Chapter 17

Individuality

560. Etymologically, 'individual' means 'indivisible'. According to this meaning, every essence, species and genus can be called individual, because they are supremely indivisible.(280) But the word 'individual' is more commonly used to mean the indivisibility of real entia, many of which frequently correspond to a single essence or a single species. This is the meaning I will use in this discussion.

561. A real ens is indivisible to the extent that it is one. But there are as many kinds of unity as there are different kinds of individuality and therefore individuals. Even an aggregation of several entia, when conceived mentally as a single, complex ens, can be called individual. This is however only a mental individuality, the individuality of a concept applied to reality. I am not speaking about this mental, artificial individuality, whose foundation is the unity of a concept; with the concept we think multiplicity per modum unius [as if it were one], as the Scholastics say. I am speaking about real unity, whose foundation is reality itself.

562. Real entia can be many, but each must be one. Indeed, if we suppose that a real ens is several entia, we contradict ourselves; if they are several, they are not one. A real ens must be one because the two parts of the division are identical. If the ens that was one, becomes two, there is no longer one ens, but two, each of which is one. Hence, every real ens, as ens, is one, and as one, is indivisible.

563. If real ens is indivisible, what is the origin of the concept of divisibility? The word 'divisibility' can be taken in a proper sense, or in an incorrect sense where it means multiplicity. In its proper sense, divisibility has its source in the mind or, more generally, in perception. For example, space is one and indivisible. But the human mind can think a limited space, and in doing so seems to divide space, because it restricts its consideration to that portion of space and divides it from the rest of space. But this action has in no way truly divided space; in itself space is totally indivisible. In fact, even when I draw in space an imaginary sphere, a metre in diameter, I do not stop space extending outside the sphere, as it did before I imagined my spherical space; nor do I prevent the space outside the sphere from continuing uninterruptedly from the space occupied by the sphere. The same can be said if a sphere limiting space is a real, corporeal sphere. Divisibility therefore in its proper sense is not real, but relative only to the actions of the perceiver.

564. Take a piece of continuous matter and divide it into two parts. Is this a true division? Strictly speaking, it is simply a multiplication which gives two individuals instead of one. To be a true division, I would have to have a divided individual. But I do not have a divided individual; I have two individuals. These two individuals that I have produced are certainly not parts of the same individual, because the two portions of continuous matter, being divided, form two wholes, not a single whole. They are not parts therefore, because the whole of which they may be parts does not exist. Can they be considered as parts of the whole that existed before the division? They certainly can - but only by the mind. Only consideration by the mind makes them parts of the whole; they are not parts when already divided, nor are they parts when united, forming one single continuum. Divisibility of matter therefore is again a way of thinking proper to the human mind and relative to its actions.

565. But could any matter be considered as an individual before the division? Is continuity sufficient to give unity to the being called matter? This question will be considered more deeply when I speak about matter. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the individuality of matter is at most very imperfect; matter, as such, has no unifying principle. The individuality, the unity, of a real ens is found, properly speaking, only in an ens which has the nature of active principle. The word 'principle' contains in its very concept unity and indivisibility. But the only entia-principles are sensitive entia and intellective entia. I must therefore speak about their individuality.

566. Sensitive principles and intellective principles are real individuals. They are first acts and, in the order of their own feeling, independent. However, although second acts are dominated by first acts and receive their unity and individuation from them, it is not absurd to conceive that a second act could arise deep within a first sensitive act. This would be an immanent act, and dominate the very act from which it arose. In this case, having become independent, it would constitute another individual. I say that the independence must be in the order of feeling, which means that the individuating feeling must not have another greater feeling dominating it with its activity. Let us apply these principles about the nature of individuality to the present discussion.

567. We will begin with the individuality of human beings. It is not difficult for us to understand that no animal can have the particular individuality proper to a human being, who is a rational-animal subject.

568. Human beings receive their individuality from the intuition of being in general which constitutes them intelligent.(281)

This intuition is a most simple act and, by nature, alien to space, just as being, which is per se object, is most simple and unextended. Now the principle intuiting being is, in us, identical with the sentient principle. For this reason I called this single root of the two principles 'rational principle'. The sentient principle of human beings, potentially identified with the intelligent principle, is perfectly one, simple and alien to space, which pertains to the term of its act (to the felt). The singleness and simplicity of the immanent, intellective first act, therefore, constitutes human individuality.

