The Summary Cause for the
Stability or Downfall of Human Societies
CHAPTER 13
Elements of the two summary forces which move society: the practical problems of political science
93. If we want to consider the separate complexes of the particular forces which taken together form the summary force moving society, we shall see that three parts have to be distinguished:
1.The human spirit, the source, in the last analysis, of the action through which anyone can work for the advantage or disadvantage of society. What I call `collective unity’, which gives existence to society itself, exists only in the human spirit.
2.Things which human beings find desirable (wealth, power, and so on) and their contraries. These are the matter which, informed by the energy of the human spirit, becomes an instrument of force.
3.The object of the force, that is, the social organism and ensemble over which every force finally exercises its operation.
In all three parts, we have to distinguish the essential from the accidental if we are to achieve our purpose.
94. Let us begin with the spirit, and consider it first in the individual. `I succeeded because I really wanted to.’ This was Napoleon’s way of expressing the means by which resolute people have always brought about great changes in human affairs. The principal force behind great people(38) drives them to keep the end firmly in view, and energetically desire it. Insignificant people have no end in their activity, or confuse the end with the means, giving equal importance to both.
95. As society is a collective body, so it possesses a collective spirit. If we bring together on the one hand all the energy with which people composing society desire its existence and power, and on the other hand all the energy of wills inimical to the existence and power of society, we have two collective or social wills. One is `positively favourable’, the other `positively contrary’ to the existence of society.
96. If the stupidity or indolence of members of a society deprives them of all energy of will relative to social existence (as in the case described above when society has reached a stage when the immediate object of the masses is no longer social, but private — a period when the only stimulus to action is selfishness) we maintain that society has only a negative will, that is, it lacks the will which is its first and deepest vital force.
97. The existence of society is assured if positive, favourable will prevails within it. If positive, contrary will prevails, society no longer wishes to exist in fact, and is bound to fall. If no social will is present, society exists only accidentally, that is, it does not exist as a result of any force it receives from the spirit of its members, but solely as a result of the material solidity of its constitution — in other words, through its inertia. It stands like a stiffened corpse ready to fall at the first blow.
98. A collective, favourable will is essential, therefore, for society. In other words, the will resulting from all individual wills must actually want whatever forms the existence and internal power of society, rather than the contrary. This is the first problem facing political theorists.
99. Things, or beings which form the matter or instrument used by the human spirit for the advantage or disadvantage of society are indifferent considered in themselves. Nevertheless, they exercise great pressure on human beings, despite the free activity of the human spirit which they do not always direct but certainly draw in one direction rather than another.
100. Although free will is not destroyed by attractions exercised on it, we have to bear in mind (when forming a judgment about the probability of human actions) that we have no other basis for our calculation. We must believe it more probable, therefore, that human beings will do whatever action results from greater pressure from their motives rather than omit that action or do something else. Moreover, a merely probable judgment about the actions of an individual becomes more or less certain relative to actions done by a multitude. If the entire population of a nation has strong motives for doing rather than omitting an action, we have to believe it almost morally certain that the majority will agree to do it, even though some individuals, by virtue of the energy of their free will, do not carry it out. The wise political theorist will, therefore, be able to foresee with great accuracy what will occur in a nation. This is the whole foundation and process of political foresight.
101. The objects used by the activity of the human spirit for good or evil in a society are ownership and rights and, more generally, everything that human beings can truly, or as a matter of opinion, look upon as good or evil, as desirable or to be feared. Because of this, the human spirit possesses a twofold relationship with these objects which, although indifferent when considered in themselves, can contribute to the good or evil of society.
102. The first relationship, as we have said, consists in the dominion the spirit has over these objects. Political theory, accompanied no doubt by moral science, has the obligation of teaching how these objects are to be employed to benefit rather than harm society.
103. The second relationship consists in the influence exercised over the human spirit by these same benefits (they do not force people to act, but according to their quantity and position persuade them to move in one direction rather than another). The second obligation of political science, therefore, is to deal with these objects and resolve the following problem: `How can we find in society the best quantity and placement of objects which the human spirit considers good or bad for moving the will of human beings so that all work together for the existence and vigorous life of society?’ This problem is more strictly political than the difficulty already discussed, which investigates the way in which the spirit of the members of society is educated to direct them socially. The first problem cannot be separated from ethics; the second deals with external facts only and with forces which, although they act on the spirit, are considered without reference to its free energy for the sake of reflecting mainly on the spirit`s passivity.
104. Finally, the object of these wills, as they work together either spontaneously or moved and strengthened by external means, is social cohesion or management. At this point, the philosopher of politics has a third problem to solve: `In the light of all unchangeable circumstances, especially natural circumstances, what kind of social management can give a more vital, enduring subsistence to society?’
105. Let us sum up. After the contrasting wills of the social members have confronted and mutually destroyed one another, a single will has to survive in favour of society itself. And precisely because it survives, it can be called `the will of the social body’.
106. After the destruction of individual contrary actions, things which human beings consider good or bad, and hence influence the will and actions of the social body, must all act on this social will with their surviving activity so as to incline it in favour of society and render it suitable to operate with external effect.
107. Finally, those things which, through the energy of the spirit, exercise activity over the social body and mediate between the spirit of the individual and society, should operate favourably rather than unfavourably the existence of society. In other words, they should improve, not worsen the constitution of the State.
Notes
(38) The following passages express vividly the character of the man whom, as we saw, found a great and feared empire. P. 2: `I succeeded in what I undertook because I WANTED TO.' — `For me, the world has always existed in FACT, not by RIGHT.' — p. 6: `I studied war not on paper, but on the ground. I was under fire for the first time in a little confrontation with riflemen on the face of Mont-Genèvre. — It seemed clear to me that neither side had any intention of achieving a conclusion as a result of the shooting. They fired because their conscience told them to do so; it was simply what was expected of them in combat. This COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY OBJECT depressed me, etc.' — p. 7. `I have given an account of my first experience under fire — it was this which initiated me into the secret of war. I realised that it was easier than one thought to defeat the enemy, and that the great art consists in unhesitating action, and above all in attempting only decisive movements. This is the way to raise soldiers' morale.' — p. 9. `Perhaps I was the only person in the army with some end in view; but my desire was to make this the end of everything. — I busied myself only in examining the enemy's position and our own. I compared his moral means and ours. I saw that we had them all, and he had nothing. His expedition was a feeble brainwave, a disaster he should have foreseen; and there is nothing more debilitating than staring defeat in the face.' — p. 40. `We needed MORE THAN A HALF of Europe if the balance were to fall on our side. I was unable to provide myself with such a weight except by virtue of the law favouring the strongest, the only law to make inroads amongst the nations. Necessity demanded that I become the strongest. — I never had any choice about the decisions I had to take; events always dictated them. Danger was never far away.' — p. 66. `My ambition never consisted in taking a few square miles of territory, but in making my cause triumph' (MS written at St. Helena).