Chapter 15 - (Part 2)

529. There are certain questions about which common sense says nothing, because they do not present themselves to the minds of the majority of people. One example is the question of the animation of the first elements, which is discussed only in philosophical circles.

530. Indeed, although common sense divides bodies into animate and inanimate, it says nothing about the problem under discussion. It is speaking only about life as seen by our exterior senses, without any intention of discussing the other question: 'Can a latent life, some kind of sensitive principle, be united to certain bodies that lack animal organisation?'

531. In any case, the common distinction between animate and inanimate bodies remains solid. We must not change the common use of these words, except to give them a wider, truer meaning within the sphere of philosophy. An inanimate body can be defined as 'that which gives no signs of life due to lack of suitable organisation', or 'a body without organisation which, as such, is inanimate'. An animate body can be defined as 'that which gives signs of life', or 'a body with organisation which, as such, is animate'.(269) In this way, philosophical opinion is fully reconciled with common sense.

532. But what do observers of nature have to say? The history of natural sciences certainly shows that the more we observe and experience, the further the realm of life extends. The sensitivity granted by Haller to certain parts of the body was extended by physiologists to other parts indefinitely. The discovery of polyps, infusoria, the spontaneous movements evidently manifested by globules of blood, etc., and innumerable other discoveries confirm the presence of life in a limitless number of bodies which seem and are at first considered totally inanimate. Ehrenberg thought he recognised that different rocks, particularly the rotten-stone, were made out of animal shells. Mault believed he had discovered that dental tartar was virtually a composite of little animals.

Payen and Mirbel claim that plants are a mass of numerous, microscopic creatures. When presenting a volume on plant physiology to the Academy of Sciences at Paris in February 1844, Payen said:

533. The hypothesis of the animation of the first elements of bodies thus coincides with the hypothesis, admitted universally today by physiologists, that there is latent life which produces no stimulated, external phenomena if the conditions necessary for their production are lacking.

But why are some phenomena considered to manifest life, and others not?

The only answer is our own experience, the sole criterion for distinguishing the phenomena; the only rule we follow is what we observe in ourselves, and then use to judge other natural beings. For example, we note the sounds we make when we feel acute pain, and experience great pleasure. The quality of the sounds, or of others analogous to them, are a sign which makes us conclude that beings who in similar circumstances make similar noises, experience pain or pleasure. We look at our own organisation and note how our bodies are structured, how our sensitivity is joined to nervous filaments, how different parts of our bodies contract on occasion of feelings; we see the kind of phenomena that accompany feeling or its cessation in our bodies. We then infer that a similar feeling must be present in beings where the same or similar things occur. But this is always a relative yardstick. It is not certain proof that life cannot exist under other forms, life which, although certainly different from our own, is nevertheless life and feeling.

534. The hypothesis, when considered in all aspects, indicates three kinds of feeling:

1. A feeling whose sole term is extension. This would be attributed simply to the individual elements of bodies.

2. A stimulated feeling whose term is extension but combined with intestine movements. It is not immobile extension, like the elementary term. This kind of feeling requires multiple, contiguous elements and movement. It requires therefore some kind of composite, dependent at least upon aggregation, if not organisation.

3. A stimulated feeling in which the stimulation is maintained by reproducing itself with some variation on the same theme. This requires a true organism in which intestine movements can be perpetuated.

The three kinds of life therefore that we must carefully distinguish are:

1. The life of separate, individual, mutually independent elements.
2. The life of united elements, that is, aggregated but not organated.
3. Finally, life which manifests external phenomena of its own and requires full organisation.

Let us consider each separately.

