Chapter 11

The finiteness and infinity of the human soul

235. From our knowledge that ideal being is not an internal, constitutive element of the nature of the soul, and that this nature is merely real, it is easy to conclude that the human soul is a finite ens. The infinite is found in man only by having recourse to ideal being which, as we said, is not part of man himself.

236. This truth is given to us directly by consciousness of ourselves. Each one knows that he is finite. When he says myself, he affirms a reality which excludes innumerable other realities of equal and different condition; he affirms something finite.

237. At the same time the human soul, as intellective, is united with an infinite being, which the idea is. From this point of view, it shares in a certain infinity. Ideal being, in relation- ship with the mind, does in fact resemble an infinite, evenly-illuminated space relative to the eye. Hence, although real things known by us are always finite because the real thing (the soul) which perceives them is finite, the means of knowing (the idea of being) real things perceived by sense is never exhausted or rendered inefficacious. It is always sufficient for knowledge of other ral things which may be given to us in sensitive perception, even indefinite perception, and in the case of infinite reality.(110) St. Thomas says:

238. An objection could arise here. - Ideal being is the form of the intellective soul; but form and matter are two constitutive elements of a nature; therefore ideal being is a true, constitutive element of the soul. But ideal being is infinite in its ideal condition. The human soul, therefore, is composed of finite and infinite. —

I reply by distinguishing the minor of this syllogism as follows. Forms are of two kinds, subjective and objective. Subjective forms pertain to the subject, which they constitute. Objective forms neither pertain to the subject nor constitute it, but draw the subject into act and can also be called, therefore, immediate causes of the form of the subject. Nevertheless, they are called forms with equal and perhaps greater propriety when they are considered as term of the act of intuition. Being in general, as the term of this act, is appropriated for the soul without ceasing to be universal in itself.(112) In fact, although it is true that being in general is intuited in exactly the same way by all intellects, it is not the term of one intellect in so far as it is precisely the term of another. In this sense, we can say that the truth possessed by the human being is created. What we mean is that the proposition, 'The truth of the intellect is created' is equivalent to the other proposition: 'Eternal truth has become the term of a created intellect.'(113)

239. Here we need to consider that every action terminating in an entity different from the action presupposes a kind of contact with that entity. At the point of contact, communication is present between the thing which touches and that which is touched. But in the case of intuition, that which is touched, ideal being, cannot be changed or altered, or mixed with anything else.(114) Communication, therefore, produces no variation in ideal being, but in the subject alone. The variation occurring in the subject consists in placing the subject in possession of intelligence, or light. But that which is possessed is not to be confused with the possessor whom it enriches. Thus, the person possessing gold is not gold. Ideal being, as light and form of the intuiting subject, does not suffer any change or restriction in itself.

240. It would not be out of place here to consider the following question: 'Is the intelligible communicated in a limited or unlimited manner to human nature? If the former, what does this limitation consist in?'

I reply briefly. The intelligible is eternal, necessary being in which essence and subsistence are not distinguished but form a single, extremely simple ens. Essence shines in the idea, it is the intelligible. If human beings were intellectually to behold the intelligible fully, they would see the Almighty whose essence is his very subsistence. However, the intelligible cannot reveal itself in all its fullness to any created being without transporting this being to a supernatural order where it sees the Creator. Indeed, the Almighty is above created nature, and the only truly supernatural ens. Direct communication with the divine subsistence is that which forms the supernatural condition of intelligent creatures.

241. But could some subjects, without being granted perception of the divine subsistence, see the intelligible in a more perfect way than it is seen by human beings? I cannot let this important question pass.
The intuition of being can be considered from the point of view of the intuiting subject and from that of the intuited object.

In the first case, the intuition can be or appear more or less perfect. It would seem that this perfection can vary in three ways. 1. According to the intensity of the act. Here, ideal being produces a deeper impression in the subject, reveals more light and is seen more distinctly. 2. According to greater facility for reflecting on the idea and intuition. This is properly speaking a perfection of the faculty of reflection, not of intuition, although human beings seem to add light to intuition when they render themselves more easily and perfectly conscious of it. However, the intensity of the faculty of intuition does assist reflection. 3. According to greater facility in applying the idea. This renders perception and reasoning more prompt and perfect. Here, too, perfection resides in the operations of reason, not in intuition, although the opposite seems the case. The preceding perfections of intuition and reflection contribute considerably to the perfection of reasoning. This, of course, depends to a great extent on the perfect organisation of the cerebro-spinal system. These differences should be discussed in a treatise on the differences in mental capacity.

242. The question still has to be answered from the point of view of the object itself. The question is: can a subject be given more of the intelligible to intuit than is given to human nature without, however, the subject's being granted perception of the divine subsistence? I reply that this is impossible, for the following reasons.
No subsistence, other than the divine subsistence, is per se intelligible. The intelligible is the essence of ens, and only the divine subsistence is identified with that essence.(115) Amongst subsistences it pertains to God alone, therefore, to be intelligible. Nothing can be added to ideal being that is per se intelligible unless there is some passage to the supernatural, divine order.

It may be objected that ideal being as intuited by us is totally indetermined and that it could contain many of its determinations without our having recourse to God to determine it. In fact, ideas of contingent entia are determinations of ideal being which could, therefore, be granted to the faculty of intuition in other minds in a more perfect (because more determined) way than in the human mind. -

This illusion arises through imperfect understanding of the origin of these determinations of ideal being, these special or generic ideas. They arise(116) through the relationship of real, subsistent entia with indetermined being in general. These entia are not properly speaking ideas, but relationships of subsistences or their vestiges with ideal being. The presupposition is that these subsistences are somehow known already. But contingent subsistences are not per se intelligible, and consequently add nothing to what is intelligible. Nothing is added through them relative to what is intelligible; they simply provide occasions for new acts by the intelligent subject. The increase in knowledge comes wholly from the side of matter, not form; from the side of the subject, not the object.

