Chapter 11

Seventh special law:
the term of complex thought is something finite or something infinite.
Neither can be changed into the other.

1381. An ens cannot be indefinite. That which is indefinite does not have everything necessary for it to be an ens, and therefore on its own cannot be an object of thought. However, although an ens can never be indefinite,(215) it can be finite or infinite.

1382. A careful examination of this law shows us that finiteness or infinitude is an ontological quality so proper to an ens that if the quality is removed, the ens loses its identity. A finite ens, no matter how much it increases or multiplies, will never change its nature; it will always remain finite. On the other hand, an infinite ens can never be divided in such a way that it becomes finite. If our mind could distinguish several things in what is infinite, each would have to be infinite and contain all the others virtually or in act, with or without advertence.

1383. There is another consequence. If we think of the infinite, we must think of it as a whole or not at all. Although we can think of it in a limited way , this limitation must be attributed solely to the way in which we think of it, not to the object of thought. A subject thinking of an infinite ens knows he cannot think of the ens totally; in other words, he knows that the nature of the ens extends without confine or measure far beyond what he apprehends. Moreover, he knows that, although the thing occupying his thought contains everything, its totality appears only implicitly or virtually. The reason lies in the way in which the subject knows: just as a person with weak sight will not see a human being as perfectly as someone with excellent sight, although both see the whole human being.

1384. The matter will be clearer if we consider that the object of thought is: 1. ideal ens which, as we saw, cannot be measured, and 2. real ens, which can be measured.

We therefore have two questions:

1.1.How is it possible for us to think of infinite ideal ens? — I reply: the fact itself shows how we think of it. Anyone who reasonably examines ideal being sees immediately that its extremely simple infinity admits no division or splitting. The question therefore is not even possible. Instead we should ask: 'When we think of ideal ens, why must we think of it as infinite?'; the reply however would be the same: ideal ens is perfectly simple and one.

1385.2.How can we think of a real infinite ens? I reply: that which is infinite and real is the same ens seen in the idea under the form of reality. But if it is not absurd to see what is ideal and infinite, it is not absurd to be able to see what is real and infinite, because it is the same one perfectly simple ens as that intuited in an ideal ens.

1386. These replies, although sufficient for those who thoroughly understand them, are susceptible of further helpful development. The perceptions which most attract our attention are those of bodies and other contingent things. Our reasoning about the perception of what is real is founded on the example of bodies, etc., as if there were no other way of perception. But taking bodies as an example will never explain the perception of the infinite. This is why it is so difficult for us to understand perception in the supernatural order.

We perceive bodies through the real action they exercise on us. Hence, what we think in their concept is a mixture of subjective and extrasubjective elements. This corporeal ens, composed partly of our feeling and partly of something acting in our feeling, is not the object per se of our thought, but is thought of in the object. The object is foreign but the mind unites it to the corporeal ens as a necessary means of knowledge.

Once more, if we consider perception of ourselves in so far as we are a substantial feeling, we see that the thought contained in this perception is purely of a subject , which we objectivise in order to perceive it. The subject however is finite, so that everything known about it or its modifications or the agent modifying it, can only be finite. What is finite can feel in itself only a finite modifying action; the modification itself must also be finite.

Furthermore, the perceiving subject , that is, ourselves, is multiple. Nothing therefore that we perceive as a passion or modification of what is multiple, and as an immediate agent or cause of this modification, can be perceived as something totally one and simple; it must be perceived with some multiplicity. In fact multiplicity is found wherever there is limit. Consequently that which is infinite, to which supreme unity and simplicity pertain, cannot be perceived as a modification of ourselves or as the force that directly produces the modification.(216) If this kind of perception existed, perception of the infinite would be inexplicable.

But there is another kind.

