Chapter 20

Psychological inertia can be reconciled with the various actions of the soul
through the law of spontaneity

1452. If the human soul or rational principle is moved only when a term is given it, how can we explain its immense activity in the various actions contributing to its extraordinary development? It would seem that the soul has either been given or not been given an object. There is no middle choice. But if it has received an object, it does nothing else but rest in it; if it has not, it does not act. It is true, of course, that the principle would have no activity of its own if it lacked an object. Nevertheless, granted the object, this activity is present with its own laws, that is, the psychological laws which we are now investigating.
First of all, union with the object takes place in two ways, speculative and practical , as I have already indicated. The merely speculative union is the first act of union, an ontological union determined by the presence of the object. The psychological union takes place through the activity proper to the subject.(243)

1453. We saw that the ontological laws of speculative reason are physically necessary because they arise both from the object and the creative power posited by the soul intuiting the object. They are not drawn from the soul's rational activity which, on the contrary, is created through them.
Investigation showed, however, that the ontological laws(244) governing practical reason were only morally, not physically necessary. In other words, they determine the moral, not physical action of practical reason; they determine what it must do if it is to be perfect, not what it actually does.

Practical reason therefore has two kinds of laws: those which govern its natural action (psychological laws), and those according to which it must act if it is to be perfect (ontological , moral laws). I have already explained the latter; I need only discuss the former.

1454. Practical reason, however, which is a kind of continuation of theoretical reason (just as second acts are a kind of continuation of some first act) never acts independently of theoretical reason, from which it originates. The laws of theoretical reason are therefore already fulfilled in the action of practical reason, although such fulfilment does not identify these two very different kinds of law which must be very carefully distinguished.

1455. Consequently, psychological activity and spontaneity , that is, the soul's varying degree and manner of union with the object (granted its presence) harmonise very well with psychological inertia , that is, the soul's inability to act without an object.

1456. A clearer understanding of this harmony will be obtained if I briefly summarise the totality of psychological development by drawing on the various places where I have discussed it. It unfolds through the following stages and modes of action, for each of which I add its sufficient reason:

1.The rational principle does not move unless it is given an object to which it can unite itself.

2.If this object is purely infinite, ideal ens, the principle rests in it; its action is utterly simple (intuition), just as the object is utterly simple. The principle goes no further with its movement, which has attained its complete term.

3.If the object is something real, given in feeling, the feeling seconds the perception, which is multiple in nature and consists of a ) what is infinite and ideal, b ) what is ideal in so far as it shows the essence of what is real, that is, the concept and measure of what is real, and c ) the affirmation of what is real, that is, the realisation of the concept. But all this is, so to speak, organically united.

4.If the affirmation or memory of what is real ceases for any reason, the concept of the thing remains in the mind, preserved by some real vestige of feeling, which takes its place.

5.But anything real perceived by our theoretical reason can become the object of our will (psychological activity) not only as conceived but as real . These are two different ways of the soul's union with the object.
In fact the will sometimes simply takes delight in actually knowing a thing (delight of contemplation). In this case it is sufficient for the object to be present in the concept possessed by the theoretical reason; the will is content to contemplate the object. This is an act of practical reason.(245)

6.But sometimes it is not sufficient for the will to contemplate the known object. It desires to feel the enjoyment of the object, that is, it desires the object as real, as a term of feeling, not as a term simply of cognition.

Relative to this real union, two kinds of volition can take place: affective and appreciative volitions.(246) In merely affective volitions , the rational principle simply seconds instinct and behaves negatively relative to the term of instinct which it conceives in the ens without distinctly appreciating it as good. In appreciative volitions , the act of appreciation intervenes and becomes operative.

1457. Appreciative volition (to which I will limit my observations) desires what is real as a term of feeling. Consequently it varies according to the diversity of the sensories and the ways in which the sensories unite with their term. Therefore:

The same can be said about every other feeling. Generally we want the desired term to be united, in the particular way required by the nature of the sensory, to the sense to which it pertains.

7.Hence, whenever theoretical reason conceives what is real, which is then desired by the will as the real term of feelings, the real thing receives the nature of end relative to the will. The activity of the will is immediately aroused to find the means to obtain the end. Either purely affective volitions can be used to obtain them, or the practical reason can move to obtain them by appreciative, calculated volitions.

8.In this last case, practical reason moves theoretical reason to discover the means .