243. Intelligence, therefore, can be increased or reinforced without any increase in what is per se intelligible; intelligence increases every time a greater supply of subsistences or realities is furnished for it to perceive. Intelligences, restricted to the natural order, cannot differ therefore amongst themselves by reason of greater or lesser quantity on the part of the intelligible which is proposed to their faculty of intuition. They differ solely according to the greater or lesser quantity of perceived reality, or according to some reality of a differing nature. It is not the object itself of intuition which can increase, diminish or vary, but whatever falls within the sphere of feeling. This explains why I maintained that angelic nature differs from human nature according to the different, more suitable feeling with which it is endowed. The difference comes about not through different intuition, but through a different nature and a different quantity of things naturally perceived (Teodicea, 750-751).

244. - But isn't it possible to have ideas of contingent things without their first having to be perceived? Don't we ourselves have many ideas of which we have no perception? Can't things be known through their likenesses without our having experienced their action in ourselves? —

Drawing attention to what happens in human beings is excellent, but arbitrary use of our imagination is not recommended. We have to observe patiently what actually occurs. This is the only way to avoid error.

Now there is no doubt that the most accurate observation shows we have no positive idea of anything subsistent unless it is preceded by some perception to which we can refer it. Thus, a blind person has no positive idea of colours. The word 'colour' does not have the same meaning for him as for others. Indeed, he would never have invented the word if he had not heard it or perceived it from others. It is true that the idea of what a person has perceived in his feeling remains even when the perception has passed, but this occurs only because the perception never passes completely. We retain vestiges of it in our imagination which is a kind of interior perception, a reawakening of the external perception.(117) If the perception were to pass without leaving some trace or habit in the imagination, there would be no way in which to refer being to the feeling, in relationship to which the idea itself, as determined, consists. This is what happens in human beings. Let us see if something else could occur in some other being.

245. An intelligence, it is said, can know things by means of their likenesses. This is true, however, only in a certain sense, which needs careful definition. If a likeness is to be capable of making me know what it represents, I must compare the likeness and the thing itself. I have to become aware of how faithful and how different the likeness is to what it represents. Otherwise, I would not know that it is a likeness rather than the thing itself. But how can this comparison be made if I do not know the subsistent thing? A comparison can only be made through a comparison of terms. I cannot, therefore, know the subsistent thing by means of some likeness unless I already suppose that the subsistent thing is known to me. But it is known (if we are dealing with contingent things) not per se, but through perception. The likeness alone, without the perception to which it can be referred, is not sufficient to enable me know the subsistent thing.(118)

246. - But wouldn't it be possible, without previous perception, to know something indicated through its likeness provided some other being had revealed that this was its likeness?

I reply: 1. In this case, the thing would not be known through its likeness alone, but with the help of some revelation on the part of another being. The revelation itself presupposes some perception.

2. The likeness, if it were merely a vestige of the thing, would give us only a negative idea, that is, it would produce in us a persuasion of the thing's subsistence, but would not permit us to know its nature.

3. If it is a true likeness, it must be such that with it we perceive the nature of the thing. In this case, in so far as it is similar to the thing, its reality would have to be of the same nature as the thing. For example, a portrait enables me to know what a person looks like because in it I perceive the same colours and shape as those present in the person concerned. I do, therefore, perceive a reality which has the same characteristics. But because the portrait differs from the person in its lack of solid extension, flexibility in the flesh, and so on, I do not perceive the person: the likeness, to this extent, is no longer a likeness.

Note the question carefully: I asked if it were possible to have a positive idea of something without any perception of it, and I said 'No'. But this need for perception does not extend in any way to all equal or similar individuals. It is sufficient to perceive one of them to satisfy our condition and have a positive idea of all individuals equal to the one perceived. If we have perceived one individual, others are known through likeness or equality with that one. But I maintain that if we do not perceive one, we cannot know others because the first one, similar to them, is lacking. If, however, some perception is given us, we certainly have the likeness of other individuals perceivable in the same way. In this case, we know them through likeness without perceiving them.

It remains true that no reality is known without perception, and that there are no likenesses of real things without perception of their reality. Consequently, if we suppose that an intelligent subject is given likenesses capable of permitting knowledge of real things, we also suppose that he is given internal perceptions of real things. But the perceptions of real things, that is perceived feelings, however acquired or communicated, do not increase the intelligible, the object of intuition, if the things we are dealing with are contingent. The intelligible cannot be increased notwithstanding the determinations or concepts of contingent, finite things which may be added to it. It can, however, be increased in one single way - through the perception of God himself. As we said, the divine subsistence, alone amongst all subsistences, is per se intelligible. Different intelligences have to be distinguished, therefore, not through any diversity occurring in ideal being which informs them, but through the diversity found in real being which constitutes them and receives a different sphere of native or adventitious perceptions acquired by means of accidental acts.

This ends the second book of Psychology.

Notes

(110) Teodicea, 145, 151.

(111) S.T., I, q. 86, art. 2; and q. 89, art. 4, ad 1.

(112) In this way, we resolve the objection (to calling ideal being 'form') which springs from the principle: 'It is impossible for there to be one form for a number of different things' (cf. S.T., I, q. 76, art. 2).

(113) St. Thomas speaks of a created truth (S.T., I, q. 16, art. 7 and 8).

(114) Rinnovamento, 433-443.

(115) Rinnovamento, 433-443.

(116) Rinnovamento, 228-232.

(117) AMS, 350-354.

(118) NE, vol. 1, 104-109.