Society And its Purpose
Book 1 - Society
CHAPTER 9
Social order
111. Differences or inequalities among members arise from the intimate nature of society. As we have seen, the two fundamental laws of every society provide an explanation for social inequality and indicate its various kinds. We begin by considering the second law: `Each member has to receive as his share a part of the good achieved through association; this share will be in proportion to the contribution he makes to the society.’
112. This law supposes a twofold inequality between the members:
1. inequality in the quantity of what each person has contributed;
2. inequality in the right to participate to some degree in social advantages.
This is a consequence of the first inequality.
Such inequalities would not exist in a society where each member places in communion the same portion of good as the other members, that is, the same quantity of means designed to achieve the social end. In theory inequalities would disappear if those associated were considered as abstract rather than real persons. In other words, persons would be considered as members(30) and, if I may be permitted the phrase, as the very shares they bring to the society on entry. Social persons resulting from such abstraction are rendered totally equal in what they contribute and in what they expect to receive; everything placed in common in this way is presumed divided into equal shares. Many social persons and shares can, however, be united in a single real person and thus give rise to the inequality we have indicated. To imagine that real persons, members of society, were all necessarily equal would be an error rising from a misunderstanding of the social bond.(31)
113. The nature of society necessarily draws other inequalities in its wake. First, a society always needs administration. By social administration I mean a co-ordinating principle that directs and harmonises all the social forces to the end of the society. Even if associated persons place in communion some determined reality — some social capital — this does not produce anything of itself until it is administered. Moreover, even if it did produce of itself the good sought from the association, this would have to be harvested and divided amongst the members according to their individual contributions. If the members contributed with their labour, this in turn has to be directed to the single end intended by the society. By `social administration’ we mean all these functions taken together.
114. Of its nature, administration is a right inherent to the members who compose the society. However, the need for unity and ability ensure that one or more persons are entrusted with the office of administration in the society. This gives rise to the idea of minister or president or executive — the three titles mean more or less the same — each of which is essentially different from the idea of member. This is easily understood if we consider that the society could, when first formed, choose a non-member as its minister, president or executive.
115. Is the relationship between the administrator and his society one of service, or of sociality? This is an important question in which it is very easy to err by attempting a simple answer to a twofold problem. The relationship between administrator and society is a complicated matter which cannot be resolved without prior analysis.
116. I note first that the administrator could be accepted and considered as a member if he posits his administrative work as his portion of social capital. In this case, the labour with which he contributes to the attainment of the end of the society should be justly calculated relative to the contributions of others. The administrator will then have a right to a share in the benefits corresponding to the value put on his work.
Administrators, therefore, can be either members or salaried workers. The former would without doubt be united to their society by the social bond; no relationship between these administrators and the society would reflect that of bond-servant and master. It is true that administrators would work for the advantage of the society, but this is the case with every member who supports a society by his own work. The relationship, therefore, is not in any way servile; it is entirely social, despite its rigorous obligations. As we have seen, obligation, which does not constitute a state of servitude, is necessarily connected with social freedom.
The administrator-member cannot be dismissed from his post unless provision for this has been agreed at the foundation of the society. If there is no agreement to this effect, he is obliged to carry out his duty like all the other members, but has the right to the administration as long as the society lasts, just as every member has the right to be a member in accordance with the conditions of his enrolment. It is wrong to believe that administration is always, and by its very nature, a servant bonded to the social body, and that the social body (the people) is always master of the administration.
117. A salaried administrator, not a member, is bound to the society by a facio ut des contract. This is not of its nature a bond of servitude, but a contract between two free persons whose mutual relationship is proper to the state of nature — when this is understood as the `state prior to social bonding’. It is true that the administrator is obliged to administer the society fittingly towards its end; it is also true, however, that the society is obliged to pay him the sum agreed for his work. Both sides have obligations and rights. This is not so when the bond is that of seigniory and servitude: in this case, the master, as end, has only rights; the bond-servant, as means, has only duties.
Note carefully that even the salaried administrator of a society, unlike a bond-servant, is not obliged in any way to act according to the arbitrary desire of the individual members or of the body as a whole. His sole obligation is to act according to the nature and end of the society. He is not a person dependent upon another’s whim, but one who exercises a specific office determined by the nature of the thing in question. As such he is a minister.
It is true that the salaried administrator can be dismissed at the society’s pleasure if no term has been fixed for the duration of his appointment, but it is also the case that he has the right to renounce his salary when he pleases, and leave his post. In other words, a bilateral contract is made on the basis of perfect equality between two sides. These observations enable us to clarify the nature of the bonds tieing an administrator to a society. Some other observations must now be made about the nature of the office of social administrator.