569. A very important characteristic which distinguishes human individuality from the individuality of animals is rooted in the nature of ideal being, which informs all human beings. Ideal being is inexhaustible; even more, it is immutable and unmodifiable. Hence, it informs us without undergoing any change or restriction in itself. Strictly speaking, it is we who are brought into union with it, not it with us. It is in itself, and has no union with other things, although they may be in union with it; this union is relative to them, not to it. They feel improved by the union, and this feeling, which forms the union, is located not in ideal being but in the intuiting being.

570. Only when we understand all this, and cease to apply to ideal being the concept of union drawn from the reciprocal union of finite things, will we understand how reflection is possible. As intellective beings, we are informed by ideal being and exist through it. Nevertheless we, who exist through ideal being, rediscover ideal being, and in it contemplate ourselves informed by ideal being. This is precisely reflection.

Reflection presupposes 1. an intelligent principle whose form is ideal being and 2. ideal being in which we see ourselves informed by ideal being.

Ideal being has two tasks in reflection: it is the form of the intelligent principle which it constitutes; it is the means by which the intelligent, subsistent principle is known. As I said, ideal being is applied to itself by means of its inexhaustible or immutable nature.

571. Reflection is the origin of our consciousness or knowledge of self. Myself is posited by means of the different actions I have already indicated. Thus human individuality is perfected by self-consciousness. We feel and know ourselves; we know and tell ourselves that we are a single principle (consciousness of individuality). This individuality is not in animals; it can be known only by human beings.

572. The individuality pertaining to animals must be found in feeling, in the unicity of the sentient principle. I have distinguished a non-stimulated, uniform feeling(282) and a stimulated feeling. We have therefore two principles of individuation.

573. If a non-stimulated fundamental feeling were evenly diffused in a given continuum, the individuality would clearly consist in the single sentient principle in which the whole continuum exists. As we said, the continuum would not be continuous and one, unless it existed in what is simple.

574. But if some movements took place in the continuous aggregate of several elements, the stimulated feeling would increase in intensity in some points of the aggregate. Now, because the sentient principle is most active where it is most intense, it is most present where it is most active. In our case, the sentient principle is single, and, in so far as it extends to the whole continuum, individuated. But it has two acts: one with which it pervades the whole of the felt continuum, the other with which it concentrates in a particular part or different parts of it. The sentient principle is therefore individuated, and becomes dominant and independent, in proportion to the intensity with which it is posited in act.

575. We must now distinguish different cases. First, let us suppose that a greater intensity of feeling, stimulated by movement and limited to a tiny space, arises in a uniformly felt continuum. Individuality will be present because the feeling acquires the individuality of stimulation, and the individuality prevails through its intensity. It is founded on the act with which the principle feels more intensely and works more actively in this tiny space than elsewhere - a principle that feels more can also feel less, but not vice versa.

576. Now let us suppose two tiny spaces in the same continuum, in each of which the intensity of feeling has reached the same level. The individuality of feeling will not be lost; instead there will be two individuals in place of one. The act of greater intensity adhering to one tiny space cannot be the act of greater intensity adhering to the other because the intensities are equal. Nevertheless, in keeping with the principle that whatever feels more extension can feel less, the sentient principle that feels in one of the tiny spaces will assume the continuum into all its feeling, while the sentient principle adhering to the other tiny space will do the same. This is a case of one and the same body animated by two souls united with each other, two indi- viduals substantially joined together, as for example in cases of bicephalous offspring, annulates, polyps, gemmiparous and fissiparous animals, etc.

577. A third case can be supposed. Feeling, in a given continuum, could be concentrated and stimulated in different tiny spaces and to different degrees. If one of these stimulated, concentrated feelings were stronger than the other, it could be the centre of an instinctive activity so great that, suitably organised, it could dominate the activity of all the other feelings. Controlling and regulating its activity for its own good, it would bring about harmonious movements, capable of holding everything in unity. In this case, there would be a single animal of varying perfection even though there were several individual feelings, existing in the same body, which could not manifest their individuality externally because they would be subject to the other feeling. This is probably the case with all those beings we call animals, particularly the more perfect. Although separate feelings, and instincts relative to these feelings, exist in animals, only one feeling prevails and dominates. In a healthy state, this feeling keeps in harmonious co-operation all the movements of the various organs that compose the body.

578. We must now consider the individuality of the animal joined to and fused into human individuality. Animal feeling is joined to intelligence through the fundamental perception that I have described. Consequently, its individuality is fused into human individuality.

579. We see again that only human beings can be conscious of their animal individuality. Hence, if in the same body there were lesser feelings which could be individuated, we could only be conscious of the all-pervading feeling we naturally and habitually perceive.

580. Parts whose movement did not modify the fundamental feeling which we habitually perceive and of which we can be conscious, would not be felt by us.

