Society And its Purpose

Book 2 - The End of Society

CHAPTER 5

The distinction between the final and proximate end of societies

204. Summarising what has been said, we see that human beings form societies for the sole purpose of obtaining a good end. Only good can be the end of a society. If human beings erroneously take what is evil as good, we have to say that their will is neither a social will nor a true will of human nature, but a deluded will of the human person in contradiction with the will of human nature.(64) The end of every society therefore is a true good, not an illusion of good, which is not good. Moreover, it must be a true good for those who associate. As we said, the true, final aim of every society is, by the nature of society itself, true human good, to which humanity tends of itself. The human person also tends to this good, provided he is not deluded and has not willingly made himself incapable of judging the real, proper object of his desires. We also investigated the general nature of the true human good which must be the continual aim of every association; it consists, as we found, not in passing pleasure but in constant contentment of spirit. Finally, the analysis of this contentment showed it to be composed of two elements: a real good independent of human freedom, and a free judgment of the human will. Such is the teaching about the end common to all societies.

205. But it is also clear that if all societies have a common, necessary end, each society must have its own end to distinguish it from others. In fact, if all the individuals who unite in some way in society basically seek their own contentment, they use different means for obtaining it. It is precisely these means which distinguish societies and constitute the proper end of each.

In the stoic teaching, which makes human contentment depend solely on the free judgment of the human will, the different societies binding human beings had no reason for existence precisely because all contentment depends on the human individual, irrespective of every association and external circumstance.

In my teaching, according to which human contentment depends partly on the efficacy of the will and partly on something real and necessary, we see why an association seeks this real good, a good desired by the human spirit and so necessary for the spirit’s true contentment.

206. It is true that opinion plays a very large role in determining this real good, which influences our satisfaction and contentment. Such a role was precisely the argument used by the Stoics to maintain that all external goods are the man-made effects of opinion and the result of the free judgment we make on them. With this judgment we form the opinion that some things are good, and that others are not good,or are evil.

As I have said, I agree that this teaching, although taken too far, contains a deep insight. The Stoics certainly glimpsed the distinction between absolute and relative good, a distinction which only Christianity brought into full light. They saw nothing absolute in anything external; everything was relative. Consequently everything was subject to human opinion, which turns into good or evil whatever it capriciously chooses.(65) But what the Stoics did not know, and what Christianity alone has revealed to the human race, is that besides feelable good there is a real, absolute good over which opinion has no power at all, a good which is most real, immutable and lacking every evil.

207. At first sight, this sublime truth of Christianity seems open to the objection: `The stoic theory is seen to be unsocial because the only real good it acknowledges is that constituted by the individual’s free judgment that he is happy; this judgment renders all association inexplicable and aimless. On the other hand Christian theory recognises only one association, whose end is the absolute good not formed by the free judgment of the will nor by opinion.’

208. This apparently true objection falls when the Christian theory is fully understood. The absolute good which Christianity conveys to all people satisfies of itself all the desires of person and human nature to the highest degree. But this supreme good does not prevent the existence of lesser goods in tune with human nature. Christianity does not deny that they are goods and pleasures; it only denies that contentment necessarily consists in them. If we add to these ordered goods and pleasures appropriate to natural human needs the free, spontaneous judgment with which we deem ourselves content, a state of contentedness certainly arises.

These states can vary in kind and value, but there is no doubt that each of them, rooted in an abundance of natural goods free from disorder, is infinitely removed from the contentment produced by the supreme good, in the possession of which Christianity places the fullness of beatitude. We only need to clarify when and under what conditions the judgment of ourselves as content can be true and spontaneous, not deceptive or forced. This judgment, it may be said, can take place only when we are conscious of our own innocence. In fact the contrary is true: although we can openly confess and try to persuade ourselves of our happiness even when we experience the remorse of guilt, we lie externally to others, and internally to ourselves.

The condition for contentment laid down by both Christian teaching and philosophy is this: when the good appropriate to human nature contains no disorder, it can constitute the matter of natural contentment, provided our human spirit feels no guilty remorse, which hinders true contentedness. Hence, the Christian theory accepts all upright societies and recognises as real some limited good different from absolute good, although the power of the former alone cannot produce contentment in human beings.

209. Contentment, therefore, the common end of all societies, is required by the general nature of association. Particular good, which must form the matter of contentment, constitutes the aim of individual societies.

The end common to all societies can be called the remote end, while the proper end of a society can be called the proximate end.

210. Let us conclude. Every society necessarily has two ends: 1. a remote end, common to all human association consisting in true human good, that is, contentment of spirit; 2. a proximate end, proper to a particular society and constituted by the good and pleasure which furnish matter for the spontaneous, internal judgment that produces and posits human contentment.

Notes

(64) The distinction between human person and human nature is of the utmost importance; it is the key to opening many secrets of humanity. I refer the reader to what I have written on the matter in AMS, bk. 4.

(65) In the next book I will deal with `the way in which opinion exercises this extraordinary power over things'. The question is as important for psychology as it is for moral science and politics.