118. As we have said, the administrative office consists in ordering and directing harmoniously all the social means (whether goods placed in communion or personal work) to the attainment of the end for which the society was set up. It follows that to this extent the society, in electing the administrator, has abdicated its power, and is obliged to submit to administrative decisions. Moreover, because the members’ work and labour are part of the social means, the members must in the nature of things obey the directions of the administrator. Not to do so would mean impeding him in his office and contradicting the reason for his appointment. I exclude, of course, cases of abuse of office by the administrator. My only aim at present is to consider the nature of the administrative office without raising further complications.
119. The concept of society includes rather than excludes the obligation of obedience to the society’s administrator. If the administrator happens to be a member, this implies another kind of accidental inequality among the members. Such obedience, however, is not servitude. There is no question of obeying anyone’s whim, but of submitting to the social order established by the administrator of the society. This submission is undertaken for the sake of the members themselves who are end, not means; it is not done for others, as it would be if obedience were accepted under the title of servitude. Obedience to the administrator of the society does not in any way entail making oneself a means; on the contrary, no member can be end unless he is obedient.
120. If we suppose a society to be established under clear agreement so that all the members know, and desire to carry out, their duty, the concept of society would require, besides the members, only the kind of administrator we have discussed. His task would be to co-ordinate, in the best possible way,(32) all the social means to the attainment of the end of the society. However, the defects to which a society is subject either in its foundation or relative to the dispositions of its members renders other provisions and offices necessary.
121. First, social pacts may be ambiguous. In this case, the members must discuss the matter and resolve the equivocation. If this is impossible, they have a moral obligation to agree upon the election of a prudent person with whose help they can reach an amicable conclusion. The office of this prudent person or judge, who either alone or with the members determines the interpretation of the social pacts and consequently perfects the establishment of a society, can be permanent or temporary. This office also is of its nature extraneous to society, and demands all the obedience necessary to enable the members to reach the friendly agreement for which the office was instituted.
122. We deal next with offices made necessary in a society through the ignorance or improbity of its members. We are not speaking about ignorance concerning the way in which members combine, as they agreed, to attain the end of the society. It is the responsibility of the administrator to teach members who are ignorant of their duty in this respect. Here the administrator holds implicitly the office of teacher; the members in their turn are obliged to acknowledge their own position as his disciples. This provides an additional reason for social submission and obedience, not for servitude.
The ignorance we wish to discuss concerns the rights and burdens of the members. Such ignorance can cause disagreement amongst them. In this case, they have a moral obligation to reach an understanding and an amicable settlement of their differences. If this is impossible, they are then morally obliged to choose a judge to whom they entrust the entire solution of the case.
I say that they are morally obliged to do this because there is a moral obligation upon all human beings `to arrive at a peaceful settlement to their differences without violence.’ This moral obligation, besides pertaining to the universal ethic preceding the existence of societies, is also generated by society itself which imposes on its members the duty of combining in the best possible way to attain its end. Every act of anger and violence is directly contrary to this duty.
123. Can the differences arising between an administrator and his society be decided by the same judge? This is certainly the case of the administrator who, as a member, takes part in the choice of the judge. It is not the case if the administrator is only a salaried official. Here, the question must be entrusted to a judge chosen by both parties.
124. Let us return to the judge whom the members have chosen to settle their differences. He must be chosen unanimously (unless the contrary was agreed at the foundation of the society). Where a single person is right, his notion is worth more than the mistake of all the others put together.
Consequently, it must never be believed that the judge chosen unanimously is representative of the social majority, and that his decision is equivalent to that of the majority. This would be a great mistake. The social majority is not of itself the judge of the rights and the duties of the members except in the case where such a compromise has come about through an agreement in which all have expressed their own opinions and the judge has been chosen unanimously. In contrary cases, the majority is not the judge. Note that we are dealing consistently with questions of good faith that occur through ignorance, not malice, on the part of the members. These questions, we maintain, must be decided by a unanimously chosen judge. Moreover, each member has the moral duty to agree with the others about a given person for this office, when the office is necessary. The judge, therefore, does not represent the majority, but all members without exception. Better, he represents impersonal reason and justice which all members, governments and societies must obey.
The entire society and all the members are in a state of submission to, and harmonious support of this personage entrusted with the termination of dissensions arising in good faith and through ignorance. Again, this does not constitute any kind of servitude.
125. Up to this point, we have dealt with questions and different opinions arising between upright members in good faith, and with the necessity of a judge for the good handling of social needs. We have not seen any necessity for material force because in our hypothesis the society and its members are unable to oppose the execution of the judge’s decisions about ending their social disagreements. Matters change, however, in cases where the members disregard their duty through ill-will or social disobedience. Clearly in the case of ill-will (disobedience), the prescriptions of the administrator or the judge will not be carried out spontaneously. Sanctions will be needed; justice will have to be sustained by force.