Infinite ens is essentially object . Nothing subjective can occur in the perception of what is infinite. To be object means that we know the object by distinguishing and separating it from ourselves and putting it in counterposition to ourselves. What is infinite is perceived simply as ens ; it neither produces a passion in the subject nor is perceived as agent . The transient acts it may cause cannot be confused with it; they are outside it and do not in any way constitute the concept. The object therefore is not confused with the subject but intuited and perceived in itself; nor can the subject impose any limit or multiplicity on the object.(217) In perceiving the object, the subject does not receive the latter as an agent; it simply sees the object distinct from itself. The subject, in perceiving the object, does not need to impart its own measurements, as in the case of contact where a part which touches is measured by the part touched; in our case, the subject attributes nothing of its own limitation to the object. This explanation overcomes the difficulty and repugnance present in understanding that a finite ens perceives an infinite ens (in the supernatural order, of course), and topples Protagoras' principle: 'Man is the measure of all things'.(218)

1387. This manner of perceiving objectively is certainly mysterious. There is no other example of it in all the perceptions of finite things from which we arbitrarily draw the law of perception. But the fact is nevertheless undeniable, and we have an example of it in nature: the intuition of ideal being. The fact, which must be admitted despite its apparent mystery relative to our normal way of reasoning, contains nothing repugnant to the human mind; as I said, it is merely contrary to our habit of reasoning. The contemplative mind, rising above habits of this kind, which limit the sphere of reasoning, will see the fact as evident and so necessary that without it none of our mental operations can be explained — all thought, of any kind, would be impossible.

1388. It is true that afterwards the subject derives a feeling of delight and happiness from his perception of the infinite. This feeling, which is so special that it cannot be confused with other feelings, makes the subject understand that its source is infinite. Although an effect of the objective perception and closely bound with it, the feeling is not the perception itself and can never be confused with it. The feeling is finite but appears to be infinite because indivisible from the objective perception. In the unity of the human being the objective perception is joined with this feeling in such a way that the perception forms, as it were, its completion and apex.

Granted therefore the objective perception united with the feeling produced in the subject by the perception; granted again the whole formed by this communication of the infinite with the finite, it follows that knowledge of the infinite is both infinite and finite. It is infinite relative to the intuited, perceived object , and finite relative to the feeling it produces in the subject.

1389. For the same reason we are fully justified in saying that those who perceive God's glory in heaven perceive God whole but not wholly . The object is all God, but the feeling which the object produces in them is not the whole action which God could cause to be felt. The whole of God is perceived as ens but not totally as agent . But I must explain how God can be agent in the intelligent creatures who perceive him.

1390. The concept of God as agent in the subjects that perceive him can be falsified in two ways. In the first, God is seen as doing nothing; only the subject acts, deriving from the infinite object of his perception the joyous feeling which makes him happy. In the second, God is seen as acting subjectively in the subject, similar to the way in which finite entia act in human beings and simply modify them.
Granted therefore that God as perceived acts supremely in the person who perceives him and that God in acting does not immediately modify the subject, what kind of action is this in the finite subject which is proper to God alone but does not consist in producing a simple modification or passion?

When I say modification or simple passion , I mean that the substance of the subject is neither changed nor increased, still less produced; it remains quantitively what it was, but in a new mode. In other words (and this expresses the concept better), the agent simply modifies but does not produce the substance, which is seen as already produced and capable of receiving in itself the agent's action. Divine action however is always performed by means of a kind of creation,(219) that is, with an action which posits an ens with its nature and quantity, but does not suppose a pre-existing subsistent ens in which the divine action can take place.

