Chapter 6

The intellective soul never loses its individuality; it is immortal

676. Although being in general contains the essence of body, it is not true that body contains being in general. The greater contains the less, but not vice versa. The sentient principle, therefore, has acquired through this progress a new term of its activity, a term superior to and independent of body. This term is per se, is ideality itself.

677. But the term of the active principle is that which determines its nature. The sensitive principle, having acquired a new term, has changed nature. It has acquired an infinitely more noble nature; it has attained a perfect, divine form.

678. The following ontological law is worthy of consideration: 'Every ens tends to preserve and perfect itself through the very power by which it is. No ens, therefore, has any power directed to self-destruction.' This law is proved in ontology, which provides it for us here. If, therefore, no ens, no nature destroys itself, every destruction undergone by entia comes from outside, from extraneous activity.

Again, every complete ens is a simple principle and has a natural, immanent term. The principle is, if it is in touch with its term; but if its term is removed, the principle ceases. The natural, immanent term is the condition of the first act through which the principle is, according to the known law of synthesism. Stripped of all its terms the principle becomes a mere abstraction, a mere capacity, an ens similar to the first matter of the ancients, who supposed it to be devoid of all form. All that remains is the creative potency of God, which is not some determined external ens. The destruction of a contingent ens comes about only through the destruction of the term in which its first act ends.

679. What is the term of the ens which we know as 'man'? We have already seen that the terms are two: the body, and being in general. The only extraneous entia capable of destroying these terms are God Almighty and contingent things. As far as God is concerned, we have already presupposed that he does not annihilate anything that he has created. The destruction of human beings cannot, therefore, come from him. But can the activity of contingent things play any part in the destruction of human nature? Can they do anything to destroy the two terms of the first act through which the human being is? The body of the human being, one of the terms, is a complex of elements organated in the most perfect, specific manner, and thus individuated. It is true of course that the forces of nature can dissolve this organisation, and as a consequence destroy with it the animal feeling proper to the human being. But no force of nature can do anything relative to being in general, which is impassible, immutable, eternal and not subject to the activity of any ens. Hence, the power with which human beings intuit being in general cannot perish. This power, this first act, is the intellective soul which cannot therefore cease to exist in its own individuality; it possesses its own individuating reality,(361) a fact which we normally express by saying that it is immortal.

680. The human intellective soul arises originally, therefore, from the bosom of the sensitive soul of which it is a power. But this power has become its principal act and has acquired immortality as soon as it has attained being in general, which is totally imperishable, unchangeable and eternal.

Notes

(361) I have already shown that reality is the principle of individuation in AMS, 782-788.