Chapter 5

The identity of the soul in its different modifications

140. I feel in various ways, I think different thoughts, I undergo various experiences, I rejoice, I meditate, I work; it is always myself, the same 'I' who does all these things. On one hand, the feeling that lies within myself is identical; on the other, it changes continually. This would seem a contradiction, unless two feelings, one unchangeable, the other changeable, lie within myself. But in this case, how can the unchangeable feeling feel the changes of the other feeling without receiving them in itself? If, however, it does receive them, it is no longer unchangeable because they become its different sensations, modifications of itself. That is, if the various sensations have to fall within one single principle (otherwise there will be nothing to feel them, and feel them as successive and variable), it is useless to recur to two feelings, one of which changes, one of which does not. The same feeling which never changes must be that which feels changes. We return, therefore, to a single feeling.

But how? Are we to say that this single feeling is in part always the same, in part unequal? If so, we run into the same difficulty, and can ask whether the part that is always equal receives the various sensations which arise in the changeable part. If so, the same argument used in the hypothesis of the two feelings can be repeated: the unchangeable part becomes changeable as soon as it admits in itself the various sensations of the other part which it then feels. As a result it affirms them, and is modified when feeling and affirming them. It would seem that no unchangeable part remains in the feeling of myself. But in that case, how is it identical at different times and places? How is it subject to infinite sensations and infinite different thoughts?

141. The careful reader will be aware that this problem, one of the most difficult in psychology, has received wholly insufficient attention from philosophers. But if our principle is true - a grave difficulty in any science conceals a precious secret in nature; the secret once revealed allows for great progress in science - the mystery of identity which we have proposed is altogether worthy of our meditation.

142. Our consideration has to begin from what is evident. It is not right that we should abandon what is certain when we meet some apparently insoluble difficulty. But my own identity is evident; I am certain that in these different times and places it is always I who undergo experiences and carry out various things. This identity is found in my own feeling, in that part of it which I call myselfness. We said, however, that this feeling is perceived, not demonstrated, and does not permit of error. We have already established that consciousness of ourselves is the supreme, infallible criterion of psychology. Even if we do not understand, therefore, how the identical feeling can receive in itself various modifications without ceasing to be identical, its identity remains true. Let us see if we can find the way through the maze presented by this problem.

143. Right from the beginning, we note that when we say 'I experience and have experienced various sensations, I have carried out various actions', we always exercise the same form of intellective operation except for change in the term. This operation is called affirmation. I, that is, myself, affirm that at one moment I feel in one way, at another moment in another way; sometimes I am passive, I undergo something; sometimes I am acting; sometimes I operate in one way, sometimes in another. But I always affirm. Hence, if the operation is always identical in form but variable in its term, we have to conclude that there is a kind of identity which can be present along with a kind of variety, and that the operation carried out by myself in affirming my own feelings is one thing, while the affirmed sensations, the term of such an operation, is another.(72)

Myself who affirms is, therefore, different from the affirmed feelings. These are the object in which the operation of the affirming self terminates, but they are not myself who affirms. Myself in so far as it is an affirming activity can certainly remain unmodified even when the feelings it affirms change; these feelings are different from that activity.
But how can myself affirm these feelings if it is not affected by them? And if it is affected, how can it remain unchanged, unmodified? I answer: myself is certainly affected by the feelings it affirms, but our solution consists in separating myself as affirming from every other activity or possibility that can fall within myself. The fact that myself is affected constantly by new feelings does not cause myself, in so far as it affirms, to carry out some constantly changing operation. Myself as affirming is an activity that does not change whatever the feelings affirmed; myself as affirming is not modified by these feelings but remains its affirming self. In fact, it is necessary for myself to be affected by various feelings if its consistently even activity of affirmation is to repeat its acts. Myself, therefore, as affirming activity is the same for any of the many, varied feelings aroused in it.

Consequently, our observation tells us that feelings as objects of affirmation have no power to change the affirming activity. This remains what it is, although the feelings within it change.

144. The affirming activity rises from the depths of myself to stand over the feelings which take place in myself. This activity affirms the feelings, although the feelings can cause no change in it because the affirming activity is different from its objects. However, the complete explanation of the identity of myself requires further explanation, principally about the way in which the identical myself can be the principle of different activities, that is, of the activity of feeling and of affirming. Either the different activities have to be reduced to one, or myself has to be split in two. In fact, myself as affirming is the affirming activity; myself as feeling is the sentient activity. If, therefore, there are two activities totally different from one another, we have to say that myself is not one, but two; one affirming and the other sentient. In this case, we return to the first difficulty, which renders affirmation impossible.

