside of or apart from this, there is no object. If what is real is to be thought, it must first be OBJECTIVISED, that is, contemplated in the idea, in the essence.

1343. Saying that something is object or thinkable or intelligible per se means more or less the same thing. Only ideal being is INTELLIGIBLE PER SE; real being is INTELLIGIBLE BY PARTICIPATION. There is only one exception to this principle (although properly speaking it is not an exception): God is intelligible per se in his reality also; his subsistence is understood in his ideal essence. Consequently in God, subsistence (that is, reality) can never be unaccompanied by ideality. It is a serious, pernicious error to say that God is an idea or even that he is THE IDEA. In human language 'idea' does not mean reality, yet God is EXTREMELY REAL. Why do we use the word 'idea' in this way? Why has 'ideal' been coined in opposition to 'real'? Precisely because we do not naturally have a vision of totally real being and do not have any experience of the necessary nexus between ideal being and complete, real being; we can only reason to this nexus. The very existence of the word 'idea' and its constant use refute the error of those who attribute to human beings the intuition of God in the present life.

1344. But what about the word 'possible'? In its logical sense, as I said, it means that which does not involve contradiction. But God himself involves no contradiction. Is he therefore possible?

The repugnance we find in affirming that God is possible shows that another concept, besides the absence of contradiction, is present in this use of the word 'possible'. Neither the creature nor God involves contradiction. The divine essence however is not only free of contradiction, but necessarily real, whereas the essence of the creature does not necessarily subsist. Hence the essence of the creature can be conceived without the inclusion of reality in the concept. This explains why the reality of contingent being is said to be possible: 'Contingent being can be realised because its essence does not involve contradiction.' This truth completes the concept of what is possible. Logical possibility is therefore the explanation of metaphysical possibility.

1345. Everything therefore can be objectivised, that is, idealised, because everything that is not necessary and does not involve contradiction is conceived as possible. In this sense all things have an idea as their counterpart. What is individual can be considered as possible; the same is true of subsistence, when considered in relationship with its idea, that is, with its essence, of which it is the realisation.

1346. When a thing is considered possible, it is universalised. But not all things can be universalised in the same way. The word 'possible', as we saw, has two meanings: one, purely logical, when it signifies the essence of something that involves no contradiction; the other, metaphysical, when it indicates the realisability of an essence. The same can be said about universalisation.
Sometimes universality is not present in a pure essence, as in the case of things which are essentially single; for example, the essence of what is individual, of what is one, of myself, of what is subsistent, etc., includes particularity and singleness. Consequently, what is individual, what is one, myself and what is subsistent can only be single. On the other hand, if we consider the possibility of the subsistence of many myselfs, many ones, many individual things, many subsistent things, etc., we see all these things universalised by metaphysical, not logical possibility.

It may be objected that a multiplicity of each of these things corresponds to a single essence, that is, to the essence of myself, of what is individual, etc. But if the multiplicity corresponds to a single essence, essence must be the means of universalisation.
I deny that each of these things corresponds to a single essence. In fact the essence of myself, of an individual thing, etc., is not the essence of some other myself, of some other individual thing, etc.; the essence of one myself has nothing to do with the essence of another myself. It is characteristic of a subsistence not to have anything in common with another subsistence. The contrary seems to be true because the nature in which one subsistence participates is confused with subsistence itself; nature is common, but subsistence is single.

1347. Someone may further object that if many myselfs share the same myself, that is, have the same selfness, they have something in common.
I agree that selfness is indeed a common essence but it is not the essence of myself, etc. Myself, considered as such, is something real, something subsistent and therefore has no ideal essence. When many myselfs are conceived, the universalisation involved depends upon abstraction which, in the absence of a specific essence, sets up a generic essence. This universalisation, founded on metaphysical possibility (that is, on the existence of a will as efficient cause, and not upon an idea as exemplary cause), is referred to a generic essence, which represents only a part of the essence in question. The other part is produced directly by the efficacy of the will. In this way the generic idea of myself is the idea of human nature in so far as the efficient cause makes it subsist in several individuals. The generic idea does not represent the individual itself, which it makes subsist in reality.

1348. 'How then can we know whether a given essence may be realised in several individuals or in one only?' This question can be answered only by considering the particular essence itself under discussion. It is the essence of a thing which either excludes or permits varying multiplicity of individuals.
Thus the essence of God and of matter excludes multiplicity of individuals: the essence of God, because it is being itself, which is one and totally simple; the essence of matter, because it is the extended term of feeling and as such has only a generic ideal essence which expresses the whole of matter, not a part of it. Thus the individual has no place in matter. When for example we say 'water', we express the total nature of water. Its nature is simple, like the real essence itself to which the concept of water is restricted.

1349. Similarly, there could be essences which determined a certain number of individuals. All the entia known to us through specific essence are indeed unlimited in the metaphysically possible number of their individuals, but it is impossible to show the absurdity of some essence unknown to us which could contain limits of this kind. One example would be the essence of any order resulting from several finite things.