1458. We cannot conclude however that the abstract concepts of end and means are formed in this way. Theoretical reason still contains nothing truly abstract. It acts according to the relationships it sees in entia, but does not abstract the relationships or see them separate from the entia. Its acts have a complex, multiple term, whose parts, like the organs of a single, understood whole, are in the whole and through the whole.
Action of this kind, without abstract knowledge of ends and means, pertains to multiple , notabstract thought. Multiplicity can be present in the object of thought irrespective of abstraction. Thus, we have seen that perception is a single action despite the three elements distinguished in the object of perception which itself is one, although organated.

1459.9.This relationship of means and end is already a bond between ideas and perceptions. Later, other bonds are revealed which associate ideas and perceptions in countless forms and make a single thought of them. The instrument which gives new activity to thought is the association and spontaneity of phantasms. We have seen that it is a law of the rational principle to unite the idea to every feeling. Consequently phantasms stimulate thought. But it is proper to phantasms to have a kind of spontaneous motion so that a single phantasm gives rise to many others.(247) Hence, such a stimulus causes a whole series of thoughts.

1460. Furthermore phantasy is subject to the law of habit, which is partly imposed on it by thoughts. Just as phantasms move corresponding thoughts, thoughts move phantasms, and just as thoughts are joined by their logical connections, so corresponding phantasms are usually represented in what could be called a reasoned series. The series of reasonings already made by the mind joins together and produces the corresponding series of phantasms. Afterwards these reasoned series of phantasms, joined together in keeping with the different reasonings, are aroused in us habitually as soon as the impulse is given to our internal sensory. We then make appropriate reasonings about them. In this way the habit to which the phantasy is subject passes into the faculty of thought, which is tied to the phantasy. This is what I call 'reasoning phantasy' or 'reasoning habit'; we use it to explain the phenomena of dreams, of distractions, and so on. Note, the reasoning habit , already initiated at this level of intellectual development, increases greatly and expands with other levels of thought which I will now describe.

10.The association of perceptions and ideas makes one real thing a sign of another and the perception of another perception. This explains the natural formation of language. Moreover nature (instinct) teaches us to use the association of perceptions in the company of our fellow human beings. Sometimes we may want to attain an end, and need to let them know about it. The knowledge we impart to our fellows is a means with which we obtain our desired end. Again, the wisdom of the Creator has endowed us with many ways of communicating our needs and will to others. One very suitable instrument is the faculty of articulate sounds which, through another gift of God, we produce instinctively as a simple physical consequence of our feelings and thoughts. When we are quickened by a rather strong feeling we instinctively emit sounds, even when alone. The movement of our tongue, the emission of air and the apposite alteration of our throat are effects of our internal feeling, independent of the aptitude which such sounds have for imparting meaning. This aptitude is soon discovered however, and is a great step in our intellective development. But abstraction strictly speaking is not yet present.

11.Are these signs or sounds which we use to reveal our needs, feelings and volitions, proper or common names?

By nature they are common names because they express a concept (otherwise they would be instinctive sounds, not intended signs), but in the beginning they are used as proper names because they express the concept still bound to the feeling, the perception.(248)
Although they begin as proper names at the moment they are applied to an object of perception, which is by nature singular, they are very soon used as common. The perception contains what is common, that is, the concept which is essentially common. Very quickly, the idea, although first tied to the object of the perception and thus particularised, is separated from this external bond. To see how far the human being, or rather human beings living in association, can progress in the formation of speech, we must consider carefully the nature of perception, the first fount of names.

The three elements of perception are: 1. the idea (unlimited, ideal being), 2. the concept (ideal being limited by the relationship of sensitive perception with it), and 3. the act of the spirit which affirms the subsistence, that is, the realisation of the concept. Although this triple object of perception is indicated by the name when it is first imposed, the spirit soon abandons subsistence , which is no longer needed, and is left with the concept intuited in the idea. From this moment, the name, which does not change, is used as common.

1461.12.But what is the nature of the concept acquired in the perception?
First of all, intellective perception takes place on the occasion of sensations and sensitive perceptions. The different sensories which perceive the real thing split it up naturally into many real things and, by means of separate perceptions, furnish us with its different sensible qualities. Hence we can apply one sound to indicate a coloured object and a different sound to indicate the same object as tasted [App ., no. 14]. But this is still not pure abstraction. Each of the sounds indicates a real substance proffered by the relevant sensory; they are qualified substantive names. Even when we are aware of the identity of the individual thing, there is still no abstraction, only synthesism. Nevertheless, this step taken by the human spirit is important.