145. I shall first show that the unicity and identity of a subject is not put in jeopardy by the fact that feeling and intellection are each composed of two elements (principle and term). I shall do this by recapitulating my entire reasoning in a series of lemmata which will gradually lead to the demonstration of the general theory that the multiplicity of feelings and operations pertaining to myself does not endanger the unicity and identity of myself. The need for careful distinctions in such a subtle argument is accentuated by the necessity of deriving many concepts from the depth of ontology, which I still have to publish. This means that often I cannot simply point to things already demonstrated, but have to investigate them with the reader.

Lemma 1

146. Two opposite elements are distinguished in every feeling: that which feels and that which is felt. This was demonstrated in Anthropology(73) by analysing feeling.

Lemma 2

147. Every feeling is one and simple. This means that what feels and what is felt, which are distinguished in the feeling, do not constitute two feelings, but a single, individual feeling. I also showed in Anthropology(74) (and it is self-evident) that a sentient principle does not exist without something felt, nor that which is felt without something that feels. These two conditions, therefore, give rise to a single feeling.

148. COROLLARY 1 - That which feels and that which is felt are, therefore, mutually dependent conditions. The law of synthesism is verified in them because, given both, one is distinguished from the other conceptually; given only one, it neither subsists nor endures conceptually.

149. COROLLARY 2 - It is clear that, if one element does not subsist without the other, and the concept of one cannot be had without the concept of the other to which it is related, both must constitute a single feeling and be found in an individual feeling. That feeling is precisely their union in act. The law of synthesism which binds the felt with the sentient is a new, speculative proof of the simplicity and unicity of the feeling that results from the bond.

150. COROLLARY 3 - We can deduce two general propositions from this fact of feeling: 1. 'it is not absurd that there are even in nature individuals which result from several different elements distinct in concept, and do so without loss of their simplicity and unicity as a result of the multiplicity of the elements'; 2. 'together the elements form an individual only when they do not exist outside the individual, and the individual results from the act of their union.'

Lemma 3

151. In every intellection we have to distinguish two opposite elements: that which understands and that which is understood. This proposition was also demonstrated by analysis in Anthropology.(75) Similar corollaries to those drawn in the preceding lemmata can be posited here.

Lemma 4

152. In the order of feeling, the agent is that which feels; the term of this action is that which is felt.

EXPLANATION - I have pointed out many times that to feel is to undergo some experience. How then can I say that in the order of feeling the agent is that which feels? - We have to pay great attention to the clause 'in the order of feeling'. Activity and passivity often intercept and intertwine in the same ens.(76) As a result, several passive and active elements are distinguished in the ens. These elements alternate and mingle according to the various aspects under which they are considered; they pertain to the intrinsic order of the ens. There is no doubt, therefore, that the principle which feels is passive relative to what is felt, in so far as what is felt actuates the principle to feel in a specific way. At the same time, it is also certain that the principle alone feels; that which is felt does not feel. This explains why I said that 'in the order of feeling' that which feels is active. That which is felt, in so far as it is felt, feels nothing. Indeed it is opposed to the act of feeling because it is the term in which that act comes to rest.

153. COMMENT 1. - Hence that which feels is said to be the principle of feeling, that is, its active part; that which is felt is said to be the term, that is, the part which in the order of feeling is not active, but equally cannot be called passive.(77) In fact, that which is felt, as felt, has no sensitive activity, nor does it experience anything from that which feels.

154. COMMENT 2. - The principle of feeling is also normally called subject or subjectum.(78)

Lemma 5

155. In the order of understanding, the agent is that which understands; that which is understood is the term of the agent's action.

156. COMMENT 1. - Hence, that which understands is called the principle of understanding (cf. 153).

157. COMMENT 2. - The term of understanding is not totally passive. It is simply not active in the order of understanding because it is not that which understands. Nevertheless, in a superior order it is active in its own way because it is that which makes the intelligent being understand.

158. COMMENT 3. - The way in which the term of understanding makes that which understands understand is not such that it changes that which understands. It does not act like a body which collides with some other yielding body and changes its shape (as though that which understands were prior to that which makes it understand). We are dealing here with a creative action to which nothing corresponds on the other side of the relationship. Again, we see, by carefully observing what happens, that what is understood is in what understands but preserves its own essence distinct from that which understands. Consequently its mode of acting can be called self-communication to which there is no corresponding passivity, but a concept of receptivity and first potency.