I say this because God as the cause of every ens makes everything with one perfectly simply act. The accidents (no matter how short lived) are posited at the same time as the substance; they are not produced by a different act. If God did otherwise, his action would contradict not only the unity and simplicity of the act with which he does all that he does, but also the perfect simplicity of his substance.(220) His substance and his action are the same; in creatures, substance and acts are different. We have in fact seen that transient acts can occur in created substances and that God can be the cause of transient acts. These, however, which can never occur in him, must remain clearly distinct from him. In created natures, on the other hand, activities are distinct from substance so that when one acts in another, it does so with its activity alone, not with its substance; the activity of one can modify only the activity of the other, but never produce substance itself. If therefore God were the direct agent in already existing substances, he would not create them but modify their activities. His activity but not his divine substance would enter into contingent substances, because what is passive and modified never receives substance but only activity from what acts and modifies. In this case, there would be a real division in God between his action and his being, which is absurd. God can act only by means of creation, that is, by creating at every moment the whole of a contingent ens together with all its modifications. It would also be absurd to say that God entered with his substance into an ens which is not. Substance can never be received in an ens which acts as patient.

Granted all this therefore, it will no longer be difficult to understand how God as perceived can act, and act supremely, in anyone who perceives him.
Two things occur in this fact:

1.The intelligent subject, to whom the perception of God is given and who possesses God as object of his intellect, can with his own activity cling to and enjoy God with all his strength in loving contemplation.

2.At the same time the measure of the strength with which he enjoys God is allocated to him by God as his Creator, that is, as the cause which produces him totally with all his acts of enjoyment.

1391. The enjoyment is limited because it is an act of the subject (the act and the subject are created by God), but the object of the enjoyment is infinite. It is in this sense that God, because he is indivisible, is perceived as a whole and cannot be perceived otherwise. Nevertheless he cannot be perceived wholly in the good which the subject derives from him, because the nature of the subject, the strength of his nature and the acts of his strength are limited.

1392. Although what is enjoyed of God is always God because the whole of God is enjoyed, the limitation of the act with which the intelligent subject adheres to God is such that God seems to be divided. Indeed different subjects endowed with different strength enjoy God differently. All of them however enjoy the infinite . In this sense I said that 'infinite being or finite being pertains to ens, that is, to the object of thought', and that neither can be changed into the other. But because what is infinite is enjoyed in varying degree, it seems to be divided, diminished or increased in our concept when this takes as its measure the relationship between infinite ens and its enjoyment. This apparent diminution, however, never deprives what is infinite of its infinity. If it did, such an ens as object of the mind would immediately be something else.

1393. This also explains how God can be conceived (always in a negative or virtual way) under various concepts, as of subsistent wisdom, subsistent goodness, holiness, etc., because in each of these the infinite is always equally present. The multiplicity of concepts (except the concepts of the Persons) has its origin entirely in the subject and in the varied and many experiences he has of them through his own limitation and multiplicity.

1394. But because the perception of God pertains to the supernatural order, a very difficult question arises: must the multiplicity of concepts under which the human being can think of God cease entirely in the beatific vision? I reply tentatively.
We should first note that, if we mentally divide something essential to God from the object of thought, the object is no longer God. It is essential to God that subsistence and essence are the same thing, the same perfectly simple being. The essence of being, separated from subsistence , is not God. By nature, human beings intuit only the essence of being, ideal being, and not its real subsistence. Consequently this essence cannot be called the essence of God. Hence human beings do not by nature intuit God. This is a truth which is proved equally by experience, reason and Christian faith.

Indeed, we have simply to reflect upon ourselves to ascertain that there is naturally no divine subsistence in the human intellect, but only a pure idea of being. A large part of the human race will not only find that the natural object of their understanding is not the subsistence of being, but also that they cannot observe even its essence in themselves. If they had divine subsistence as the object of the their thought, it would be of such value that no one would be ignorant of it. On the other hand, reason shows that this need not be supposed in order to explain the actions of the human spirit. Furthermore, if we intuited God, beatitude would depend solely on our own will because we would possess its source, which is not the case. Finally, to say that human beings by nature see God is a MANIFEST ERROR CONTRARY TO CHRISTIAN FAITH, which reserves the vision of God to heavenly beings.

