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Society And its Purpose

Book 2 - The End of Society

CHAPTER 14

Independence

263. Let us continue to clarify ideas. We have placed the concept of social freedom in the individual member of society considered as end, not means. The sole and ultimate purpose of everything done by the individual and by the social body is the good of the individual himself. Hence he cannot be used for any purpose; everything is used for his purpose, for the attainment of his end.

The concept of independence differs from that of social freedom. Properly speaking, social freedom is found only in society; independence is of its nature extra-social, outside society.

In society the individual is always free, even when dependent on government and bound to obedience. We have shown that obedience (the same can be said about dependence) is not subservience if dependence and obedience are regulated by the nature of things, not by arbitrary human judgment, and if the purpose of the dependence and obedience is the advantage of the very people who depend and obey. Human beings, however, because endowed with certain inalienable rights (which we discussed in the preceding chapters), always exist in a sphere where they are independent of others. These rights define the sphere of their independence. Social freedom and extra-social independence are, therefore, distinct.

264. We must note carefully that the word `independence’ is habitually used in the bad sense of unacceptable insubordination to legitimate authority. We must also realise that it is very easy for our self-love, that is, our hidden wickedness of heart, to over-extend the sphere of our primitive, inalienable rights in order to extend our sphere of independence. This renders us violently unjust towards society.

Finally, in this very delicate and dangerous matter of independence, a most noble, moral duty forbids us to constitute ourselves absolute judges in our own cause. Probably there is no moral duty more salutary and necessary than this for human society. It obliges us, in accord with the principles of humility and Christian diffidence, to resort to the judgment of the most upright, authoritative people in our endeavour to know the exact limit of our primitive rights.

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