535. If we imagined a single element of matter, extended and perfectly solid, as I think the first elements are, it would give no sign of life. Even if it could act on our senses, which is impossible owing to its smallness, it would not give us any sign of life nor provide itself with any movement nor receive any movement in itself. At the same time, however, its sentient principle would be simple, and the term of this principle would be the tiny space determined by the element. If we suppose the matter of the element to be uniformly dense throughout, the felt term would be homogeneous and uniform. On the other hand, if the density varied in the element's different strata or points, there would be difference of intensity [App., no. 8]. In this minute life the characteristic of continuity would be fully present.(270)

536. If to one animate element we add other animate elements, we can readily conceive new phenomena. Let us suppose that the elements are differently shaped. Held together by their own attraction or retention, the polyhedra they form will vary according to the shape of the elements. If we suppose that their shapes are regular, the polyhedra will be regular.

These regular polyhedra however will differ from each other not only in shape but also in density and consequently in specific weight. This will be clear if we bear in mind that the following two accidents depend on the different forms assumed by the first elements that unite:

1. The points of contact will vary in quantity, with the result that the closest union will be among elements that have larger surfaces touching.

2. The intervals inside the crystals will vary in size, so that the greater the empty space enclosed by the surfaces of each elementary crystal, the smaller the specific weight or attraction of each crystal.

537. If at first only two elements unite, their bination must result in molecules whose properties differ from the first elements. This difference will increase markedly with ternation, quaternation, etc, of the first elements.

538. If we suppose that the first elements, even when in contact, unite with a force less than the force which makes the matter of each element perfectly solid, we would immediately have new vital accidents. In these molecules the continuous felt element, to which corresponds a single sentient principle, is more extensive than in the first elements. If these molecules resulted from only two or three elements, perpetual, internal movement(271) could certainly never begin; there would be no vital movements. But if the two or three elements were moved by an external impetus without dividing, the adjacent surfaces would rub against each other, and in this case the uniform feeling diffused throughout the elements would necessarily receive stimulation. It would not be absurd therefore for a sensation to arise in the feeling, in the absence of all extrasubjective phenomena.

Moreover, granted that the two elements no longer had their centres of gravity in the closest possible proximity, due to violence from outside, it would not be absurd to imagine that they were impelled to re-establish the previous equilibrium of forces by the activity of the feeling which invests them.

539. The feeling diffused in the two elements is single, due to their continuity and, while repugnant to separation from them, tends to unite itself to them, keeping them united and in immediate contact at the greatest number of points possible. It does this through the activity of that organising function I call 'retention', which I will discuss later.

540. Here we would have the characteristic of stimulation, in addition to that of continuity. But the stimulation would only be momentary and accidental because it would lack a system of successive stimuli to keep the elements of the little group in continuous, regular and harmonious movement.

541. In the life of two or three, or certainly of a few elements united in a single molecule, we have 1. continuity, and 2. the possibility of stimulation, that is, two characteristics of life. But in this case, the stimulation, dependent on the external force which makes the elements slide and rub against each other without separating, would be momentary. It would arouse only a transient sensation, which could not be sustained by the spontaneous activity of the sensitive principle.

Hence the external phenomena of animal life are possible only on condition that living elements join together in a sufficient number. These elements would compose a machine of varying complexity and of such ingenuity that stimuli could be reproduced by the mutual action of the organs. In their turn the stimuli, perpetuating the movement, would arouse feeling. Feeling, once harmoniously stimulated, could maintain both the continuity of the parts and the unity of the organism; it would spontaneously assist the harmonious movement which would stimulate and maintain feeling in its very stimulation.

542. From these observations we conclude that organisation (which is itself a production and development of feeling) causes the varieties of natural beings and the different kinds of phenomena presented to our observation. Hence:

1. Composites of just a few elements can manifest only mechanical, physical and chemical forces. Their true cause is very probably the feeling inherent in the first elements which, through lack of suitable organisation, is unable to manifest itself in another way.

2. In composites of several elements, a certain regularity of organisation must begin to emerge. This is seen in minerals, and in similar aggregations visible principally in metals.