If on earth mankind is not granted to see the identity of the essence and subsistence of being and therefore not to see God, we must acquire knowledge of the supreme Being BY REASONING and not by direct intuition. This reasoning leads us to know that God is, but not the mode in which he is, concealed in his subsistence.(221)
In the beatific vision, however, where the subsistence of being is perceived, the connection of identity between the subsistence and the essence of being will be seen; this connection will reveal God. God will be seen sicuti est [as he is], when the imperfection of reasoning will come to an end et scientia destruetur [and knowledge shall be destroyed].

If we want to use reason to investigate whether the divine subsistence will appear to us devoid of all relationships with creatures, we must say, in my opinion, that it will be seen only in its creative relationship with creatures, not otherwise. God's infinite perfections will be contemplated in this relationship, as I have stated elsewhere.(222) But because his relationship with creatures is multiple (not on his part but on that of creatures who are multiple), his divine perfections will appear multiple, and different from the way they appear to us on earth. In our present state we cannot attain to the perfectly simple source of the divine perfections, where they identify with each other, and all identify with being. We shall do this in heaven. There, we will see that the divine perfections which appear in creatures now and hereafter as multiple, will in God be his perfectly simple essence alone. On earth we can see that this must be so, but how it is so remains a mystery because we find no example in nature. Thus, although we will be able, even in heaven, to use different concepts to express the divine being, we will see the same being in each concept. Their multiplicity will not prevent us in any way from seeing God as he is. We will see simultaneously how the divine perfection is diffused in many relationships and how there is one single, identical, primordial and essential perfection in all of them.

1395. Furthermore, when we think of a perfection in our present condition, for example, wisdom, we see it as limited. Only by 'eminent' reasoning , as the theologians call it, do we understand that this perfection must be unlimited in God. This is why I said that when we think of God as subsistent goodness, etc., the concept we form of him is virtual, not actual. In heaven we will not use reasoning to induce this necessity but see directly that the case is so, is a fact, because we will see wisdom as infinite and necessarily infinite; above all, we will understand directly how it can be so.
If then in heaven divine perfection appears to us as one (just as the one, identical centre of a circle is also the beginning and term of all the radii), each of the divine perfections will obviously be sufficient to make us know God as a whole. As the term or beginning of a single radius is sufficient to indicate the centre of the circle, so in each of the perfections we will always see the same infinite ens.

Thus, infinite ens, although seemingly divided through the various aspects under which it is considered, never ceases to be infinite ens. Infinity is a condition which pertains to infinite ens, just as finitude is a condition pertaining to finite ens. The law of thought which I have proposed is therefore valid.

Notes

(215) How then do I say that ideal being, which essentially constitutes the object of the mind, is indeterminate ? — It is not indeterminate in itself, but relative to contingent realities. It is a means of knowing these realities but makes one known only when it receives some addition of feeling. The indetermination of being is not a quality proper to being but an enduring indeterminate relationship with contingent things; it is an indetermination foreign to being. For example, a portrait which showed a great likeness to several people is said to be indeterminate, although not indeterminate in itself. Similarly, if the person portrayed is unknown, we say the portrait is indeterminate, although the portrait itself is always determinate whether the original is known or not.

(216) NE, vol. 2, 672-691.

(217) Rinnovamento , bk. 3, c. 47.

(218) Note, the intellective principle as such is entirely actuated in the object and therefore receives from the object this unique condition: as an intellective principle it cannot act nor even suffer from another agent, but can only intuit, know. If it acts, it does so because it is sensitive as well as intellective (this explains why it is called rational). Its action, regulated by what it knows, can also consist in the enjoyment of what it knows.

(219) Teodicea, 547-548.

(220) When I apply the words 'substance', 'action', etc., to God, I do not mean that these concepts are in God as they are in creatures. I use the words in the sense given by theologians, which was illustrated particularly in the book De' divini nomi and in the works of St. Thomas.

(221) Teodicea , 55-74.

(222) Ibid ., 660-698.