1462.13.It can happen that two or more different real things perceived in different ways give us similar pleasure or similar pain. In the first case our joy, and in the second our pain is expressed by fitting movements. People will see pain or pleasure on our face and in our gestures. Our feelings can also be expressed by spontaneous, instinctive sounds which strictly speaking express something real, that is, our pleasant or painful feeling. They can however be very quickly associated with the real objects which are their cause and form, according to the Scholastic saying, sensibile in actu est sensus in actu [what is sensible in act is sense in act].

Let us suppose that a mother wishes to keep her child away from various harmful objects. To make the child understand that such objects are harmful, she will make gestures and sounds expressing pain, fear and other similar affections. She will use these signs to make the child understand that he must keep away not only from fire, but from razors, ponds or precipices, etc. Because the feeling produced by the objects is the same, it is always natural for her to use the same signs, especially in light of the law that 'animals and human beings always follow the easiest way to produce their action', and that it is easier to repeat the same sound than to find new ones. Thus a sound will gradually become fixed as a common name for all harmful objects. On the other hand, if a mother were to invite her child to enjoy pleasant objects, such as eating fruit and sweets, playing, etc., she would use signs which express joy, and by repeating the same signs in very many different circumstances and for very different real objects, will finally determine a common name for all pleasant or useful objects.(249)

The names given by the mother would mean 'that which causes pain, sadness' and 'that which gives pleasure, joy'; they would express entia, characterised and distinguished by the effect they produce in the child's feeling. They would therefore be common names of very extensive meaning because they would include innumerable kinds of effects. Granted this faculty, nothing prevents us from inventing common names of more limited meaning in accord with our need, determined not by pleasure or pain in general but by a genus or species of pleasure or pain, of enjoyable or unpleasant feelings. Words like good and bad , useful and useless , healthy and unhealthy are classified by grammarians as substantivated adjectives . This classification is incorrect, however, because such words precede adjectives in the development of human language. Their philosophical name would be qualified substantives since they express the concept of a substance determined by one or more species of its accidents.

According to the same law, it seems that the common name which initially means the full species, must be transferred to signify not only very extensive genera but the least extensive and even most limited genera. For example, the sight of grass covering a stretch of land moves us to name it 'meadow', thus indicating the object of our perception by a proper name. Later, we give the name 'meadow' to every similar stretch of green, that is, we use the name as common; we abandon the thought of the subsistence of the first real meadow and make the concept and name common to every stretch of grass. The word 'meadow' now indicates the object of our concept . In the first perception of the meadow it is true that we perceived qualities other than the colour green: we perceived the size, the shape, the intensity of colour, etc. But these qualities did not strike our gaze as vividly as the colour green. We ignored the other qualities without naming them, being content to name the object of sight according to its most vivid quality, 'a green ens'. Consequently, if we were to see a green tapestry and had no other words to name it, we would not look for a new word — this would take too much effort and not serve our purpose — instead, we would immediately use the same name, meadow . The name would now have an extended meaning and be generally understood as 'that which is green'.

The conclusion is that naturally we think genera and species and produce common names . All the first substantive names must therefore have been qualified substantives , but never simply substantives. The most ancient languages bear clear traces of this, a fact which Leibniz noted. It will therefore be helpful to add his examples to mine.(250) He was at work in Germany before the caustic spirit of sophism had penetrated that nation, a spirit introduced by Kant, a son of his times and a corrupter of true philosophy. Leibniz says:

1463. In this passage however Leibniz does not deal with the cause which inclines human beings to form common names , and form them so easily that they do it effortlessly; furthermore, the less developed the human race is, the more readily it forms common names. The cause is always:

1.The nature of perception . Perception apprehends things in their special action on particular sensories, and does so only partially, in unilateral activities, not in their whole being and activity. The perceived ens is therefore determined by these sensible qualities.

2.The nature of feelings . Here disparate objects produce the same or similar feelings. The different causes of these feelings are attached to the feelings as to real things, and receive a common name. This name is more common than that which expresses an aptitude for producing particular perceptions, because it indicates several disparate real things through their aptitude for causing the same feelings.

