Chapter 16

Unlimited space as the term of sensitive souls

554. In Anthropology I showed that a limited portion of space cannot be conceived unless we also suppose that solid, unlimited space is felt. I think I have demonstrated with this and various other arguments that all the phenomena manifested by corporeal feeling suppose every sensitive soul to have solid, unlimited space, or if we prefer, unmeasured space as its nature-given term. Corporeal, felt terms originate in this unlimited space and extend into a limited space contained within determined borders.

555. If we add to this doctrine the teaching about the animation of the elements, then the corporeal elements I have described approximate in some way to Leibniz's monads, which represent the universe. My elements, or rather my sentient principles, would certainly not represent the universe in the way Leibniz attributes to his monads. This great man claims that they represent the universe with all that it contains of both corporeal and spiritual beings; my sensitive principles encompass only solid, unlimited, unmeasured space in which corporeal beings subsist.

556. After reaching the opinion which I have just explained (it was not achieved lightly but only after long reflection and by logical necessity), I must ask myself whether a sentient principle could exist which felt only solid, unlimited space, and if so be an individual. Although obviously a question of pure possibility, it is not without its usefulness. Time is not wasted when we clarify concepts connected with those immediately required by philosophy. I maintain that the concept of such a sentient principle does not in itself involve absurdity. And if there were such a principle, it would certainly be an individual, in view of the simplicity and reality pertaining to the nature of a principle, particularly this principle.

557. There is however a rather important consequence: could there be only one of these individuals? If there were two principles with an identical term, such as unlimited space, they could not in any way have some distinct reality, because reality is the principle of individuation.(278) Therefore they could only be one, not two principles. The fact that they could not have a different reality is proved as follows. Their only activity or reality is that which they receive from their terms. If with our imagination we added some other reality, they would no longer be pure principles as our hypothesis supposes. If therefore the term is one and identical, the reality and activity of the principle co-relative to it must also be one and identical. But solid, unlimited space is one and identical. Therefore the principle which is referred to such a term must also be one and identical. This ineluctable argument is rather difficult to accept because the human mind so easily inclines to consider the principle as having some other appendage; the mind cannot see how a pure principle can be an ens, a substance, unless something else is attributed to it in addition to the sentient, perceiving act. The appendage would then be the difference used for distinguishing the imagined principles. But if the thinker strives to remove every arbitrary addition from the concept of principle, he will at once see the efficacy of my reasoning.(279)

558. Granted this, what relationship would exist between the single principle and the sensitive souls of bodies? These would arise and individuate deep within the principle by means of new terms, that is, corporeal terms. The initial principle could, in a certain but improper sense, be called the 'common soul', or better, the 'common principle of sensitive souls' (of corporeal feeling).

559. The individuality of these souls would remain intact, but they would have a proper act and an act common to them all. The former would constitute their own reality and substance, and hence their substantial difference. The reality proper to each would thus be the principle of their individuation. This agrees with St. Thomas' teaching, which is valid for merely sensitive souls, that matter is the principle of individuation of souls. There is nothing contradictory here. But we must discuss more extensively the individuality which constitutes them.

Notes

(278) AMS, 782-788.

(279) This teaching is coherent with the other that a continuum, whether large or small (prescinding from stimulation) can have only a single sentient principle. From this fact I deduced the multiplication and concentration of sensitive souls. The teachings support each other because they have the same proofs.