Chapter 12
Does the separated soul retain any inclination to unite itself with the body?
701. It is a theological opinion that the soul separated from the body preserves some tendency to reunite itself to the body.(374) Has philosophy anything to say about this? It would seem at first sight that such a question about the state of the separated soul lies outside the boundaries of philosophy. At a deeper level, however, we find that philosophy can say something about it, at least by way of not improbable conjecture.
702. It would seem that, if philosophical reflection enables us to know 1. the elements constituting the human soul, that is, the rational soul; and 2. the elements it loses at human death, we should also know what elements remain after the removal of those which death eliminates. Thinking about the question, however, we immediately finds ourselves following a path of reasoning that seems to lead our thought to a conclusion contrary to the theological opinion we have just mentioned.
The rational soul loses its bodily term through death. All that remains to it is the sole term of essential being. But every activity and reality of a principle is determined solely by its term. No activity can remain in the rational principle, therefore, except that through which it intuits being. Hence, if the bodily term is altogether removed from the rational principle, the sensitive principle itself no longer remains; the intellective principle rests in the idea; no activity remains which can possibly be a principle inclining it to take up the body once more. The very memory of the preceding body must be entirely abolished because the memory of bodies cannot be preserved without some vestigial phantasm of them. The phantasm itself ceases, however, when the brain, the appropriate organ of fantasy, is lost.(375) This seems to be how reasoning can proceed, but it is defective because it forgets an important fact about the human soul already indicated by us.
703. I have shown that every sensitive soul which has as its term a body occupying a limited portion of space must first have as its term (in logical order) pure, solid, unlimited space. This is necessary because an unlimited space is included in the concept of the limited corporeal space which is term to a feeling. Feeling cannot be thought without the concept of unlimited space (cf. 554-559). Consequently, the rational soul, which is sensitive and intellective, must have the same term of simple, unlimited space. What happens, then, at death? Simply the dissolution of the corporeal organism, and consequently the dissipation of the organic-corporeal feeling. All that perishes is the organism and its relative feeling, nothing more. The body, however, which limits space is essentially different from the space that is limited; this space is altogether independent of the body. Space, therefore, cannot be taken from the soul simply because the soul has lost its bodily term. The rational soul which has lost the body must, therefore, still retain two terms: 1. essential being which renders it intellective; 2. pure, unlimited space. It follows that with this second term it still maintains a certain relationship with the created universe whose extension it feels.(376) But we have seen that the principle which feels unlimited space is the root of the corporeal sensitive principle (cf. 558). It is as it were the principle of the sensitive principle, the remote principle of feeling. Here we have already arrived at a very satisfying conclusion: the human soul separated from the body still preserves its radical potency for feeling.
704. But this is not sufficient. We have to make use of the following ontological or cosmological theory: 'Principles have existence in accordance with their term; but once in existence they have their own activity relative to those same terms.' This theory is proved by intimate observation of any subject. Although a subject or principle cannot be conceived as existing without its term, it is certain from experience that, in existing, it can carry out different activities and exercise different functions relative to its term. We shall speak more at length about this important truth in the second part. But, granted this, there remains in the separated soul the identical subject which was present before the soul ceased to perceive the body. There is nothing repugnant, therefore, after the cessation of the actual perception of the body, if this identical subject, receptive to activity, retains its habitual dispositions and tendencies. Moreover, since bodily sensation is an act of a principle which has space as its term, there is nothing to prevent this same principle from preserving an inclination to the preceding act, that is, to its preceding perception. Its tendency in this case is rather like that of the eye which, having seen an object, can continue to look in the same direction and with the same intensity even when the object has been removed and the eye sees nothing more.