159. COMMENT 4. - The principle of understanding is also called subject or subjectum.

Conclusion

160. If that which is felt does not act in any way in the order of feeling, and that which is understood does nothing in the order of understanding; if, moreover, the agent alone is the principle which feels and understands, and is alone called subject, it is clear that the duality (principle and term) found in feeling does not detract from the simplicity and unicity of the feeling and understanding subject.

161. I will now demonstrate a second thesis: the feeling or intelligent subject remains the same whatever change takes place in their terms. The terms in question are first, that which is felt (term of the feeling subject) and second, that which is understood (term of the intelligent subject).

The following difficulty requires the demonstration of this thesis. Although it appears clear from what has been said that what is felt and what is understood are outside the feeling and intelligent nature which constitutes the subject, and by adhering to the subject neither multiply it nor remove its unicity, it is also true that they are conditions determining its activity. As a result, it seems that changes in these conditions must cause the sentient or intelligent principle to undergo some modification. In fact, feeling in one way or feeling in another, or understanding one thing or another to varying degrees, are accidents that change the action of feeling or the action of understanding.

162. First, we have to clarify the question by determining its various parts. The following observations enable us to do this. First, it is certain that, given real individuals, they can conserve their identity despite the things which change in them.

163. To see how this is possible, we have to establish that not everything found in an individual names the individual and constitutes it as that individual, that subject. This is clear from the kind of analysis we have carried out on feeling and intellection which shows that what we call 'sentient subject' is not everything found in the feeling, but only the active principle of feeling; what we call 'intelligent subject' is not everything found in intellection, but only the active principle of understanding. This is sufficient for us to recognise that the solution of the thesis with which we are engaged has to depend upon an accurate determination of that which must remain unchangeable in a given subject, if the subject is to preserve its identity.

164. In dealing with the sentient subject and the intelligent subject, we have found that the immutability we are seeking cannot and must not be sought except in the principle of immutability. But granted changes in that which is felt or understood, it cannot be denied that the action of the sentient principle and the intelligent principle changes. In other words, this action is borne to other terms where its activity either increases or diminishes. We should note, however, that the action itself must be carefully distinguished from the principle of the action, and that there is nothing contradictory in affirming identity and lack of change in the principle, together with change in the action.

165. It will be objected that the principle itself is subject to change if it acts differently. - But this shows that the distinction I made between principle of action and its action has not been thoroughly understood. The principle is united to the action, but is not the action; if the principle were the action, it would cease to be its principle. The word 'principle' indicates a first, simple and immutable point; anything added to this is no longer principle. It is true that the principle cannot be separated from its action, but it can and must be really distinguished from it. Here again we come face to face with the law of synthesism through which two things are inseparably united without being confused. The principle, therefore, is a simple point logically anterior to the action, which can be compared to a line proceeding from its point. In such a case, it is not absurd to imagine several different actions proceeding from the same point, just as it is not absurd for several lines to begin from the same point without any change in the point.

166. The principle of action can and must be separated by our thought from the action. We must acknowledge the immutability of the former and the mutability of the latter
. But if action arises through power of the principle, we have to say that all actions proceeding from a principle are contained in the power possessed by the principle. - This is certainly true, and is attested by the consent of mankind which drew from this kind of observation the concept of power, potency and first act distinct from second acts, that is, actions flowing from the first act. In the first principle, therefore, we find a certain activity from which, under given conditions, actions arise. This activity, potency, virtuality or first act (as it would be better called) always remains the same; it is unique, simple, anterior to all actions. It is called 'substance' by all mankind (a name which excludes all actions) and 'substantial subject'. Everyone agrees about separating the principle of actions from the actions themselves; everyone agrees about the importance of speaking of the principle separated from the actions.

167. This is also the way in which arose the common distinction between substance and accidents.

'Substance is that which the mind conceives in a being without the mind's having to make use of anything else to form a first concept of the being.' It is clear that accidents cannot be conceived on their own; we have to fall back on the substance through which they subsist. In the same way, second actions cannot be conceived on their own. The mind, in order to have some concept of them, must fall back on the principle which produced them. Second actions cannot stand without their causal principle. When I have reached the first principle of actions in every given order of activity, I can go no further; I must stop. This first principle is conceived by the mind, therefore, without its having to ascend to some ulterior principle within the being under consideration. Here the mind comes to a halt and declares the principle to exist in se.(79)

168. Substance is also defined as: 'The act by which the specific essence subsists' (cf. 52). But in any subject whatsoever, the first principle of actions is precisely that first act in which all the actions subsist. Hence the first principle of feeling and the first principle of understanding are both substances, if separated from one another.

