Society And its Purpose
Book 1 - Society
CHAPTER 2
The social bond
37. We must now consider more closely the nature of the two bonds. We begin with the social bond. Two or more persons associate with the intention of obtaining some good for themselves, which is the end of society. This good must be sought for the advantage of all the persons forming society, who otherwise could not be called members of society. Associated persons, therefore, together form a moral person (of which the individuals are only parts) whose good is that sought by society. This good is the very end of society. Each of the associated persons by the very nature of society, desires the good of all, because each desires the social end, which is common to all. I call this desire of each member for the good of the whole body social benevolence.
38. One important consequence of this, which does honour to human society, is that a moral element is present in the very essence of society, because the constitutive principle of moral virtue is also, generally speaking, the constitutive principle of society.
39. The principle of moral virtue, simply stated, is:(5) `Respect person as end; do not use person as a means for yourself.’ The object of virtue therefore is always the dignity of the person, and here precisely lies the origin of human association. We have said that every human society is simply the union of two or more persons undertaken with the intention of obtaining a common advantage. All the persons in this union together have the role of end, and the advantage expected from the association is applied equally to all. This consideration recalls Plato’s sublime statement that `without justice there could not be even a society of highwaymen united to rob travellers.’
40. Highwaymen are certainly unjust towards travellers but not among themselves. Their injustice affects only those outside their society, not the members themselves. They are not unjust in so far as they are associated. If they treat the members of their own society treacherously, they are treating them as outsiders, not as members. If their unjust actions affect only a particular companion, they set him outside the society; if their actions affect all members, the society disintegrates.
41. For this reason, `to set someone outside the benefit of law’ means `to deprive him of social benefits’, that is, to separate him from society and consider him as no longer belonging to it. Hence the excellence of the social bond: where it is present, there is no injustice; injustice begins where it is absent.
42. We will be more convinced of this if we look again at societies of villains, such as bandits or highwaymen or pirates. In my opinion, we find not only an element of justice in a society of assassins or pirates, as Plato observed, but a principle of humanity. In the hearts of such unfortunate people a spark of humanity still burns: they defend each other when attacked, share common dangers, and in a fraternal spirit happily divide the booty. Affectionately and tenderly they remember their fallen companions. One poet has them say:
At the climax of the feasting
When the red wine passes round
Memories of our dead companions
Mingle with the spoils we share.
Memories flicker on sad faces
Mindful of once happy friends.
43. A society of pirates is unjust only towards non-members. But let us suppose they add many persons to their company. From that moment these persons are no longer the object of their injustice; as numbers increase, injustice diminishes. A still greater increase in numbers would turn the band of robbers into a tiny nation. The republic of San Marino is an example of this. Still more people are added and the group now extends its power not by minor attacks on land and sea transport but by formal wars; in other words, by conquest. Injustice necessarily becomes more limited and restricted as the association grows, because all those who become members of the society are sheltered from its injustice. Ultimately, we would have a Roman republic! As history shows, the origin of our society of highwaymen and pirates is precisely the origin of this legislator of nations and powerful mistress of the world. In Rome’s case, Romulus was leader of the highwaymen and pirates.
This society of villains therefore is unjust only because it is limited — remove its limits and it at once loses its injustice. We are justly horrified at its beginnings, but only because it was too small. We call it a band of robbers, whose action was murder, whose heroism was ferocity. But as the society grows, its nature changes before our eyes. Unnoticeably it is given other names, becomes a city,(6) a fatherland, kingdom, republic and empire. Its undertakings are now called wars, and the men who fought, conquered and perished in those wars, are brave and heroic; their glory in human eyes becomes pure, sublime and greatly to be envied.
44. These observations are not without value if they help to temper the ill-considered anger of those who oppose contemporary societies because they believe injustice presided over their birth. We cannot immediately conclude that an extended and firmly established society is unjust simply because its origin was unjust. As they grow, societies sometimes have an extraordinary capacity for continually cleansing themselves of the vileness in which they originated. As I have explained, a moral element is essentially present in every society. This element, small at the outset, later develops and increases along with the society. As it expands, it marvellously separates and rejects all that is vile and despicable in the social body.