3.Finally, the nature of appetence , which is also something real and to which the mind joins distant desired objects as well as those suitable as means for obtaining these distant objects. The result is other names that are still more common. All these names indicate multiple real things which have a more or less indirect, common aptitude for making the appetence obtain the object to which it tends as to its end. For example, we could use the wordvehiculum for all things capable of carrying something, and instrumentum for all things suitable as a means for doing something, etc.

1464. Some comment about the potency that Aristotle called common sense, admitted by all the Scholastics, will be helpful. According to Aristotle, common sense is an internal potency with its own organ in the brain which receives the sensations of the five external senses. That this potency has its own organ in the brain is a gratuitous proposition. In fact, reason proves the opposite, because every corporeal feeling must have a particular corresponding movement. If sensations of different senses happened simultaneously and they were all received by the organ destined for common sense, this organ would have to produce simultaneously different movements, which is clearly absurd. Furthermore, if the organ were composed of several parts, each of which received one of the movements, there would be several organs and several senses, not a single, common organ; we would still be unable to explain how a single sensory organ could govern all the different sensations. Again, if a common sensory were present in an organ different from and in addition to the special sensories, all the special sensations would have to be double. They would first have to be separate in the special sensories, and then united in the common sensory. This is contrary to fact.

Finally, if we add all that was said in the Rinnovamento against the unification of sensations in a common sensory, we will clearly see that solid philosophy cannot admit the common sense of Aristotle and the Scholastics.(253) Consequently, the faculty Aristotle allotted to common sense for discerning and judging the difference between the sensations of the various special sensories disappears. The same reasoning also invalidates the faculty which he and his followers attributed to the special senses for discerning or judging between their own different sensations.(254) Finally the Aristotelian definition of phantasy as the faculty which preserves the species of both the special sensories and common sense is corrected.(255)

1465. Nevertheless, although we can exclude these errors, there must be something in reality that corresponds to the 'common sense' of the Aristotelians. Without such a sense the animal could not direct itself according to its various sensations and feelings. But no new sense can be admitted. We have seen that animal feeling has an extended term and a simple principle . The multiplicity and variety of sensations and feelings pertain to the extended term; the animal's governance of its sensations, feelings and sensories pertains to the simple principle. All sensations and feelings exist in this immaterial, simple and identical principle. The animal not only feels each but is moved by them all, and performs its actions according to its total feeling, as I have explained at length in Anthropology .(256)

The animal has a single, fundamental feeling which can be modified in different ways. The modifications are particular sensations(257) which do not exist in separation from all the rest of the feeling, but are its most vivid parts; they are variations which take place in its extended term. Hence the animal always acts as a result of the state of this single feeling, not as a result of a mere sensation (although the special vividness of the sensation can give the opposite impression). The total sensation therefore is something real, to which, as an object of intellective perception, a name can be given. The sensations themselves are as it were different facets and attitudes of this feeling and can also be named. Similarly, because the term is distinguished from the principle and confused with the stimulus when this is applied to a sensory, the stimulating object as stimulant is itself named. This name then becomes the common name for all the objects capable of stimulating us in a given way, or for all objects if our attention, in the intellective perception, extends to the whole feeling without being restricted to what is most vivid in the feeling. In this case the invented, common name will be that which is sensible .

1466. As I said, however, we normally restrict our attention to what strikes us most or to what we need. In our natural state it would therefore be difficult and time-consuming to invent for felt things a name as common as that which is sensible . We first invent less extensive common names for things that fall under our senses, and then unconsciously use these names with more extensive meaning, according to our need. Moreover, because our attention is activated more by the vividness and convenience of sight-sensations than by any other sensation, we invent, from the very beginning, a name which equates with what is visible . Later we extend this meaning to everything that falls under our sense. This is what happened in fact, as we can see by examining languages, particularly ancient languages. All languages used the words applied to sight-sensations to mean not only the objects or terms of these sensations but everything that falls under the senses. Thus, we generally speak about visible things to indicate all that acts on our senses. This history of words, of which the clearest traces are preserved amongst peoples and in the most ancient languages, is well worth our consideration.

The following are examples of how words are applied to hearing while retaining the use they had when first applied to sight. In Exodus, Moses says: ' All the people saw the voices';(258) in Deuteronomy, ' Forget not the words your eyes have seen ',(259) and later, ' You saw no form but only voices'.(260) Calmet correctly notes that 'the Hebrews use the verb to see to indicate all the senses.'(261) The Greeks did the same, especially the ancient Greeks, like Aeschylus who used the phrases 'to see noises'(262) and 'to see the voices of a human being.'(263) Examples are numerous, many of them in Latin and modern languages. But the closer we come to modern times, the more the meaning of words moves away from perception and nearer to the common concept.

