Chapter 13

The preceding teaching about the union of soul and body avoids the opposite errors

712. Let us pause for a moment to consider how the teaching I have developed about the connection between the human soul and body corresponds to the facts and, at the same time, avoids the contrary dangers on which other systems have foundered with various degrees of damage. I shall not repeat what has been said or, if I do, I shall place it in a new light.

713. Systems about the union of the human soul with the body normally go to one of two extremes. Some were conscious only that the human soul is single and, in their endeavour to unify it, neglect one of the two active principles in human beings, that is, either the sensitive or the intellective principle. As a result, they did not grasp the knot of the union between these principles. Others, considering only the twofold aspect of these two principles of action, ended by separating them and thus positing several souls in the human being.

The first group can be divided into three systems, which are either erroneous or imperfect. Some could not explain the union of the rational principle and the body, and reduced everything to the sensitive soul. I totally exclude this sensistic system. I have shown at length the specific difference between the sensitive and intellective principles by examining their specifically different terms, that is, being in general, and that which is felt.

714. Others fixed their attention exclusively on the rational principle and saw clearly that this is what is proper to human beings. However, they were unable to reconcile the sensitive with the rational principle, and said that the sensitive soul reasoned by feeling. Feeling itself was knowledge, that is, people feel with their intellect. Plato sometimes seemed to have conceived things in this way. This rational system is defective in the same way as the sensistic system. It removes the specific distinction between the animal-sensitive principle and the rational principle.

715. Finally, there were others who although they realised that feeling is not understanding, and understanding not animal feeling, affirmed that they were two immediate activities of the same soul. They began from true principles, that is, from the principle that the intellective soul 'virtually contains inferior forms',(379) and from the other principle, 'of each thing there is one substantial being and one substantial form'.(380) They tried to avoid the error of two souls in the human being, of two or more substantial forms.

But a great difficulty follows if feeling and understanding are merely two activities of the intellective soul. Feeling is not understanding, sense is not intelligence. If these two things were to be in the soul as part of its essence, two forms would compose a single form, which is repugnant to the unity of form. On the other hand, feeling cannot exist without a subject if it is a simple faculty of the intelligence. In this case, beasts have to be made either intelligent or machines. It is, however, gratuitous to maintain that in beasts a subject is added to this faculty. Because feeling in man and feeling in beasts, considered as feeling, is of the same nature, the addition of a subject would mean adding something other than feeling to feeling in beasts, in which we see only feeling. On the other hand, the soul is intellective only in virtue of its acts of intelligence. If intelligence is of the essence of this soul, it cannot be the direct principle of feeling. A directly sentient being is not intelligent in so far as it is sentient; it is not the intellective soul. Moreover, intelligence cannot perceive feeling if feeling is not already formed. A principle is required which will form feeling (a principle which will feel) and thus furnish intelligence with matter of perception.

716. Again, if the intellective soul were the proximate, direct and single principle of feeling, it would follow that sensations and animal movements would always be acts of intelligence. This is the opposite of experience; in human beings, sense is at work without preceding intellective acts.(381) This shows that the principle moving them is not always the intellective soul. We have to find, therefore, a system in which man is furnished with a single soul, a single substantial form, and in which there remain two active principles of feeling and understanding. These principles must not be connected in such a way as to constitute two souls, but at the same time must not be so separate that sense can move without the intervention of intellective activity.

717. Philosophers who wanted to maintain this second condition often fell into the opposite error present in the systems already mentioned. In other words, they wanted to posit several souls in the human being.(382)

I do not mean that when the whole of antiquity distinguished soul (anima) from spirit (animus), it intended to posit two souls in the human being. Common sense did not pass any opinion on the matter. It admitted the distinction which it found expressed in language itself, but it did not bother to decide the question. For myself, I consider the use of these two words or their equivalents as a witness from the human race in favour not of two souls, but rather of two active principles in the human being, each one of which has its own proper activity. One, however, receives the other in itself and dominates. Let me offer some authorities to clarify this distinction between the two active principles.

718. Scripture continually distinguishes flesh and spirit as adversaries. And it certainly speaks of the flesh not as dead but as alive.

St. Paul distinguishes the soul from the spirit when he speaks of the word of God as 'piercing to the division of SOUL and SPIRIT.'(383) And in a fragment of Plato's Timaeus, we read: 'He shut intelligence in the SPIRIT, and SOUL in the body.' Flavius Josephus says: 'He (God) sent into man SPIRIT and SOUL.(384) In Juvenal we find: 'At the beginning, the common maker furnished them with a SOUL only; to us he gave a SPIRIT also.'(385)

An illustrious Savoyard, who is perhaps too inclined to follow the two-soul system, brought forward the authorities I have just transcribed. In the following passage, he speaks both of the ancients and of certain physiological facts which show the existence of two activities in human beings, although they do not in any way demonstrate the existence of two souls.(386)

None of these observations can demonstrate the duplication of the human soul, although they do indicate two active principles and, if you wish, two lives.(402) Lactantius' 'inextricable' difficulty(403) consists in finding a system in which the two active principles remain distinct in man, but nevertheless avoid the error of two souls. I think that the system I have proposed satisfies this condition.

