Chapter 16

The second special ontological law of practical reason:
its object is that which is possible

1434. We now apply the second law of reason which states: 'The term of thought is that which is possible.' Two extremely sublime consequences are immediately apparent. The first states that practical reason has as its term the essence of entia in relationship to the essence's realisation.

1435. In speaking of the law of perception, we saw that practical reason must adhere to a real ens according to the measure of the ens, and that its measure is determined by ideal-general being.
This measure is the specific idea of any ens with which we are dealing, and the specific idea is always ideal being, considered as manifestative of this real ens.
We have, therefore:

1.ideal being in general, the first absolute measure, the measure of all measures of real entia;

2.the specific idea, the proximate measure of a real ens;

3.and a real, measured ens.

The first law is that of the first measure which measures all others. In other words, the practical reason must act according to the indication given by this measuring element and embrace the measure which ideal being assigns. The second law is that of the proximate measure. In other words, the practical reason, having received this measure from the absolute measure, must hold it as the norm of its esteem for and adhesion to any real ens. These norms of practical reason are, therefore, superior to real ens. It follows that the moral order comes to practical reason from those laws which prescribe for it the attitude it must have towards each real being. The ultimate reason for moral respect is an idea, and an ens is esteemed only in so far as this idea prescribes.

But an idea contains the essence of an ens. The respect of rational reason terminates, therefore, in the essence of the ens. The real ens is appreciated not in itself and for itself, but in its essence and for its essence. But the essence of an ens, when we are dealing with contingent entia, is ideal, and is called possible when considered relative to the realisation of the essence. The final, necessary term, therefore, for practical reason is the possible essence of a thing in relationship to the realisation of the essence.

1436. The moral act, as we see, consists not only in respect for a real being according to the measure of its ideal essence, but also in a tendency to realise this essence. If practical reason has as its object the realisation of an essence, it follows that practical reason tends to produce it if such a realisation has not yet come about, or has come about imperfectly. It also tends to produce it in the most complete and perfect way. If the realisation has already come about, practical reason will tend to adhere to such a perfectly realised ens.

There are, therefore, two moral acts: 1. adhesion to a real ens (special-justice); 2. realisation of an ideal ens (beneficence, charity). The second act is divided into the two acts of production and perfecting .(237)
We can conclude, therefore, that there is a law of complete realisation of species or of excluded equality , which the Creator follows in the formation and government of the world.(238)

1437. We have been dealing with contingent entia. A similar argument can however be applied to supreme, necessary, absolute Ens. Although the supreme Ens has subsistence and reality in its essence, this essence is nevertheless not less manifestative of its subsistence and reality. Or, better, the subsistence of the supreme being, in so far as it makes itself known with its own light, is the law imposed on practical reason; and, in so far as it lives complete in itself, is the real object of practical reason itself.
We also have the second consequence deducible from our knowing that the term of reason is that which is possible: practical reason has, as its law, harmony in the object.

1438. Any essence which does not have in itself the subsistence of an ens is called 'possible' considered in relationship to the realisation of the essence.
Logically speaking, 'possible' is everything which does not involve contradiction. Hence the object of reason, ens, is as I said immune from every contradiction; it is self-accordant, fully harmonious.
Practical reason, therefore, which itself is reason, must have a harmonious term immune from contradiction if it is to act according to its own nature.

1439. Careful consideration shows that the malicious human being, on the contrary, always has some contradiction as the term of his activity; he endeavours to do the impossible. In fact, it is impossible to destroy the intrinsic order of universal being. Because essences are immutable, it is impossible to make an ens, considered according to its essence, different from what it is. When a person, instead of acknowledging some conceived ens according to its measure, wishes to acknowledge it according to another, arbitrary measure, he re-presents to himself the essence of an ens changed relative to its measure, and consequently possessing greater or lesser value than the true ens. He re-presents something false as the object of his activity. He does not present it as false, however, but as true. No one can want to deceive himself fully and absolutely; every malicious person tends necessarily to persuade himself that the good he wants is true good. If he could convince himself fully hic et nunc that it were not good, not true good, he would never follow it.

He would not abandon true good for that which he would know not to be good. Although there is no doubt that he can with his speculative reason know that he deceives himself, he does not want to acknowledge this with his practical reason. He tells himself that the good which seduces him is not good in general, and that it brings in its wake greater harm. At the same time, he wants it as good for him here and now, abstracting from future consequences or from a multitude of other considerations. As we said, it is through abstraction that practical reason mistakes the path prescribed for it by its natural laws. If, therefore, a person wants practically, and at the very moment of his action, that evil be good, he will try with his activity to denature and destroy truth, and to make that which is in one mode something very different for him. In other words, he attempts to change the order of an ens.

Now in this case, an ens would contradict itself. It would be one thing and have one measure relative to theoretical reason, but be something else and have a different measure relative to practical reason which, by tending through malicious activity to put an ens in contradiction with itself, attempts the impossible.

1440. Here we see the origin of the incessant struggle and implacable battle which every malicious person fights within himself, and of the peace and concord found in the just.(239)

Notes

(237) For the distinction between the moral acts of production and perfecting, cf. PE , 197-211.

(238) Teodicea , 617-641.

(239) Cf. ER , 94-107.