1467. The name given to a perception, and then transferred to mean the full species (which can be defined as a perception of the phantasm ), is the origin of all allegorical, metaphorical, figured, transferred and other kinds of language.
In fact, in the most ancient languages, people used the functions of life instead of the verb 'to live', which applies to the fundamental feeling as a whole.

These characterised the perception because they attracted the attention more. In Genesis (16: 13), the Hebrew text says, 'Do I still see , after him that "sees me"?', where 'I see' replaces 'I live'.(264) Elsewhere 'to eat and drink' means 'to live', as in Exodus,(265) where we read that the Hebrews 'did eat and drink' after seeing the Lord. To express a peaceful, prosperous life, Scripture speaks about everyone 'dwelling under his vine and his fig tree'.(266) This expression does not in itself indicate everything present in the concept of a happy life, but is transferred to give this sense. It is sufficient to name that which caught the attention most in life; the rest is understood as present. 'To make someone a slave' is expressed as 'bend his back'.(267) This part of the concept engraved itself more deeply on the phantasy; the remaining parts were implicit. 'The city will be deserted and filled with sadness' becomes 'No more will the voice of bridegroom and the voice of the bride be heard.'(268)

For the first human beings, therefore, the application of general precepts was ineffective. Particular precepts had to be given, as a kind of example and representation of general precepts. The Decalogue is composed entirely of particular precepts; for example, 'You shall not commit adultery', means we must not sin by lust; 'You shall not kill', means we must not harm our neighbour, and so on for the other commandments. It was of no value to legislate for the human race in general terms; particular precepts were given, like the following:

In Scripture, 'to seize or kill a mother and her children' indicates tremendous cruelty. The sacred writings are full of such phrases, the Old Testament more than the New. The oldest books of antiquity have practically no other kind of expression. After Scripture, Homer abounds in them. The lesser frequency of such expressions in the sacred books of India and China is for me new proof that these books are not necessarily as old as was thought, or that they were altered and translated, although their style was perhaps less metaphorical because thought, which then came to a halt, had made such rapid progress. The characteristic of the words and ancient forms of speech we are discussing is that they 'express the concept given by perception'. This expression, because so particular, was later transferred to mean an ever more common and general concept or opinion.

1468. As I said, the explanation of all metaphorical speech and grammatical turns of phrase lies here. It also explains why the style of the ancients is more poetical than that of modern authors; they described things for the senses. No other fact is required to explain the natural development of thought and the application of words to thoughts. The ancients, forced to form a language they did not have, had first to name concepts bound to perceptions, and then name concepts severed from perceptions. In perceptions however they did not name everything, but only what struck and attracted their attention most. This was taken as an indication and sign of the whole perception. The name expressed the perception and referred to it as an indication or natural sign. The word itself always meant 'that which produces this feeling'; for example, 'that which is beautiful' produces the feeling of beauty; that which is healthy is 'that which produces health'. But because the same indication was found in other objects, the word was suitable for indicating them as well. This was true also for disparate objects, because they produced the same feeling and, I must insist, the meaning of a word refers to feeling. 'The unity of feeling is the primal instrument for the formation of genera and species signified by words.' The feeling is an effect produced equally by several causes and hence a common natural sign of them.

1469. Furthermore the unity of feeling also explains the association of partial feelings which, as I have said, is the source of metaphors and particularly of metonymy. The element that we name relative to a perceived feeling is that which attracts our attention most because it strikes our sense more vividly or responds to our need , the two guides of our attention. Sometimes the feeling contains the cause and effect, the container and the contained, the sign and the thing signed, etc. The word, precisely because it is suitable for arousing other feelings through association, expresses one of these elements and is then transferred to mean them all or another element.

We say 'I did not see his face' to mean 'I did not see the man'. The part that attracts our attention more is his face, so the word is suitable for arousing the thought of the whole person. We say 'I will draw steel' to mean 'I will draw my sword', that is, the material is used for the whole instrument (material and form). 'The whole earth exulted' means the inhabitants of the earth, the container for the contained. The same can be said about every case of metonymy.