169. Because the first act of a being is that which constitutes its substance, and second acts are normally accidental, we usually add the concept of immutability and permanence to the concept of substance in relationship to its actions; immutability and transitoriness are normally attributed to the actions.

170. Another question arises here: 'What determines a first act (a substance) to have the power of extending itself to one, certain determined group of second actions rather than another?' Our reply about the possibility of these groups has to be found in the intrinsic order of being. This order excludes the possibility that certain actions may be found virtually comprised in a single potency, but allows others to be associated and fused in one potency.(80) The real subsistence of such substances depends solely, however, on the will of the Creator who draws to the act of subsistence some substances rather than others from amongst those which do not involve contradiction.

171. One other observation must be made. All the activity of the sentient principle is determined by that which is felt, and all the activity of the intelligent principle by that which is understood. This results from the analysis we have already made of the sentient and intelligent principle. As we saw, that which feels does so only in so far as something felt is given to it, and that which understands does so only in so far as something understood is given to it. If, therefore, that which is felt determines the activity of that which feels, and that which is understood the activity of that which understands, it follows necessarily that what feels must, in order to remain identical, have inherent to itself from the beginning of its existence, something felt in which all future sensations are virtually contained. Equally, if that which is understood determines the sphere of activity of that which understands, the latter cannot remain identical in its successive acts of understanding unless it has inherent to itself, from the first moment of its existence, something understood in which are virtually comprehended all the objects which can afterwards be represented to its understanding.

172. If we have a thorough grasp of this observation, we shall find in it a new and very effective demonstration of my theory about the fundamental feeling (cf. 96-104) and about universal being naturally intuited by the human soul. Only in this theory do we find verification of the fact that we, as sentient beings, feel virtually from the first instance everything that we later come to feel distinctly. Corporeal sensations are in fact simply modes of the fundamental feeling itself.(81) Again, it is only in this theory that we, as intelligent, understand virtually everything that we later come to understand distinctly. The intelligible entity of all things is reduced to the intuition of being in general.

173. If, then, we take as proven the simplicity and identity of the feeling and intelligent principle in the various sense-experiences of the former and the various intellections of the latter, the truth of our system is also proved. If instead we start from our system, that is, if we admit the truth of the fundamental feeling and of the intuition of being, the most subtle difficulties about the simplicity and identity of the sentient principle are solved; its simplicity and identity are a necessary consequence. The wise reader should pause here to consider the harmony of truth. The identity of the sentient and intelligent principle (which are not doubted by anybody) is a truth apparently very distinct from the truth of the existence of the fundamental feeling and of the intuition of being. Nevertheless, these truths agree and harmonise admirably, they sustain one another, and become proofs of each other because each contains the other deep within itself.

174. A final difficulty remains, which can easily be solved after what has been said about the other problems. How can the sentient principle and the intelligent principle be one principle in human beings? To answer this we have to return to our teaching about substance.

175. We said that substance is the first operative principle of an ens from which flow its actions and passions, and consequently its different states. These actions and passions and different states are contained in this principle virtually, that is, in the power, activity or potency which is their efficient cause. We also said that we can conceive different groups of these actions, passions and states, although it is not possible a priori to demonstrate that every group is possible, that is, reducible to a first act, first power, first substantial principle.

176. Determining a priori which of these groups can be included virtually in a first substantial principle would require nothing less than total knowledge of the intrinsic order of being. But the intrinsic order of being is not known to us directly; it is brought together gradually from observation and experience. Only when observation or experience shows us the existence of a group of activities united in a single substantial principle are we authorised to conclude that such a substantial principle is possible. Ab esse ad posse datur consecutio [From what actually is we can conclude to what is possible].

177. Internal observation witnesses that at one and the same time each of us is a single, sentient and intelligent principle. Every human being can say to himself: 'Myself who feels am the same myself who understands. If I were not the same, I could not know that I feel nor that I reason about my sensations.'
On the other hand, there is no repugnance in a sensitive activity having the same principle as an intellective activity, if we consider that several actions can begin from the same principle, as we said, just as several lines can begin from the same point.

178. However, I have to admit that one extremely serious objection still remains. I said that constituting a sentient principle necessarily requires our mental conception of a primal felt thing which virtually comprises all the particular actions of feeling that we are later able to carry out. In human beings, this primal, fundamental felt thing is one's own body, sensible in space. We also said that constituting an intelligent principle necessarily requires our mental conception of a primal understood thing which virtually comprises all that we later understand. In human beings, this primal, understood thing is being in general.
Now if the sentient principle is constituted by what is felt bodily, and the intelligent principle by intelligible being, we have to say either that the extended bodily element and intelligible being are identical or that they constitute two different principles, never one.

