Chapter 3

'Second class' -
Erroneous systems about the nature of the human soul
which reduced it to a sentient subject

27. I. Another principle was added to material elements when it was understood that they alone were insufficient to explain the operations of the soul. Nevertheless, these elements were not immediately abandoned. Although something spiritual had been attained, it was not easy to take the next step and realise that this principle, precisely because it did not pertain to the material elements, was spiritual. Nor was this done immediately. The addition of this new principle led, however, to some understanding of sense.

28. This is how Plutarch set out Epicurus' (b. 337, d. 270 BC) opinion:

(The soul) is a tempering of four qualities, that is, of fire-like, air-like and spiritual (wind-like) qualities to which a fourth UNNAMED quality must be added. This, for Epicurus, was a SENSITIVE quality, that is, one furnished with the power of feeling.(42)

Stobaeus adds the following explanation of Epicurus' opinion:
Amongst these qualities, spirit (or wind) generates motion, air generates quiet, fire generates bodily heat. Finally the fourth quality generates sense WHICH IS NOT FOUND IN ANY OF THE OTHERS.(43)

Epicurus was aware, therefore, that sense could not be explained by material elements alone, or by their qualities, and had recourse to another, unnamed principle, so-called because it was different from the known, named elements, but was not as elevated as intelligence. Nor did he realise that this fourth principle must be immaterial.(44) He then joined it to organisation in such a way that it vanished when organisation disintegrated.(45) In other words, he caught a glimpse of the sensitive soul.

29. II. According to Plutarch, the Stoics posited the principal part of the soul in sense(46) and then attributed sense to a kind of spirit similar to that posited by Aristotle, a spirit whose nature was heat.(47) All other parts of the soul derived from this principal part with which they constituted the soul.(48)

30. III. We have already seen how, after the teaching about atoms, their harmony was professed by Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus. In the same way, the teaching which placed the essence of the soul in the senses was followed by that of the harmony of the senses. Plutarch says that Aescupalius, the doctor, defined the soul as 'the interrelated exercise of the five senses'.(49) This, however, entailed less than the teaching of Epicurus who, in positing a sensitive principle, had embraced the whole of animal feeling. Aesculapius reduced the soul to five external, common ways of feeling without realising that animality has many others.

Notes

(42) Plutarch, De Placit., bk. 4, c. 3, and Adv. Coloten., bk. 1.

(43) Phys., bk. 1. Theodoret says almost the same (Graec. Affect., bk. 5).

(44) Diogenes, bk. 10: 63 ss.; Lucretius, bk. 3; Sext. Emp., Hypotip., 187-229.

(45) Lucretius, bk. 3: 224 ss.; Diogenes, bk. 10: 64 ss.

(46) 'The Stoics posit the passions in affective parts of the soul but the senses in the principal part' (De Placit., bk. 4, c. 8), and in another place: 'The Stoics call the supreme part of the soul its principal part, and the seat of phantasies, assent, sensations and appetites; they CALL it the REASONING part' (De Placit., bk. 4, c. 21).

(47) 'The Stoics maintain that it is indeed spiritual but resides for the most part in heat' (Theoderet, Graec. Affect., bk. 5).

(48) 'Seven other parts originate from the principal part of the soul and extend through the body' (De Placit., bk. 4, c. 21). Plutarch also says that the Stoics understand sense in different ways and 'the eighth part of the soul from which the soul is constituted' (De Placit., bk. 4, c. 8). This makes Corsini's preference for Stobaeus' reading ('from which the sensitive power is constituted') quite unlikely. Cf. also De Placit., bk. 4, c. 4.

(49) Plutarch, De Placit., bk. 4, c. 2.