Society And its Purpose
Book 1 - Society
CHAPTER 13
Invisible and visible society
149. We must examine more closely the nature of society in general.
Human beings, the basic elements of society, are made up of two parts: one internal and invisible, the other external and visible. Similarly, there are two parts to every human society, the invisible and the visible, the internal and the external.
Two kinds of bonds, internal and invisible, external and visible, correspond to these two parts of human society. The former draw together what Leibniz called `the republic of souls’; the latter bind together external society, which falls under our senses.
We must now explore the relationship and the connection between invisible and visible societies, which are as it were the soul and body of human society.
150. In order to do this, we first concentrate on the elementary principles of society, that is, the human individual, and on the union and correspondence which exists between the spirit and body forming the individual. The exterior part of the human being, that is, the animal body, has a twofold relationship with the interior part, that is, the spirit: 1. an active relationship, which consists in being able to manifest through external signs the impressions and modifications of the internal part of the soul; 2. a passive relationship, which consists in being suitable for receiving the impressions of the external things of bodies, and transmitting them to the internal part. This twofold relationship can also be observed between external and internal society. External society must manifest internal society, and at the same time convey to the latter all that takes place exteriorly.
151. We must pause now to consider briefly both relationships, active and passive, between the two societies, visible and invisible. We examine first the active, then the passive relationship.
The active relationship, by which the external aspect of a society becomes a truthful and faithful reflection of the internal dispositions of souls, must be considered as a quality necessary to the perfection of human society. It can even be called the constitutive law of human society. Indeed, if a society were simply external, it would not differ in any way from a union of inanimate, mobile things; if the external presentation were false, only an apparent society would exist — it would be a fact, but a fact without right, which of itself is always nothing.
Note that human beings consent to live in society only because they suppose, generally speaking, that its exterior corresponds to the interior of those with whom they live and associate. The very people who delude themselves about making their fortune by deception and lying are in the end victims of their own delusion; they know very well that society is founded upon the law of truthfulness. If this were not the case, it would be impossible to deceive anyone; the act would not be accepted as a manifestation of the truth. It would, therefore, `be impossible to imagine an external society unless its members held that everything external possessed of its nature a real capacity for manifesting what is internal’. Although degrees of mutual diffidence are possible in a society, mistrust cannot increase beyond certain limits. At some point the society would self-destruct; it would be rendered impossible.
We must therefore acknowledge the following as a constitutive law of human society: `External society must be representative of the internal society of its members.’ Consequently, `external society will be better constituted in so far as the external bonds between human beings are sincere, and faithfully correspond with similar bonds or affections of spirit.’ On the other hand, `if the external, material part of society does not reflect something internal and spiritual, the society’s appearance is only a chimera; it cannot last. It is contrary to nature that fiction should endure; it is a vain shadow without a body, a fragile canvas sketched without consistency and solidity because it has no truth.’(49)
Notes
(49) The internal bonds of society are: 1. rights, 2. social affections. The first are ideal, the latter, real. The external bonds of society are: 1. external laws and all the external acts relating to government and governed; 2. ways of life. External bonds correspond to rights, and produce their effect chiefly in the order of intellectual things; ways of life correspond to affections, and produce their effect in the order of real things.
Certain civil societies are furnished with far fewer external bonds than others. Examples of these are federations of States which constitute a nation composed of two or more nations. The federal government's action is limited to certain general objects, and persons in different States have no common way of life. The author of De la démocratie en Amérique rightly says of the government of the United States: `The Union is an ideal nation that does not exist except in the spirits composing it. Only the intelligence can uncover its extent and its limits' (t. 2, c. 8, p. 281, 2nd ed.).
As we shall see in the following chapter, exterior society forms or sometimes maintains the interior. If however a way of life and forceful government is lacking, internal society is weakened. For example, as long as the citizens of Rome could be contained within the walls of the city, communal living and a common way of life was a source of unity in their interior society. When Roman citizenship was extended to all subject peoples, the city (civitas) became something ideal, that is, something embraced by mind and law, and not enclosed by external walls. Montesquieu offers the following reflections on this extension of Roman citizenship: `When the peoples of Italy became citizens of Rome, every city brought in its wake its own characteristics, its own interests and its own dependence upon some great protector.
The divided city-state no longer formed a single whole. Being a citizen of Rome was now a kind of fiction; the `citizen' no longer had the same magistrates, temples, walls, gods, or burial places as Rome, nor did he look upon Rome with the same eyes, or have the same love for the fatherland; feeling for Rome existed no longer' (Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains, et de leur décadence. Chap. 9).