705. In my opinion, it is certain that something similar to what is said of the eye can be said of the intellective principle, which remains identical in the separated soul. This principle already had an inclination towards perception of the bodily feeling, and the inclination must remain in it (as we said about the sensitive principle of space), although it no longer has any matter over which it exercises the inclination. In fact, the perception of the natural, corporeal feeling included: 1. the sensitive principle of space with its term, space; 2. the sensitive principle of body with its term, body (as we saw, this principle is an act individuating the prior principle); 3. the intuitive principle of being. Only the second of these three elements ceases with the separation of the body. The intellective perception of the feeling of space remains, that is, the intellective perception of the principle and term of this feeling. But the principle of this feeling preserves the actuality which puts it in relationship with the body. Consequently, the rational principle remains, and it remains with its inclinations because it perceives a sensitive principle inclined towards its bodily term.
706. This teaching also shows why the separated soul preserves its own individuality through nature. A principle which had pure space as term, and no other reality in itself, would have to be one, and thus without the individuation proper to a principle feeling the body (cf. 557). But, as soon as some activity tending to the body were added to the principle, the new activity or reality would individuate it. Matter, as I said (cf. 564), is divisible and consequently multipliable of its nature in such a way that one portion of matter is not another.
It is precisely from this relationship between the intellect and matter that St. Thomas proves the individuation of matter and consequently a plurality of intellects.(377) This truth led the Scholastics to assert that matter was, generally speaking, the principle of individuation. This proposition is far too general, as I mentioned elsewhere. In fact, every reality, whether material or spiritual, when it can be distinguished, is already per se a principle of individuation. St. Thomas realised this, and corrected the principle with various limitations. One of these affirms: 'Form is individuated through itself.'
The intellective soul separated from the body remains individuated, therefore, primarily because of the perception that it preserves of the feeling which reaches out to space. In turn this feeling is individuated as a result of the activity which it preserves towards the bodily feeling.
707. Here I must not overlook an extremely important observation: the individuation of the intellective soul, and that of the sensitive principle, are brought about under very different conditions. The sensitive principle is individuated directly through the separation of matter because it is connected through its own essence to the elements. Every elementary feeling is therefore a different individual when the elements are separate and discontinuous. If two groups of elements were to compose a completely equal organisation, there would be two, equal, organic feelings, but not a single identical feeling. Consequently, the intellective souls which perceived these organic feelings would be two, not one, and would remain two as separated souls. But if, on the contrary, the Almighty were to change the organism in the case of an intellective soul which perceives the organic feeling, and did so by substituting another, totally equal organism without any change in the perceived organic feeling, the intellective soul would be totally unaware of the change which has occurred solely in the matter, not in the feeling which is all that the soul directly perceives. The soul would not therefore lose its identity in any way through such change. Experience shows the same thing. The matter composing the body changes with age without detriment to the identity of the soul. Indeed, not only does the matter change, but even the organic feeling, although never specifically. The individuality of the intellective soul does not originate directly from the individuation of matter as such, but from the individuality of the feeling. Only when several feelings exist are there several intellective souls, which are referred to the feelings, because an intellective soul can perceive only one, not two or more organic feelings. The intellective soul, although already originated and constituted through itself, draws its origin from one organic feeling alone.
708. But after all this, the individuality of the already constituted intellective soul draws its individuation from another source. It carries out some rational acts with which it sends out new activity and thus differentiates and individuates itself by acquiring the additional reality in which the activity consists. The terms of these acts may indeed cease for the separated soul once it has lost the organic feeling. However, the soul, by remaining identical, retains that activity through the principle we have indicated, namely, if a constituted principle exists, it has its own proper activity independent of its term (cf. 707). So, although all the cognitions received in the present life in dependence upon bodily organs may naturally perish relative to the soul, the acquired activity of the soul is retained. And this is sufficient to individuate it.(378)
709. Several objections can be made to this teaching, but they are not insoluble, as far as I can see. I shall mention only those which appear most relevant and, by clarifying them in my answers, fill out the teaching itself.
Objection 1. - You have said that the intellective soul retains perception of the feeling of space. In this case, do the elements of the body (which dissolves), elements which have their own bodily feelings, remain deprived of these feelings?