581. Here we see once more the reason why not every movement produces a sensation.

582. This will be better understood if we consider the following. First of all, it is a law of the fundamental feeling that although it extends to certain parts, it cannot reveal to us the locality of those parts;(283) the word 'locality' simply means a relationship between parts determined by surface sensations. Experience itself shows that not every movement in parts felt by us produces sensation. The retina, which is very sensitive to light, can be lacerated without our observing any sensation. Again, although the laws of sensiferous movement are little known, we could conjecture as follows. Every part of the human body is formed of molecules of varying composition. First, there are the elements; these form molecules of the first level, which form second-level molecules; these in turn form third-level molecules, and so on. According to the hypothesis we have suggested and are discussing, feeling always adheres to the elements. But does it adhere to first-order molecules and of all the succeeding orders?

In other words, is the feeling of every molecule of any order in continuity with the feeling of another molecule, or is it continued by the elements alone and by certain determined molecules which cannot change their relative position unless the elements composing them change their relative position? I think it very probable that molecules are simply an organisation suitable in some way for the intestine movement of the elements.(284) I have laid down, as a condition for stimulation, that the elements to which feeling adheres and which are in contact with one another, must rub against each other and thus frequently change the extended continuous term of feeling. Hence, I do not stimulate any sensation if I stimulate a membrane composed of fiftieth-order molecules in such a way that the molecules, but not the elements, move and rub against each other, and if this elementary movement is not propagated to the centre, which is the term of the dominant feeling constituting the human being.

But whenever I am able to arouse an internal movement in the elements so that the movement is propagated and in continuity with the central, intestine movement, I determine the sensation proper to a human being and capable of entering human consciousness. In fact, sensation is not caused by the absolute movement of the body and organs,(285) but by the relative movement among the felt elements, a movement which must be in continuity with that of the centre. If the intestine movements of the elements were limited to a part of the body without extending to the centre, a stimulated feeling would arise different from the all-pervading feeling because the movement would lack continuity, just as the feeling of continuity multiplies when the continuum divides and becomes discontinuous.

583. Only on these conditions does aroused sensation refer to the individual feeling of the human being, the all-pervading, fundamental feeling amongst all the feelings aroused in the human body. Here we have, I think, the probable reason why the stimulation of the nerves must be propagated to the brain, granted that WE, who are the rational principle of the all-pervading feeling, are to sense it. This means that if such a sensation is felt where the stimulus is applied, that part also is included in the felt term of the all-pervading feeling. But to be included, the part must communicate with the centre, because the human fundamental feeling receives animal individuality from the centre, that is, from the unity and continuity of the term of the all-pervading feeling. If the part is divided from the centre, it pertains to another feeling.

584. For stimulation therefore to produce an individual sensation, the following is necessary: a movement must take place

1. in a felt continuum;

2. in the elements to which feeling adheres; and

3. the movement must be propagated to the seat of the individuality of feeling, that is, to the location of what is felt. This felt element corresponds to the greatest fundamental feeling and is individuated by virtue of its density, in such a way that the sentient principle feels an uninterrupted, continuous motion (that is, in the continuum).

Notes

(280) St. Thomas distinguishes four kinds of individuals: 1. single, 2. most particular species, 3. most general genus, and 4. immediate proposition (In 2, Met., Lect. 4).

(281)I have shown in Anthropology, 782-788, that reality is the principle of individuation. Human beings are realities. To know what individuates us, we must look for what constitutes us as real beings. In any case, relative to indeterminate ideal being, I have to say what I said about space: although we can conceive as possible an ens whose sole act by nature is the intuition of indeterminate ideal being, there could be only one ens of this sort. Our mind, if it forces itself to conceive two entia (which it thinks it can), is deceived. It would either think the same identical ens, or would add some other differentiating act to it, which is contrary to the hypothesis. Cf. Teodicea, 617-634, for the law of excluded equality.

(282) Glisson and others hold that there are degrees of absolute density in matter independent of the degree of porosity. I can only consider this opinion as a mere possibility. In fact, the porosity or intervals between the elements seems to me to explain sufficiently all the density we can observe. But granted the graduated density of matter in the smallest elements, we must suppose that their fundamental feeling also increases by degrees. In this case, the centre of the atom would be the seat of the greatest degree of uniform feeling, and this would be a third basis for animal individuality, a third principle of individuation.

(283) AMS, 154-180.

(284) If, when a molecule moves, no movement arises in its internal parts, and if feeling adheres to these parts, stimulation of the molecule's external parts cannot continue.

(285) NE, vol. 2, 804-809.