Chapter 7

Proofs of the fundamental feeling

96. Having already shown that this feeling indubitably exists,(50) I simply wanted to direct the reader to those demonstrations, but I now find that I have at hand a note written in 1821, when I outlined some reasons suitable for proving the existence of this feeling. I think it useful to put this before the eyes of the reader, changing the word 'consciousness', which I used improperly, to 'feeling'.

97. A fundamental feeling exists in human beings.

First proof - In my present state, I find I have a great number of sensations, including those which have their source in the body, and the memory of previous sensations. Moreover, I have many cognitions and think many thoughts. But I find that all my sensations, present and past, and all my thoughts are distinct from one another. In fact, if two sensations or two thoughts were not distinguished from one another in some way, they would not be two, but one. On the other hand, I see that I am always the same. It is I myself who think, perceive and do all these things. If it were not I, the same myself, who carries them out, I could not compare two sensations or two thoughts and come to know their diversity. This myself, therefore, is not the sensations and the thoughts. These differ; myself, on the other hand, is one. Myself is the subject who possesses the sensations and the thoughts. Myself considered in its own proper nature, is independent of sensations and thoughts which are accidental and vary continually, without however being able to make myself vary.

If I now begin to remove mentally some particular thought or sensation, I soon realise that I am not destroying myself; I feel that myself remains. If, therefore, myself remains identical when I take away from it any particular sensation and thought, it is clear that even if I were to remove all accidental sensations and thoughts one by one, I would not have taken away myself, the essence of which suffers in no way from being deprived of its accidental sensations and thoughts. Myself remains, even when deprived of all modifications. In this way, I come to form for myself the idea of the feeling which I express by the word myself, pure and simple.

98. Second proof - Words, which offer a faithful portrayal of ideas, confirm this. In fact, when I want to express the act of feeling, I say: 'I (MYSELF) FEEL'. Let us cancel the FEEL. Have I cancelled myself along with the feeling? Certainly not. But what if I cancel I (myself), and am left with FEEL alone? In this case, either I suppose myself in FEEL or, if I want to prescind absolutely from myself, FEEL has no meaning. In other words, the feeling expressed in the word myself exists independently of any particular sensation; on the other hand, the particular sensation, if it is to exist, needs the fundamental feeling in the same way that an accident cannot exist without substance, nor what is made without a maker - although there can be both substance without accident and maker without what he produces.

99. Third proof - Again, all my sensations only produce states or modes of existence of my soul which feels the given mode of its being provided by some particular sensation. But how could it feel its modes of being if it did not feel itself essentially? What does 'feeling one's mode of being' or 'one's existing' mean except feeling the relationship of a given modification with oneself? If the soul is to feel this relationship, it has to feel itself because that modification is referred precisely to itself. If the soul were not to feel itself prior to sensation, sensation would be nothing for the soul. In such a case, sensation would be an action on a being that does not feel itself and cannot, therefore, feel anything else.

100. Fourth proof - We could also reason as follows: either this action is done in the soul or outside the soul. If outside, the soul feels nothing; if in the soul, the soul is an ens which either feels itself or does not. In the first case, the fundamental feeling is present; in the second, even the possibility of sensation vanishes. If the soul does not feel itself, how can it feel that which is in it? It would be like a person denying that he sees a table, but affirming that he sees its shape or its colour. The modification of what is sensible is sensible, but the modification of what is not sensible, is not sensible.

101. Fifth proof - Again, the argument can be expounded as follows: why does the soul feel the various modes of its existence produced by sensations? Doubtless, because it has the faculty of feeling the modes of its own existence. But isn't the first feeling, anterior to every acquired modification, a mode of existence? If it is, why remove it from the faculty to which all other modes are subject? Until we find some sufficient reason for the contrary, we must say that an ens which feels the modes of its own existence must also feel its first mode, which precedes all other particular changes.