Reply. No. The feeling of space remains equally united with the intellective soul and with the surviving elements or organisms. Because this feeling is of its nature one, it can be multiplied, that is, remain united both to the subject, to the intellective soul, and to the sensitive, corporeal principles separated from the soul. It preserves its singularity and identity in itself, but can be joined to several subjects which individuate it. There is nothing contradictory in this, nor anything out of harmony with the nature of sensitive principles.
710. Objection 2. - You have said that when a term is identical, and when the principle referred to it has no other reality than that which comes to it from its being principle of that term, then this principle itself must be one and identical. But intellective souls have identical being as their term. There can only be one of them, therefore, not several.
Reply. That is true, but once the principle has been put into being, it can have a reality and activity of its own different from that included in the naked concept of principle. As soon as this principle carries out some activity of its own, it immediately acquires individuation from this activity. There is a plurality of human souls both because they have as their terms distinct organic feelings, and because they have their own rational activity, which is carried out in the acts of reason they engage in from the very first moment of their existence. If, however, we supposed the existence of intelligences different from human intelligences, they would certainly lack a principle of individuation if they had only identical intelligible being as their term, and all intuited it at the same level, without any other activity or reality except that which sprang from this intuition. They would be one, because only a single reality of such a nature can be conceived. We can deduce from the objection, therefore, only that souls, besides having something in themselves which individuates and distinguishes them, all retain a common, mysterious bond, a subjective root, common both on the part of sense and of understanding. This root establishes the unity of the human species even in reality, and is in great part the reason for the empathy felt by individuals of the same species. And this explains why at certain moments, human beings appear to be a single human being.
711. Objection 3. - If separated souls retain an inclination to the fundamental, corporeal perception, this will prove an impediment to their happiness.
Reply. Revealed doctrine teaches that the souls of the just who receive their eternal reward find all things in God through Christ. If we consider the soul in itself, without the additions it receives from divine goodness or divine justice, we have to say that as separated from the body it remains imperfect precisely because it is deprived of its natural act. But we also have to add that it does not feel any pain because no habitual tendency is painful if it makes no effort to be satisfied. In our case, all such effort has been removed because of the removal of the corporeal term. No one can make himself act without the term of his activity. The effort itself needs something for its own formation; it is never made relative to nothing.
Notes
(374) Theologians are divided on the question, 'Does the separated body desire to unite itself to the body?' There are three principal opinions. Scotus denies this appetite. Suarez denies what he calls an elicited appetite: 'It is very probable that the separated soul led by the natural reason does not desire, with an elicited appetite, reunion with the body except through a certain strong longing, and under conditions which seem impossible, naturally speaking.' But he does admit a 'certain natural aptitude' which he improperly calls 'natural appetite' (Tract. De Anima, bk. 6, c. 10). St. Thomas, whom I follow, admits a true inclination, a true natural appetite, for which he gives proof in S.T., I, q. 26, art. 1, ad 6; De Spirit. creat., q. 4, art. 5; De potentia, art. 2, ad 5; and elsewhere.
(375) I am speaking of the separated soul according to its nature, and prescinding from anything else it could obtain in the next life through divine disposition. Cf. the appendix to Teodicea, 48-49.
(376) The words used by St. Paul to describe death are highly appropriate: 'Praeterit enim FIGURA huius mundi' (1 Cor 7: 31). The word figura indicates strictly speaking the limitation of the space making up the bodily substance, not space itself.
(377) 'The intellective soul, just like an angel, has no matter from which it can arise. Nevertheless, unlike an angel, it is the form of some matter. So, according to the division of matter, there are many souls of a single species. But in no way can there be many angels of a single species' (S.T., I, q. 76, art. 2, ad 1).
(378) In the Platonic system, soul is simply something which moves body. Consequently, when separated, it does not retain any tendency towards body. On the contrary, Platonists consider body as a prison for soul. Although conscious of the disorder which is at present so noticeable in humanity, they failed to realise that this is not nature but the effect of original sin which has corrupted the whole man and changed him for the worse. They look upon the union of soul and body as an imperfection, a punishment. But this is absurd, and simply proves the erroneousness of this system.