3. A more complex composite must result in plant organisation which of course lacks all organs similar to those with which human beings express pleasure, pain, instincts, etc. But their organisation contains a system of self-reproducing stimuli. All that is lacking are the external signs of feeling which human beings experience and express. If there were feeling in plants, we would be incapable of knowing its degree of unity, centralisation and stimulation.

4. With a more fitting organisation, the phenomenon of irritability or contradistention is manifested. This phenomenon, although incapable of revealing to us with certainty the existence of feeling, comes close to doing so both because of the similarity manifested by the movements of irritable, contradistensive bodies with spontaneous movements (which arise from feeling), and because the composition of these bodies resembles that of felt organs.

5. Finally, an even more complex and perfect organisation manifests extrasubjective phenomena, commonly called animal phenomena. Properly speaking, these phenomena confirm for us the presence of feeling, of the continuity of the term of feeling and of the unity of action of the feeling itself. Such unity is capable of dominating all movements, which derive from it their continuity and direction but not their principle. These movements reproduce the stimuli which re-arouse the feeling when it loses its state of excitation, and return it to its previous state.(272)

543. Moreover, the system under discussion indicates that not all the parts of an animal body are necessarily felt by the same individual, that is, form parts of the fundamental feeling itself. Some of these parts could have a feeling of their own which would, nevertheless, be necessary for constituting the extrasubjective machine where the arousal of the feeling must be reproduced or continually re-activated by stimuli which need not be term to the fundamental feeling of the animal.

544. The system also shows how some insensible parts of a body can become sensible, or viceversa, provided the feeling proper to them is communicated to and in continuity with the total feeling or, if separate from the whole feeling, at least co-operates with the organic unity.

545. Finally, the system shows why certain organs or parts of the human body seem to enjoy a life of their own, and are subject to death before others.(273)

546. Difficult questions now arise, full of those enigmas which accompany all natural investigations. Nature itself is an enigma, resulting from numerous enigmas.

How does the feeling proper to an element, a molecule, a rudiment, an organ have continuity and union with the fundamental feeling of other elements, molecules, rudiments, organs? Is the continuity of parts sufficient, as we have supposed? Is this continuity sufficient to make the lesser feeling lose its individuality? Does it perhaps individualise itself through the maximum stimulation effected at a point of the continuum where, consequently, the vital activity accumulates, that is, the intensity of the feeling which is the centre of all the harmonious movements? If there are various centres, are there many sentient individuals in the same continuum? And can each of the different movements which continue from these centres independently of each other be so harmonised that they do not break the continuum into many continua? Is this not the case with polyps, gemmiparous, fissiparous animals and entozoa? If so, does each of the sentient principles have the whole continuum for its felt element?

547. Granted spontaneous generation, we must admit that the elements, or certainly the molecules of which the new tiny animals are composed, are already animate. Otherwise, materialism is inevitable, for we would have to say that life and feeling are produced from brute matter, which is absurd. The term of feeling is in fact the opposite of its principle. If the extended term produced the principle, which is essentially simple, the effect would be unlike and contrary to the cause, a violation of the ontological principle 'that every cause must produce an effect similar to itself'.

548. In the second place, if the elements lacked feeling, they would have no existence of their own, but only extrasubjective existence, relative to another subject. They would thus be impossible, absurd beings, pure illusions. It is certainly true that 'possibility is indeed thinkability; what cannot be conceived cannot be' (in the principle of cognition).(274) But a being that is a mere relationship with another cannot be conceived; when a being has a relationship, there must be some thing in it which constitutes the term a quo of the relationship. But if the element did not feel, it would be nothing in itself and could not be the subject or the term a quo of the relationship. It could not be thought, and being unthinkable, would not be. It would simply be a false appearance.

549. Observation provides two facts: 1. generation happens much more easily in the microscopic world than in the world of large bodies, and 2. spontaneous generation takes place only in the tiniest animals. These facts are highly probable proof that life is joined to the first elements. If so, the two facts are immediately explained. If life is joined to the first elements, it is self-evident that, while they remain unorganised, they are free to combine in the way more suitable to their life instinct (I will discuss this law of formation in the second part), forming without any difficulty organated individual animals. On the other hand, bodies which are already composites cannot organate themselves into animal form because the organising elements cannot move freely within them.