1470. We must also note that change in meaning never ceases, precisely because association of thoughts and feelings never ends or stops. This explains changes in languages. Association unfolds in a continuous series which sometimes regroups and returns on itself. Both the human mind and its accompanying use of the signs makes continual progress in this way. Signs which sometimes change from common names to individual names, revert once more to common and even very common names. The same is true about transferred and proper names which are continually interchanging. For example, in the logical order, 'Adam' must have first meant a perceived tract of red earth and been applied to the individual object of the perception. Later it meant 'all red earth', which is the specific idea understood in the perception; it was now a common name. Next, it expressed the first created man because he is formed from red earth. The common name has once again become individual. It was then given to women as well as men, and thus took on the general meaning of 'that which is formed from red earth', but its use(272) remained tied to the more limited genus, human beings.

1471.14.So far we have seen how human beings in society were able to think what is common and invent words to indicate it.
But what is common is still not pure abstraction. This comes later, and we have great difficulty in understanding its origin. Elsewhere, I concluded that we were unable to think and name pure abstraction because nature provided no stimulus for us to do so. From here, I went on to deduce the divine origin of the abstract part of language.(273) Now, however, more mature reflection shows me that the demonstration is not irrefutable.

We have to distinguish the question of fact from that of simple possibility . Relative to fact, there is no doubt that the first human was taught to speak by God himself; God spoke first and, in doing so, communicated a part of language, as I shall show elsewhere. Relative to simple possibility, the case is different. I now think it possible that the human family, not an isolated individual, could with time come to think these abstractions and at the same time, by some complex action, indicate them vocally or through some other sign. I think I have found the stimulus which moves the human mind, the stimulus I had previously sought in vain.

This must certainly have taken place after the processes mentioned above; abstract names must have come after common names , as ancient languages clearly demonstrate. They had very few abstracts (perhaps of divine origin); in their place they frequently used common names , that is, qualified substantives . This characteristic is still found in the language used by Plato who however took abstraction much further when he entitled his dialogues 'On what is just', 'On what is beautiful', 'On what is holy', 'On what is good', rather than 'On Justice', 'On Beauty', 'On Holiness', 'On Goodness', etc.

1472. But how could the human family, simply with its own resources, arrive at pure abstracts, or at least at some abstracts? There must be something in real nature, some natural sign of the abstract, to which the abstract can be joined. Without this, the attention of the human mind cannot rest in abstracts nor draw them together. Let me explain what this is and how it was given to humanity.
We invent names to arouse in others' minds the concept of the thing we are indicating: a part is used for the whole, the container for the contained, etc. When the name given to the part or to the container is sufficient to arouse the concept of the whole or of the contained, no other name is needed. Granted the natural association of feelings, this is precisely what happens.

Granted moreover that corporeal entia have several parts, each of which can be perceived on its own, it is clear that each part can, without any difficulty, also be named on its own. Thus relative to the human person, in addition to the name 'man', other names were easily invented, like 'head', 'face', 'arm', 'hand', etc..

Each of these parts however has its own particular qualities and properties, perceived together with the part to which they belong. For example, one of the properties could be strength. This can be named in two ways: either with a neutral, common name, meaning 'that which is strong', or with the name of the part where it is most frequently seen and engages our interest, for example, the hand or arm, or horns. A name is of course applied in the easiest way, and surely it is easier to use 'hand', 'arm', 'horn', etc., to indicate strength than invent a new name, a neutral common name? The strong parts of the body had already been named, and it was clearly easier to use them with a metonymical meaning. The extension or transference of the meaning of a word already in use is, as a general rule, easier than the search for an entirely new one. But the names of these parts, which indicate objects of perception, were among the first to be invented and can therefore be understood as meaning 'strength'.

This is precisely what we find in ancient languages: 'the hand of the Lord'(274) or ' the arm of the Lord'(275) are continually used in Scripture to mean the strength of God; ' a horn to David' indicates the strength of David.(276) A sign is found to which the mind can attach an abstract concept, and then the name, as it gradually loses its first meaning, becomes ever more abstract until it results finally as an abstract name. 'Face' or 'visage', parts of the body which reflect human affections, are applied to God, and taken to mean his benevolence or even his anger.(277) Path is taken for his Providence, etc. In this way we can even arrive, in the formation of pure abstracts, at extreme abstraction.