719. In fact, I have said:

1. The union of soul and body comes about through a natural, immanent perception by which the rational principle perceives the animal, fundamental feeling. The physical nexus in the perception is such that ex percipiente et percepto fit unum [perceiver and perceived together give rise to a single thing]. Nevertheless, although the union between perceiver and perceived is physical and results in one, composite substance, its components retain a real distinction (but without separation). The perceived is not the perceiver, nor is the perceiver the perceived.

2. Rational perception is an act of the rational principle and consequently proper to human beings who, as we said, are defined as 'rational subjects'. Hence that which is united as form to the animal feeling is the rational soul, the only soul proper to human beings.

3. What is perceived is known; the rational soul, therefore, knows the animal feeling. To know it, the soul must share in it; otherwise, it would not perceive it. Consequently, feeling (but not mere, naked feeling) is present in the rational soul. What is present is feeling in its condition as ens. The rational principle, therefore, is also sensitive, but not in the way that the animal principle is. The latter is a direct principle of feeling; the former exists at a much higher level in so far as it perceives being at all its levels and therefore at the level of animal-feeling. This explains the truth of St. Thomas's affirmation: the rational soul 'CONTAINS VIRTUALLY the sensitive and nutritive soul.'(404)

4. At the same time, the purely sensitive principle, although perceived, preserves its difference from the rational, perceiving principle in so far as the former is the direct principle of animal feeling (what is perceived is not confused with what perceives). This becomes clear if we consider that animal feeling, if it did not exist, could not be perceived by the intellective principle. That which is perceived has to exist. Feeling is not made to exist by the rational principle but by the direct principle of feeling itself (which makes feeling exist). This explains the dissolution of animal feeling without the intervention of the rational principle. Once the dissolution has taken place, animal feeling is no longer perceived and death of the human being intervenes. If animal feeling were produced directly by the rational principle, it would never cease. If a cause continues, the effect continues. Death in this case would be inexplicable.

5. This explains the struggle that occurs within man, and presupposes two activities. Activity remains in the perceiver and in the perceived, although both are joined substantially in the perception.

6. It also explains the dominion that the rational soul must have of its nature over animality. In the union between perceiver and perceived, the active part is played by the perceiver. This becomes even clearer if we consider that here we are dealing with rational perception in which what is perceived (the animal feeling) is apprehended under its condition of ens. This apprehension is more intimate and perfect than that with which the sensitive perceiver perceives matter, on which it depends in part as a third, foreign (extrasubjective) activity. The direct agent in what is felt, that is, in the body, is the sentient principle. Consequently, the rational principle dominates the body through the dominion it has over the sentient principle united to it through perception.

7. We notice at the same time that alterations and changes independent of the rational activity can arise in animal feeling as a result of the action proper to the sentient principle and of the action of (extrasubjective) matter. These passions are not attributed to man as to their cause because man is only the rational principle. The rest are conditions and appendages.(405)

8. The rational principle, therefore, is the sole, substantial form constituting the human being and containing in its power the other forms. The sensitive principle as such pertains to the matter of the human being, not to the form. As the form of man is the rational principle, so the matter which remains informed is not the dead body, but the live, animal body, that is, animal feeling, which is informed through perception and thus elevated to the condition of ens, object of the rational soul, and modified in various ways by the action of the soul.

9. Even more can be said. Animal feeling, whether perceived or not by the intellective soul, is identical. It does not duplicate itself by being perceived, but simply exists in two modes, that is, in itself and in the perceiver. But the perceiver if it does not alter the nature of animal feeling while it perceives, does not alter its principle and its term. The principle of animal feeling is, however, an extremely simple activity. By perceiving it, therefore, this principle perceives the activity in itself, as ens. The perceiver, simple as it is, receives in itself the perception of another activity, which itself is simple. The identification of the two principles, sensitive and intellective, lies here, and the principle arising from the two identified principles is the rational soul united to the body. As an ancient author said:

10. Because the two activities are identified to the extent that one contributes to increasing the power of the other, the sensitive activity can cease without cessation of the rational activity. Scripture, in fact, teaches us to lose our soul in order to save our spirit. 'In this life', says our ancient author, 'the SOUL is lost to save the SPIRIT.'(407)

11. The distinction between the two activities is not destroyed as a result of what I have said, that is, that the first intellective act arises in the depth of animal activity and is as it were a new actuation of the same subject. On the contrary, although it proves that the principle of both activities is the same as a result of their common origin, it does not prevent their being specifically and infinitely different. The nature of an activity is always formed by its term, not by its generative, imperfect beginning. Here, the term is as varied as the variation between the felt, extended element and being in general. Once intellectual and rational activity has originated, an entirely new nature, an imperishable substance, is present which is so different from sensitive nature that it would be altogether separate from it, were it not united through perception. It is perception which unites the two terms, that is, animal feeling and intellective being, and thus impedes separation between intellective and sensitive power.

