Chapter 3

The nature of the first perception by which the rational principle
constantly perceives its own animal-fundamental feeling
and thus unites itself to the body

267. We should not misunderstand the nature of this constant perception of the animal-fundamental feeling. Characteristics of this perception are:

1. By it the soul does not perceive the extrasubjective, anatomical body but the whole animal-fundamental feeling in itself, indivisible, continuous, harmonious, etc.

2. Consequently, the soul does not perceive the principle of feeling without its term because the principle cannot exist without its term.

3. Similarly, the soul does not perceive the subjective body (the term of the feeling) divided from its principle. This mental division of the term of animal feeling from its principle is carried out only later, through reflective analysis on the feeling. A felt body divided from its feeling principle cannot exist by itself. The primal, natural perception, which does not isolate the body from its principle, is insufficient to give us the pure notion of subjective body.

4. Much less does the soul perceive the parts of the body separate from the whole. On the contrary, it perceives the whole in its perfect simplicity and harmonious unity.

5. The soul perceives nothing extrasubjective, such as shapes, sizes, boundaries, etc.

6. We have no awareness of the perception in its initial state, because awareness arises from reflection on what happens in us. This perception is anterior to every reflection.

268. We must now investigate whether, in the fundamental perception, the soul enunciates an express affirmation.
The reader may think this is my opinion because I have consistently kept the concepts of affirmation and perception together. But I did this only for particular, transient perceptions to which an express assent of the spirit is always, or nearly always, united. Perception in general however is seen to have three degrees: 1st. apprehension, which is an implicit, habitual affirmation; 2nd. express or actual affirmation; 3rd. persuasion.

269. Persuasion can be implicit and habitual, or express and actual, depending upon whether it arises from apprehension or from implicit or express affirmation. These two degrees, affirmation and persuasion, rapidly follow one another and cannot exist without each other.

270. But could the first degree, apprehension or habitual affirmation, exist without actual affirmation? This is precisely what happens in the first perception through which the rational principle has a continuous union with the animal feeling.
Animal feeling, because it is one, and without distinguishable boundaries (the distinct boundaries of our body pertain to extrasubjective experience) is indistinguishable from other feelings, which do not yet exist. Moreover, it cannot attract attention because it is uniform, natural and, so far, the only thing perceived (the human being has not yet rationally perceived himself) (cf. 267). Again, the soul does not need to say anything to itself - it would not even know what to say. Nevertheless, despite all this, a kind of implicit, habitual assent, an indistinct affirmation of what comes later, is not excluded from apprehension.

271. It may seem more suitable to call simple apprehension rational apprehension rather than perception. If so, I would not disagree.