The Summary Cause for the
Stability or Downfall of Human Societies
CHAPTER 11
Relationships in public affairs between the action of speculative reason in individuals, and the contemporaneous action of practical reason in the masses
75. Until now, we have considered our political criterion in the circumstances to which it is subject as a result of the twofold progress of the human spirit. We have seen that human understanding, as it acquires breadth of calculation, learns how to put the whole before the parts but, as it acquires height of abstraction and consequently runs a risk of neglecting substance through fallacious love of accidents, becomes simultaneously more capable of prudent use of the criterion of substance. This enables it to safeguard substance itself and leave accidents to their own natural progress.
76. Here we have to consider that modern nations, despite the seeds of Christian culture sown in them, suffer the vicissitudes of politics. This culture, of which we have already spoken, does indeed save them at times from the edge of the abyss, but it does not obviate political difficulties. There is a contrast between ascending progression, in the case of the speculative reason of those who govern, and descending progression, in the case of the practical reason of the masses, that is, relative to the earthy, grosser part of society. The ascending progression constantly prevails over the descending, however.
77. These two forces of speculative reason on the part of the more educated, and of practical reason on the grosser part (in other words, the reason of individuals and of the masses) operate simultaneously and as it were in parallel. The contemporaneous and sometimes contrasting action of the two forces explains why Christian societies are often storm-tossed without suffering total shipwreck, especially if Christianity is considered as a single society in which individual nations are simply members.
78. With this in mind, it will not be out of place to note the reasons according to which the use of our criterion of substance and accidents is gradually abandoned, only to be taken up again in the differing states to which Christian nations are subject.
79. I note first that substantial institutions are lost sight of
1. in proportion to their antiquity;
2. in proportion to the increase in the multiplicity of accidental institutions.
80. Clearly, the length of time during which substantial institutions have existed will contribute to forgetfulness of the impelling necessity which brought them into being. In this regard, the nation, if capable of renewal (and granted that it is destined to be punished, not annihilated), simply undergoes a crisis whose purpose is to draw ideas together once more. In this case, there is no need to recall accidental institutions and any external activity because they are continually present. In the order of providence, the crisis is intended as a reminder of the reason for the ancient institutions, and undoubtedly achieves its aim. As soon as the memory is re-activated, ancient institutions are reunited with modern practices. As a result, the system is completed in human understanding; knowledge is advanced and society ameliorated.
81. In Christian nations, which possess an interior philosophy of renewal and are not destined to perish, this process normally takes place within three generations (the minimum period required).
82. In the first generation, when the reasons for the ancient institutions are already forgotten, people rebel against the institutions and overthrow them more or less quickly.
83. The second generation now finds the society in a state of agitation and decomposition, and, through lack of its old supports, in danger of total ruin. But this generation is anxious and diffident about novelty and, after coming to its senses, raises once more the fallen institutions. It re-founds the society on its shaken foundations; it devotes itself totally to this aim while taking little notice of its accessory parts. Machiavelli indicates what is at stake when he says:
True virtue is sought in difficult times; when times are easy, it is not the virtuous but the rich and well-placed who find favour.(37)
This shows that in the second, fortunate period of which we are speaking, attention is given not to what is essential but to the accidentals which surround people, such as external splendour. When times are difficult, people return once more to what is solid and effective.
84. Finally, the third generation appears, enriched with the experience of the two preceding generations. Now that passions have been tempered on the one hand, and the yoke of habit broken on the other, this generation has a noble, joyful mission, that is, the happy possibility of discovering a complete system which unites ancient and modern; its duty is to acknowledge ancient institutions as necessary, and subsequent useful practices as a natural development and progress in perfection of ancient institutions. However, this period of three generations is brief; it concerns only those upheavals (such as the recent revolutions in Europe) which spring from rational principles within Christianity. The theory is not applicable to political revolutions dependent upon brute instinct, or upon devastation caused by barbarians, or upon universal degradation (which can never be the case with Christianity).
85. I said that the second reason why the first institutions gradually lose their importance in public opinion is the multiplicity of accidental institutions which arise after them. In fact, whenever new institutions are established, people inevitably devote some attention to them. And the more rapidly they are instituted, the more people’s attention (which is very limited), is distracted from substantial institutions.
86. This teaching provides an explanation for the duration of certain barbaric States. The Chinese, Tartars and Turks — and all nations denominated static because they show no signs of development and add no new accidental institutions to their ancient, substantial institutions — last for a long time because of their preoccupation with what gave and gives them existence; they are not distracted by accessories. If these commonalties did establish new institutions, as we do, they would crumble irreparably.
87. Many important corollaries flow from this. Here we will indicate only the following political maxims which are derived from the principles we have posited:
1. Every new, useless institution is harmful because it drains energy from the ancient institutions.
2. Every novel, accidental institution essentially brings some harm in its wake. It should not be undertaken, therefore, until political acumen shows that its utility will outweigh the damage it inflicts.
3. The best institutions will always be those which bond better with the ancient, substantial institutions, and thus harmonise with them.
4. It is indispensable for government to revive or reinforce by extensive education the memory of the intimate reason for fundamental political institutions.
Notes
(37) Discorsi sulla prima Deca di T. Livio, bk. 3, c. 16.