179. Answering this extremely serious objection means noting that there is an entity in every thing that is felt because every act of any kind is an entity. But the felt entity certainly lacks intelligible light or knowability. In fact, the phrase felt entity does not include understood entity. Saying felt rather than understood is the same as excluding knowability from feeling. On the other hand, that which understands has for its object an understood entity because the understanding principle simply understands, and everything that it understands is necessarily entity. The term of the sentient principle and the term of the intelligent principle are, therefore, equally entity. Some identification is present in their terms.

180. But how are they distinguished? -

They are distinguished by the different way in which the same entity adheres to the same principle. Entity is communicated to the sentient principle in entity's mode as felt. This is what I also call reality and activity. But entity is communicated to the intelligent principle in entity's mode as understood. This is what I also call ideality, intelligibility, knowability, light, and so on.

Granted this, it is clear that the sentient principle and the intelligent principle can co-penetrate to the extent of forming one and the same principle of operation. The same term is present in both principles, although it terminates in one of them by adhering to it in one mode and communicating itself in one of its forms, and in the other by adhering to it in another way and communicating itself in another of its forms. Two principles are present, therefore, if we consider the form in which entity is communicated; but only one if we consider entity itself which is communicated irrespective of its forms. We can say that two principles are present provided we recognise that in us they are not two first principles, but that above them there is a prior, single principle which holds them subordinated and joined to itself. This first principle has reference to entity and not to the forms of entity. It is the principle of synthesis in both the theoretical order (by manifesting itself in its characteristic as reason) and the practical order (by manifesting itself in its characteristic as will). This superior intellective principle is, as superior, the point from which the two activities, sensitive and intellective, spring. It is called the rational principle.

Notes

(72) Note that the expression 'affirmed sensations' also includes 'the operations of the spirit'. As we said (cf. 136-137), these also are sensible. Only as such, that is, as feelings, can they be objects of affirmation. Nothing that takes place within us can be affirmed unless it is felt in some way. Cf. Teodicea, 153.

(73) AMS, 230-322.

(74) Ibid.

(75) 505-509. - Duality of thought was clearly indicated in the last century by Abraham Kaan Boerhaave, a philosopher and medical doctor, in a book entitled: Impetum faciens dictum Hippocrati per corpus consentiens philologice et physiologice illustratum, etc. (Lyons, 1745). It deserves to be read. He says: 'Mind is said to be that which thinks. This is the first proposition that mortals know about the mind. Does this mean that thinking is the mind itself?' Here we recognise the Cartesian school which acknowledges that an act of thought is necessary for the mind to exist. He continues shortly after: 'This thought contains two things, namely THAT WHICH THINKS and THAT WHICH IS THOUGHT' (9-10). But the imperfection of Descartes' theory soon becomes apparent. After having said that the mind is 'thought itself' because it is the first property of the mind manifested to mortals, Boerhaave says that 'thought cannot be known or defined.' Here we find 1. a manifest contradiction between saying that thought is what is first known and saying that it is not known and cannot be defined; 2. that the door is opened to scepticism if the whole edifice of human thought is founded upon that which cannot be known and cannot be defined. - I say that thought or the mind knows and defines itself. It does not deceive itself in doing this because the truth of cognition is not a creation of its act of knowledge (which would make it subjective), but is given to it by the ens which it intuits, that is, by what is truly the first known.

(76) For an example of these different actions and passions whose conflict, so to speak, results in an ens, cf. NE, vol. 2, 1005-1019, where I show that the human individual results from actions and passions which take place between soul and body.

(77) I have shown that the saying 'There is no action without corresponding passion' is contrary to philosophical observation of different entia and contains a materialistic prejudice (Rinnovamento, bk. 3, c. 47).

(78) It would be desirable to note always the distinction I make in several places when using these two words. I take the first to indicate a principle which feels or acts when the principle is a substance, and the second to indicate any special principle which feels or acts when it is a simple faculty. The two words, which distinguish our two operative principles, are often useful for abbreviating and clarifying philosophical argument. Cf. The Philosophy of Right, vol. 1, The Essence of Right, 239.

(79) It may be objected that the first principle itself is not conceived except in relation to its actions. - This is true, but the mind can abstract from the actions; it is sufficient that it conceive them as virtually contained in the principle. We have here two questions: 'How does the mind come to form the concept?' and 'Does this formed concept stand on its own without need of another?'

(80) Cf. NE, vol. 2, 648.

(81) Cf. NE, vol. 2, 705-706.