45. Two causes explain how Romulus’ band of brigands changed into a republic whose laws exhibited justice and equity never previously seen in the world: 1. they practised justice among themselves, that is, they formed a true society; and 2. they increased their dominion immensely through prudence and strength. This increase in dominion was an increase in their justice. They were not content merely to extend their power by land and sea; their aim was to widen and extend their association. Normally, they treated their allies not as mere tributaries but as associates, giving conquered peoples the rights and advantages of Roman citizenship.(7)
46. Some may regard as too absolute my proposition that the expansion of a society goes hand in hand with its purification from elements of injustice and that consequently universality renders it entirely just. Objectors say that the inclusion of all human beings in a society would not make it just, if the intended end were itself not upright. The objection seems solid enough, but collapses if we pay careful attention to what I have said.
47. I maintained that the nature of society requires those who form it to enjoy within it the personal dignity of end, and that this moral element is inherent in every society. We know that if a society seeks a less than upright end, it must do so by violating personal dignity, which alone makes something less than upright; in other words, the person, who must be respected as end, is used as a means. I have reduced all injustice and lack of uprightness to this.(8) It is clear, therefore, that if a society proposes an end irreconcilable with uprightness, it either partakes less, or not at all, in the essence of society. It is also clear that giving the quality of end to persons associated together is precisely a characteristic proper to the social bond. It follows that this bond contains nothing wrong or unjust; everything wrong and unjust lies outside the ambit of personal association. Again, if all persons were associated and society had become truly universal, all would be respected; the dignity of each person would be inviolable. Finally, it is absurd and repugnant that a universal society should exist which pursues a non-upright end; this is only possible if there is at least one person whose dignity may be offended. This however is impossible unless some person is used solely as means. But in this case, such a person would be excluded from the society. This is contrary to the hypothesis; we would be dealing with a non-universal society which did not include all persons under every respect.
48. It cannot be denied that when the universality of a society is understood strictly, no intelligent, personal being can be excluded from it. Such a society must include God himself. If the supreme and greatest intelligence were excluded, the society could certainly have a non-upright end, because a person whose dignity could be violated would remain outside its sphere.
49. We can only stand in wonder before the mind of Cicero who, in his meditation on social perfection, conceived and described a truly universal society: `This entire world is to be considered simply as a city common to both gods and human beings’.(9) This sublime concept constitutes the basis of Christendom, which is simply a divine realisation of the Ciceronian city-state.
Notes
(5) To avoid extending this book indefinitely, I have to take some things as proven. But the proof of everything I affirm can be found in my previously published works. When need arises, I will refer to the principal passages of these works. Cf. in this instance, Principles of Ethics, 66–68, 101–105, and Storia comparativa dei sistemi morali, c. 8, art. 3, §6.
(6) Certainly, not all the early associations Cicero describes as: `Associations of human beings, later called city-states' (Pro Sext., 42), were legitimate and holy.
(7) Some authors are excessively hostile and unjust towards the Romans — the modern practice it would seem; others see the republic as the type of all virtues — as they did in the past. But both exaggerate. Nevertheless, I think Gravina's words about the Roman empire contain a good deal of truth. The empire, he says `spread most profitably throughout the whole world as a result of its growing humanity.' He goes on: `The Romans made slaves only of the enemies of humanity; only those who rejected the laws of reason were ENSLAVED. — They allowed the Greeks and other cultured peoples to live according to their own laws, demanding only SOCIETY in arms and counsel, not SLAVERY. When they set out to rule, they used their powers and possessions for UNIVERSAL COMMUNION in the law of nations, for the spread of reasonable living and for the improvement of the human race' (Orig. juris civil., bk. 2, c. 16). — This wise, human policy was pursued by the Romans not only through a kind of good instinct; it was also formulated by writers during the Republic, and taken as a principle by their politicians. Cicero is perfectly clear about this: `The principal foundation of our dominion, and the enhancement of the name of Rome, was undoubtedly due to Romulus, the principal founder of this city. He taught, by means of the Sabine treaty, that the State must grow even by accepting its very enemies. Our ancestors, following his authority and example, always provided others with some share and communion in the city-state' (Pro Corn. Balbo, n. 31). Tacitus himself valued highly this constant maxim of Roman policy. In his opinion, its absence amongst the Spartans and Athenians accounted for their fall: `Although the Lacedemonians and Athenians were powerfully armed, their sole cause of ruin was to treat those they conquered as foreigners. But our founder, Romulus, was wise enough to consider as citizens in the evening many people who had been enemies in the morning' (Annal, bk. 11).
(8) Cf. PE, 101–105.
(9) De Leg., bk. 2, c. 2.