Chapter 15

The synthesism of practical reason.
Moral good is twofold: ontological and psychological

1431. We now come to the law of synthesism proper to reason and its consequences for practical reason.
The rational principle has a twofold quality. It comes out from itself, fixes itself upon and takes up residence, so to speak, in the object, that is, in something different from and opposed to itself as subject. In the same way, whenever practical reason acts in conformity with its own law of reason, it is ordered and satisfied in itself (psychological-moral-good) and gives what is due to its ens-object. Thus the exigency of ens is satisfied (ontological-moral-good).

Vice versa, practical reason, if it deviates from the law proper to reason, produces two evils: 1. it disorders itself by not uniting with and unfolding its activity towards its term as required by its nature (psychological-moral-evil), but even worse, 2. it posits a disorder between itself and the ens, because the natural relationship between the two terms has not been observed (ontological-moral-evil).

1432. Moral evil therefore cannot be fully repaired by the simple correction of the disorder left in practical activity, which simply restores the psychological order . Satisfaction must also be given to the ens whose exigency has not been respected, so that the ontological order is restored. This explains the origin of punitive and vindictive justice, as well as that of penal satisfaction. If anyone has within himself the whole of the ontological order and therefore necessarily presides over its conservation (this is God), it is clear that his justice would demand penal satisfaction for an ens harmed by a moral evil.
The same must be said about upright action. In addition to the psychological good effect which comes in the lower order proper to the subject who has done moral good, there must also be an ontological reward.

1433. But this effect varies according to the particular ens whose exigency has been respected.
If upright persons do good relative to themselves (objectively considered), they will have the ontological good of an increased love and esteem of themselves (testimony of conscience, which differs from the feeling of moral-psychological harmony).
If they do good relative to their fellows, the ontological reward to which they have a right is the love and gratitude of their fellows. If the love and gratitude are denied, the supreme Ens who presides over the ontological order must compensate. Equally he must punish the unjust refusal of love and gratitude.

Finally, if they do good relative to God, he reserves for them rewards worthy of both himself and the moral virtue they have exercised towards him.
The same argument is also valid for harm.
It will be helpful if we see more clearly the twofold quality, psychological and ontological, of moral harm and good by comparing the good proper to the activity of the rational principle with the good proper to the activity of the sensitive principle.

The term of the sensitive principle, undivided from the principle, has a union or relationship of reciprocal activity with the principle; the term of the rational principle is essentially in opposition to its principle; here the union is an intuitive relationship, not a reciprocal activity. Hence all harm experienced by the sensitive principle is reduced to what it produces in itself; what it produces in another does it no harm. The material, extended element as term of the sensitive principle is, as I have said, not susceptible of harm and good, because anything not joined to it is not its term. If a dog bites a man, we do not say that the dog suffers any harm from the action, and if we say it is a bad dog, the description refers solely to the harm done to us. This is metaphorical, not literal language. In the case of the rational principle, however, the term is an object distinct from ourselves, so that whenever we harm another (for example, our fellow), we act contrary to the law imposed on us by an ens as term of our activity. This results from the above-mentioned laws of objectivity and synthesism, through which the term is present to the rational principle. The sensitive principle is therefore subject to harm for the sole reason that the activity of its natural instinct can be disturbed. On the other hand, the rational principle can cause harm in two ways: 1. by upsetting the ontological order when the principle alters the natural relationship of entia and thus tends on its part to destroy ens in general, which possesses this intrinsic order — this action is imputed to it as cause; and 2. by not adhering to its natural term according to the law of its constitution and thus causing disturbance in itself. Consequently moral necessity is simultaneously objective and subjective.(236)

Notes

(236) The Essence of Right , 189-193, 211-222.