102. Sixth proof - How does it come about that the soul, given that it is not felt through itself, can then come to feel itself by means of the modifications it receives? I grant that such modifications can move the soul to reflect on its own feelings, and compare its various states. It thus moves from its natural quiet to perceive its own feeling and come to a more distinct and satisfying idea of itself. But here we are talking about simple feeling, not of comparison between several feelings. I maintain, therefore, that actions carried out on the soul could never, however strong they were, bring the soul to feel itself if it did not already feel itself by nature from the very beginning. In fact, these acquired sensations may be considered either before they have modified the soul or in the act of modifying it. Before they enter the soul they are still not sensations; in the act of acting on the soul neither the agents nor their operations can give the soul feeling because they themselves do not possess it and, even if they did, could not communicate it (feeling is incommunicable). On the contrary, it is the soul which makes sensations of the impulses it receives from agents different from itself. The soul, therefore, possesses feeling before the impulses were given to it, and independently of the impulses. It does not receive feeling from them, but gives it to them.

103. Seventh proof - No one denies that the soul at its origin and through its nature has the faculty of feeling. Not all will grant, however, that it also possesses the act of feeling. They say that the act is one thing, the faculty another. It is, of course, true that a particular act is very different from the faculty that produces all the acts. But what we need here is a clear idea of 'faculty'. This is how I understand it.

Certain conditions are necessary if a faculty is to operate. Given these conditions, the faculty operates, that is, it becomes a particular act (a faculty, in so far as it is act, ceases to be a faculty). Thus the faculty of sight needs light, that of hearing needs undulations from aeriform fluid, that of taste some tasty substance, and so on. Given these conditions, any faculty whatsoever activates itself. I also note that such action depends upon the faculty as a true efficient cause; other conditions influence the actions only as occasions, stimuli and so on. For example, although the balcony window must be open if the sun is to illuminate a room, it is not the balcony window but the rays of the sun which illuminate the room.

There is a great difference, therefore, between the merely necessary condition and the cause. Equally, although a movement of air is necessary for me to hear some sound, it is my organ, my faculty of hearing, that hears, not the air. Let us grant, therefore, that the occasion of sensation is altogether different from the cause, and that this cause is the subject or faculty which feels. If the cause of feeling is the faculty, and this operates necessarily, granted certain conditions, the faculty carries out its act in virtue of its own activity, not in virtue of external things. It must, therefore, of itself always be in a certain act. If it did not possess a first act of its own, there would be no way of understanding how it could pass from potency to act. There would be no sufficient reason for such a passage. As we said, no action of the body on the soul has power to draw the soul to act; the body can only offer an occasion for the soul's activity. The correct idea of faculty, therefore, is that which makes it consist in a universal act preceding all particular acts. This universal act is then particularised and specified when some individual matter is provided to which the faculty can apply and restrict its activity. Thus, different objects placed successively under an enormous mass of iron are crushed one by one, not because the mass begins to be activated each time, but because it operates, that is, weighs heavily, even if it is not crushing any particular object. If, therefore, the universal faculty of feeling present in the soul is already in act independently of external, particular impulses, the soul feels itself. This proposition is equivalent to saying that, after analysing the ideas we have of the soul, we declare it to be a sentient ens. Everyone grants us this.(51)

Notes

(50) NE, vol. 2, 692-721.

(51) Aristotle's definition of the soul, 'The soul is that by which first we live and feel and understand', (De Anima, bk. 2, c. 1) shows that human beings, as soon as they are animated, possess the act of life, of feeling and of intelligence precisely because they have in themselves that with which they 'first live and feel and understand'. In fact, if the soul is that with which one feels, that with which one feels is not present as long as one feels nothing. But the soul is always in human beings because it is the substantial form of its body, as we shall see. Hence, there must always be some feeling present. The same must be said about the understanding.
One can argue in the same way from Aristotle's other definition, 'Soul is the first substantial act of a physical, organic body; it is the power of that which has life' (De Anima, bk. 2, c. 1 and 2). And this is true whatever the philosopher's state of mind when he wrote these words.