126. The uses of social force are: 1. to constrain reluctant members to obey social administration; 2. to constrain them, if necessary, to choose a judge and accept his decision about their disagreements; 3. to constrain them to compensate the society and its members for the damage caused to either through their disregard of social obligations; 4. to safeguard the society from the harm they threaten.
127. But to whom of its nature does the use of force belong? To the society as a whole(33) or to the majority of the members? Generally speaking, not to the society as a whole, nor to the majority or minority of the members, nor to the individual members; it pertains to the party which has justice on its side. If the majority were wrong, and the minority right, the legitimate use of force would, according to social right, rest with the latter. It could happen that a single member were opposed by all the others. If their intention were to inflict injury and injustice on that member, the use of force would pertain to him, not to them [App., no. 2].
Note, however, what has been said: `In the case of any disagreement between individual members, or between two groups of members, or between a member and the society, or between the society and its government, there is a moral duty incumbent upon the parties in the dispute to seek a peaceful solution amongst themselves or, if that is impossible, to submit their views to a judge,(34) unanimously chosen, whose decision they will accept.’ Any party refusing to take part in setting up this tribunal, which has to decide de bono et equo (what is good and equitable), or refusing to accept its decision once the tribunal has been established, is de facto guilty of negligence against the social, moral duty we have described. The other party can, therefore, use force against its opponent. Such cases could be foreseen when a society is established, and a stable chief of social enforcement could be unanimously appointed.
128. This office would not be established in order to act according to the whim of the members. In such a case, the chief enforcement officer would be a bond-servant of the members, whether united or divided. Fulfilling a determined office is not, however, bond-service; a determined office is constituted by the nature of things, not by human whim.
129. The duties of the chief social-enforcement officer are therefore: 1. to constrain the disagreeing members to take part in the choice of a judge, if no one were chosen when the society was established and some now refuse to make a choice; 2. to constrain the unwilling to carry out what the judge decides.
If disagreement arises between the society and its administrator, or the judge, the dispute must be settled peacefully by the choice of another judge, if one has not already been determined at the establishment of the society. Here again the chief enforcement officer should constrain unwilling parties to choose a judge and carry out his decisions. If, finally, the officer abuses his position, a state of war exists between him and the society. There is no doubt that precautions to avoid this catastrophe have to be taken at the establishment of the society. This is the most difficult problem in constituting a society.
130. The judge and the chief social-enforcement officer can be either extraneous to the society, or belong to it. What has been said about the administrator of the society must also be applied to them.
131. Social order, therefore, supposes three primary offices: administrator, judge and enforcement officer. All these are free offices, not bond-servants of the society. On the other hand, the society is not a bond-servant of any of these office-holders, although it submits to them and is obliged, by its intimate nature, to obey all three, which are as it were the three principal wheels on which it moves. The union of these three primary offices is normally called `government of society’.
Notes
(30) Roman right distinguished human beings and persons. All people were human beings, but not all were persons. A person was defined as: `a human being considered in a certain state.' `State' meant `a quality by reason of which human beings made use of different RIGHT'. In other words, members of the great Roman association were considered as persons; non-persons were all those not belonging to this association. A bond-servant, for instance, was not recognised legally as possessing the state and condition of member. Consequently he was aproswpoV (Theophil. I. Inst. de stipul. ser.), `a person not having laws' (Cassiodor., Var., bk. 6, c. 8). He was listed amongst the `THINGS on the estate' (Bk. 32, §2, D. de legat. 2) and considered as `nothing and dead' (Bk. 32, and 209, D. de reg. jur.) precisely because he had no place in society. — Every limited society necessarily gives rise to such a difference between bond-servants and free persons. Thus, the world requires the institution of a universal society from which no one is excluded and in which all are free. This was the work of Christ.
(31) This is overlooked by those who favour a universal franchise in representative governments. It is not the real person who must be represented, but what each person contributes. Representing real persons instead of social persons or the shares by which each citizen takes his place in society is a principle of apparent equality, but of real injustice and inequality.
(32) Requiring the impossible from people is unjust. Thus it is unjust to claim that the administrator should absolutely speaking work in the best way. No one is able to discover what is absolutely the best. A society can and must require that its administrator exercise his office diligently and earnestly, and in the best possible way, but only relative to his capacity, not absolutely speaking. He should take those decisions which, in good faith, he believes are the best for attaining the social end. The society has no right to require more than this.
(33) Note carefully that we are speaking about society in general. There is not the slightest doubt that in our civil societies the use of force belongs to government alone, whose function it is to protect and support justice.
(34) It is obvious that `judge' here refers to an office, not an individual. If the parties did not agree on a single individual, they could each choose one for themselves and form a tribunal. There could also be several subordinate tribunals, for example, tribunals of first instance, appeal and final instance. Whatever method is used in organising the office of judgment, we include it all, for brevity's sake, under the single word `judge'.