Part Two

Development of the Human Soul

Introduction

731. The first part of Psychology, which deals with the essence of the soul, pertains to antiquity; the second, which deals with the development of the soul, is more accentuated today. To this extent, our modern age is a continuation of antiquity, just as the development of our faculties and the constant, ever more distinct growth of their powers (which under new forms add variety to the same humanity) is a continuation of the essence of the soul. Just as the soul's activity progresses naturally so in meditating upon ourselves, we first ask about the nature of the soul, and then about its modifications, that is, about its activities and how they are carried out. The history of philosophy shows this quite clearly.

There is, however, a very notable difference between the soul's progress in the spontaneous development of human life, and the progress of psychological knowledge during various ages of mankind's life. The soul, while attaining its final acts, never abandons itself; its ultimate acts are necessarily joined to the root which produces them. Philosophical considerations and attention are different. Often, philosophy departs from its first argument and finally, through natural limitation and weariness, forgets its original aim. Forgetfulness of this kind means decadence in philosophy, which first abandons the essence of things for which it searched so avidly and generously in the beginning, and then devotes its entire attention to what things do and produce. But such results, separated from their first, substantial cause, are nothing more than empty phenomena and inexplicable appearances.

This explains what at first looks impossible. Flourishing periods of profound philosophy are followed by totally superficial, material thought, deprived of life and without a spark of genius to warm it despite the heritage of truth to which it has succeeded. Noble, venturesome, sublime minds, enraptured by divine enthusiasm in their contemplation of truth, give way to philosophy which ignores its predecessors. This was the base, foolish but proud banner which the 18th century flaunted before our eyes.

Although many causes contributed to this deplorable state, the first and deepest, it seems to me, is found in the psychological cause on which the rest, as effects and second causes, depend. We are not dealing with lack of natural talent, which is given even-handedly by nature in every age — we only have to look at what has been achieved through great, social changes, or in natural sciences, arts and commerce to see how abundantly talent has been available. Rather, we need to look for an explanation of the mental progress which we mentioned. From generation to generation, humanity passes from one aspect of thought to another in an ordered series in which the first link is concerned with the nature of things while the others deal gradually with the operations and acts proper to different natures. The final links, which are very remote from the first, totally occupy our minds and distract our attention from previous links. Above all, we forget the first link from which all others have arisen. The result is a broken chain of scientific truths and a realisation that in some mysterious fashion human knowledge has become superficial and base. Because we do not see how this has happened, the final truths and conclusions, once detached from the unchanging principle, that is, from the nature and essence of things, have no value, no stability, no reason.

Lack of such a firm foundation in the philosophy of the last century is clear even from its own shameful, proud admission. Philosophers of the time gloried 'in not wanting to consider or discuss the essence of things'. Their presumptuous, overbearing modesty maintained that 'the essence of things is unknowable'. This maxim is the true principle and fount of all superficial knowledge.(1)

But, thanks be to God, this period of philosophical superficiality, of materialism and sensism has now passed, or is certainly about to pass. Everyone feels the need to repair the broken chain and ensure that all its links are firmly connected, from the last to the first. I have done what I could to aid this extremely useful and necessary work. This explains why I studied the ancient part of psychology first, and examined the essence of the soul, which is almost entirely forgotten in normal treatises, before dealing with the modern part, the development of the soul. However, I did try to take care that ancient philosophy was revived and restored in such a way that it would not offend modern tastes.

732. The advantage from the point of view of knowledge and its perfection will become apparent as we go on. For the moment I want to show readers the principal division of this second part of the philosophical investigations we have undertaken.

If we are to describe the development of the human soul accurately and expound it clearly, two equally broad and necessary questions have to be faced:

1. What acts, potencies, functions and habits are produced by the human soul?

2. What laws does the soul follow in its continual activity and operations?

733. The first question has to be considered analytically because it aims at breaking up (if I may use the word) the essence of the soul into all the various activities of which it is capable. The second has to be considered synthetically because it aims at uniting under certain universal laws the different ways in which the soul acts and continually expands. The second question aims at reducing the infinite multitude of the soul's acts to the simplicity of the norms prescribed by nature. The soul's acts never deviate from these norms.

It is clear from this that all the material we have at hand is distributed of itself into two sections. The first, beginning from the essence of the soul, moves on to its extraordinarily various operations; the second moves from the operations, which are eventually drawn back to the unity of the essence from which they emerged and in which they finally come to rest.

734. Let us begin our first investigation into the activities of the human soul. The intention is not simply to list these activities historically, but in addition to deduce them and make them originate from the essence of the subject to which they belong. Our work, therefore, is divided into two questions: 1. How are these different activities contained in the essence of the soul? and 2. What are these activities, and how can they be numbered and classified?

Notes

(1) Teodicea , 138.