APPENDIX
[ to Part One of Psychology]
OPINIONS OF PHILOSOPHERS
ABOUT THE
NATURE OF THE SOUL
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A book dedicated to |
Introduction
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Those who thought in this way were not wrong to the extent that what they said was wholly valueless. We do in fact live as a result of blood, warmth and spirit. But since the soul is in the body when all these things have been assembled, thinkers did not rightly express WHAT IT IS. In fact, it can only be seen rather than expressed. Lactantius, De Opificio Dei, c. 17 |
1. Giuseppe, dear friend, I have been a disciple of truth from my earliest years. This has been and is my first duty, as it is everyone's. I have also devoted myself to a study of common sense in human beings, all of whom I respect as endowed with the divine light of intelligence. I have tried to weigh their past and present opinions relative to arguments which most affect right thinking and a good life, keeping in mind, as far as I could, the fundamentals of their thought rather than the words in which it is presented. I found, with great satisfaction to my spirit, that their opinions were more in harmony about substantial, necessary things than appeared at first sight, and sometimes more than they themselves thought.
So, knowing how enamoured you are of philosophy and how highly you appreciate the words 'know yourself', I am sending you this brief exposition of the principal opinions of philosophers and of people themselves on the nature of the soul, together with some favourable, conciliatory comments on their authors. I know that you will accept this little work of mine as a sign of my affection for you. It will perhaps be useful in your assiduous work as teacher of young students of philosophy or, if I am wrong about this (after all, your own erudition needs no help from others), will at least draw some helpful exchange from you.
2. What I intend to do, therefore, is to set out the thoughts and principal opinions on the nature of the human soul. My guiding line will be the principle adopted by the Eclectics: 'All human error has a true and a false side. What is true depends upon what we observe in nature; what is false depends on our failure to observe what is in nature' and on phantasy, which supplies for what has been overlooked. Generally speaking, human thought is true when positive; false when negative, exclusive and arbitrary. This principle, when applied to the formation of a philosophical system (the unfortunate error made by the Eclectics), is sterile and illogical because the person who does not first possess what is true as a type with which to recognise what is false cannot discern what is true from what is false in the teachings before him. On the other hand, it serves admirably when applied to the history of philosophical placita, which is not amenable to examination until the philosophy itself has been uncovered and adequately established. Only when this has been done can these placita be judged equably and even reduced to some kind of harmony as we draw from the most varied and discordant conclusions a single whole, bound together in marvellous unity.
3. However, the opinions to which I wish to draw attention, and which I shall deal with as a philosopher rather than a historian, are for the most part found in ancient philosophy and have come down to us only in minute fragments - the ruins as it were of long-lost monuments. Moreover, the ancient language in which they are expressed is highly synthetical (analysis was developed only during the course of centuries) and had to express concepts which were indistinct (and even worse) in the mind. It would seem therefore that I should be allowed by fair-minded people to interpret these concepts and provide them with some reasonable meaning, although this will often depend more on conjecture than some definite statement.