I shall now add some further proofs which confirm the perpetual duration of the intellective soul.

Notes

(379) S.T., I, q. 76, art. 4.

(380) Ibid.

(381) Cf. Conscience, 89-93.

(382) Gennadius says that this error of two souls was common in Syria. 'We do not say that there are two souls, as James and other Syrians write. There is not an animal soul which animates the body and is MINGLED WITH THE BLOOD, and another spiritual soul which provides reason' (De Ecclesiatic. Dogmatib., c. 14). Origen also, in his De' Principi (3: 4), seems to posit two souls, and says that when Scripture mentions flesh, it has to be understood as the soul of the flesh. It is certain that it has to be understood of the sensitive principle, but this is an activity, not a distinct soul in the human being.

(383) Heb 4: 12.

(384) Antiq. jud., bk. 1, c. 1, ‡2.

(385) Sat., 15: 148-149.

(386) De Maistre, Eclaircissement sur les Sacrifices, c. 1.

(387) Malebranche, Leibniz and many other noble, modern intellects thought the same. They had not penetrated the nature of the subjective body, nor formed any idea of body except that given by extrasubjective experience which (properly speaking) makes us feel only a dead body, not the life of a body. On the other hand, there could be no proportional median between the extrasubjective body and the intelligent spirit. Moreover the sensitive soul, which adheres essentially to the body, does not exist divided from it because no principle can exist without a term. If these thinkers had arrived at the concept of a substantial feeling with a simple principle and an extended term, they would have seen that the intellective principle communicates directly not only with the principle (soul), but also with the term (body). It does not communicate, however, with the body separated from its immediate principle, but with the single feeling in which the sensitive principle and the body are inseparably united. Note again that the sensitive principle, called 'soul' by the ancients, is not properly speaking soul except when it is alone, as in beasts. It is not soul when united to the intellective principle as in human beings.

(388) Lucr. 3: 409 ss.

(389) Ibid., 276.

(390) Theaet.

(391) De Opif. mundi, in Justus Lipsius, Phys. Stoic., 3, diss. 16.

(392) Iliad, 2: 3.

(393) Iliad, 1: 333.

(394) Ibid., 1: 193. — There is no doubt that it is always the rational principle which deliberates in favour both of duty and of passion. The rational principle, however, is oppressed and tempted by another, contrary activity which is mostly sensitive.

(395) Odyss., 20: 18. 'Plato, in quoting this verse in Phaedo, sees it as one power speaking to another.' — However, it is the same intelligent spirit which reproves itself. In other words, it reproves its own intelligent will. The animal principle is incapable of reproof or encouragement. Nevertheless, the intelligent spirit could not complain and encourage itself unless it were passive in relationship to some foreign power which stimulated and tempted it.

(396) Theognis, Inter vers. gnom., edit. Brunkii, v. 72-73. — Everyone of us knows the Capricci del Bottaio, which are dialogues between Justus and his soul.

(397) Plato, De Rep. — This proves only that the will can be moved by contrary motives placed before it by the intellect. The intellect, without ceasing to be one in itself, apprehends several contrary things because they are all contained in being in general. Nevertheless, the argument shows that there is in human beings a feeling which is not the rational soul, but actually opposed to it.

(398) This principle of Aristotle (Catheg. de quant.) does not impede the possibility present in the intellect for perceiving opposite things, and the desire of the will for them. Even opposite things converge in being, in which the intellect perceives them and in which they are SINGLE THINGS.

(399) De nature humana. — Hippocrates' opinion has nothing to do with the two soul-theory because illness exists even in beasts. The duplication which produces illnesses in animals is that of soul and matter, of principle and of the term of feeling. The organic term can break up into different elements. The organic body, even granted that it is a continuum, virtually contains plurality.

(400) Tuscul., 2: 21. — The famous author errs here. In using 'command' at this point, Cicero means 'to put in order'. If something is put in order, it does not have to be a person, although it is necessary that a person be the one who puts things in order.

(401) Pensées, 3: 13.

(402) Man's twofold life is admitted by ecclesiastical writers. Lactantius will serve as an example for them all: 'Because man is made up of two things, body and soul, one of which is earthly, the other heavenly, TWO LIVES are attributed to him, a temporal life assigned to the body, and an eternal life for the soul' (bk. 7, c. 5).

(403) 'There is another, INEXTRICABLE QUESTION. Are the SOUL and the SPIRIT the same, or is there something by which we live, and something else by which we feel and know?' (De opif. Dei, c. 18).

(404) S.T., I, q. 76, art 4.

(405) Notice here that physiologists view the vitality of the body as possessing a principle distinct from the rational soul. This is true in part, although they exaggerate this independence through their ignorance of psychology. Barthez is a good example. He says of the animal principle: 'It is absolutely independent of the thinking soul, and even of the body, in all probability' (Nouveaux éléments de la science de l'homme). Nevertheless, if Barthez means by this independence a real distinction only, his language, but not his thought, is inexact.

(406) Tract. super Magnificat. Amongst the works doubtfully attributed to St. Augustine.

(407) Ibid.