Let me take more general abstractions as an example. First of all, in metonymy the sign is taken for the thing signified. This is very common and very natural. Suppose we are asked what something is and reply: 'A body, a light, an elephant'. Here the sign is taken for the thing signified. We simply use the word itself instead of a long rigmarole such as: 'It is the ens signified by "body" or "light" or "elephant", etc.' We should not be surprised therefore that word , verbum , (*), debir are used in Scripture and in Greek and Latin authors to mean any fact or event whatsoever, and even most generally 'thing', as we see in the lexicons. Moses says, ' Lest you forget the WORDS which your eyes have seen'.(278)

In the first book of Samuel(279) we read, ' I am about to do a WORD in Israel', a very frequently used form of speech in the holy books. 'Expression' or 'word' itself is taken to mean the most general abstract by which we can conceive an efficient and real ens . It was also applied to mean the second of the divine Persons.
Even ideal being can be indicated as representing something real by transferring 'image' to it or 'something seen', as ancient languages did.

1473. So the human mind, with the help of these kinds of sensible signs provided by nature and hence denominated, determines certain abstracts and names them according to these signs. Thus there is no longer any obstacle to impede the mind's progress, and its whole development is explained naturally.

Notes

(243) Note however that this psychological union is itself partly determined by the information given by the object as stimulus, with the result that a diversity of objects moves the soul to varying degrees of activity. In general the following principle, which I will discuss elsewhere, is valid: 'Certain complex objects whose elements are ordered to one another arouse a complex, multiple activity in the soul, resulting from several mutually ordered acts. But while the intrinsic order in the complex object is simultaneous, the order in the soul's activity unfolds in successive acts.'

(244) Anything physically necessary proceeds from the nature of any ens whatsoever, that is, from (*) (nature).

(245) This contemplation was considered by the Scholastics as an act of theoretical reason. But as an enjoyed, willed and loving act, it should be placed, I think, among the acts of practical reason. However, it is nearest to theoretical reason, which it reinforces. I think that bliss should be placed in this act of the practical reason which reinforces and completes the act of theoretical reason, not in a mere act of theoretical reason without the intervention of human will.

(246) AMS , 612-635.

(247) AMS , 416-494.

(248) NE , vol. 1, 134-210.

(249) Rinnovamento , bk. 2, cc. 31-33.

(250) NE , vol. 1, 138-155.

(251) He derives Rhine, Rhône, etc., from (*), to flow; Leine from (*), to melt, applied to snow; Ocker from aha , auue , eau , acqua , etc. — Hence lanum in Mediolanum probably means water, as if to say 'in the middle of the water', and the torrent Leno which flows through Rovereto also originates from (*). A great many words therefore can be reduced to the same origin.

(252) Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain , bk. 3, c. 3, §1. Although some of the etymologies given here by Leibniz can rightly be criticised, his reasoning is valid and could be enriched by numerous, indisputable examples.

(253) Rinnovamento , bk. 2, c. 38.

(254) Cf. St. Thomas, S.T. , I, q. 88, art. 4, ad 2.

(255) St. Thomas, S.T. , I, q. 88, art. 4.

(256) Book 2.

(257) NE, vol. 2, 692-748.

(258) Ex 20: 18 [Douai].

(259) Deut 4: 9 [Douai].

(260) Deut 4: 12.

(261) Deut 4: 9.

(262) Cf. Septem contra Thebas .

(263) Cf. Prometheus.

(264) Calmet says, '"see" is used here for "live", that is, a function of life considered as life itself' [Commentarius, vol. 1, pt. 1, Venice, 1774].

(265) Ex. 24: 11 [Douai].

(266) 3 Kings 4: 25 [Douai].

(267) Et dorsum eorum semper incurva (Ps 68: 24 [Douai]).

(268) Auferetur vox sponsi et vox sponsae (Jer 7: 34).

(269) Ex 23: 5; Lev 19; Deut 21-22: 2.

(270) Ex 23: 4.

(271) Lev 19: [14].

(272) The distinction between the use of a word and its nature , that is, the way in which it indicates things, must always be kept in mind.

(273) Teodicea , 100-115; NE, vol. 2, 514-527.

(274) 1 Samuel 5: 6 [Douai].

(275) Is 51: 9 [Douai].

(276) Ps 131: 17 [Douai].

(277) Ps 26: 8-9 [Douai]; Lev 20: 3, 5-6.

(278) Deut 4: 9.

(279) 1 Sam 3: 11.