550. Now, all generation, even that of larger animals, always takes place by means of humidity and heat. Fluids are therefore the first living things and organisers, precisely because their elements and molecules are mobile and, by organating themselves in different ways according to circumstances, bring animate composites into being.

551. A fifth proof of the animation of the elements is supplied by internal observation, which tells us that sensation extends in a continuum.(275) This fact is also proved by reasoning. If it were not true, we could not have any idea of the continuum.(276) But we do have the idea of the continuum. Therefore the extended felt must be continuous. Now, where something is felt, there is feeling; feeling and felt are two indivisible things.(277) That which is sentient is thus in all the assignable points of a felt body, and must consequently adhere to the first elements, that is, to the smallest continua of matter.

552. Whenever the argument permits, I shall give other proofs as confirmation of the life of the elements. Anyone who understands them thoroughly will see that the hypothesis ceases to be a hypothesis and becomes, it seems to me, another demonstrated truth.

553. It is not my intention however to solve these most intriguing questions. I think a philosopher has done enough by determining which hypotheses concerning these mysterious questions do not involve logical contradiction or contradict other metaphysical truths or the experimental data daily furnished more abundantly by the physical sciences.

Notes

(269) In my hypothesis, the life of the organism would be a life of stimulation; the life of a simple element would be simply a life of continuity. Common sense has never examined, nor does it know, whether a life of continuity exists. I will throw greater light on this later.

(270) Glisson, in his work De vita naturae quoted above, acknowledges that the cohesion of his sentient or (as he calls them) percipient elements results from their continuity: 'The elements, which perceive the utility they enjoy from their mutual union, love or desire their union. Consequently they strive to preserve the union by adhering together. This internal cohesion is simply movement, or movement which results from continuity, and is used by nature to preserve continuity. By the natural means of perception and desire, therefore, cohesion is first grounded IN CONTINUITY' (c. 34, n. 22). However, we must note that according to us it is sufficient for the elements to be continuous at some point of contact, which excludes the question of void and filled space.

(271) I say 'perpetual' because two or three elements placed in contact would draw as close together as possible through mutual attraction, even though their centres of gravity were not in maximum proximity. But their movement would cease as soon as they had found the position required by their mutual gravitation. I assume that the cause of the attraction or gravitation is, as I will explain later, the activity of the sentient principle.

(272) Chemistry, which has still much to do, supplies us with valuable facts in confirmation of these ideas. Minerals often result from only two kinds of elements; plants from at least three, but the animal body requires at least four kinds of chemical elements: oxygen, hydrogen, carbon and nitrogen. The last element is not necessary for plants. It is certain therefore that the phenomena of feeling are never presented to our external observation without a complex, multiple organisation.

(273)The ancients were aware of this partial life proper to some parts of the human body. Aretaeus describes the matrix as follows: 'It would perhaps not be incorrect to view the uterus, the female organ, which is situated in the middle of the female ilium, as an animal. It moves backwards and forwards in the direction of the ilea and resembles the xiphoid cartilage in its movements sideways, left and right, sometimes to the liver, sometimes to the intestines. We could say that the uterus, in the human being, is like one living animal inside another' (Delle cause e dei segni de'mali acuti, bk. 2, c. 11, translated by Francesco Puccinotti). Galen speaks about the opinion of some doctors who considered every muscle as an animal in its own right: 'Indeed one of them said that our will perceives every muscle as a kind of animal, and that it draws and twists the tongue to the shape suitable for a sound or apt word.'

(274) NE, vol. 2, 559-566.

(275) NE, vol. 2, 846-870.

(276) AMS, 94-103.

(277) AMS, 258-261.